This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
Games; The Secret World 0f
Mai/reat0rs’ Pla>ers’ and Policy
Book r B' .Alle"' New York: McGraw-Hill lnd $So *“7- 402 PP- Ulus. Notes. Bib.
’ *19.95 ($15.96).
Hayward bn Admiral Thomas B. d> U. S. Navy (Retired)
abou|Stv!^ y0U W0ldd ever want to know
and Di 6 secrct've ways of the creators
that v,ayerS °* war games—and much
just as s°on for§et- But,
their ' T Ga™es is about people and
'heir lanV8Tnt~'°r’ more accurately, ■acK ot It.
of th!>rCkCan be dtde question but that one Puter aeneficial sPin-°ffs of the corn- gamin^6 'f “Btquitously manifested in drug J 3nd s'mulation, from the comer Pent;.,, °rC}? tbe eloseted depths of the tary a°n' Used intelligently by the mili- can be ,COmbat information center team achiev K?>U^bt t0 a state °f readiness unfleet u fr outs'de °f combat itself: a groun 3 C3n exercise an entire battle War c6r m°re without putting to sea; a c°mnle 6^6 Can ponfront its students with them t X strategic scenarios and compel sions- ° SI?1U^ate war in its many dimen- learn \and national policymakers can the c0rCthln8—but not much—about does a °f future events. War Games Proving,k6SpeClally eonvincing job of ,ng the veracity of the latter.
readabl^t! APen bas written a highly set, f ^ book> interesting from the out- exPloitC fk W'th intriguing vignettes that player, the, human frailties both of the ing an and creat°rs of war games. Tak- mationT*386 °f the Freedom of Infor- numerr,Act’ Alicn has managed to obtain allegeHUS records °f war games, some never h contajn top-secret material inform 6-°re Pahiishcd. Armed with this Search at'°n’ au8mented by extensive rePries' and Pers°nal participation, he ing nrlnf0 almostevery aspect of the gam- Polit' °, si°n with a heavy focus on geo- ture 'Ca games, which by their very na- decj 3re vulnerable to highly subjective gue, 1.0n'rnaking, and hence second- Ihink'08 ^lany future war gamers will they kWice about volunteering to play if x believe that something they regard as a learning process might some day be dissected by an author more consumed with the vagaries of the players than with the experience of the process itself.
Like a good investigative reporter, Allen relates the course of numerous scenarios in which the players come out a distant second best. Lost is the message one would have hoped this work would have conveyed: that war gaming can be an essential element in the professional development of military officers and policymakers.
Gaming also carries with it an inherent risk—the risk of believing the outcome. Human nature being what it is, no doubt it is too much to ask the participants in war games to forget the lessons learned as the curtain is drawn on the “hot wash- up.” The larger the game and the more profound the assumptions, the more pertinent the point. Counterbalancing the many benefits of war games is the risk of making more of the results than is meant to be. Allen falls prey to this trap again and again. Games are training evolutions. When they are glamorized to represent anything more, they can be strikingly misleading and deceptive. The General Accounting Office is right on target when it reports, “Different analysts, with apparently identical knowledge of a real world problem, may develop plausible formulations that lead to different conclusions—none of which are verifiable or refutable. ...”
Dr. Peter Perla, an analyst with the Center for Naval Analyses, in an article in the Spring 1987 Naval War College Review, has this to say: “Fundamentally, war gaming is an experiment in human interaction and is best used to investigate processes, not to calculate outcomes.” For the interested reader of War Games, Perla’s article would be of considerable value. In fact, it may well be all one needs to know.
Admiral Hayward retired from the U. S. Navy in 1982 following completion of a four-year tour as Chief of Naval Operations. He had an illustrious career as a naval aviator and senior national advisor at the highest levels of government. Admiral Hayward currently heads a Honolulu-based consulting firm specializing in Pacific nations' defense and international security affairs.
Deep Black: Space Espionage and National Security
William E. Burrows. New York: Random House, 1986. 401 pp. Photos. Gloss. Notes, lnd. $19.95 ($17.95).
Reviewed by Rear Admiral W. J.
