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As the future comes racing in, the Marine Corps must cho°s<j between riding the wave of high-tech enhancements to convention warfare capabilities and equipping and training itself for the "i creasing demands of low-intensity warfare around the gl°be'
be capable of a wide range of conventional warfare ^ Nuclear arms control will have a significant ene $ conventional land warfare. With the Intermediate Nu 0 Forces (INF) agreement, the perceived nuclear thre will rise, especially in NATO. This trend may be aC^0f ated by West Germany’s proposal to reduce the nuff> 0{ NATO’s short-range battlefield nuclear weapons, m0, which are stored on its soil.2 Clearly, in perception } in fact, a less nuclear world is emerging. Experts f°re‘^ gap in deterrence with the Soviet Union and thus a n£e
The U. S. Marine Corps is at a juncture. Land warfare is in a technology revolution, and the world political scene is becoming more frenetic, less nuclear, and increasingly multipolar. What should the U. S. Marine Corps’s role be in this brave, new world of military and political realities? Should the Corps ride the wave of new technologies toward enhancing conventional warfare capability, or should it embrace totally the challenge of low-intensity warfare? Which mission should the Marine Corps select?
The Mission: Low-intensity conflicts (LICs) will most surely exceed the number of mid- and high-intensity conflicts in the future. Increasing nationalism, religious and racial strife, bitter sectarian enmities, competition for materials and energy, and endemic poverty will ensure a slow bum into the 21st century. But, for the U. S. military there will be an important distinction among conflicts. The swift use of appropriate force will meet mid- and high-intensity threats to vital U. S. interests. By contrast, LICs will be mostly off-limits to U. S. military forces—certainly to U. S. ground forces—because of the Vietnam experience.
Anyone who believes another Vietnam War looms in America’s future has missed the war’s profound effect on the populace. Americans will support well-defined, circumscribed actions, such as the Grenada operation and the Mayaguez incident—provided the United States is clearly in the right, losses are low, and operations are concluded quickly. But they will not tolerate another prolonged blood drain like Vietnam.
The United States must depend on indigenous f°rC. during LICs. When properly supplied and trained, forces can achieve perhaps all that is achievable in k* | given the predominantly social and economic r0°tSuSt these types of conflicts. The United States for its part n’jty be a steadfast “Arsenal of Democracy” in low-ini®" warfare, and a combatant only when U. S. national ests cannot otherwise be protected. The moral impera^)r for the United States in the world is to be neither victm1^ executioner. Yet in Vietnam, the U. S. military utl ^ tingly became a bit of both. We must never again alio)' ,r military to be committed where it could become el j The United States is critically deficient in convent|(L|| land forces, relative to its commitments. The situation •, only worsen as demographics and manpower costs ma ■ more difficult for the United States to maintain a m11 „y establishment of two million active-duty members- j 1994 U. S. active-duty forces will probably have decre‘ ^s by 5%} In the 1990s, Congress and future administrate . increasingly will demand that all general-purpose t
bcr1
mand element. Each MEF can alternately form two
size-
of>s
tltf
will nee
to fight in MEFs or in large MEBs. A MEF is a po' ^ __ combat force of combined arms capable of defeat111'? numerically superior enemy. A MEB is a capable t ,
"*of»
under certain circumstances and for a prescribed per'1
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increase conventional combat capability, particularly in NATO and especially on land.
Representative Les Aspin (D-WI), chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, suggests that ten additional ground divisions are needed to restore NATO’s overall deterrent following the removal of INF missiles.3 But who would supply these additional forces? The U. S. Army, in part? Not likely. Budgetary constraints have forced the Army to actually consider decreasing forces in West Germany by one division and decreasing active-duty strength from 780,000 to as low as 750,000.4 In fact, a decrease to 772,300 will occur in fiscal year 1989 and a probable further decrease to 760,000 in fiscal year 1990.5
The U. S. Army did not increase its active strength during the Reagan defense buildup. Instead, it held active strength at 780,000 and embarked on an ambitious and overdue modernization program that includes 15 major acquisitions. Moreover, the Army formed four Light Infantry Divisions (LIDs) out of hide for non-NATO contingencies. The merits of these new feather-light units are still being debated, but the consensus within the Army is that LID personnel should have come from an increase in active-duty strength.6
Over the long term, the Army will have to choose between people and hardware. Full modernization without cutting personnel requires an unlikely 6% real growth in the Army budget.7 Under zero real growth, full modernization will require the Army to reduce drastically its active strength to as low as 521,000.8
These disparate developments could lead to some real trouble for the Marine Corps. If the Army were to provide more conventional ground combat capability for NATO while maintaining four LIDs, and if the Army attempts to trade off significant active-duty strength for modernization, will Congress and/or a future administration then point to the not-so-small Marine Corps as a source of additional Army strength? Contentious as it is, we should not dismiss this proposition out of hand, given the austere budgets that lie ahead for defense.
