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The U.S. Fleet’s era of high living has ®ndcd along with the quest for the Holy fail of the 600-ship/15 carrier battle ®rouP Navy. The fleet has declined by s°me 2% per year since fiscal year 1985, he Reagan administration’s high-water h'ark in its crusade to make the United tates strong again. The Navy will share he fate of other services in the years ahead^—tight budgets. Secretary of De- ense Dick Cheney, discussing the avy’s $91.8 billion share of the Bush administration’s total $278.3 billion fis- eal year 1992 Defense Department bud- Set request, described the real pain to come: “ . . . this means a real decline in budget authority of 1% below FY 1991, l2% below FY 1990, and 24% below FY
By Scott C. Truver
1985 .... In FY 1996, the cumulative real decline since FY 1985 will reach 34%.”'
This translates into fewer ships, aircraft, personnel, and less materiel available to fulfill the Navy’s and Marine Corps’s missions. The number of battle- force ships will decline from 545 to 451 and the number of available carrier battle groups (CVBGs) will decrease from 14 to
- between 1991-1995. Similar reductions will occur in carrier air wings: from
- active and 2 reserve wings in fiscal year 1991 to 11 active and 2 reserve wings in 1995. By 2000-2005 the Navy may have no more than 400 ships and 10 carrier battle groups, if current trends continue unabated. Less may not be beautiful, but it is clearly the wave of the future for U.S. defense strategy, policy, and operations, as was understood by Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Frank B. Kelso, II when he said:
“This is not, however, a risk-free strategy. There should be no doubt that, if the continued decline in Navy funding, force structure, modernization, and personnel persists, we will reach a point where this nation will no longer be capable of maintaining the maritime superiority so vital to the support of our global interests .... From today’s perspective, I must conclude that we should not drop below the 450 ship level we will reach in
Table 1 Shipbuilding and Conversion (SCN) Programs, Fiscal Years 1990-1997
| FY 1990 | FY 1991 | FY 1992 | FY 1993 | FY 1994 | FY 1995 | FY 1996 | FY 1997 |
New Construction/Class N‘mitz (CVN-68) |
|
|
|
|
| 1 |
|
|
Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) | 5 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 3 |
Ohio (SSBN-726) | 1 | 1 | — | — | — | — | — | — |
Los Angeles (SSN-688) | 1 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
Seawolf (SSN-21) | — | i | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 |
Avenger (MCM-1) | 3 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
Osprey (MHC-51) | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | , 1 | — | — | — |
MHC (Variant) | _ | — | — | — | — | 1 | — | 2 |
Wasp (LHD-1) | — | 1 | — | — | — | — | — | — |
Harpers Ferrv (LSD-49CV) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | — | — | — | — |
LX | — | — | — | — | — . | 1 | — | 1 |
T-AGOR-23 SWATH | 1 | — | — | 1 | 1 | 2 | — | — |
SuPPly (AOE-6) | 1 | — | 1 | — | — | — | — | — |
T-AGOR-24/T-AGS | 3 | — | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | — | — |
AR | _ | . --- | — | — | — | — | 1 | — |
ARS | — | ' -- | — | __ | 1 | — | 2 | — |
Sealift Initiative | — | _ | — | — | — | — | — | — |
lcac | (12) | (12) | (12) | — | — ’ | — | — | — |
SOF Patrol Boats | (7) | — | ' — |
| — | — | — | — |
USCG Icebreakers (WAGB) | 1 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
USCG Patrol Boats (WPB) | (12) | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
Total New Construction | 19 | 10 | 12 | 11 | 9 | 10 | 9 | 7 |
Conversion/CIass CV SLEP | 1 |
| __ | _ |
|
|
|
|
CVN-65 RF/COH | 1 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
Moored Training Ship | 0) | — | — | — | —- | — | — | — |
Cimarron (AO-177 Jumbo) | 1 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
Service Craft | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
Landing Craft | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
Other Costs | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | —- |
Total Conversion | 3 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
TOTAL SCN | 22 | 10 | 12 | 11 | 9 | 10 | 9 | 7 |
Source: Highlights of the FY 199211993 Department of the Navy Budget, February 1991.
1995. To do so would seriously jeopardize our ability to maintain maritime superiority.”2
President Bush outlined the new defense strategy the same day that Iraqi armored forces invaded Kuwait. Speaking at the Aspen Institute on 2 August 1990, the President offered his vision of the new world order and the roles of America’s military forces in helping to preserve regional stability and peace. While recognizing that the Soviet military will remain the number-one concern of U.S. defense planners, Bush indicated that political-military uncertainty and great potential for instability and conflict throughout the world will require forces that can be maintained at high readiness levels to respond rapidly whenever U.S. interests are threatened:
“In an era when threats may emerge with little or no warning, our ability to defend our interests will depend upon our speed and agility. We will need forces that give us global reach. No amount of political change will alter the geographic fact that we are separated from many of our most important allies and interests by thousands of miles of water.”3
Nevertheless, there is significant concern that the fiscal austerity forced on the Navy and its sister services owes more to the fall 1990 White House-Congress budget summit than a sober and comprehensive reassessment of global trends and the need for naval forces. The fiscal 1992— 1995 force-restructuring Cheney announced appears “reverse-engineered” to fit the reality of the budget and not necessarily that of the new world order. Misguided policy decisions may hinder tomorrow’s Beet from satisfying all the operational requirements and commitments placed upon it by America’s political leadership.
1991-1997 Shipbuilding Programs
The President has proposed a fiscal year 1992 Navy shipbuilding and conversion (SCN) program of $8,647 billion, which will fund 12 new-construction ships; for fiscal year 1993, the total requested is $8,298 billion for 11 ships. Throughout the fiscal 1992-1997 Six- year Defense Plan, a total of 58 new ships will be requested, at a projected annual cost of approximately $8.5 billion. Unlike previous plans, which saw the Navy compensate for near-term fiscal constraints by “padding” the out-year accounts with more ships than would other
wise be expected to be funded, the current plan shows annual buys decreasing from 12 in the current year to just 7 ships in fiscal year 1997.
