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The grunt—like this rifleman—is the young Marine on the ground. He is proud of his ability to brave the elements and to close with and destroy the enemy—on foot. In combat, he does most of the fighting, and even more of the dying. Without him, there would be no Marine Corps.
as it is today. To many, an infantryman by de^n' j0g- someone who operates on reduced brainpower. 1 VoSe ically, grunt duty should be left to the individua intellect and demeanor keeps him out of society s stream. Over the years, the U. S. Army and the ^ have made infantrymen of those who lack the jeS. education and basic skills for other more technics a Most Marines, in fact, consider the infantry t0 jaity “soft,” or non-technical military occupation SP ^jc (MOS), one that requires little more than sonlC|-antry' weapons training. Misperception still stalks the in
man, despite the complex realities of modern
battle-
rity
Within the Corps he is known, not always with affection, as a “grunt.” Depending on its user, the term can mean many things. To the aviator, a “grunt” is any Marine who does not fly. This definition, however, would offend a logistician—whose technical skills surely cannot be lumped with those of unwashed Marines who earn their pay in the mud.
Actually, the true grunt resides in a very small community, known as the infantry. Whether a rifleman, machine- gunner, antitank assaultman, or mortarman, the infantryman has been, and will continue to be, the backbone of the Marine Corps for the foreseeable future. Everything the Marine Corps does remains focused on “the man on the ground who must physically seize the objective.”1 Without the grunt, the Corps would have no F/A-18s and no Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs). Any measurement of the Marine Corps’s effectiveness and combat readiness must begin with the grunt’s world, his strengths and weaknesses.
In any fighting force, not just the Marines, the infantryman usually exists at the bottom of the social heap. This was as true in Washington’s army-—where anyone with any sense and the financial means served in the cavalry-
11 mine1
In a combat zone, the grunt constitutes a smau 1
of the population, but he does the vast majority dying. In World War II, 70% of all battle casualties ^^ Army were absorbed by the infantry, but only W c yjet- Army’s soldiers were infantrymen.2 In Korea an pS nam, even as the ratio of infantrymen to supp°rt^ ^ grew smaller, the grunts’ share of the casualties ^ a larger. The Marine grunt who will fight as a mem ^g MAGTF may benefit from a large volume of sUPP f t>e- firepower, but he will still stand a greater chance ^
the
coming a casualty than the artilleryman or
aviator
supports him. In a 16,000-man Marine amphibi°l's^ gade the number of frontline infantrymen who W ^js death directly totals no more, than 2,000.3 Many ( ^ at fellow Marines in the combat support units will ais risk, but the grunt will suffer most of the pain- c0lll-
Even if the grunt escapes injury, his lifestyle- - .^g bat or not—is less than glamorous. At war or inf^1$
the infantry still travels primarily on foot. HeliCndPt^ armored vehicles, and trucks have eased the wear-a on his feet, but they have not eliminated it. Perhaps than any other single factor, this distinguishes the e from his more mobile and more comfortable comr (0 artillery or tank units. Even when the infantryman
19»1
/,'• V-"
trait the Corps tries to foster, and one that too over into the surrounding community. He probably ^ j
pnlict cr^ppifip^ll v hp n orunt hut hp firtTllV
battle, the time will inevitably come when his feet must take him to close with the enemy. The foot-mobile Marine grunt, much like his ancestors in the Roman legions, must also learn to endure the rain, cold, heat, dust, and mud, which become his constant companions. A Marine wallowing in his fighting hole during a driving rainstorm conjures up a barnyard image that might explain the origin of the term “grunt.” The image is hardly glorious.
The nature of the grunt’s life makes anyone marvel at his ability to persevere, and even to regard his lot with extreme pride. The reasons are actually quite simple. But they are often lost on those who think that combat readiness somehow hinges on proper massaging of numbers.
The leading reason for such pride centers on a psychological reality that recently has been discounted with scorn—the male ego. Male chauvinism thrives within and is essential to the survival of the infantryman. Time magazine recently expressed surprise that many of the Marine guards at the U. S. embassy in Moscow were “hard-drinking, brawling, women chasers.”4 But to many Marine grunts, the label not only fit—it was expected. The infantryman lives, trains, fights, and often dies in an all-male world where peer pressure repeatedly motivates him to perform the extraordinary. In peacetime this can and has led to embarrassment, but in combat the male ego is as essential as ammunition.
The second reason builds on the first, and is more readily acknowledged by analysts. Few deny the existence of unit cohesion, the bonding of individuals into a team whose members will die for each other. Unit cohesion reaches its most intense form in an infantry squad, where the members probably know each other more intimately than members of their own families.
