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Since March 1985, however, a new leader in the Soviet
'°PS, as they cautiously advance, have discovered that the °viet trenches are abandoned. Soviet policy is on the march, we in the West have no choice but to follow. In a re-
ect*on. On top of everything else, expectations mount: the ti ^ntum seems irresistible, and because the public perspec- f itself is in motion, those who adhere to the status quo
‘he Sun Rises on Empty Trenches
For more than 40 years, U. S.-Soviet relations have been '°cked in the equivalent of a global trench warfare. On the 0viet side there has been unrelenting pressure against the c°alition of the West. On our side there has been, with some eXceptions, unceasing determination to resist that pressure, to c°ntain Soviet aggression, and to carry out our obligations as 5 feader of the free world.
The result of this has been stalemate. From time to time, J°stly new offensives have created a bulge in the front; new °rces have been brought to bear; a few yards of territory ave been won or lost to each side. But whenever the smoke eared, things were much as before. Neither side could make any real gains against the other.
^n'°n has begun to effect what appear to be important hanges in his country’s goals and methods. Suddenly, we j*re confronted with an entirely new set of strategic possibili- es- It is as if a night has passed containing sounds of move-
ent all along the Soviet lines, and now, at sunrise, our koi 5
S,
^rkably short time, relations between the two superpowers aVe changed from the politics of stalemate to the politics of Maneuver.
Among the peoples of the West, what President Reagan ailed the "Moscow spring” has been greeted with a delight Ordering on euphoria; nevertheless, the new situation poses r avenges to international security. If nothing else, the old e,ationship was at least stable. The nuclear strategies of both °untries contained a low order of risk. Each side viewed the I °rst case—a massive offensive by the Warsaw Pact escalat- 8 into a thermonuclear exchange—as the product of a strat- of last resort by the other side. In short, deterrence ^rked.
( Flow there is movement, and with movement comes uncer- l^'nty. For the present, the initiative rests with the Soviet rf.i'l°n' Western leaders must view Soviet actions in both a ative and a true sense. It has become harder to make the a|Culations of strength and interest that form the basis for an ti;ctive new strategy. It has become harder to fix the posi- is of the two centers of power. It is harder to understand— vch less to control—the direction and timing of the maneu- |,,rs- In the absence of historical distance, it is easy to mis- f a slight deviation in path for a fundamental change in
S in relative terms to be traveling backwards.
Cn*ed at the Current Strategy Forum, U. S. Naval War College. Newport, Island, 15 June 1988 "
It is clear that the Soviet leadership is as aware of the new uncertainties as we are and is exploiting them.
At the end of these maneuvers, the United States and the Soviet Union must take up new positions. By then, changes may have come about in their relationships to each other, to their own coalitions, and to the emerging superpowers of the future. On the Soviet side this will depend on the breadth, the depth, and the permanence of the Gorbachev reforms; on our side it will depend on the entire foundation of our national security—on science and education, on economic power, on diplomatic acumen, on defense strength, and above all, on national political will.
Both the Soviet impulse and our responses to it are worth examining in greater detail.
The 'Moscow Spring’
The growing conviction that General Secretary Gorbachev is serious about reform—and indeed the anticipation in 1985 that his rise to power would result in such a program—have stimulated a tremendous interest by Western observers in things Soviet. The international press has responded enthusiastically to the opportunity to roam without censorship in a country long removed from foreign scrutiny. Soviet officials have been remarkably forthcoming. The institutional Soviet obsession with appearing virtuous under all conditions has been notably absent. For example, who could imagine five years ago that the Soviet Communist Party would have permitted an official, fallen from grace, like deposed Moscow Party Chief Boris Yeltsin, to criticize members of the ruling Politboro in interviews with the Western press? But this is the epitome of Soviet fashion today. A sunburst of news stories has joined a very considerable open debate in Soviet periodicals to inform us of the challenges surrounding Glasnost and Perestroika. Every morning we can see the box score of the reported struggle between Gorbachev and his number two man, Yegor Ligachev.
