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While reviewing the impact of events in 1988 on the U. S. Marine Corps, I first thought—as one who once wore the green—that regardless of the tide of national and international events the Marine Corps will remain one of the President's most versatile instruments of U. S. power and diplomacy. With that in mind, this is my look "over the trench,” from which the Marine Corps has always had to fight for survival.
First, 1988 brought the end of the Reagan buildup, which was significant because it marked the first time since Dwight Eisenhower’s presidency that we enjoyed eight consecutive years under a single commander-inchief. In my opinion, Ronald Reagan’s successor, George Bush, is equally strong in his leadership and his commitment to a national defense apparatus that is fully capable of protecting our vital national interests and meeting all of our international commitments.
Second, our new commander-in-chief and the Marine Corps are confronted with new fiscal reality, which leaves uncertain the level at which modernization can continue and the level of force structure that can be maintained. It is possible to sink to a level of defense spending that would compel a slowdown in modernization efforts, if we strive to maintain the high states ol readiness to meet our worldwide commitments that we have attained during the 1980s. The problem of decrea^' ing defense dollars is compounded by the fact that the
Naval Review'
?Un is to provide two manufacturers with lvv° guns and two LAV chassis each, for which they will develop turrets for intention into the LAV configuration.
During 1988 a new generation of the man-portable Stinger surface-to-air mis- Sl'e (which provides an ultraviolet as well as infrared tracking mechanism) was toadied for fielding in 1989. It is called ac Stinger RMP (for reprogrammable Couiputer microprocessor) and expecta- tlons are that 8,000 will be delivered dur- jj'g 1989 if funding holds out. However, ae pedestal-mounted Stinger (a turret with two four-pack Stinger launchers for mounting on the rear of the HMMWV [high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle]) was delayed by budgetary restraints. The Marine Corps also signed 1988 contracts with General Electric and FMC to build prototypes of an air defense LAV, which could include the Stinger as the antiair weapon (a 25-mm. weapon, the Hydra 70 pod could be chosen, as well).
The emphasis on the Corps's LIC role in no way diminished the requirement for adequate amphibious shipping; it may even impose heavier requirements. In the next 14 years, the Navy is scheduled to retire 55 amphibious ships. The prospects for replacing them become dimmer by the year. According to General Gray’s annual report to the Congress, U. S. naval forces require amphibious lift for two Marine expeditionary forces (MEFs), one from each coast. The prospects for getting a two-MEF amphibious lift are remote. Some 1988 developments were encouraging, however. Ingalls Shipbuilding was awarded $341.4 million to design, construct, test, outfit, deliver.
Mar'rani°Unt mgredient in a formula for the future. The r'He
ar'ne Corps Combat Development Center and the Ma- ^Ccmps Research Development and Acquisition Com-
By the Honorable Sam Nunn
Manpower pool of young men and women needed for °Ur armed forces is shrinking and will continue to do so until 1996. Recruiting and reenlisting high quality per- >nel will pose a leadership problem for the Corps dur- ln8 this period.
Third, there is little doubt that 1988 was a year in nich world and national events—both political and mil- ,,ary reinforced the need for the U. S. Marine Corps as e cornerstone of future American defenses. Foremost in esc developments was the leadership of a practical, ft'amic, aggressive, and above all else, decisive Com- «ndant—A1 Gray, a giant among his peers.
my opinion, the most significant changes General ray has initiated in the Corps are: the reorganization hm the Fleet Marine Forces; the enormous effort to- v | improved Marine battle skills training; and the de- °Pment of new concepts for professional military edu- iiall°n ^ mUSt remem^ere^ ^at 1988 was the first / year of the “Gray administration,” and his deter- cbv^ Perscverancc 'n making every Marine a warrior is yously reflected in his concentration on basic battle ’’kills
pi ^ Gray has moved out smartly. He has begun to im- >his'llent t*le G°ldwater/Nichols military reform act, and "nil enhance the Marine Corps’s position in the joint s(raa- The Marines’ Total Force doctrine was given ^ cture as Manpower and Reserve Affairs were com- u d mto one headquarters element. Marine battle skills <*nle 3 ^as'c Part °f ^ training plan at multiple lev- d mnnghout the Corps, as General Gray removed all 1 about his conviction that a return to the basics was
Were ^ot'1 established at Quantico, transforming r,0, .tstoric Marine Corps training base into a true war- j^'ng center.
, action, the Marine Corps completed the grounded °n an upgraded program of professional military Cation for its officers, staff noncommissioned offi- them an(l noncommissioned officers. This will be imple- deecjSc* 'aim this year. The goal of this effort—and in- efp ’ lbe certain collective results of all of these 1988 leticeS 'wiH be enhanced morale and operational competing at ab grade levels and in all specialty codes and Slip asslgnments, adding luster to the Corps’s already p reputation for professional military excellence.
to_ as a result of—and largely as a complement
ititen. 6Se Ifltintives, the Corps formalized its own low- ny conflict capabilities, in an environment where
increasing budgetary constraints have forced attention on means of replacing massive worldwide troop presence with smaller, highly mobile, quick-reaction capabilities. The Special Operations Force, for example, is here to stay and will receive increasing support from Congress.
In short, 1988 may well have produced historic events that will ensure the quality of our nation’s defense, and will forge forever an expanding role for the warriors of the United States Marine Corps.
I have just completed my first day of hearings with President Bush's newly designated Secretary of Defense. I have known and worked with Dick Cheney for more than a decade. We jointly sponsored the legislation that eventually led to the law requiring the annual National Strategy review. His responses to my questions on the need for the United States to continue the force structure needed to support the doctrine of maritime superiority were totally supportive. And the Navy-Marine Corps team is the very heart of this strategy.
Senator Warner (R-VA) is the ranking minority member on the Senate Committee on Armed Services.
. . . Into the Future
The events of 1988 provided additional and, in some instances, significant reinforcement of trends that had emerged earlier. In national affairs, the prospect of flat defense budgets remained, owing to continuing fiscal pressures and diminishing public support. On the international scene, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev announced bold policies and proposals that further raised hopes for a more stable superpower relationship and peaceful resolution of some regional conflicts. Notwithstanding the heightened attention to East-West relations, the predominant form of global violence continued to be unconventional warfare, including terrorism. Less important, but still significant—especially for the Marine Corps—were more troubled negotiations and increasing costs, both financial and political, associated with foreign-based U. S. forces.
Forecasting the outcome of these events and trends is difficult. Moreover, some developments, especially those related to new Soviet policies, must be approached with considerable caution. Even while resisting the temptation to arrive at unwarranted conclusions or to take premature
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’Ced"iRs / Naval Review 1989