Those who have never bantered with comrades while hiking 20 miles in the rain, before trying to sleep a few fitful hours in an ooze of mud, will never understand the two basic elements that motivate the grunt. Those who
have done this need no further explanation. cj0sef The Marine infantryman of the 1980s deman s scrutiny than the grunt in general: fMar>ne5
- First of all, he is a teenager. The average age or
in a rifle company rarely tops 19 years. seeni0
- The young Marine has a native intelligence not jy
the ranks 10-15 years ago and he therefore is ati
than his predecessors to ask “Why?” after receiv^ ^ order. This frustrating type of questioning P*acefSnlida' mium on patient leadership, for the grunt can be j. |,js ble, once convinced of the urgency and necessity order. jve-i
- The Marine infantryman can be extremely agg[^ spi«;
^ ; il>
enlist specifically to be a grunt, but he firmly Pellp himself and actually seems disappointed if not c°nnjI1g is with hardships to challenge his self-image. His trai
though)6’TuUt t0° °^ten '3ase<J on repetition rather than Instead h *S Prevents I**111 fr°m being a subtle tactician, thus close? tak6S thC dirCCt aPProach- The Marine grunt knowing tt>y ^esernbles a young, aggressive boxer who, charges--. e undamentals, still puts his head down and bludgerm rVI lng t0 take Punishment for a chance to p08re°hnh!s opponent.
man benef r^f century> the Marine infantry-
Every w1 s rom a totally modern weapons inventory. anti-tank ^°n i r°m new M-16A2 rifle to his Dragon tinned wirSSVe w'tI' thermal night sight has been intro- the way jn 'n 16 Past ^’ve years- The Marine grunt leads new equip, C\)unc* combat technology. Unfortunately, this P°Wer, akment *s able to produce impressive fire- implex a° ,Crfates a burden. The new weapons are more E>rag()n nioh 1 Cy *3r'n® new maintenance problems. The the gunne^ * trac^er’ P°r example, cannot be serviced by the Draso ’ t°f even ^ the battalion armorer. In addition, gen, com? unct*°ns by means of a small bottle of nitro- Pressed to 6,000 pounds per square inch. This bottle cannot be refilled on the battlefield. And even the new, highly-regarded M-16A2 has handguards that break on impact with hard objects.
Whether or not all his new weapons are functioning properly, the Marine infantryman still must carry them. This time-honored task has become nearly impossible over the years. Figure 1 provides a sampling of the load that must be carried by a grunt on foot. The weapons’ weights are staggering in themselves, but these numbers do not include individual weapons and ammunition or personal equipment, which often total more than 60 additional pounds. New vehicles will help carry the burden, but they are too few and too terrain-limited to offer any real relief. The grunt now has the ability to bring a lot of accurate firepower to bear on his enemy, but he may not get all those weapons to the battlefield in time.
The true measure of the grunt’s effectiveness, however, lies not in the individual or his weapons, but in his unit. Whether or not the infantryman seizes his objective depends largely on the ability of his platoon, company, or battalion to live up to its combat potential. Like that of the grunt, the unit prognosis is mixed. In recent years, the Marine Corps has tried to solve the chronic problem of personal instability in combat units. Because of the Unit Deployment Program, which assigns Marines to infantry battalions for at least three years, it is not uncommon to find Marines who have served together, often in the same squad, throughout an entire enlistment. Such cohesion has obvious benefits. There is a flipside, however. Most infantry units are undermanned. In fact, the average Marine Corps battalion operates routinely at about 85% of its wartime allowance.
By itself, the manpower shortage could be weathered if it were not for more insidious drains on the infantry units. Rarely will all Marines assigned to a unit be present for duty in the field. In addition to the ever-present “sick, lame, and lazy,” many others will be sent to temporary duty (which can last for several months) at headquarters or base commands. On Okinawa, battalions arriving to serve six months as part of the Unit Deployment Program immediately lose 10% of their on-board strength. These men are reassigned to serve as lifeguards, to run gymnasiums, and to man base-ordered working parties.6 The grunt must now train in a squad that contains perhaps seven of its allotted 13 Marines. Even so, his own battalion headquarters will seldom be manned at less than 100% strength— the battalion’s losses to temporary duty being covered by the best of the infantrymen from the already-depleted rifle companies. Add to this the incessant demands for infantry to perform in parades, and in tactical demonstrations, and a myriad of other peacetime duties. Small wonder that one of the grunt’s most common complaints is that he has no time for himself.
