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The Afghan mujahedin used Stinger ground-to-air missiles successfully to offset Soviet air superiority, a fragile battlefield condition that U. S. Marines have long taken for granted. Would the ground Marines do as well, if suddenly taken under air attack for the first time in 45 years?
Marine Corps doctrine is based on the assumption of air superiority—a dangerous one—and makes no provision for action should that assumption prove false.
We have, in fact, no written doctrine that does not assume air superiority, according to the officers 1 interviewed recently in the ground doctrine section at the Warfighting Center. Disturbing as this answer is, however, it confirms my earlier research in Fleet Marine Force manuals and interviews with many experienced instructors and students at Amphibious Warfare School.
1 have yet to find an officer who has participated in a ground exercise that was not based on this “assumption.” Many of the officers were even surprised by the question, which in itself is revealing. Air superiority has been assumed for so long that it has become an axiom for all our tactical thinking. This belief is difficult to understand when examined in light of recent history, which includes many examples of successful operations fought without air superiority—the North Koreans and communist Chinese in the Korean War, the North Vietnamese during the Vietnam War, and the mujahedin against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Although a country may fight successfully without air superiority, it may not be able to fight successfully if it assumes air superiority.
The U. S. armed forces define air superiority as “the degree of dominance in the air battle of one force over another which permits the conduct of operations by the former and its related land, sea and air forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by the opposing force.” This definition, like so many from joint publications, sounds as if a lawyer wrote it; perhaps that is
why it is so misunderstood.
This is my definition: “Air superiority is a fragile- teI1j
porary condition which is established only with great .
J -in hich
fort by our antiair warfare assets. It is not a condition which the threat cannot attack us; it is a condition in w
his attacks cannot prohibitively interfere with our
land-
air, and sea operations.” “Prohibitive interference defined as interference of such an extent that we cann reasonably hope to accomplish our mission and retain combat power for future operations. .
If air superiority is so fragile, why do we make assumption that we always will have it? We make it cause we are a product of our experience, and for 45 yea no Marine on the ground has been attacked by an ene ' aircraft. Our current leaders’ combat experience is 1 they have enjoyed not only air superiority but air s premacy—meaning that the enemy could not (or luck1) did not) attack from the air.
The Soviet Army views air superiority differently^ result of its experience with the German Luftwaffe durnv World War II. Because the Soviets do not assume air sup riority, they place great emphasis on antiair warfare we‘^r ons and tactics, particularly in defending their maneuv elements. .
In contrast with the two air defense systems curren ; employed by the Marine Corps, HAWK and Stinger-[1 Soviets have more than 15. .
Just as the Soviets learned from the Luftwaffe, the ^ raelis have learned from the Egyptians, and the Brit11, from the Argentines. ■
In 1973, Egypt was able to gain and maintain air supL ority over the Suez Canal without using any aircra ' Egypt used its Soviet surface-to-air missile (SAM) ^ terns and antiaircraft artillery (AAA) to cover gr°u^j forces as they crossed the canal. The Israelis had assum air superiority based on their experience in the 1967 Ara Israeli War. This assumption proved deadly for many 1
raelis on the ground and in the air. The introduction
of the
an
to
Soviet model of establishing air superiority by using integrated system of SAMs and AAA was a lesson which most of the world paid close attention. f
In 1982, the British assumed that air superiority °v the Falklands would be established quickly and ma
ta'ned by the Royal Navy’s air arm and that their naval and §r°und operations would have little worry from enemy air attack. In the event, the British lost many ships, aircraft, and lives to Argentine air power. Some authorities main- ta'n that the entire operation would have been called off if British had lost one more major ship. It is doubtful the
r'tish will assume air superiority again.
. Even the view of the U. S. Army toward air superiority 's very different than that of the Marine Corps. The Army . °es not assume air superiority and puts great emphasis on !’? air defense artillery (ADA), a separate combat arm. E‘ke the Soviets, the Army provides air defense units to all 'Maneuver elements. Although the Army relies on the Air . °rce as much as possible, it does not assume that the Air °rce always will provide enough fighter cover to prevent anV enemy air attacks.
, The assumption of air superiority by the Marine Corps ^as resulted in a serious lack of priority for air defense Capons and tactics. After all, if we have air superiority, do we need weapons to defend ourselves against enemy air attacks? The Marine Corps’s only weapon systems that are dedicated to air defense belong to the avia- l|()n combat element of the air-ground task force. The ®r°und combat element and the combat service support ^ement have no air defense weapons or units dedicated to ^fending them against enemy air attacks. What about our ,'Shters? They are very important to the Marine Corps *ntegrated air defense system, but it must be remembered *kat they are also expected to conduct close and deep air SuPport. Thus, they are not totally dedicated to defending a§ainst enemy air attacks.