Holland, Jr., U. S. Navy (Retired)
The dust cover advertises:
“Deep Black provides as detailed a look through the intelligence keyhole as can be had without a top secret security clearance. It shows in vivid detail how Washington keeps tabs on the world while coming to grips with what is probably the most important question of our time: Can the United States adequately verify arms control agreements?”
The book does not live up to its billing.
It is, as advertised, vivid. William Burrows is a first-rate story teller. He has blended fact, some fiction, and high- grade rumor into a breathless tale, which focuses on, but is not limited to, satellite photography. Regrettably, his methods of research and documentation are those of journalism, not of scientific investigation. Technical details are spewed about in the styles of lan Fleming and Tom Clancy. The resulting air of precision enhances the book’s readability, but unfortunately creates an unjustifiable aura of accuracy.
The accuracy of the technical information supplied on the Navy’s sound surveillance system will be questioned by most naval officers. The descriptions of that system are so filled with conjecture portrayed as fact as to render the whole section hokum. With this background, one also questions the validity of other technical statements and from them the assessments in the rest of the book. This is unfortunate because most of what Burrows has to say of value does not depend upon detailed technical data.
Each chapter has extensive footnotes, but they lack the precision required to lead readers to an original source. Even so, there are items that those in the trade probably would prefer not to have been broadcast. Even a casual scanning of the notes is instructive to anyone who is tempted to believe in the “security” of
make
aircraft carrier Leonid Brezhnev
flight deck. Also of interest to Navy'11® hp Al: tend^r
secrets disclosed to those who do not appreciate the concept of “need to know.”
Most professionals will share Dr. Hans Marks opinion, cited in the book, that this work and others like it provide the Soviets with information that the United States “must pay dearly to get.” In fact, it provides insights the country may not be able to get at all. There is no evidence suggesting that Burrows considers he has a responsibility for any damage that may result from the collection, collation, and interpretation of sensitive information in the areas of national intelligence collection, interpretation, and use.
Apart from this issue, the book serves at least one useful purpose. Burrows clearly and convincingly describes the role that political persuasion, preformed opinions, personal conviction, and organizational bias has in the intelligence collection and analysis process. His exposition that contrasts the differing interpretations of former CIA Director William Colby and former Air Force Director of Intelligence General George Keegan on a series of photos of Soviet civil defense efforts is classic. Burrows carefully avoids taking sides or casting these two in good-guy/bad-guy roles. This passage contains an object lesson for those who pursue unbiased technical advice. For anyone in a senior decisionmaking role, this section alone is worth the time to read the book.
Understandably, the more general and older the subject matter, the more accurate and useful the discussion. As the book approaches more current issues, its depth and usefulness decline, not only from lack of available information, but also because the author lays weak groundwork for his final thesis.
Burrows discloses his bias and plan when he says:
“The technical collectors and especially those in the Air Force tended to be less gratified by what they could see than frustrated and apprehensive by what they were convinced was eluding them.”
He does not recognize that this specific condemnation is in part a statement about all intelligence operatives who customarily practice “worst case analysis” as a fundamental principle of their trade.
The final chapter on arms control and verification is the weakest, even though it is touted to be the main point of the book. It contains a simplistic plea to accept arms control agreements with verification based solely upon overhead reconnaissance—“national technical means.” Burrows sums up his previous expositions on the great abilities of overhead reconnaissance to deny there is any requirement for on-site or intrusive inspections. He makes this claim despite his earlier case that the personal bias of the interpreter can, in large measure, determine the content of the evidence collected. While his argument might have had merit when counting rules were simple—before warheads multiplied— and when launchers could not move, his case is weaker now than it might have been during SALT I. Further, he ignores the inherent difficulties in dealing with a closed society and dismisses some valid concerns for hiding and cheating as “illogical.” The author evidently hasn’t played bridge in a wardroom where one learns that a “peek in the hand is worth two finesses.”
This is a book to be read as a primer by those who have no concept of overhead reconnaissance, how it works, its abilities, and pitfalls. It is also worth reviewing by those knowledgeable and proficient in the field as a lesson on why to keep one’s mouth shut.
