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To mark the 20th anniversary of the Pueblo incident, the fall issue of Naval History carried a feature comprised of oral history excerpts from five flag officers who were involved in various facets of the situation. The late Vice Admiral Edwin B. Hooper, USN (Ret.), was Commander Service Force Pacific Fleet when the Pueblo (AGER-2) was preparing for her intelligence-gathering mission. Admiral John J. Hyland, USN (Ret.), was Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet at the time of the Pueblo’s capture. Vice Admiral Kent L. Lee, USN (Ret.), was in 1968 a captain and skipper of the aircraft carrier Enterprise (CVAN-65); his excerpt told why the carrier did not send her planes to the Pueblo’s rescue. Vice Admiral John V. Smith, USN (Ret.), described the frustrations of trying to negotiate with the North Koreans for release of the ship’s crew. Vice Admiral George P. Steele II, USN (Ret.), recounted the release of the crew in December 1968. Commander Lloyd M. Bucher, who was the commanding officer of the Pueblo, responded to the admirals by providing his own recounting of the events of 1966-68. His seven-page response appears in the current winter issue of Naval History, excerpts from his statement are published here.
Intelligence Problems: From my point of view intelligence support for the Pueblo was perhaps the sorriest, poorest and most regrettable of all aspects of the entire incident. A few of the debacles known to me are presented here for the reader’s edification.
After proposal of the mission and review by the intelligence community in Washington, approval was required by each of the many echelons named previously. Final approval was withheld until the last possible moment in order, presumably, to take advantage of the very latest intelligence appraisals. The final approval for the Pueblo’s mission came to ComNavForJapan only the night before our scheduled departure from Yokosuka.
As I was to find out during the court of inquiry, the CinCPacFlt approval of the mission with its appraisal of “minimum risk” came over the objection of Lieutenant Commander Richard A. MacKinnon, assigned to the Korean intelligence desk. He had evaluated certain information available to him which, in his mind, made the mission risky indeed. His next senior on the staff disagreed with him. He reevaluated his available information and concluded again that the mission should not be conducted. This time he took his recommendation to the CinCPacFlt special assistant for Naval Security Group matters, Captain Everett B. Gladding. He was again rebuffed and later went to either the chief of staff or to CinCPacFlt, Admiral John J. Hyland, with his findings. He was again rebuffed in his attempt to have the mission canceled or postponed.
Later, following the seizure of the Pueblo, Lieutenant Commander MacKinnon was transferred to a new duty station at 12th Naval District headquarters, where his duties were below his training and ability. He requested permission to testify before the court of inquiry. He was denied permission. Fellow naval officers scored him a troublemaker. It was at this point that he came to me with his story. I went to Vice Admiral Harold G. Bowen, Jr., who was the senior member of the court of inquiry and requested that the officer be allowed to give testimony under oath. The testimony was taken behind closed doors. Although there was absolutely nothing classified about any of his testimony, it was embarrassing.
I feel certain MacKinnon’s career was finished the minute he bucked the line. Some senior officers have suggested that I was completely wrong in not disobeying an ill-advised order to the effect that I should keep my gun covers on. Here was an example of an officer who tried to overcome an ill-advised order and paid a
MIAMI NEWS (CHARLES TRAlNOW
rather high price. It makes it difficult for a person to know which ill-advised orders to disobey. . . .
A recommendation was made by the National Security Agency to the Jo>nt Chiefs of Staff that the Pueblo mission should be reevaluated or canceled. The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not receive that message, nor have I ever learned if it was received by CinCPacFlt, to whom it was also addressed for information.
On 21 January 1968, 40 hours before the attack of the Pueblo, a most noteworthy event took place in South Korea. A raiding party of North Koreans was dispatched there to assassinate South Korean President Park Chung Hee and became popularly known as the “Blue House raid.” The raiding party was killed, save one man who eventually gave the details of the raid. Now to most laymen this would have been a significant event; I found out later it had been headlined in most U. S. newspapers. The Pueblo was supposed to receive a daily intelligence summary from CinCPacFlt and ComNavForJapan. No mention of that raid was ever made to the Pueblo... No higher echelon bothered to tell me that the raid had occurred. I firmly believe that the Blue House raid was the trigger that caused the North Koreans to attack the Pueblo. . . .
The Attack and Seizure: The confrontation began about noon on 23 January with the rapid approach of three P-4 torpedo boats and one SO-1 gunboat. All were at battle stations with their mounts trained on us. The temperature was below freezing. We were at the time lying to in order to conserve fuel. Since we were well outside the claimed 12-mile limit and since my orders required me to stay outside 13 nautical miles and to uphold the principle of freedom of the high seas, 1 decided to stay right where I was. As a gesture toward maintaining our assigned cover story, I ordered the civilian oceanographers to man their deck winch and
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Proceedings / February 1989
commence operations.
The ships confronting the Pueblo were soon joined by a fourth P-4 and another SO-1 also at battle stations. It indeed seemed we were in for some heavy harassment, and I ordered a modified damage control condition set below decks. I also ordered that no one except the bridge watch come topside; I wanted the Pueblo t0 appear lightly manned. It may be fairly asked why the ship was not sent to general quarters. The P-4 torpedo boats took station less than 100 yards away. My orders included specific tasking to determine what response would be elicited by the presence of an unarmed surveillance shtp operating in international waters adjacent to North Korea. I was additionally ordered not to be provocative or give the £<orth Koreans an excuse for attacking. ^uch an attack might draw the United States into another war. To have ordered general quarters could have provided the Provocation that we most certainly did n°t want.