As if the Marine Corps’s air defense situation were not
bad already, it is going to get worse. For the past 29 years the centerpiece of our air defense system has been the HAWK missile system; it is the only system we have with a realistic 24-hour, all-weather capability. Within the next two years each Marine Expeditionary Force will lose one of its three HAWK batteries.
Our dangerous assumption is also the reason why so little emphasis is given to passive air defense—i.e., the measures by which we can minimize the effects of enemy air attacks. The North Vietnamese and the Vietcong showed us that the effects of air attacks can be lessened and often countered if the proper measures are taken— both used camouflage effectively and operated at night when possible. Of course, the lessons are not important if you assume that you never will be attacked from the air.
Another result of our dangerous assumption has been our lack of training in how to fight without air superiority. While we hope to have air superiority most of the time, even the most optimistic among us must admit that there will be periods without air superiority in the amphibious objective area.
No military expert would argue that air superiority is not important. It is vital to our ability to win ultimate victories on our next battlefield. It is far too important a condition for us to take for granted. We can fight and win without it for short periods, but certainly that kind of fighting will be far different from the standard daytime tactics being taught and practiced throughout the Fleet Marine Force.
In order to correct the problems created by our assumption of air superiority, we must begin immediately to do several things. First, we must recognize that air superior-
Does the Marine Corps Really Need HAWK?
The Marine Corps has long prided itself on the ability of its combined arms organization, the Marine air-ground task force, to accomplish any assigned mission as a self-contained fighting force. But recent events indicate that a scenario where the Navy- Marine Corps team will act independently is remote.
The most likely case for independent action is at the lower end of the spectrum of conflict, where a Marine expeditionary unit—about 2,000 Marines and sailors—would be used. These units have no assigned HAWK assets (though they could be assigned) since employment of so small a force generally envisions complete air superiority and no air threat. So, the Marine Corps does not need HAWK at this level.
As we move higher on the conventional level of conflict, we are likely to use the Marine expeditionary brigade as our fighting force. HAWK is assigned to our brigades, though in small numbers (notionally one battery). The pertinent questions here are: Where will those limited HAWK assets be used? Will the brigade be employed independently or as part of a joint force? And, how significant will the air threat be?
The HAWK system will probably be used to defend the aviation combat element’s airfield. It is a high-value resource for ensuring air superiority is maintained, and the HAWK batteries normally are assigned to the aviation element.
But do we really need HAWK in this case? Or is it just nice to have as we try to consider all situations. Chances are we will not be employed independently, but as part of a joint force. Perhaps HAWK missile capabilities could be provided by another service, more accustomed to operating as a heavier and more static force. Besides, the best we could do as a stand-alone force would be to destroy a maximum of 24 enemy aircraft in a single attack with the notional brigade organization, though we expect to engage only those aircraft that have “leaked through” fighter defenses.
The air threat in mid-intensity conflict would probably be minimal, along the lines of the Falk- lands War. Even there, the British Rapier system proved ineffective against leakers because they could not get positioned to cover all avenues of approach. But U. S. forces in the same scenario would undoubtedly have more air assets
to counter the enemy threat than did the British with their HamL force. In a brigade operation, then, the primary air threat would be from “leakers.” D° we need the HAWK capability to defend against these aircraft’ or are other weapons available- I contend that HAWK is not needed. _
When we finally become involved in a Marine expeditionary force scenario, we must reC ognize a serious, strong air threat. Does the force alone p°s sess enough air defense assets counter this threat? The ans^T is probably no, since the HAW
ity cannot be assumed and cannot be seen as an exclusive responsibility of the aviation combat element. Air superiority is the purpose of antiair warfare—one of the six functions of Marine aviation. So, obviously, it must be the air wing’s job to establish and maintain air superiority, right? Wrong! It is every Marine’s responsibility to do his part. Air defense is no more exclusively an aviation job than nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) defense is a ground job.
Second, we must have written doctrine on how to fight without air superiority, and our exercises must require us to employ that doctrine. Maneuver elements should be required to fight with the enemy in control of the airspace. By doing so we will kill two birds with one stone; it will require our units to fight at night and in bad weather in
order to counter the enemy’s supporting arms. Someorie did that to us once. .
Third, we must start teaching antiair warfare to ouro cers at all levels of their professional military education Currently only two or three hours of instruction are d voted to the subject at the formal officer schools in Quarl tico. Compare that with the excellent one-week nucleaf- biological and chemical package of instruction at Ampb* ious Warfare School, or the two-week cold weather paL' age (which includes a week in Bridgeport, Californ'a\ NBC and cold weather training are important, but what aT you more likely to face on the next battlefield—nerve ga!> or Hind helicopters?
