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reconnaissance became increasingly apparent. In what was a fast-moving war, particularly after the ground campaign began, the time delay in returning film to the ship, processing it, then distributing it to the strike crews was intolerable. I believe the answer to this long-standing problem of tactical reconnaissance lies in fielding real-time video downlinks similar to those used so successfully by remotely piloted vehicles spotting naval gunfire.
The requirement for large numbers of unguided bombs will probably never be erased. But an increasing percentage of our weapons must be capable of penetration and pinpoint accuracy if we are to attack critical targets with minimal collateral damage, or strike point targets in unpopulated areas—revetted tanks, for example. Putting more accuracy in the delivery platform—as in the F/A-18—is highly desirable, but ultimate accuracy always will depend on some intelligence in the weapon itself. In the near term, that means forward-looking infrared (FLIR) systems and lasers—our F/A-18s need that capability now.
Tomahawk missiles proved deadly accurate in their combat debut, reduced aircrew exposure, and delivered a psychological blow that often exceeded the devastation caused by the warhead. Since they do not depend on good weather—a requirement for FLIR/laser systems—they are excellent gap-fillers during bad
weather or when manned aircraft cannot be consistently i for attack.
Maritime interception is hardly the U.S. Navy’s most practiced skill, but, in conjunction with efforts by the Coalition navies and the U.S. Coast Guard, it surely ranks high on the list ot successes in this crisis. It served early notice to the world that the Coalition was serious about driving Saddam Hussein from Ku" wait. Without this vital maritime stepping-stone, I doubt that the world community would ever have come together. Further, the intercept action began the fiscal and material campaign of starvation that steadily eroded Iraq’s ability to wage war.
No account of this war would be complete without acknowledging the accomplishments of the Desert Storm troops. They had good leaders, a supportive nation, and a clear understanding of their duty. In the end, they were a half-million hardworking, determined Americans who went to war and did their job like generations before them.
Captain Bien, who commands Carrier Air Wing 15 on board the USS Carl Vinson (CVN-70), was shanghaied from his command to serve as the Navy’s air liaison officer in the strike cell in Riyadh during Desert Shield and Desert Storm. A nava flight officer, he flew 225 missions in Vietnam with VF-154, was a Top Gun instructor, commanded VF-114, and was the deputy commander of CVW-15-
After the Storm
VADM R. F. Dunn, USN (Ret.)
The storm—Desert Storm—has passed. Now it’s time to clean up the mess. But the lessons to be learned from the Gulf War are not so clear-cut as some would have us believe. There are lots of clouds around, and some of them are filled with rocks and lightning.
Desert Storm was more than a successful battle in a far-off place. It was a turning point for American self-esteem, an exclamation point for the Reagan defense investment, and a point-of- no-retum for the United States on the world stage. It may be seen as a defining moment in recent history—both in the way the United States looks at its armed forces, and in the way the armed forces plan and train for the next war.
On the one hand, it was a war fought just as President Bush was beginning to define his new world order. On the other hand, it was a war fought with the weapons, some of the tactics, and the people trained during the Cold War to fight the Soviet Union. In this light, was Desert Storm a harbinger of the future, a modified throwback to the past, or an event unique unto itself?
There were indeed several circumstances peculiar to Desert Storm. The Coalition was afforded five uninterrupted months to build its forces. Rarely have land-based forces been able to mobilize on the frontiers of an actively hostile enemy— acclimatizing, training, and stockpiling supplies—and then pick the time to attack. All of these factors obtained for Desert Shield/ Storm.
This required an accommodating (or ignorant) enemy, a nearby ally willing to have U.S. and Coalition forces on its territory, a United Nations working in unprecedented harmony, and a vast arsenal of people, equipment, and supplies available in Europe, because the threat they were created for had disappeared. That such a conjunction of circumstances might occur again soon, especially considering shrinking U.S. defense budgets and diminishing overseas base access, is problematical at best.
Yet these aspects of the Gulf War, and the unlikely-to-be- repeated circumstances that made it relatively easy for land- based forces to participate, have been downplayed in the extreme. Given a near nonexistent naval public-relations effort, many citizens—and their leaders—have no idea of what the Navy did in the war.