The United States might well need a larger Army or a different Army and be unable to afford either one; but, a nation so totally dependent upon the oceans cannot afford to compromise maritime power. If the United States loses access to important overseas bases—a conceivable turn of events in future decades—maritime power will gain even greater importance.
Leveraging Strength: Marine Corps combat power should form a distribution that peaks at the middle of the conflict spectrum. Such an arrangement would provide some capability for both high- and low-intensity warfare, but would squarely aim the preponderance of combat power at winning mid-intensity conflicts. This is eminently sensible. Mid-intensity conflicts are bound to occur, and they will hold serious consequences for the Western world. The very survival of U. S. allies may be at stake. At this level of conflict, maritime forces provide the United States with great usable leverage. Here, the U. S. Marine Corps can have an immense, even strategic, effect. At least one mid-intensity conflict involving the
United States is sure to occur in the next several decade- Korea, Southwest Asia, and the Mediterranean are like- battlefields. Thus, a need exists for Western mariti»,c power and a capable U. S. Marine Corps to project tn* power ashore.
Force Structure: Marine operational forces form trU‘ combined-arms teams as Marine Air-Ground Task Force" (MAGTFs). In the Fleet Marine Forces, Atlantic and Pa cific, there are three large MAGTFs called Marine E*Pe ditionary Forces (MEFs), consisting of a ground divisi°n' an aircraft wing, a force service support group, and ac0'11 rine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs), comprised of a re"' forced infantry regiment, an aircraft group, a brig30 service support group, and a command element.
In peacetime, MEFs form Marine Expeditionary Ln'j (MEUs), consisting of an infantry battalion, a reinfofCe helicopter squadron, service support, and command e ments. MEUs, the smallest of the MAGTFs, normal- deploy on board U. S. Navy amphibious ships for P1^ ence missions that may develop into contingencies (e-L, the 1983 Grenada operation).9 MEUs will play a speC' role in the few LICs in which the United States will lI1
ploy force. Forward deployed and rather limited in MEUs can be used quickly for short-duration opera11' by a U. S. president without the need to coordinate deployment of forces from the continental United Sta and other theaters of operation. . „
In wartime, Marines would fight in some combine of MEFs and MEBs. MEUs forward deployed at con initiation could be extremely useful. They could seC^. selected facilities and key terrain ashore, thereby expe ing the reinforcement of follow-on forces and saving v‘ able facilities, such as ports and airfields.
In mid- and high-intensity conflicts, Marines
but does not have the resiliency and tactical option* y MEF. Unfortunately, a MEF is much harder to deP ' than a MEB .
The Marine Corps Reserve includes a ground do'11’ ^ an aircraft wing, and a force service support group- s quality, Marine reservists are among the best; but in c ^ of MAGTFs, they form only a MEB because of equlP^(S, deficiencies. In addition, as in most reserve comp011 the Marine Reserve operates some older equipment limits interoperability with the active forces. j eg
A prime national goal should be to modernize pand the Marine Corps Reserve to produce a fully 1 ^ operable reserve MEF. Such an upgrade would inch1 ^ explicit intention to mobilize the reserve MEF early ,, completely as a second MEF under Fleet Marine '^e(C Atlantic. With two modern MEFs in each ocean, ^ would be little need to shift operational units betwe®nv aters. For the money, this would be the most combat j, bility the United States could buy—in an area when- most deficient.
$h',rategic Mobility: The U. S. Navy’s 63 amphibious
siPs lift slightly more than the assault echelon (AE) of a
MEF.10'
^Ua
These ships are split almost evenly between ar>tic and Pacific fleets, and it seems highly unlikely
yet, the Merchant Marine will lack 12,000 quali-
Sllff.a "swing” strategy would be employed to concentrate sj?e1Clent amphibious shipping in one ocean for a MEF- a antphibious operation.11 The U. S. Navy does include ^ amphibious ships in a deployable battle force ^ sh'ps, which it may achieve in the late 1990s.12 But sUr> 76 amphibious ships, a two-ocean split will not a MEF-size operation. After 1996, block obsoles- 8hiCe will become a major problem, since 45 amphibious ^ reach the end of their service lives by 2006.13 tj)Cr J'ile amphibious shipping for the AE is a problem, f^FrvUnt sh'PP‘n8 f°r tpie assault follow-on echelon tain ls a catastrophe steadily growing worse.14 To sus- e^.'he AE ashore, commercial ships are needed to lift ll5S'plTlent and supplies. Yet, the U. S. Merchant Marine theeen in serious decline for many years. By the end of kq'fK decade, there will be a significant shortfall of W ‘1 for all contingencies that include AFOE shipping, fi, Se
„Up Merchant seamen to man the required number of ^ ' assuming they are available, fa^ reasonable compromise in sealift for amphibious war- ^Se'L/0 Provicfe sufficient amphibious shipping for a 3sSll .^EB and a separate MEU in each ocean while also 5b|e ^e requisite level of merchant shipping is avail- <His s °r the two MEB AFOEs.15 This amount of amphibi- ailft should be written into law just as three Marine divisions and wings were made law by Congress nearly four decades ago.16
With more than a MEF embarked in amphibious shipping, four MEBs depend on prepositioned equipment and strategic airlift. Three MEBs worth of equipment and supplies are forward deployed on board three squadrons of commercial ships chartered to the Military Sealift Command.17 A fourth MEB’s equipment and supplies are stored on land in Norway. The Marine Corps Reserve is dependent upon the sequential use of strategic mobility assets.