But despite all this information, we must recognize that our understanding of what is happening in the Soviet Union is both incomplete and inconsistent. To some extent, our perceptions are being managed by the Soviet leadership; to some extent, what we see is probably accurate; and to some extent, no one, either over here or over there, knows for certain what is happening. Many forces have been unloosed, and the total reality is too large and too complicated to assimilate.
What we can see developing, however, and what we must be alert to, are three facets of the Soviet enigma. These can best be represented as dyads:
► The known and the unknown
► The internal and the external
► The illusion and the reality
Let’s begin with the known and the unknown. The best example of this can be found in the attempt by Gorbachev to address the mismatch between Soviet resources and Soviet interests. Theory has it that a major diversion of effort from the military to the civilian sectors is under way.
What is known about this initiative is that Gorbachev recognizes the imperative to correct a tremendous imbalance in Soviet planning. Contrary to a widely held misperception, it is the Soviet Union, not the United States, that is overextended around the world. For many years Soviet resources have been overdrawn by military requirements, and the equalizing pressures of the marketplace have been suppressed by a ruthless oligarchic will. This has resulted in a strategic non sequitur. On the one hand, the Soviet economy is stagnant or even slipping backwards. Competitiveness is zero. Despite an excellent educational system and a heavy investment in scientific research, innovation has failed to reach the factory floor or the collective farm. On the other hand, Soviet military spending absorbs about 16% of the gross national product. The army and air force maintain a huge offensive capability across the borders from NATO, while increasing numbers of Soviet observers believe that NATO doesn’t threaten them. And 20 years of capital and technological investment have produced a navy that this nearly self-sufficient land power doesn’t need and that doesn’t make its citizens more secure.
Gorbachev’s plan to redress the imbalance seems straightforward: while internal reforms overhaul the state machinery, Western assistance, in the form of joint ventures, increased trade, and scientific “exchanges,” will modernize the products of the machinery. Some costs will have to be paid—a marginal improvement in human freedoms; an increase in the availability of consumer goods; a holiday from the military buildup; and, what may be most difficult for the Soviets to swallow, candor about their situation and humility in accepting help.
But the costs are not excessive, particularly in the short ran, and there is a collateral benefit: for with Glasnost and Perestroika, Gorbachev finds an attentive audience. Affable and distingue, he appears to the West in the guise of peace. This puts the United States on the public relations defensive and supports a long-standing Soviet objective of driving a wedge between us and our European NATO allies.
It sounds like a plan that cannot fail, but now the unknowns come into play.
First, can he overcome the resistance to change in his own country? The extent of that resistance may be formidable, as no one understands better than his own countrymen. One popular Soviet story tells of a citizen who grew increasingly frustrated standing in a long line to receive his daily vodka ration. Finally he threw up his hands. “That’s it,” he said.
“1 can’t take it anymore. I’m going to the Kremlin to shoot Gorbachev.” But an hour later he was back. “What happened?” someone asked. “No good,” he replied. “The line was even longer over there.”
There is a long line of opponents. Reactionary ideologues, entrenched bureaucrats, leaders of nationalist movements, impatient senior military officers, disgruntled consumers, those who continue to harbor an obsessive fear of the West— many of the people that Gorbachev depends on may be paying lip service to his program in public while opposing it with all their strength in private. As with many who oppose change, their tactics may simply be to wait him out until either he loses the reformer’s zeal or the system replaces him. Again, we don't know.
Second, if the diversion of resources is so inevitable, why isn’t it happening now? Soviet military spending continues to be massive. So far, the only impulse to eliminate systems has come from the INF Treaty, not from a manifestation of
Perestroika. It is possible that even if a consensus on reform were reached, the physical obstacles would take years to overcome. For example, in a major restructuring, what new use could the Soviets find for their highly specialized naval shipyards? The possibility exists that Perestroika will create a depression in certain industries without establishing new industries to take their place.
This leads to the second dyad. While internally the Sovie* Union is busy with reform, and the future of Soviet policy is being debated, externally, for all the hopes that have been raised in the West, there has been little change in the substance of Soviet capabilities or in their doctrine for employment. We can see this in two examples.