What is most striking about this picture of the future fleet is what is no longer in the plan. The Navy has cancelled the fiscal year 1991 fast combat supply ship (AOE) and oceanographic survey ship (T-AGS) in order to fund fully the fiscal year 1990 and prior year programs within resources already appropriated.4 Other proposed changes in prior-year programs concern the Ohio (SSBN-726)-class/ Trident II ballistic-missile submarine, Ar- leigh Burke (DDG-51)-cIass Aegis destroyer, and the patrol boat, for a total of $144.7 million in SCN transfers. Still other programs, like the Wasp (LHD-1) and the Ohio-class SSBN, have been terminated, while the Seawolf (SSN-21) program has been scaled back significantly. In addition, the $405 million appropriated in fiscal year 1991 to help finance a service-life extension program (SLEP) overhaul for the USS John F. Kennedy (CV-67) will not be used. All things considered, $10.74 billion has been carved from the fiscal year 19921997 SCN programs.5
The proposed Navy budget thus provides for a deployable battle force of 477 ships by the end of fiscal year 1992 and 464 ships by the end of the following year.6 During this period, new ships joining the fleet will include: six Ticonderoga (CG-47)-class Aegis cruisers; four Ar- leigh Burke Aegis destroyers; one nuclear-powered aircraft carrier (CVN); one nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN); seven nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs); three amphibious assault ships; seven mine warfare ships; two fast combat supply ships; three towed-array ocean surveillance ships; and seven Military Sealift Command (MSC) oilers. The addition of these ships will be more than offset by the decommissioning of 87 ships and the transfer of other ships to non-deployable reserve status.
Aircraft Carriers
The Navy maintained for years that 15 deployable aircraft carriers were the minimum essential force” required to meet global commitments. However, 1990 funding constraints compelled the Navy to accept a force of 14 deployable carriers, which will decline to just 12 carriers—with the “deployable” modifier probably discarded—by fiscal year 1995.
The term “deployable” has been used to identify those active carriers ready for operations and those which, even if undergoing a shipyard availability, could be
taken out of the shipyard and deployed to a forward area in a reasonable time-" variously described as no more than 9-12 months. Other active-fleet ships undergoing more extensive and lengthy SLEP availabilities or nuclear ships being refueled along with complex overhauls were considered “non-deployable,” aS also was the USS Lexington (AVT-16E the Navy’s training carrier which could not carry out fleet operations. The Navy's fiscal year 1992 plans reveal a “12 +
1 + 1” force level, with 12 carriers considered deployable, one carrier in a service life extension program or complex overhaul, and one carrier designated as a training carrier—14 active carriers, only 12 of which are truly “deployable.”
According to observers within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the future standard of measure will be available carriers, regardless of their “deployable” status. Hence, given a force level of only 12 carriers by 1995, the Navy should consider no more than 11 decks to be “deployable.” This affects forward- deployment patterns and maintenance schedules, as it may take some seven carriers, for example, to keep one carrier continuously on station in the Arabian Sea/Gulf of Oman, as the post-Desert Storm requirements for regional stability may dictate.
The Navy plans to decommission the 47-year-old USS Midway (CV-41), after she returns to San Diego from her Desert Storm combat operations. The Midway may be placed in a “ready reserve” status to serve as a possible training carrier. Also in fiscal year 1991, the USS Independence (CV-62) is scheduled to become the Japan-homeported carrier, and the Lexington will finally be retired after 49 years of service. In fiscal year 1992, the USS Forrestal (CV-59) is scheduled to become the Navy’s training carrier, but she will retain a “contingency deployer” capability. The following year, the USS Ranger (CV-61), which also saw combat in Operation Desert Storm, will be decommissioned and also placed in “ready reserve” for possible contingency operations. The USS Saratoga (CV-60) will be decommissioned in fiscal year 1995; the USS America (CV-66), in 1996.
A ninth Nimitz-class CVN will be requested in fiscal year 1995, with $852 million requested in fiscal year 1993 for long-lead items. A “modified-repeat” of the United States (CVN-75), CVN-76 may incorporate some upgraded features if research and development funds for contract design changes are released by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Otherwise, CVN-76 may be “less modem” than CVN-73 when she should be
^I'vered in 2003. This proposal for N-76 has been controversial because ■ °jne observers associate it with the can- eNation of the congressionally initiated jiscal year ,991 funding for a SLEP of
e John F. Kennedy. In previous plans, i*1 the John F. Kennedy and America ^ ^een earmarked for SLEP overhauls, at were dropped from the schedule when e decision was made to reduce the force rom 15 t0 ]4^ and t0 12 carriers.
'milarly, the Navy’s nuclear refueling iTv over*lau' f°r the USS Enterprise \ . vU-65] has also come under some crit- IClSm as an unnecessary expense—some
-^AL.LS SHlpBU1LDlNo
$2 billion in all—at a time when force levels are coming down and less expensive options for maintaining 12 carriers are available.) Clearly the Navy desires both extending the life of the John F. Kennedy and building the new CVN, if only to respond to the congressional language in the Report of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, on H.R. 4739, the Fiscal Year 1991 Authorization Bill:
“The committee notes that many potential threats to United States secu-
U S. NAVY/INSET NEWPORT NEWS SHIPBUILDINO/MIKE DILLARD
Scenes like the launching of the USS George Washington (CVN-73), above, will fade, along with the minimum 15-deployable-carrier goal, as the Navy responds to severe budget reductions. The USS Chosin (CG-65) represents a new breed of surface combatants that should increase the Navy’s overall antiair warfare capability well into the next century.
rity have not abated .... Navy carrier battle groups have unique capabilities and the ability to represent U.S. interests around the world. In light of these circumstances, the committee believes that it is not in the national security interests of the United States to reduce carrier battle group force levels below 14. While fiscal considerations may result in active force levels that are below 14 the committee believes that the Navy should take such steps as necessary to allow a future force expansion to 14 carrier battle groups.”