In terms of deployment scenarios, MAGTFs will probably enter combat as MEUs and MEBs. However, they must grow to MEF size. Just as a MEU might hold the door open for a MEB, so a MEB must clear the way for a MEF. Piling MEB upon MEB is a necessary and sufficient strategy for achieving the requisite level of combat power.
Amphibious Assault: Amphibious warfare has made quantum leaps from the dismal failure at Gallipoli in World War I through the halcyon days of World War II to the master stroke at Inchon during the Korean War. The
43
In8s ! November 1988
intelligence, terrain, and surprise. With the synergy
combined arms, MAGTFs can defeat numerically supel
future will be no less progressive and bright. The next great innovation will be over-the-horizon (OTH) assault to better protect amphibious shipping and to provide greater latitude to the landing force.
Two components of the OTH assault, the landing craft air cushion (LCAC) and the MV-22 tilt-rotor aircraft, are now realities.18 A third component, the advanced assault amphibious vehicle (AAAV), will enter development in the early 1990s. The AAAV is needed because the LCAC and MV-22 will be too few, too valuable, and too vulnerable to land in the teeth of heavy infantry weapons. For instance, the 73-mm. gun on the ubiquitous Soviet BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicle and the 30-mm. gun on the newer BMP-2 easily overmatch MV-22 and LCAC ballistic protection. In addition, both BMP variants typically carry antiarmor and shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles.19
The AAAV is the strong third leg upon which future amphibious assault rests. The LCAC, MV-22, and AAAV can probably avoid landing near heavy armor formations because they will remain concentrated and farther behind the coastline for decisive action. But, it will be nearly impossible to avoid heavy infantry weapons, such as BMPs, because an enemy will spread these assets along a coastline as mobile combat outposts. The AAAV can I*111 ' in strength against such threats and prevail. With a -- ' mm. gun, 30-mm. ballistic protection, and carrying 31 ’ least a squad of infantry, the ideal AAAV will move ov£l ' the water at high speed in the OTH assault. Using 1j’1 | AAAV, OTH Marines can commit forcible entry by k'c ^ ing the door down and not just by trying to sneak ,r through open windows.
Combat Power: MAGTFs are relatively light f°r£l compared to Soviet-style mechanized and armored forc£' with their powerful artillery formations. Opposing f°r£e generally will outnumber MAGTFs, perhaps to an eS treme. The traditional approach for defeating a numer| cally superior force is through superior strategy and taC tics, which broadly include leadership, trainHV
rid
forces through a more efficient use of assets. Serious pr< lems arise, however, if a skillful enemy operates as e,‘ ciently or nearly so.
In this situation, the MAGTF must possess qualitativ£ superior weaponry. Nuclear weapons certainly make
qualitative difference, but they present special prof- Nuclear weapons are necessary for the worst-case sce^ ios but are not sufficient to form a primary strategy
MAGTF needs a nuclear weapons capability for
rence and contingency use; however, conventional ons that greatly increase MAGTF combat power are a
lutely necessary.
tial1
Conventional weapons with the greatest potentr making a difference have at least three properties: P
sufvl'.
ence, lethality, and reach. Presence means high ability and excellent reliability, availability, and main
ilaixl a 25" ng 31 :<,vC
2 ^ kick’
ak'(
S 'lity (RAM). These weapons fight on the battlefield day 5llJ night, rain or shine, and exact a heavy toll from the e"emy. Fragile weapon systems have no place in battle, Cv®n if they are repairable or covered by a manufactur- trs Warranty. What good is a warranty in combat? Who a weapon system that has to live under a mainte- ^nce tent?
. lethality requires that a weapon system have a high j'n8le shot probability of kill (Pk) and a short dwell time.
. a target-rich environment, targets must be killed j1ckly and surely without compromising the launch plat- ,r,T1’s survivability. First round kills are essential, since p tend to be fired “within parameters” and with the enient of surprise. They also reduce stockpile require- ver«s. Lethality requires that both Pk and dwell time be , ^ultaneously satisfactory. A deficiency in one can rarely e overcome by the other.