I released an operational immediate tressage that reported the events in progress. I was n0( overly worried, except for °ur watertight integrity. One of the SO-1 gunboats raised an international code of Slgnals flag hoist which queried our na- honality. I ordered the ensign raised. It Was common practice not to fly the en- Slgn on these missions, not wishing to advertise unnecessarily. We observed a lurry of activity on the bridge of the ^O-l when our ensign went up. Within 'lve minutes a new signal was in the air lr°m him, “Heave to or I will fire.” I Was already hove to. I was perplexed, Primarily because of concern about giv- 'ng the appearance of following his order.
1 sent a Critic message advising higher command of what was transpiring. Critic meant that our message would go to all uigher commands including the White House.
At that time all of the P-4s were within ‘0-50 yards of the Pueblo, stationed on ooth bows and quarters. One of them attempted to bring a boarding party to my larboard quarter. The harassment now Seemed in earnest, but I still thought it Was a bluff. I ordered the ship under way, departing at one-third speed to allow the °ceanographers to retrieve their equipment. I ordered a course that would most quickly open the Korean coastline and ordered full speed ahead. Within five minutes or so we were at full speed, 12 knots, and the P-4s were running rings ar°und us. . . . One of the SO-Is again raised the signal to heave to or they Would fire. I ignored the signal and continued on.
A few minutes later the P-4s moved away from the ship to about 500 yards and one SO-1 commenced firing its cannon at us from about 3,000 yards. The tlrst salvo carried away our HiCom antenna and wounded many on the flying bridge. I had taken the precaution to order that preparations be made to destroy classified material and now I ordered it done. The crew was at modified general quarters. Between salvos from the SO-ls, the P-4s darted in and raked the ship with machine gun fire. There was no possibility of manning our machine guns, or getting to the ammunition and preparing the guns to fire. The tarps were frozen and the gun positions were totally exposed. I radioed for immediate assistance and gave details of what was occurring.
Soon it became apparent that further flight was impossible, without a slaughter of the crew and the probable loss of all classified material. I thought to buy time by coming to a stop. During the firing the classified material destruction was not properly progressing. I hoped that this above all else could be accomplished before we were all killed or the ship was seized or whatever was to happen. I desperately hoped that U. S. forces would appear on the scene, and I had communications from Kamiseya indicating the “help was on the way.” Two North Korean MiGs were now flying over us and firing rockets ineffectively. We had to depend on the promised help if the ship was to ever have a chance of breaking clear of the situation.
I conferred with my engineer officer about the possibility of scuttling. We concluded the Pueblo might only founder, so I decided it was best to hold on so we could escape when the promised help arrived. Because we hadn’t received an effective scuttling system, we were concerned that the ship would sink only partway. And if so, the first casualty would be our communications, inasmuch as the generators would flood first. Also if help arrived, I wanted to be able to move out of there as quickly as possible.
I followed the North Koreans toward their coast for perhaps an hour at dead slow speed trying to give my men as much time as possible for classified material destruction, which was going very slowly due to the fantastic amount of material and the lack of adequate destruction facilities. Wastebaskets were pressed into use as incinerators, filling the passageways with smoke. . . .
Following a quick inspection below decks, I decided that we would have to chance heading back to sea to gain more time, so I swung the ship once again to the east. Immediately we were taken under fire again, this time resulting in several more people being hit and one man mortally wounded. I swung the ship back slowly and wondered if the small amount of time my action bought had been worth it. By now more than two hours had passed since we had been taken under attack and had asked for assistance.
(Events at the court of inquiry made it clear that the USS Enterprise [CVAN-65] and two other carriers were less than one hour’s flight time from us when we first asked for assistance and told the world that we were under fire. U. S. forces in South Korea were even closer.) We were boarded about 1445, and it was well after 1900 when the ship was finally brought to dock in Wonsan. . . .
Admiral Hyland concluded his remarks by observing that, all things considered,
‘ ‘ B ucher got a completely failing grade. ’ ’ That being the case, I wonder what grade is assigned to the naval and air forces, close at hand, who did not respond to our plight? What grade can be given to the many commanders, such as himself, who were not prepared for our emergency? What grade for the intelligence community that performed so miserably? . . .
Questions Remain: Now I have some questions. The admirals find the reasoning for my actions faulty. They have reasons and excuses for not assisting the Pueblo. Why should anyone accept their reasoning?
If the confessions we signed under brutal conditions were bad, how much worse was the confession the United States Government signed to get us released?
Was the United States warned in advance of the potential for seizure of the Pueblo, and, if so, why was the Pueblo not warned? President Lyndon Johnson remarked in a press conference on 18 April 1968, “. . . in the case of the Pueblo, the North Koreans had warned and threatened the Pueblo for a period of several weeks before they seized her.” If there was a threat or some intelligence from North Korea of an expected reaction to the Blue House raid, why were we on the Pueblo not notified in any way, shape, manner, fashion, or form? . . .
Recently, the Defense Department again slighted the crew members of the Pueblo by refusing them POW medals, insisting that since we were not at war with North Korea, the Pueblo crew could not be “prisoners of war.” Those medals were awarded, and deservedly so, to the prisoners of North Vietnam, with which we were also not at war. These slights to the crew of the Pueblo infuriate me. Regardless of what the Navy Department thinks of me, why doesn’t it give consideration to a crew that acted heroically? . . .
To obtain copies of the Fall 1988 and/or Winter 1989 issues of Naval History, readers should write to the Assistant Circulation Director, U. S. Naval Institute, 2062 Generals Highway, Annapolis, Maryland 21401. Send $3.00 per issue for members of the Naval Institute and $6.00 for nonmembers, plus $1.00 per issue for postage and handling.
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^roceedings / February 1989