In addition to CVN-76, the Center for Naval Analyses and the Naval Studies Board of the National Academy of Sciences are investigating all manner of alternative aircraft carrier designs and modes for the sea-basing of tactical aircraft: smaller 40,000-ton carriers to operate advanced short take-off/short or vertical landing (ASTOSL/ASTOVL) aircraft; mid-sized 60,000-ton carriers similar to the CVV of the late-1970s; modified 100,000-ton Nimitz-class ships; 200,000- ton “Super Nimitzes”; and floating islands that could accommodate land-based aircraft. Overarching all considerations is the imperative of cost—the cost of the carriers and sea-bases, and the cost of the aircraft that operate from them—which will continue to dog naval aviation and the rest of the Navy for decades to come.
Surface Combatants
Affordability and a reassessment of global requirements resulting from the new world order will affect current and future surface combatant programs. Despite the reaffirmation of the need for surface combatants in both the blockade and combat operations of Desert Shield/ Desert Storm, skepticism remains regarding the future trends and dimensions of the Navy’s programs, particularly within the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
Although the Arleigh Burke (DDG- 51)-class Aegis destroyer remains the foundation of the future surface fleet, budgetary constraints have forced the Navy to reduce the originally planned construction rate from five ships to an average of four per year.7 In a repeal of one of the decisions of the mid-1990 Major Warship Review, the current plan continues the procurement of the DDG- 51 Flight II ship rather than proceeding to the Flight III design that would have included a helicopter hangar for a full LAMPS-III helicopter antisubmarine warfare capability.
In response to a CNO initiative, efforts were under way in 1990-1991 to redefine required surface combatant designs and operational characteristics to meet the changing international threat environment and constrained SCN accounts. The surface warfare community has been directed to examine $400-$600 million unit cost-constrained concepts, to determine near-term future “battle force combatants” to complement the Flight II DDG-51s. When asked about what these ships ultimately might be, surface warfare program insiders commented that an Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)-class frigate would cost about $510 million today; they also wonder what real requirements such a dubious “battle force ship” will be able to meet. They note, as an indication of the true antiair warfare capabilities of “cheap” warships, the exploits of the USS Nicholas (FFG-47) during Operation Desert Storm when she failed to detect an incoming missile, which exploded dangerously close by her. (Others remark more casually that the FFG-7s are “Helen Keller”-ships: they see and hear no threats.)
We might look for a resurgence of a plethora of “FFGX” concepts, which
Despite cutbacks in the Trident SSBN program, the conviction persists that a reliable undersea leg of the nuclear deterrent force can be maintained. (Right, the USS West Virginia [SSBN-736] commissioned on 20 October 1990.)
may include the short-range AAW system (SRAAWS), a U.S. Navy version of the NATO AAW system (NAAWS) combat suite intended for the dead NATO Replacement Frigate (NFR-90) program. (NAAWS was cancelled this year, but insiders expect SRAAWS to be resurrected.) Others, however, argue for a “smaller and cheaper” Aegis combat system for these future low-mix ships. Numerous related technology efforts for these future ships will appear, not the least of which will be a restructured and reinvigorated Naval Sea Systems Command program for integrated electric drive. By early May 1991, several new studies were under way, with results expected in the late fall: (1) Destroyer Variant (DDV) Study; (2) Warship Requirements Study (WARS); (3) Surface Combatant Operational Requirements Study (SCORES); and (4) Phase II of the Revolution at Sea 2020 effort.
By the end of fiscal year 1991, the remaining two Iowa (BB-61)-class battleships will be retired and all the Knox (FF- 1052)-class frigates will be gone from the active fleet by 1993. Many of the 1960s- built cruisers and destroyers also will be decommissioned during the current Six- Year Plan. Eight of the Knox frigates will support the new “Innovative Naval Reserve Concept.” Each of these frigates will train four cadre reserve crews to enhance the Navy’s mobilization forces. Thirty-two of the ASW frigates will be placed in a 180-day reduced operating status and will be manned by reserve crews during a major conflict, while the other six Afnax-class ships will be retired.
Despite the accelerated decommissioning of surface combatants, more modern and sophisticated Aegis combatants (57 as compared to 16 in 1991) will be in the fleet in 2000. The older and much less capable Tartar/Terrier guided-missile destroyers—Charles F. Adams (DOG-2) and Farragut/Coontz (DDG-37) classes^ will be decommissioned, leaving thc U[1] more capable four-ship Kidd (DDG-993) £g class. Of those guided-missile cruiser* a (CGs/CGNs) remaining in the force fiscal year 2000, most will have receive^ I the New Threat Upgrade program making n them capable against post-1995 a'( II threats. This will increase the overall an- Lfl liair warfare capability to support naval1 expeditionary operations, an important ■ consideration because the air threats i" I future conflicts are expected to increase ■ significantly.
Open-ocean antisubmarine warfare capability of the surface fleet basically will remain unchanged, except for the precipitous reduction in Knox ASW frig' ates. Although the Aegis cruisers anti destroyers entering service are much more capable ASW platforms than the Knox-class frigates, and the numbers of Spruance (DD-963) and Oliver Hazard Perry-class combatants will hold constant throughout this period, the 25% reduction in ASW ships through fiscal year 1993 cannot easily be overcome: “quantity has a quality all of its own,” according to a Russian proverb. The situation is further clouded by changes in the nature and dimension of the submarine threat to U.S. naval forces. Much quieter and more capable submarines are joining the Soviet fleet, while Second and Third World navies’ advanced diesel and air- independent submarines operating in the shallow waters of the world’s littorals make the U.S. ASW problem much more complex and troubling.
The Navy’s ability to provide naval gunfire support in future Marine Corps operations will decrease significantly after the decommissioning of the /owa-class
Table 2 Percentage of Lift Requirement Met for 2.5 MEIis
FY 1991 FY 2000
Vehicle square | 95% | 88% |
Cargo cube | 99% | 108% |
V/STOL deck spots | 89% | 85% |
LCAC spots | 89% | 119% |
Troop berthing | 109% | 90% |
The Navy is reducing its amphibious lift capability by 38%. The Wasp- class—above, the Essex (LHD-2)— will stop at the five ships already funded. Funding for the LX-class amphibious warfare ships—to replace older LSDs, LPDs, and LSTs—will be requested in fiscal year 1995, but there are no clear plans for how many ultimately will be built and when.
battleships. Gone with the battleships VVlH be the 16-inch guns. All that will re- Ntain by the end of the decade are about 5-inch guns (compared to some 252 o-inch and 5-inch guns in fiscal year and 51 76-mm. weapons—the later having practically no applications in naval gunfire support.