Shortages of infantry manpower have led to a level of training that, while impressive in its intensity, may prove deficient in combat. When not otherwise tasked, the grunt lives in the field, repetitiously rehearsing his combat skills. Individually, the grunt is extremely proficient, and better-trained than most of his prospective enemies. But lack of numbers and continuous demands for trained Ma- 31
Figure 1 Weights of Infantry Weapons
Weapon | Weight (Pounds) | Ammunition (Pounds—Rounds)'__________________ ^ |
Squad Automatic Weapon (SAW) | 15.2 | 6.92/200 |
M-60 Machine Gun | 56.2 | 21-300 |
M-224 60-mm. Mortar | 46.5 | 4.5 |
M-29 81-mm. Mortar | 102 | 9.5 (per High Explosive) |
Dragon Antitank Missile | 6 (Day Tracker) | 25 |
Mk 19 40-mm. Machine Gun Shoulder-fired, Multi-purpose | 20.6 (Night Tracker) | 25 |
131 | 56-40 | |
Assault Weapon (SMAW) | 16.6 | 13.4 ^ |
>erams
for
Scribner’s Sons, 1980), pp. 158-160.
1 Figures derived from Table of Organization of a Marine infantry re£* ground combat element of a Marine amphibious brigade. y
1 -‘Booze, Brawls, and Skirt Chasing,” Time, 13 April 1987, PP- 2°" ^its s* For detailed discussion of the male imaee and unit cohesion in combat
the
rines to perform other duties produces unit readiness that is cyclical at best, even in units that have, on paper anyway, stayed intact for a long time. During its six-month deployment to the Mediterranean, a battalion may be at its peak combat readiness. But five months after returning, it may be required to participate in a combined-arms exercise in the Mojave Desert with its squads and platoons manned by only a fraction of those Marines who went to the Med, the others having been siphoned off for other duties. Even if all those Marines could be recovered for their original infantry assignments, it remains questionable whether the battalion could fully succeed in combat and avoid excessive casualties. The gaps in training and in unit cohesion are not that easily bridged.
Despite such problems, the grunt will continue to be regarded as a first-rate fighting man. Those characteristics that have always distinguished the Marine—courage, esprit, and physical stamina—will compensate for many of the deficiencies. Not long ago, an Australian newspaper reporter, perplexed by the straight-ahead, seemingly suicidal tactics of the Marine grunts, labeled them “Bullet Catchers.” Nonetheless, the reporter conceded that U. S. Marines were far better to have as allies than as enemies.7 This will continue to hold true in coming years.
The Marine Corps combat infantryman currently suffers from many of the maladies that have traditionally afflicted military forces during any period of peace. He is neither fish nor fowl—packing more firepower than light infantry but too foot-mobile to be considered mechanized infantry. At the small unit level, he compensates for his lack of
numbers by being able to summon an incredible arn°Ua|[y, air, ground, and naval supporting firepower. Tactic he is unsubtle, preferring to grapple with the enern- close combat. He will win this type of toe-to-toe strU®ariy but will sustain heavy casualties in doing so, partlcU in the early stages of battle. n£jer
But as he looks into the future, he need not P° ^ whether he will ever be replaced, for without the r there can be no Corps.
- General P. X. Kelley, USMC. “Statement on Posture, Plans, and Pf°£
FY 1988-1992,” Marine Corps Gazette, April 1987, p. 22. v, yod'
- John Ellis, The Sharp End: The Fighting Man in World War //• ( c
- t-°r detailed discussion of the male image and unit cohesion in cotuv0*
S. L. A. Marshall, Men Against Fire. Reprint. (Gloucester, MA: Pt-tL' 1978). . in t
- Based on the author’s personal experience with a battalion participal,I,“ Unit Deployment Program, September 1986-March 1987.
- “Bullet Catchers’ Lead the Way,” Australian, 22 November 1981-
th
Captain Moore is currently the Air-Ground Exchange Officer w j^etl fine Air Group-26. Captain Moore is an infantry officer who gra^ Jtaff from the Naval Academy in 1976. He has served in commandan billets in the 2d Marine Division and 1st Marine Amphibious 3s including command of rifle, reconnaissance, and weapons comPanHc well as serving as a political science instructor at the Naval AcaC*e . and holds a master’s degree in Military History from Duke Univl!r^a,,ipllS graduated with distinction from the Naval War College Off- Seminar in Washington.
With All Due Respect
A lieutenant was caught without proper change for a soda machine. Accordingly, he flagged down a passing cadet and asked, “Got change for a dollar?”
“I think so,” said the cadet cheerfully. “Let me check.”
The lieutenant drew himself up stiffly and barked, “That’s not the way to address an officer. We’ll replay this scene. Got change for a dollar?”
The cadet saluted smartly and said, “No, SIR!”
Louis M. Starita