It is a strong signal that something is wrong if our be and brightest officers, serving as instructors, are not con 1
. By Lieutenant Colonel R. E. Sonnenberg, U. S. Marine Corps
^’teries will be spread out and nable to cover all corridors tyected to be used by a deter
mined
enemy. Besides, the Ma-
es wiH be part of a joint urce’ and other assets could be Ctl to provide air defense.
In
summary, I must conclude
th
raj the Marine Corps does not ceQally need HAWK. Given the sj ncePt of employment envi- , ned in any size task force, we °w we will not face much of a'r threat in a unit- or bri- j* e-sized operation. If operat- 8 with a brigade, we would efj >fbly defend against “leak- II ■ If operating as an expedi- rj°nary force, we will face a se- l Us, significant air threat and jj sPread too thin to be effec- jje without outside support.
0r 5e we can expect a brigade
k it°rCe t0 be Part °f a joint a, . force, other assets will be liable.
, HAWK is a mobile system,
|[s difficult to transport quickly. Sl2e, bulk, and considerable
j °t°r transport assets, plus the ensive maintenance effort re- 1, lred, result in a large and Seavy system not mobile in the •-Se that it can move quickly.
K also relies quite heavily s Perfectly working set of
Hawk
on
c°nn
isystems (data links, power,
fnunications) to be effective.
In the heat of battle and fog of war, this utopia may not be achieved. Therefore, we can make better use of the space required to move a fragile HAWK unit supporting a MAGTF.
The Marine Corps should reevaluate the need for the capability HAWK offers considering its bulk, complexity, and intended use. Perhaps the expeditionary and amphibiously oriented Marine Corps does not need the capability of low-to- medium altitude antiaircraft surface-to-air-missiles. By forgoing some centralized control, we could develop other systems to handle the perceived threat. Using Stinger is one method of accomplishing this, though Stinger is a low-altitude, line- of-sight weapon (positive identification is good, though). More Stingers could be employed as individual weapons. Or, other means of employment could be explored. Contractors are beginning to mount multiple Stinger launchers on vehicles, such as the Avenger, a high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) with eight missiles in two launchers. This highly mobile system will be able to react quickly to warnings of incoming enemy aircraft.
Perhaps we should look at arming helicopters for the low- to-medium altitude air defense mission. The ability to react quickly to an incoming threat is necessary in today’s high speed tactical environment. Since a sophisticated enemy will have forces coming in low and fast, maybe we shouldn’t be overly concerned about the medium altitude and let friendly fast- movers and helicopters handle the situation.
Or, maybe we should just recognize that the brigade- or force-size operations we will encounter are really going to be joint operations. If the threat warrants, we should rely on other services to provide the capability now provided by HAWK, and allow the Marine Air Ground Task Force to retain its highly mobile character.
In any case, the Marine Corps, should eliminate the 30- year old HAWK and find a better way to provide the capability required.
Colonel Sonnenberg is assigned to the Marine Air-Ground Task Force Warfighting Center at Quantico, Va. He has a Masters degree in computer science and has served in data processing units throughout the Marine Corps. He is a 1989 Naval War College graduate.
\ynt about teaching us how to fight without air superiority, ty, should teach officers what they need to know, not We know how to teach!
dj anecdote may illustrate the pervasiveness of our ^gerous assumption. After briefing a group of young [t ICers on the future of the Corps, a senior officer asked if ta/6 Were any HAWK officers in the group. A few of us ^ed our hands, whereupon he told us that we needed to •>i, a new military occupational specialty (MOS).
AWk is too heavy—when have we ever fired one in .§er anyway?,” he said. (Actually there is no “HAWK pre ^ the MOS is 7204 Antiair Warfare Officer, which beSently includes HAWK and Stinger as the weapons to !hi Usech) Fighters are going away, he added, since any- 8 that cannot land on an amphibious ship will not go.
Well, that leaves us with Stinger as the only dedicated air defense weapon in the Corps (and no officers—since all 7204s got new MOSs).
Troubled by this apparent lack of concern for the enemy air threat, I asked him how the Corps planned to establish air superiority and defend against the enemy air threat. He answered that we will not go to war by ourselves—I guess he meant that someone else, the Navy or the Army or some “ally” will take care of us.
Now, that is a dangerous assumption indeed!
Captain King is the commanding officer of Alpha Battery, Second Low Altitude Air Defense Battalion, MCAS Cherry Point. N. C. He is a 1989 honor graduate of the Amphibious Warfare School.