Submarines [2] *
years to support an attack submarine force that was expected to be significantly reduced from the 1980s’ 100-SSN force objective, even that program has now been cut to just one submarine per year. The hope was to replace nearly one- for-one the remaining Sturgeon (SSN- 637) submarines built during the 1960s, which will support an SSN force of about 67-70 submarines by the end of the decade. But most observers expect the SSN-21 program to be truncated at only five units because of the more than $2 billion unit cost. This will eventually silence claims that the Seawolf force will have an increasing, not decreasing role, in future limited conflicts—a contention based on the limited Tomahawk land- attack missile launches from submarines during Desert Storm.9 Admiral Kelso essentially acknowledged this fact of life in February 1991 when he announced a new submarine design initiative later identified as the Centurion:
“Additionally, we are commencing a study effort to define new, lower cost options for a successor to the Seawolf. While affordability will be a major consideration, this follow-on SSN must be capable of maintaining our edge in ASW against projected 21st century threats.”10
Amphibious Warfare Ships
The Navy is reducing its amphibious lift capability to bring it in line with revised requirements. Unlike the 1980s, when the lift requirements were set at the assault echelons of one Marine expeditionary force (MEF) and one Marine expeditionary brigade (MEB)—essentially four MEBs—the current objective is to provide sufficient lift for only 2.5 Marine expeditionary brigades (MEBs), a reduction of 38%. Accordingly, the Wasp (LHD-1) amphibious assault ship program will be curtailed to the five ships already funded, and the Harpers Ferry (LSD-49/Cargo Variant) program will end with the two ships requested in fiscal years 1992-1993. The final 12 air-cushion landing craft (LCAC) will be procured in fiscal year 1992.
Funding will be requested in fiscal year 1995 for the first ship of the next amphibious warfare (LX) class, a functional replacement for the 37 Austin (LPD-4)-, Raleigh (LPD-1)-, Anchorage (LSD-36)-, and Newport (LST-1179)-class ships. About 27 LXs were identified in previous plans,11 but this will probably be scaled back to meet the revised lift figures and available funds.
Early 1991 projections indicate amphibious warfare ships will decrease from 61 ships in fiscal year 1991 to 49 ships by 2000. (These figures exclude the Navy’s two command ships, which, in theory, are to support Marine amphibious operations, but which, in reality, have come to serve as Navy flagships.) The reduction in lift requirements to just 2.5 MEBs announced in early 1991 will leave some categories with more lift than actually required (see Table 2).
With the addition of new amphibious warfare ships (e.g., the LX) expected by 2000, unless existing force levels are seriously eroded by more accelerated decommissionings, the projections beyond the current plan do not pose dire consequences for the Marine Corps or the Navy.
Mine Warfare Ships
The final three units of the USS Avenger (MCM-l)-class mine countermeasures (MCM) ships were funded in fiscal year 1990, and all 14 ships are expected to be in the fleet by 1995. The Avenger was part of the Navy’s MCM forces deployed to the Persian Gulf during Operations Desert Shield/Storm; the extensive mine damage suffered by the USS Tripoli (LPH-10), while operating mine countermeasures helicopters, and
Desert Storm analyses likely will highlight the critical need for effective mine hunting/sweeping assets, like the Warrior (MCM-10), above. Mines were among the few effective weapons used by Iraq, and by most accounts stymied the Marine Corps’s plans for amphibious assaults.
the USS Princeton (CG-59) in February 1991 attest to the critical need for effective and sufficient mine-sweeping and hunting capabilities.
The Navy intends to truncate the previously planned 17-ship Osprey (MHC-51) program at 12 units, all of which will transfer to the Naval Reserve Force by fiscal year 2000. Following on the heels of the MHC program will be eight new- design MHC(V)-class ships, which mine warfare observers say will be a ‘ ‘deployable” (i.e., larger and capable of being deployed to foreign mine crisis zones) version of the Osprey design, which will be fitted out for both mine-hunting and sweeping operations during the same mission, a capability not enjoyed by the Osprey MHCs.
Congress shares a growing concern that current fiscal austerity will cause the Navy again to deemphasize mine warfare programs, despite the ample evidence that Congress in recent years has been highly supportive of practically all mine and mine countermeasures initiatives. Others comment on the difficulties encountered in the MCM, MHC, and mid- 1980s’ aborted Cardinal (MSH) programs as evidence of the Navy’s traditional lack of interest in this area.12 That judgment may be too harsh, but the recent history of mine events—three major crises since 1984—indicates the dire
consequences that may result from a lack of real appreciation of the full dimension of the threat from future adversaries’ weapons that wait.
Fleet AuxiliariesIStrategic Sealift
One of the critical lessons of Operations Desert Shield/Storm is the overwhelming evidence that the United States
cannot support even a “limited-objective” land war without sufficient strategic sealift assets. Despite the claims of rapid and effective movement of materiel to the Gulf, Navy Vice Admiral Paul D- Butcher, Deputy Commander U.S- Transportation Command, noted wryly that it was “dangerous to use Desert Shield and Desert Storm as a good example of what we can do in sealift, because 47% of it came from foreign flag ships- which might not be available in the nexl emergency.”13
During the previous two fiscal years- Congress has appropriated $1,275 billio11 to support various sealift initiatives. The Navy is responding to a Congressional^ Mandated Mobility Study (the second such effort in ten years) to review the nation’s total strategic airlift and sealiftprepositioning, and amphibious lift requirements. And, the service is dovetailing that analytical assessment with alternatives for acquiring additional roll- on/roll-off (RO/RO) ships and for neW- construction and/or converting commercially available ships to meet future needs. Another $1.2 billion has been requested during the fiscal 1992-1997 period to procure ships for the Ready Reserve Force, to increase it from 96 to 142 cargo ships and tankers, and to acquire specific ship types identified in the new Mobility Study.