A weapon’s reach includes not only long range, but the Leans to acquire targets at maximum effective range. i/n§-range precision weapons are particularly desirable. ney also reduce stockpile requirements and the weight of O'tions transported, while killing targets sooner and ’ Orally enhancing survivability. For these reasons,
ter wave monolithic integrated circuits). Advanced microelectronics pack tremendous signal processing, data transfer, and weapon control capabilities into smaller volumes; reduce weight; increase RAM; and decrease costs in quantity production.21
Fortunately, advanced microelectronics is a strength of the West and a glaring weakness of the Soviet Union. It is logical for the United States to exploit this advantage. The Marine Corps, while clearly not the one to lead this parade, should follow this technology closely. Precision conventional weapons with science-fiction-like capabilities are coming. With these advanced weapons, and others more mundane, Marines will bring decisive combat power to future battlefields.
Like all successful organizations, the U. S. Marine Corps must continue to evolve and not ossify in its thinking. Dispensing with the obsolete, retaining the useful, acquiring the necessary, and knowing the differences are key planning considerations.
&at,
(ltl§ others, the recent Presidential Commission on Inte-
Statu Long-Term Strategy recommended that the United es acquire an assortment of precision conventional P°ns for a range of combat scenarios.20
‘Deputy Secretary of Defense William Taft IV, “Military Personnel Cutback Predicted,” Defense News, 14 December 1987, p. 42.
2Robert J. McCartney, “Bonn Presses for NATO Agreement on Plans to Upgrade Nuclear Arms,” The Washington Post, 27 February 1988, p. 4.
3Les Aspin, “Guest Viewpoint,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, 2 November 1987, p. 1.
4Larry Carney, “Army May Bring Back Division in Germany,” Army Times, 7 December 1987, pp. 1, 26.
5Larry Carney, “Army Fears Loss of $3B and 10,000 Troops in Huge Budget Shift to Shore Up Navy Firepower,” Defense News, 13 June 1988, p. 3.
6George C. Wilson, “Army Trainers Seek to Bolster Infantry’s Line,” The Washington Post, 7 November 1987, p. 1.
7Paul Mann, “Congress Saddled With Years of Tough Defense Decisions,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, 14 March 1988, p. 64.
8George C. Wilson, “Army Faces Deep Personnel Cuts to Pay for Arms,” The Washington Post, 11 February 1988, p. A4.
9From 1965 to February 1988, MEFs, MEBs, and MEUs were termed “amphibious” rather than “expeditionary.” In World War II, various Marine units also had “amphibious” in their designations.
,0Capt. Michael H. Decker, USMC, “Three MAFs for the Corps,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November 1987, p. 76; NAVMC 2710, “Marine Air- Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs),” U. S. Government Printing Office, 28 May 1985, pp. 12-14. The assault echelon of a MEF (or MEB) doctrinally includes logistical support for 15 days of combat. An assault follow-on echelon in commercial shipping carries logistical support for another 45 days of combat.
“Decker, p. 76.
l2Caspar W. Weinberger, Annual Report to Congress, Fiscal Year 1988, Executive Summary, p. 168.
l3Maj. Alan P. Heim, USMC, “Power Projection, Amphibious Lift, and the Navy/ Marine Corps Team,” Marine Corps Gazette, December 1987, p. 37.
,4LCol. Ky L. Thompson, USMC, “For Want of a Ship . . . ,” Marine Corps Gazette, June 1988, pp. 62-66.
,5NAVMC 2710, pp. 6, 8. A MEB requires 20-24 ships and a notional MEU of 3-5 ships. A large MEB would likely be in the 25-30 ship range. l6Title 10, U. S. Code, Section 5013.
“NAVMC 2710, p. 14.
I8LCdr. David H. Smith, USN, “New Speed for the Spearhead,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November 1987, pp. 41-49.
“Joseph R. Bumiece and Paul A. Hoven, “The BMP,” Combat Weapons, Summer 1986, pp. 18-23.
20George C. Wilson, “Precise Non-Nuclear Arms Urged,” The Washington Post, 10 January 1988, pp. 1, 22.
2iVHSIC Program Office, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, “Annual Report For 1986,” 31 December 1986.
p<;
it**'
%\'Chn°l°gy: Advanced microelectronics is the key tech- Cre °y °f precision weapons and has the potential to in- Wec (he presence, lethality, and reach of conventional Vf|L°ns- This technology is known by acronyms, such as ted L (very high-speed integrated circuits), IFPA (infra- °Cal plane arrays), and MIMIC (microwave/millime-
A veteran of both air and ground combat in Vietnam, Colonel Karch is a fighter pilot, test pilot, and nuclear engineer. For the past several years, he has worked on the Marine Corps’s highly successful light armored vehicle program. More recently, he joined the newly formed Joint Project Office for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in the Naval Air Systems Command.