First, let’s discuss the much publicized question of Soviet strategy. To the extent that we have been able to read about it in open literature, it is clear that most Soviet policymakers, civilian and military, have accepted the terms “defensive and “reasonable sufficiency.” Where they differ is over what those terms mean and who is to control the implementation o strategic objectives. On the conventional level, the military insists that the best way to prevent war is to remain in a p°" sition to crush the capitalist West. The civilians, on the other hand, believe that enough will have been done when the defensive capabilities of each side exceed the offensive capabm- ties of the other side. .
The debate may go on a long time, but meanwhile, nothing has changed in the field. When more than 240 well-equipPe“’ mobile Soviet and Warsaw Pact divisions are available to cross the border, and when no Soviet observer doubts that they would do so without provocation, the present offensive- versus-defensive debate sounds like a quibble over terms. Particularly when seen in the context of a foreign policy that is, if anything, even more aggressive under Gorbachev, the offensive character of the Soviet threat cannot be denied.
In the same way we see the unique position of the Soviet Navy. After 20 years of impressive expansion, force levels are declining slightly, and out-of-area deployments have been reduced. The Gorshkov methodologies appear to be waning-^ The new head of the navy, Admiral Chemavin, appears to e more pragmatic, more attuned to the big picture. It may be argued that the Soviet leadership now understands that if NATO will never attack the Soviet Union, an offensive navy is now a luxury that a continental power, secure and nearly self-sufficient, cannot afford. Therefore, Soviet sea power may be entering into a period of recession, just as the Frenc Navy often did during the monarchy.
But that is if we look at the program internally. Externa y> the facts say something else. The reduction in naval force structure, slight as it is, has been offset by qualitative improvements. A lower operating tempo may permit—and th>s is still unclear—higher readiness for rapid force generation- The introduction of the SS-N-20 missile on board the Typhoon-class SSBN and the SS-N-23 missile on board the Delta IV-class SSBN have permitted the Soviets to withdraw their deployed strategic nuclear reserve force from the wate - off the United States into well-defended patrol areas close to their own shores. Although the superior capabilities of our own submarines continue to pose a wartime risk, protection of the Soviet SSBN force has certainly become much easier- In turn, this may have given the Soviets increased wartime flexibility to raid the SLOCs. In this mission the quality o both the surface and submarine forces saw major improvements in the 1980s, represented by the Kirov, Slava, Sov- remennyy, and Udaloy and by the Akula, Oscar, and Victo^ III, respectively. As this decade ends, the Soviets will be 0 the verge of bringing meaningful tactical aviation to sea W1
advent of their first large-deck aircraft carrier, the Leonid Dezhnev.
When we consider all of these factors; when we consider 00 the success of the Soviet space program and merchant U'arine, the potential of their heavy industry, their energy in eveloping overseas trade, and the acquisition of their first 1116 warm-water naval port at Cam Ranh Bay, we can appre- ^ate that the Soviet Union, even as a land power, is rapidly eveloping the infrastructure of real sea power. And it is 0lr>g so with all the advantages of a despotic control remi-
Chemavin’s April proposal, aircraft carriers and ballistic missile submarines would be excluded, and the superpowers would be limited to 15 warships and 10 auxiliaries. This would effectively wreck the U. S. commitment to NATO on the southern flank but would hardly touch current Soviet Mediterranean force levels. And of course it wouldn’t affect any future deployment of that 65,000-ton Soviet cruiser.
In the same way, the Soviets are attempting to capture the distributed offensive capability of our sea-based cruise missiles while preserving their own ability to raid the SLOCs.
The term most frequently used is ‘zone of peace’ .... But what the Soviets really mean is a zone of exclusion for U. S. and Western sea power.
, ^ereas the Leonid Brezhnev is only a large cruiser. Yes, we c'e tempted to add—at 65,000 tons the largest, flattest-deck ^er in the world.