The previous goal of one Supply (AOE-6)-class fast combat support ship for each deployable battle group—12 in today’s plans—has been reduced, with the balance of capabilities needed to be provided by pairing a Navy ammunition ship (AE) with an oiler/stores ship (AOR/ AO/T-AO). Only one AOE is in the current plan, in fiscal year 1992, compared to the planned buy of four in last year’s program. By the end of the decade, the combat logistics force should stabilize at about 52 ships, a small reduction from the current force of 56 ships.
The fiscal year 1991 five-year SCN plan submitted to the Congress last year also requested 16 fleet auxiliaries: five ocean surveillance ships (T-AGOSs); nine oceanographic research/survey ships (T-AGSs/AGORs); one salvage ship (ARS); and one repair ship (AR). This year the program also encompasses 16 auxiliaries, but over a six-year period and with a different mix: eight T-AGSs, three ARSs, four T-AGOSs, and one AR. The Navy’s aging destroyer tender force looks to the end of the decade before the prospects for rejuvenation brighten.
U.S. Coast Guard
The new Naval Policy document notes
at >n “joint maritime operations” the avy. Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, cn appropriate, can be combined for lyerse missions in the post-Cold War cra deterrence, stability, insertion, overing, support, and heavy combat. As c°ntingency actions and limited objective c°nflicts are regarded as the most likely ®nue in the future, the Coast Guard s °uld have a more significant role to P ay—-arnong the many other nonsense missions it is called upon to per- enn. Important areas will be future fown water” conflicts—a mission area almost completely ignored by the avy—and drug interdiction and mari- ,.me defense zone operations, which con- Inue unabated today.
than the ongoing icebreaker ,WAGB) and Island (WPB-1338)-class PSrol boat new-construction programs, dnd ‘he Hamilton (WHEC-317) high- endurance cutter rehabilitation and mod- Snization program (FRAM, including k-15 close-in weapon system and Harpoon antiship cruise missile installation), f. e only high-priority new ship construc- Program is to replace the aging buoy-
To order, call 1-800-233-USNl In MD, 301-224-3378
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tend °—“ w nQer fleet. Another future program
Plains the Heritage-class prototype to o°' °w the Island-class WPBs, but no ner initiatives are on the horizon. The oast Guard would appear ideally situ- d ed to take advantage of future trends and dynamics to meet “small-boat” needs in future combat environments. erhaps more than any other U.S. armed fervice, however, the Coast Guard has een consistently able to do what is demanded of it within austere funding evels-—an ability that will be in demand ln the future.
H^_Way Ahead? _________________
Nearly 100 years ago the U.S. Navy Used the “lessons learned” from war to ftake itself ready for the dawn of a new Century and to ensure that future Navy Policy and programs could meet the chal- enges of a new world order only faintly Perceived.14 Late in the fall 1990, as Preparations for conflict in the Persian ulf proceeded toward a mid-January 1 deadline, the Navy and Marine °rps convened a long-range planning
Conference at (he Naval Academy, with
. e apparent objective of launching a crit- lcal assessment of the implications of the Post-Cold War world order for the future U S. naval forces. Anecdotal observa- '°ns from several participants at the conference confirmed apprehensions that the Navy and Marine Corps continued to suf- er from a lack of a coherent, agreed- Ppon vision of the future. Instead of a single, unifying concept, there were diverse divinations championed by the various naval warfare communities.
This situation will, unless rectified, make it more difficult to present coherent and compelling arguments about the real requirements for and capabilities of naval forces to support the strategies and carry out the operations of the future, especially as the Air Force and Army, in light of the dramatic success of Operations Desert Shield/Storm, press their cases for more prominent positions and greater resources. However, as expressed by Admiral Kelso, “Desert Shield and Desert Storm are unique operations in many respects and do not represent the only scenarios we could expect. For example, we were fortunate to be able to use a very highly developed port and airfield infrastructure in Saudi Arabia, which would probably not be available in other regional scenarios. We must ensure that our naval forces are flexible enough to meet the demands of an uncertain future. Operations to support regional stability will place greater emphasis on power projection—carrier air strikes, amphibious operations, and cruise missiles. At the same time, local sea control will remain a prerequisite to projecting power ashore.”15
As coalition air strikes from aircraft carriers and land bases, and cruise missiles launched from surface combatants (and at least two U.S. submarines) and thousands of rounds of naval gunfire from battleships nullified much of Iraq’s instruments of war, the U.S. Navy’s new long-range assessment effort, given the somewhat ironic title of “The Way Ahead,” focused on the numbers and types of forces best-suited for the international conflict environment of the 21st century. (See “The Way Ahead,” pp. 36-47, April 1991 Proceedings) It is ironic in that the Navy’s chosen title is almost identical to the United Kingdom’s 1981 Defence White Paper, “The Way Forward,” that presaged the precipitous decline of the Royal Navy as a global force.16 That too may be in the offing for the United States.
