This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
By Commander Bruce Lemkin, U.S. Navy
he USS Seawolf, an SSN-21-class nuclear attack submarine, is conducting self-training in international waters in the Mediterranean. In the course of afire drill, the captain orders the ship to periscope depth to emergency ventilate to remove the simulated smoke. While at periscope depth, the ship receives her radio broadcast by satellite. The high-speed printout of the burst transmission is immediately brought to the commanding officer.
The message tells him that intelligence sources indicate a rapidly developing, potentially threatening situation in the Mediterranean littoral Third World nation Risingfast, which has assembled an imposing array of technologically sophisticated weaponry including several modern diesel submarines, a small force of capable amphibious ships, a formidable modern air force, and advanced weapons, including chemical.
The Seawolf is directed to reposition at best tactical speed to a position in international waters off the Risingfast coast and conduct all-sensor surveillance while remaining undetected and ready to launch a multiple land- attack strike with conventional Tomahawk cruise missiles. In addition, the Seawolf must be ready to conduct torpedo attacks on Risingfast’s submarines and amphibious fleet should the situation escalate.
The Seawolf’5 tactical speed—that is, the maximum speed that a submarine can use while simultaneously searching for other submarines (to locate or avoid)—is 57% greater than that of even the newest SSN of the previous class, the improved Los Angeles (SSN-688) class. Thus the Seawolf can rapidly and safely traverse the several hundred miles to the assigned mission area, conducting an effective search for any other submerged submarines enroute and arriving at the scene well ahead of any surface units that might also be ordered in. The Seawolf’.? extraordinary quieting (10 times quieter than the improved 688) gives her such an acoustic advantage over any submerged platform, including the most sophisticated Soviet submarine, that her ability to reach her destination undetected is virtually assured.
Readiness to carry out the assignment is inherent in the breed—U.S. submarines at sea are always loaded out and ready for any of numerous potential missions. No refueling or scrambling for a logistics port is required.
The dramatically increased weapons loadout of the Seawolf, twice that of the improved 688, gives the captain great confidence in his ability to inflict catastrophic damage to the designated targets, should that be ordered. The Seawolf’.? present weapons loadout, which consists ofa significant number of Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles and antisubmarine!antisurface torpedoes and mines, will place considerable, flexible force at Risingfast'5 doorstep in just hours . . . covertly, without unnecessary provocation. And if it should come to war, the captain notes, far better that his unmanned Tomahawks make the first attacks, eliciting the full output of Risingfast’s extensive air defenses before U.S. carrier-based and other manned aviation assets come into action.
As indicated in support message traffic, other U.S- SSNs are also being positioned swiftly and quietly. Another SSN-21 class, also on deployment in the Mediterranean, is taking station off the coast of the nation of Al- soran, one of Risingfast’s potential collaborating allies. The other U.S. SSN currently in the Mediterranean, a 688-class submarine, will stay farther off the coast, providing support to the carrier battle group ordered to close the vicinity and conducting a continuous antisubmarine warfare search for potentially hostile submarines. Three SSN-21 -class submarines of the ten U.S. SSNs exercising in the North Atlantic off the U.S. East Coast have been directed to depart their assigned exercise areas and are transiting toward the Mediterranean at high speed . . ■
The so-called breaking out of peace in 1990 was much more wishful thinking than reality, as developments in the Persian Gulf all too starkly illustrate. As all the think tankers, academicians, politicians, and others on both sides of the Washington, D.C., beltway race to predict the nature and structure of the world of the near future, only one thing can be stated with any real certainty—it is uncertain. The dramatic changes in a world that we are familiar with, if not even comfortable in, must cause us to reevaluate—- but not necessarily dismiss out of hand—the policies and structure that have ensured U.S. security for the past 45
years. The demise of the Cold War in no way entails the attendant demise of the threat and, in fact, as global balances of power shift, may only lead to a more diverse, unpredictable threat.
The outcome of the Second Russian Revolution is anything but certain. Our desire for the Soviet Union to complete its metamorphosis to an American clone of pluralism and democracy defies historic logic and must not be permitted to fog our judgment. The consequences of the social, economic, and political collapse in the Soviet Union are, unfortunately, more likely to be a repressive, totalitarian regime that seeks to assuage its internal troubles through the fabrication of an external threat.
Although we should make every reasonable effort to prevent this, our fervor to divest ourselves of a potent security structure must be mitigated by the sober reality of
the Soviet Union’s massive and continually improving military capabilities. The most significant threat to our security is, and will continue to be for the foreseeable ] future, the Soviet Union’s strategic forces.
In addition, the rapidly proliferating advanced weapons technologies in the Third World and the inevitable friction between the have-nots and the haves make it all the more pressing for the United States to maintain adequate mill' tary forces. Those who breathed a sigh of relief at the end of the Cold War should catch that breath. In today’s | world, the scenario presented at the beginning of this article is not only plausible, it is highly likely. We must be prepared.
Inherent in the U.S. defense budget development and justification is the definition of a strategy that is fully supported by the planned defense structure. Defining such a strategy in the uncertainty of the evolving world is the challenge facing today’s defense planners. This challenge is further exacerbated by the deficit-driven momentum to slash defense spending.
Because of these factors, U.S. forces for the foreseeable future must be multipurpose, flexible, highly mobile, and incorporate maximum bang for the buck. The modern nuclear attack submarine, with its inherent stealth, speed, versatility, and significant multicapable weapons loadout, is a natural primary part of this mobile, efficient, effective team.