0 this same method is seen time and again in the well- ■j, chestrated campaign of Soviet naval arms control proposals, d e Proposals are not new with Gorbachev; some of them .ate to the 1950s. What is new is the frequency of their api 1Stance and the apparent willingness of many well-meaning v | naive audiences to accept the Soviet declarations at face ti Ue- The term most frequently used is “zone of peace”—in t^e South Pacific, the Korean Peninsula, the Indian Ocean,
^ Arctic, the Mediterranean, and most recently, Southeast for'3 ®ut wFat the Soviets really mean is a zone of exclusion r Ff S. and Western sea power, tj what the Soviets really want is to prevent the mari- tjQe nations from exercising their full rights to use intema- waters. That is the capability that they fear the most, t0 °ss the spectrum of conflict, from humanitarian assistance
tT
Iscent of the highly regarded Colbert administration in 17th Century France.
Finally, there is the dyad of the illusion and the reality. qIS has always been a facet of the Soviet enigma; but now °rt>achev and his subordinates are raising it to a more sonicated level.
We in the West, whose ethical foundations lie on concepts truth and justice, are frequently surprised to find that other lv>lizations have different ethics. In our relationship with the i°viet Union, this has had a curious inside-out effect. We j.aVe been lied to so many times that we now eagerly rush ^'A'ard at the first sign that the Soviets are telling the truth. Ccasionally, the Soviets may find it convenient to lie, and e must learn to deal with this, j, For example, in September of last year, Admiral f°nopulo, the Soviet Black Sea Fleet commander, was ^ed during a visit to Istanbul if the construction of the Leo- “ Brezhnev wouldn’t pose difficulties for the Soviet Union •'der the Montreux Convention. Oh, no, he replied, no diffi- ^ 'ies at all: for the Montreux Convention prohibits the pas- of aircraft carriers through the Straits of Dardanelles, ,. nUclear strategic defense. Regardless of whether their doc- 1^° 's offensive or defensive, for any competitive strategy 5(j the Soviets can develop, the potential for multi-axis oper- Vv,0tls by mobile, flexible, self-sustained naval forces of the 's a definite counter.
^rj °.beyond the generic term of “zone of peace” to a de- the Ption of the proposals, and you will find in each case that uharacter of the restrictions lines up with a discrete U. S. ability In the Mediterranean, for example, under Admiral
They want to eliminate all missiles with a range of greater than 600 kilometers. We have many; they have few. To accomplish this goal, they have linked sea-launched cruise missiles formally to the START negotiations and informally to discussions aimed at Warsaw Pact tank levels.
Again, this is an example of using the politics of maneuver to reintroduce an old objective under new conditions, and to make it seem plausible or even inevitable only because momentum has been generated and the perspective has changed from the true to the relative.
The U. S. Response
While we wait to see whether the Gorbachev reforms are fundamental or superficial, and whether in any event they are lasting or transitory, we are challenged to respond to a moving situation. We must be agile enough to regain the initiative to the point that no matter where the Soviets would like us to go, we can largely influence, if not control, the final positions taken. In the 1990s, superiority in maneuver must lie at the heart of our strategy.
But our ability to respond—to follow the maneuvers in such a way that ultimately we lead them—is highly dependent on the climate in this country. There the trends are disquieting.
Last year’s stock market crash and the persistent misgivings over our ability to compete in world markets point up fundamental strategic issues, and defense critics are right who cite these as key components of our national security strength. Where they are wrong, however, is assuming that excellence in education, industrial vitality, and a sound economy can come only at the expense of military strength or the meeting of our legal commitments to friends and allies. We are not the Soviet Union: we are not overextended in the world: to bring innovation into our marketplace, we do not need to reform a creaking, unwieldy system of price controls and centralized management: our military is not a burden on our society. What we do need to do is to stop living so much in the present and to start living more for the future. The likelihood that today’s youth may become the first in America to know a lower standard of living than their parents should shock us out of our borrowing and spending binge. It may.