It is not too late in mid-1991 for the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard to shape their destinies through a forceful articulation of the roles, missions, and functions that they are best suited to carry out, and which the other services cannot reasonably perform. After the Desert Storm euphoria subsides, however, the American people will continue to shift their focus inward, a process begun well before 2 August 1990. The war on drugs, the environment, the economy and federal budget deficit, the need for integrated energy policies, providing ade-
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GUIDED
CG-61
CG-63
CG-64
CG-65
CG-66
CG-67
CG-68
CG-69
CG-70
CG-71
CG-72
CG-73
DDG-51
DDG-52
DDG-53
DDG-54
DDG-55
DDG-56
DDG-57
DDG-58
DDG-59
DDG-60
DDG-61
DDG-62
DDG-63
DDG-64
DDG-65
DDG-66
DDG-67
CVN-73 George Washington
CVN-74 John C. Stennis
CVN-75 United States
GUIDED MISSILE DESTROYERS
FY Program | Builder | Status (May 1991) | Type! Hull Number | Name | FY Program |
|
|
| FLEET BALLISTIC SUBMARINES | ||
1983 | Newport News | Lau. 21 July 90 | SSBN-736 | West Virginia | 1984 |
1988 | Newport News | K.L. 1 Dec. 90 | SSBN-737 | Kentucky | 1985 |
1988 | Newport News | Ord. 30 June 90 | SSBN-738 | Maryland | 1986 |
|
|
| SSBN-739 | Nebraska | 1987 |
|
|
| SSBN-740 | Rhode Island | 1988 |
1985 | Bath Iron Works | Com. 16 June 90 | SSBN-741 | Maine | 1989 |
1986 | Bath Iron Works | Com. 9 Mar. 91 | SSBN-742 |
| 1990 |
1986 | Bath Iron Works | Com. 22 June 91* | SSBN-743 |
| 1991 |
1986 | Litton/Ingalls | Com. 12 Jan. 91 | ATTACK SUBMARINES |
| |
1987 | Litton/Ingalls | Lau. 1 June 90 |
|
|
|
1987 | Bath Iron Works | Lau. 8 Sep. 90 | SSN-753 | Albany | 1984 |
1987 | Litton/Ingalls | Lau. 2 Nov. 90 | SSN-755 | Miami | 1984 |
1988 | Litton/Ingalls | K.L. 30 May 90 | SSN-756 | Scranton | 1985 |
1988 | Bath Iron Works | K.L. 6 Mar. 90 | SSN-757 | Alexandria | 1985 |
1988 | Litton/Ingalls | K.L. 19 Nov. 90 | SSN-758 | Asheville | 1985 |
1988 | Litton/Ingalls | K.L. 22 Apr. 91 | SSN-759 | Jefferson City | 1985 |
1988 | Litton/Ingalls | Ord. 25 Feb. 88 | SSN-760 | Annapolis | 1986 |
|
|
| SSN-761 | Springfield | 1986 |
|
|
| SSN-762 | Columbus | 1986 |
|
|
| SSN-763 | Santa Fe | 1986 |
1985 | Bath Iron Works | Com. 31 Mar. 91 | SSN-764 | Boise | 1987 |
1987 | Litton/Ingalls | Lau. 2 Mar. 91 | SSN-765 | Montpelier | 1987 |
1987 | Bath Iron Works | K.L. 8 Aug. 90 | SSN-766 | Charlotte | 1987 |
1989 | Bath Iron Works | K.L. 12 Feb. 91 | SSN-767 | Hampton | 1987 |
1989 | Litton/Ingalls | K.L. 24 June 91* | SSN-768 | Hartford | 1988 |
1989 | Bath Iron Works | Ord. 13 Dec. 88 | SSN-769 | Toledo | 1988 |
1989 | Litton/Ingalls | Ord. 13 Dec. 88 | SSN-770 | Tucson | 1988 |
1989 | Bath Iron Works | Ord. 13 Dec. 88 | SSN-771 | Columbia | 1989 |
1990 | Litton/Ingalls | Ord. 22 Feb. 90 | SSN-772 | Greeneville | 1989 |
1990 | Bath Iron Works | Ord. 22 Feb. 90 | SSN-773 | Cheyenne | 1990 |
1990 | Litton/Ingalls | Ord. 22 Feb. 90 | SSN-21 | Seawolf | 1989 |
1990 | Bath Iron Works | Ord. 22 Feb. 90 | SSN-22 |
| 1991 |
1990 | Litton/Ingalls | Ord. 22 Feb. 90 |
|
|
|
1991 | Bath Iron Works | Ord. 16 Jan. 91 | AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT SHIPS |
| |
1991 | Litton/Ingalls | Ord. 16 Jan. 91 | LHD-2 | Essex | 1986 |
1991 | Bath Iron Works | Ord. 16 Jan. 91 | LHD-3 | Kearsarge | 1988 |
1991 | Litton/Ingalls | Ord. 16 Jan. 91 | LHD-4 | Boxer | 1989 |
Litton/Ingalls
Litton/Ingalls
Litton/Ingalls
Warfare (OP-03), Surface Warfare Plan, 1989, ber 1989, p. 10. Kjf'
‘‘Edward J. Walsh, “Navy Struggles to M[ Mine Warfare Shipbuilding,” Armed Forces Jour** L '4‘ International, April 1991.
’ ’“TRANSCOM Deputy Commander Warns of i ^*4! ft Decline.” American Maritime rvmorcss ^b-5(
I LA" 'A
------------------------------------ sj |
Dr. Truver is Director, Defense Studies and Anal)1' ^ ses, in the Combat Systems Operations Center 5
TECHMATICS Inr* Hp 1C 9 frpniipnt onnfrihlltof ^ '-'S
Sim
Ord. 30 > Ord. 10 Ml Ord. 10 L
<- ’$ Ord-
Ord. 28 T, Ord.9l"j Ord. 4 311'
Lau. 23
Lau. 24
Lau. l7j Lau. I*Tty K.L. # 1 K.L.9)f« K.L. 25*0
31 >’AC
Com- H Com.
Com-
ISMC!
1*1
5%A
5
18 TO
quate levels of education and health care, the needs of the homeless, and many other critical domestic issues will compete with defense requirements for attention and resources. The Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard will be just one group vying for their share of the available funds; arguments for maintaining robust naval forces will compete not only with the Air Force’s and Army’s petitions, but with those in the domestic arena as well. There are strong indications that the new Naval Policy for the 1990s document will provide much- needed guidance and inspiration to support tomorrow’s fleet. If successful, this will ensure that Dick Cheney’s admission—“It is important to recognize that, in many parts of the world, such capabilities will seldom be available to military commanders through other means” than carrier battle forces and amphibious assault groups—will not soon have a hollow, almost mournful toll.17
MISSILE CRUISERS Monterey Cowpens Gettysburg Chosin Hue City Shiloh Anzio Vicksburg Lake Erie Cape St. George Vella Gulf Port Royal
Arleigh Burke John Barry John Paul Jones Curtis Wilbur Stout
John S. McCain Mitscher Laboon Russell
Paul Hamilton Rarnage Fitzgerald Stethem
Statement of the Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney before the House Armed Services Committee, in connection with the FY 1992-93 Budget for the Department of Defense, 7 February 1991, p. 7.