This could well cause a downplaying of the need for naval forces in future conflicts—notwithstanding the unique geography, politics, and timing of this one. Already, voices in the land are saying that long-range, land-based strategic air power can handle future contingencies, and that land-based tactical air forces can do the job better than sea-based air. That these arguments are based upon false conclusions and will be inimical to the strength of the nation does not seem to matter at all to their partisans.
These same partisans have more to their agenda than merely denigrating the contributions of sea-based air power. They covet the air power resident on the carriers and in the Marine aircraft wings. Moreover, they say, the reasons for the success of the air campaign—and, indeed, the entire war—can be boiled down to two facts: there was one central air commander...and he was a U.S. Air Force officer.
It thus follows that all Navy, Marine Corps, and Army aviation must come under the aegis of the Air Force—as the service most qualified to organize, train, and employ the nation’s air forces. _
Swept under the rug is any suggestion that Desert Storm was special; that it is a bit unusual for land-based air forces to have the time and protection to position themselves for a land war.
Desert Storm
orgotten is any idea that naval air power is not power unto lsc|l, but part and parcel of naval power—trained, supported, °Pcrated, and commanded by people well-versed in the intrica- Cles °f war at sea and war from the sea. Lost in the euphoria of SUccess is any thought that—in another place, at another time— ‘ may well be naval air power without the support of any land- a^ed air power that carries the day.
Naval power was first in the Gulf, of course; the Navy’s Mid- 0 East Force has been there for more than 40 years. Just a few years ago Navy forces escorted reflagged Kuwaiti tankers and c Ccked Iranian seaborne aggression. It was Navy forces that enforced United Nations sanctions against Iraq after 2 August a task they continue to perform.
E was Navy sea-based air power—first from the deck of the dependence—that undoubtedly deterred Saddam Hussein from a8gression beyond Kuwait and encouraged the Saudis to permit and-based forces into their country. It was naval forces that t'ade it safe for others to land; and naval forces that delivered the
vast tonnage of war material to the land-based forces. Naval forces were full partners in the war from the very first to the very last. That story must be told.
Beyond making up for a poor external-information effort, the Navy should look inward. Sifting through information far beyond that possessed by most observers, it has undoubtedly begun Such introspection. Here are some thoughts worth pondering by the Navy and the Proceedings readership:
^ Intelligence was weak. The enemy was neither as numerous lor as skilled as we thought, nor did his equipment prove to be i awesome.
^ Tomahawks work.
^ Stealth is sexy ... it may also be important.
^ Air-launched precision standoff weapons are cost-effective and minimize losses, but heavy tonnage continues to be a required naval air mission.
- Work with night vision devices pays off.
- The Royal Air Force Tornado experience proved once again that low-altitude ingress and attack is hazardous to one’s health, although stealth might help.
- The value of gaining and maintaining air dominance was proved yet again.
- We won the electronic war—Navy EA-6Bs excelled.
- Armed reconnaissance is vital in locating of mobile equipment (read Scuds). It did not work very well in Iraq.
- Battle damage assessment left a lot to be desired.
- While Scuds did little real damage, other tactical ballistic missiles will do better in the future. We need a sea-based counter.
- There were insufficient airborne refuelers (tankers), either land-based or sea-based.
- The logistics system performed magnificently. Sealift was the key to success.
- The mine sweeping problem persists.
- Aircrews continue to fire on friendly troops. Why?
At some risk—left, the Princeton (CG-59), lies dead in the water after striking a mine—naval forces provided our first real combat power in the Gulf, e.g., the Independence (CV-62), an F/A-18, and Marines.
► The Navy lost the public-relations war. This is an injustice to the Navy men and women who performed so well—and dangerous for future budget battles and the strength of the nation.
Desert Storm is over and the troops are coming home to waving flags. But the Navy stays on. Carrier battle groups, amphibious ready groups, the Middle East Force, the logistics train—all doing what they’ve been doing since the end of World War II. They are on station, ready at a moment’s notice.
If the nation’s leaders learn the right lessons from Desert Storm, the Navy will again, someplace, some day, be first on the scene, carry a major share of the load, and be the last to leave. That’s the way it is.
Admiral Dunn commanded the USS Saratoga (CV-60), Carrier Group Bight, and Naval Air Force, Atlantic. He was Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, Air Warfare (OP-05), when he retired in 1989.