On the other hand, it may aggravate a modern tendency to turn away from personal accountability in favor of laying the blame at the feet of institutions, like our national defense.
Ultimately, the climate from which we develop our strategy depends on our own political will. And today, nearly everywhere we look, this is a question mark. In one direction— movement being mistaken for progress—there is the perception of a diminished threat. In another direction, there is a tendency to overlook national commitments together with a desire to shift the burden of them to other shoulders. In another direction, the American sense of fair play compels people to say, “the Soviets are giving up so much, we must give up something in return”—the most visible thing being our highly capable Navy.
In another direction, even that advantage is not well understood. Although people appreciate the sacrifices that our sailors make and prize the U. S. record of success in naval operations, they grow complacent, they discount the importance of our Navy to the deterrence of war, some may even see it as superfluous or as hindering the peace process. That is certainly what the Soviets would like them to think.
So the climate is an obstacle, and it may get worse in the future. In 1995, the youngest person able to recall the march of Hitler, the failure of appeasement, and the dangers of unpreparedness will be about 70. Among the citizens of the West it is possible to see the first stirrings of a will to disarm, such as overtook the democracies in the 1920s, resulting in the Washington and London Naval Conferences, with all the disasters that ensued. Already, the offensive/defensive argument has spread to our own coasts. People without experience of the sea have trouble understanding the disadvantages of a purely static, defensive orientation. They see global, forward, offensive operations as destabilizing, when in fact they are just the reverse. Their call for defensive weapons, doctrine, and employment would actually limit our responses in this time of maneuver rather than facilitate them.
In short, an agile strategy for dealing with both the illusion and the reality of the Gorbachev maneuvers depends on a political will confident of its own goodness that seeks to preserve the advantages that foster stability. Such a will must be maintained regardless of who wins the election this fall.
Assuming that that happens, it is then proper to ask what are the general principles that we should follow in responding to the Soviet politics of maneuver? In closing, let us look at three.
First, we should recognize that, from now on, it will not be possible to reduce the balance of arms between the Soviet Union and the United States through quid pro quo. Following the implementation of the INF Treaty, the overall balance will remain, but within specific categories of systems the capabilities will all be asymmetrical. For example, the recent Soviet proposal to reduce both Warsaw and NATO Pact forces by a million troops is whimsical in light of Soviet superiority in this area.
But if the Soviets ever do adopt a truly defensive doctrine, they must ultimately agree to asymmetrical conventional force reductions both in Europe and in Asia. One of the outcomes of Gorbachev’s politics of maneuver, therefore, will be an opportunity for us to test whether meaningful reductions are really their intent. We must be alert to this development and must not hesitate to fly straight through any Soviet chaff cloud linking such reductions to irrelevant concessions from the West.
In particular, our naval forces must not become a bargain" ing chip. Our unrestricted use of the sea is more important to us than any agreement. If the Soviets are sincere, they will agree first to asymmetrical reductions in their own offensive forces, and then after a time of settling out, it will become apparent to both sides that Western sea power doesn’t threaten them.
Second, to the question of how should the U. S. respond to Glasnost and Perestroika, my answer is, that depends! Is the maneuver real or illusory? Is it internal or external? D° we know the whole story or just part of the story? Is it in 0 interests or not? Again, we must deal in the daylight, not in the nighttime counters to possible counters. Our relationship with the Soviet Union cannot depend on who the Soviet leader is. On the INF Treaty and in the Afghanistan accords, we found substantial reasons to come to terms. As a gran(f' father, 1 hope that in the future we can find a new, peacetn relationship with the Soviet Union. But we must recognize that detente may be dangerous. We are in a period of 'nst“! .. bility in which our perspective is no longer rooted in com! able assumptions. "2
Third and finally, we must recognize that the Soviets, or without Gorbachev, could reverse their field at anytime, which our own lassitude would prevent us from responding, for a critical period. Therefore, we must curb this peculiar y American tendency toward unrequited altruism and deal strictly in our own interests and those of our friends and a lies. Once again, in the politics of maneuver, actions, not words, are the reality.
uwihtki
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