Statement by Admiral F. B. Kelso, II, U.S. Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, before the House Armed Services Committee on the Posture and Fiscal Year 1992/1993 Budget of the U. S. Navy, 21 February 1991, pp. 12-13.
Remarks by President Bush at the Aspen Institute Symposium, Aspen, Colorado, 2 August 1990, p. 4. "‘Highlights of the FY 1992/1993 Department of the Navy Budget, February 1991, p. 39; Statement of the Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, pp. 11-12 Chart 9.
5“Navy Systems Terminated in the FY 1992/1993 Budget,” Inside the Pentagon, 21 February 1991
p. 10.
'’Highlights of the FY 1992/1993 DoN Budget, p. 13. 7See Scott C. Truver and CDR James A. Hazlett, USN, “Surfacing a New Battlegroup,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, April 1991, pp. 81-88.
“Kelso Statement, op.cit., p. 7; Norman Polmar, “The U.S. Navy: Cutting Back . . . SSBNs, Too?” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1991 dd 121-122.
g“Sub-Launched Tomahawks May Impact SSN-21 Debate,” Defense News, 4 February 1991, p. 35. 10Kelso Statement, op.cit., p. 7.
"Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Surface
lift Decline,” American Maritime Congress ington Letter, 18 February 1991.
“See Harold & Margaret Sprout, The Rise of ALp can Naval Power, 1776-1918 (Annapolis, MjJ Classics of Naval Literature Series, 1990, pp- 2W” (Cq
?587) CM.
Kelso Statement, op.cit., p. 6.
"The United Kingdom Defense Programme: ^ Iq. Way Forward, 25 June 1981, Command 82**' k *>’ HMSO, London. See also, Derek Wood, "Storn'f Passage Ahead—The Future of the Royal NaV)? ( International Defense Review, 12/1981, pp. 1693|1; [CM. and Desmond Wettern, “Britain’s Forgotten Lc* k’M. sons. Naval Institute Proceedings, March 1982. PP .1C\i llOff. |CM
nDick Cheney, Annual Report to the Congress, J‘IIV I uary 1991, p. 50. i
Electric Boat Electric Boat Electric Boat Electric Boat Electric Boat Electric Boat Electric Boat Electric Boat
Newport News Electric Boat Newport News Electric Boat Newport News Newport News Electric Boat Electric Boat Electric Boat Electric Boat Newport News Newport News Newport News Newport News Electric Boat Newport News Newport News Electric Boat Newport News Newport News Electric Boat Electric Boat
Lau. 2 3* K.L. 6 ff K.L. I ^
w„
>cW
s&-47 SD.48 Sc3' ^D-49
ash' LsD-5q
Name | FY Program | Builder | Status (May 1991) |
>1NG SHIPS |
|
|
|
Tortuga | 1985 | Avondale | Com. 17 Nov. 90 |
Rushmore | 1986 | Avondale | Lau. 6 May 89 |
Ashland | 1986 | Avondale | Lau. 11 Nov. 89 |
Harpers Ferry | 1988 | Avondale | K.L. 15 Apr. 91 |
Carter Hall | 1990 | Avondale | K.L. 11 Nov. 91* |
Type! Hull Number
Name
FY
Program
builder
Slatux (May 1991)
(F L
P-6
pit !CM-7 ,88. cM-s my ^M-9 f !%0
!«■ CM.,,
# CM.,,
I”1 'CM.i
. K.4
;r. k-S, to *HC-52 its ^.53 :£l PC-54
J^6
T-AO-203 Laramie T-AO-204 Rappahannock
1989
1989
Avondale
Avondale
Old. 24 Mar. 89 Ord. 6 Oet. 88
USCG MEDIUM ENDURANCE CUTTERS WMEC-913 Mohawk 1990
Derecktor
Del. 15 July 90
*' {cm C0UNTERMEASURES SHIPS
USCG HERITAGE CLASS PATROL BOATS
1990 CG Yard.
K.L. June 90
Champion | 1984 | Marinette Marine | Lau. 15 Apr. 89 |
|
|
| Curtis Bay |
|
Devastator | 1985 | Peterson Builders | Com. 6 Oct. 90 | WPB-1401 |
| 1990 | CG Yard. | Ord. 1 July 89 |
Patriot | 1985 | Marinette Marine | Lau. 15 May 90 |
|
|
| Curtis Bay |
|
Scout | 1985 | Peterson Builders | Com. 15 Dec. 90 |
|
|
|
|
|
Pioneer | 1985 | Peterson Builders | Lau. 25 Aug. 90 | USCG ISLAND CLASS PATROL BOATS# |
|
| ||
Warrior | 1986 | Peterson Builders | Lau. 8 Dec. 90 |
|
|
|
|
|
Gladiator | 1986 | Peterson Builders | K.L. 7 May 90 | WPB-1338 | Grand Isle | 1990 | Bollinger | Del. 5 Feb. 91 |
Ardent | 1990 | Peterson Builders | K.L. 22 Oct. 90 |
| (ex-Amelia Island) |
|
|
|
Dextrous | 1990 | Peterson Builders | K.L. 11 Mar. 91 | WPB-1339 | Key Biscayne | 1990 | Bollinger | Del. 1) Mar. 91 |
Chief | 1990 | Peterson Builders | Ord. 12 Dec. 89 |
| (ex-Annette Island) |
|
|
|
WPB-1340
Jefferson Island (cx-Bainbridgc Island) Kodiak Island
1990 Bollinger
Del. 9 Apr. 91
^■nehunters
WPB-1341
1990 Bollinger
Osprey | 1986 | Intermarine USA | Lau. 9 Mar. 91 |
| (ex-Block Island) |
|
|
|
Heron | 1989 | Intermarine USA | Ord. 17 Feb. 89 | WPB-1342 | Long Island | 1990 | Bollinger | K.L. 29 Oct. 90 |
P elican | 1989 | Avondale | Ord. 3 Oct. 89 |
| (ex-Galveston Island) |
|
|
|
Robin | 1990 | Avondale | Ord. 2 Aug. 90 | WPB-1343 | Bainbridge Island | 1990 | Bollinger | K.L. 3 Dec. 90 |
Oriole | 1990 | Intermarine USA | Ord. 1990 |
| (ex-Grand Isle) |
|
|
|
| 1991 | Avondale | Ord. 15 Apr. 91 | WPB-1344 | Block Island | 1990 | Bollinger | Ord. 22 Dec. 89 |
| 1991 | Avondale | Ord. 15 Apr. 91 |
| (ex-Isle Royale) |
|
|
|
WPB-1345
1990 Bollinger
K.L.