The SSN, and in particular the forthcoming state-of-the- art Seawolf, is one of the few weapon systems that truly have the ability to function effectively throughout the spectrum of plausible scenarios in the uncertain future. ■, This multiple-mission platform is also the most affordable option for a submarine force that must be designed for maximum cost-effectiveness and a variety of threats.
Yet ignorance or wishful thinking, or both, have caused some to question the need for a sophisticated and seemingly expensive new SSN. The inevitable biases and parochialism of warfare specialities and other services faced with a shrinking budget have contributed to this debate.
As a career submariner whose last assignment was as commanding officer of one of our highly effective Los Angeles-class SSNs, I certainly run the risk of seeming parochial—but it is that experience and my estimation of the seriousness and multiplicity of the threats we face that convince me of the necessity not only for a highly capable SSN force, but also for the painstakingly crafted and designed Seawolf.
Our best estimate, as stated by Vice Admiral D. L. Cooper, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Undersea Warfare, is that “The Soviet Union is building submarines at the same or a greater rate than it has even in the eighties.
[In 1989] the Soviet Union built nine submarines—four diesel, two strategic and three attack (SSN or SSGN). This high construction rate will probably continue.” (In 1990, the Soviets built ten more new submarines; the United States built only one.) Admiral Cooper went on to add that modern Soviet submarines “are very quiet, well outfitted and operated very professionally,” and that though the total numbers of Soviet submarines will go down, the “quality of Soviet submarine is much superior to earlier
years.”1 Congress recognized this in a study on ASW c°nvened by House Armed Services Committee Chairman Les Aspin; the conclusion was that the Seawolf should be built.
The Soviets’ reliance on their submarine force to ensure Maritime and strategic security is legendary; the subulate is the capital ship of the Soviet Navy. The Typhoon and the Delta IV and the other Soviet SSBNs are considered the most survivable portion of their strategic forces, jast as we consider our SSBNs. Security of these deterrent forces continues to be top priority for Soviet leaders. The 'aost credible threat to these SSBNs is the U.S. attack submarine force. Hence the oft-repeated Soviet desire for 'he establishment of so-called ASW-free zones (which are rpally Soviet SSBN patrol areas where the Soviets would hke to preclude U.S. SSNs from potentially operating) and the suggestion to limit numbers of SSNs.
The Soviet SSBN force of 63 total platforms cannot be °verlooked. Its continuing modernization, as well as that °f its security force, the Soviet SSNs, must be countered through a U.S. submarine force that is certain to retain the edge. Though the Soviet economy is in a shambles and Pleads for reduced defense spending, this has not resulted In reduced capability.
Although we believed that we could write off the Third 'A’orld threat during the Cold War by convincing ourselves 'hat if we could handle the Soviets, we could certainly handle the threat posed by any underdeveloped country, the proliferation of technology and sophisticated weapon systems has invalidated much of the basis for such confidence. More than 40 nations worldwide now operate submarines; the advanced SSN, with its quieting, sensors, ar>d tactical speed, remains the clearly superior means to counter any modern submarine, be it nuclear or diesel Powered. As the adversary gets quieter, it is imperative to
^ O-K.. u * optimize the ability to exploit fully and rapidly every fragment of acoustic information.
This requires the most sensitive sonar arrays and extensive processing capabilities—characteristics that necessitate a larger, quieter platform than the improved 688-class SSN in service today. The SSN-21 is such a platform.
But antisubmarine warfare against any adversary is only one aspect of the SSN’s role. It can also be moved into an area of concern rapidly and stealthily without unnecessary provocation (as in the Risingfast scenario), and while waiting for further developments or direction, the SSN’s sophisticated sensors can engage in covert surveillance, including Indication and Warning (I&W), all the while providing the CinC with a source of tremendous on-the- scene firepower, with its land-attack cruise missiles ready to be launched instantaneously on order. This same SSN can simultaneously surreptitiously deploy SEALs or other special forces right on the enemy’s doorstep—something no other platform can accomplish with the same degree of stealth. The SSN can also plant mines in the threat nation’s navigational routes.
All these capabilities—antisubmarine, antisurface, land-attack strike, special-forces insertion, mining, and covert surveillance—are available and ready in our submarine force today. But the most advanced of our current SSNs, the improved 688, has reached the limits of technological improvement, including weapons loadout and sensor capabilities.
The Seawolf, in addition to twice the weapons loadout capacity of the 688 class and revolutionary improvements in quieting, tactical speed, and detection capability, will have the flexibility for accepting continued improvements in weapons, sensors, and data processing as technology evolves.
In a Navy that is sure to be smaller, with the emphasis on maintaining technological superiority rather than superiority in size of force, the SSN-21 is the only responsible choice. It ensures superiority in submarine warfare and provides a magnificent platform for ably responding to the uncertain threats of today and into the next century.
4,v the first brightening of the early morning sky begins to illuminate the Risingfast coast, the officer of the deck shifts the periscope optics out of low-light intensification. Thus far, as observed by the Seawolf, air and naval activity are particularly intense. Message support traffic corroborates the captain's evaluation that Risingfast is indeed gearing up for some type of military activity. Perhaps diplomatic efforts will be effective this time, perhaps not. As the captain notes to himself, one must hope and pray for the former and be ready for the latter. As always, the Seawolf is ready . . .
'Daniel L. Cooper, VADM, USN, “Address to Naval Submarine League Annual Symposium, 14 June 1990,” The Submarine Review (July 1990), pp. 5-14.
Commander Lemkin was selected as a Federal Executive Fellow for 1990-1991 and is assigned to the Atlantic Council of the United States. During his extensive career in submarines, he commanded the Hynum G. Rickover (SSN-709) from 1988 to 1990.