$
N-8
■>ocEan
5tJL C°MbAT supply ships
WPB-1346
Supply | 1987 | National Steel | Lau. 6 Oct. 90 |
|
Rainier | 1989 | National Steel | K.L. 31 May 90 | WPB-1347 |
Arctic | 1990 | National Steel | Ord. 6 Dec. 89 | WPB-1348 |
WPB-1349
SURVEY SHIP (Military Sealift Command) Fanner
5MQS.40
|8fi
0 '^Graphic SURVEY SHIP (Military Sealift Command)
8 7^-45
91* Waters 1990 Avondale
STAL HYDROGRAPHIC SURVEY SHIPS (Military Sealift Command)
. ,AGS-5i
7 Acs ' John McDonnell 1987 Halter Marine
r '" 2 Uttlehales 1987 Halter Marine
]! , AN°GrAPH1C RESEARCH SHIP (Military Sealift Command)
4 Ag0r.„
7 A Thomas G. Thompson 1987 Halter Marine
>* H \
5uG°S-19
ik.
1985 Bethlehem Steel Del. 31 Aug. 90
SURVEILLANCE SHIPS (Military Sealift Command)
“riant)
Victorious Able Effective Loyal Impeccable
1987
1989
1989
1989
1990
McDermott
McDermott
McDermott
McDermott
K.L. 16 May 91
Lau. 18 Feb. 91 Lau. 14 Feb. 91
Lau. 27 July 90
Del. 21 Mar. 91 Lau. 7 Feb. 91 K.L. 18 Feb. 91 K.L. 3 June 91*
Staten Island (ex-Jefferson Island)
Roanoke Island (ex-Key Biscayne)
Knight Island Pea Island (ex-Kodiak Island)
Galveston Island (ex-Long Island)
#Names changed as indicated in February 1991 CONVERSIONS/REACTIVATIONS AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
1990 Bollinger
Ord. 22 Dec. 89
1990
1990
1990
Bollinger
Bollinger
Bollinger
Ord. 22 Dec. 89 Ord. 22 Dec. 89
Ord. 22 Dec. 89
’K
>19,
>2
^Military Sealift Command)
CV-63 | Kitty Hawk (SLEP) | 1988 | Philadelphia NSY | Del. 28 Feb. 91 |
CV-64 | Constellation (SLEP) | 1990 | Philadelphia NSY | Start 2 July 90 |
CVN-65 | Enterprise (RF/COH) | 1990 | Newport News | Start 1 Jan. 91 |
AUXILIARY CRANE SHIPS |
|
|
| |
T-ACS-9 | Green Mountain State | 1988 | NORSHIPCO | Del. 24 Sep. 90 |
|
|
| Norfolk |
|
T-ACS-10 | Beaver State | 1988 | NORSHIPCO | Can. 12 Jan. 90 |
|
|
| Norfolk |
|
FLEET OILERS (JUMBO) |
|
|
| |
AO-177 | Cimarron | 1989 | Avondale | Start 25 June 90 |
AO-178 | Monongahela | 1989 | Avondale | Start 29 Jan. 90 |
AO-179 | Merrimack | 1987 | Avondale | Del. 11 Feb. 91 |
AO-180 | Willamette | 1988 | Avondale | Del. 5 June 91* |
AO-186 | Platte | 1990 | Avondale | Start 26 Nov. 90 |
«A 0. i pO. lifAO. AO. Ao.
194
1%
197
198
- ■200 ■201 ■202
Benjamin Isherwood | 1985 | Tampa Shipyards | Del. 30 Nov. 91* |
Henry Eckford | 1985 | Tampa Shipyards | Lau. 14 Aug. 89 |
John Ericsson | 1986 | Avondale | Del. 25 Jan. 91* |
Kanawha | 1987 | Avondale | Lau. 22 Sep. 90 |
Pecos | 1987 | Avondale | Del. 6 July 90 |
Big Horn | 1988 | Avondale | Lau. 2 Feb. 91 |
Tippecanoe | 1988 | Avondale | K.L. 19 Nov. 90 |
Guadalupe | 1989 | Avondale | K.L. 9 July 90 |
Patuxent | 1989 | Avondale | K.L. 21 Oct. 91* |
Yukon | 1989 | Avondale | K.L. 8 Apr. 91 |
ACOUSTIC RESEARCH SHIP T - AG-195 Hayes
1987 Tacoma Boat
Del. 31 Mar. 91
Sources: USNI Military Database; U.S. Navy, Chief of Naval Information, Naval Sea Systems Command; U.S. Coast Guard, Office of Public and International Affairs, Office of Acquisition Management.
•Projected Date.
[1]l()n to strategic deterrence by the year 4000.8 As an economy measure the Navy has also decided to forego the planned hackfitting of the Trident Il/D-5 missile 'hto the first eight Ohio SSBNs, at least U|'til after fiscal year 1997, leaving them to lield the less-capable Trident I/C-4 httssile. Nevertheless, the conviction is ■hat these SSBNs will ensure a strong and rehable sea-based leg of the nation’s nuclear deterrent force well into the next
century.
Austerity has also hit the Seawolf ■SSN-21) program. Although last year's Major Warship Review concluded that ■hree SSN-21s would be built every two
The 18th and final Ohio (SSBN-726)- °ass Trident submarine was funded in lscal year 1991; earlier plans called for ~4 Trident SSBNs. With older Poseidon . b“Ns decommissioning early, these 18 ‘/■dents will be the Navy’s sole contribu-