Admiral Holland’s last assignment on active duty was as Deputy Director, Space Command and Control on the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations staff. He is now Executive Director for Education and Training of the Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association.
Soviet Military Power, 1987
(Sixth Edition)
Caspar Weinberger. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1987. 160 pp. Illus. Charts. Maps. $7.50. ($6.75) paper.
Whence The Threat to Peace,
1987 (Fourth Edition)
USSR Ministry of Defense. Moscow:
Military Publishing House, Progress Publishers, and Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1987. 96 pp. Illus.
Charts. Maps. $2.95 ($2.65) paper.
Reviewed by Steven L. Llanso and Norman Polmar
In the battle of print, the United States still holds the lead but the Soviets are rapidly catching up.
This year’s edition of the U. S. Department of Defense Soviet Military Power argues once again that the Soviet Union continues to close the gap in a wide array of military and weapon technologies. The same can be said for the Soviet Union’s annual review of U. S. military power, Whence the Threat to Peace. Although the Soviet style still closely resembles a virulent communist tract, their 1987 edition has more of the nuances that contribute to readable self-justification of 0 military development.
But even as the Soviets close t■ ® P lemics gap, the U. S. Soviet Mi' ■ Power has craftily taken a different ^ adopting a more academic style—n ^ hedging of predictions, less emphasis possible than on probable, greater ance between Soviet successes an ures. Some of the muscular adjec 1 that modified many descriptions >a ^ year’s report have been deleted, o c have been replaced by language more fuse and general in tone. . ^
A striking example is the change in title of the chapter on Soviet interests involvement in the Third Worm- ^ year this section bore the screamer bal Ambitions.” This year s bears the more tepid “Political-Mi' and Regional Policies.” The changes the first chapter on Soviet aims and ^ suggest that damage limitation seelTI have become at least as important as ^ gressive outreach for Soviet p'anrJ® c( Maps of Soviet strategic directions re a pull-back either in Soviet ambitm ^ U. S. inferences of Soviet ambitions.
U. S. statements on such ambitions.
There are points on which Soviet ^ tary Power becomes more emphatic- Soviet space program, which certa'jor merits scrutiny, is carefully analyze its military implications. Soviet bio cal warfare research is examined PI’in pally by recounting the death and dis 0oj- tion caused by the accidental release anthrax at Sverdlovsk in 1979. New P ^ tographs and artist’s concepts of weap systems such as the ZSU-X air dc e . vehicle, the Pomornik air-cushion a ing craft, and a more realistic (a . bow-on) view of the nuclear-prope L atiV/iaii uauiui
their first appearance. It is unfortun ^ that satellite photography of the Brez i" cannot be published, but the bow aSPe^ does reveal that the carrier has a SP ^ phased-array type radar, a large TA installation on the mast, and an ang L will be an artist’s view of the Alexoti _ Brykin strategic missile submarine I ^ and an interesting photo of an Oscar-c ^ cruise missile submarine. The latter some anechoic tiles missing, revca 1 “ the considerable thickness of this ma rial, and extensive deck piping, aPPa ently for pumping a polymer over • submarine.
Attention was briefly paid to the assc tion that Soviet forces in unspecified cations had used lasers to irradiate F World manned surveillance aircraft. j keeping with the less strident overas tone, it was merely noted that these a
past year b e
Sov Seconc* advantage available to U let defense writers and editors is the \y. ' Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), and^h VCr *tS ,rue technological, political.
houbl Uman'tar’an merits’ SDI has the
and E CC**=ed quality of being innovative gra ifas'*y characterized in words and Phics, especially when linked to the
the
to observer-6 .^aUSec* ser'ous eye damage
torie^n r.Casons m>ght explain the lowered creasin ,°Vlf Military Power, which in- annimi ® ^ bas lbe ^°°k of a corporate Urgent .report anc* has lost much of the aginn ,?nC of lts Predecessors. First, an comm t min‘Stration that has sustained a fense f6nt t0 imProving national de- sevenih<>r -S!X years can hardly enter its report T lt l0Ut sorne relative progress to Would ° Pa'nt tbe lhreat too blackly made SPea^ P°orly of the investment over thVCr‘he past several years. More- any L e . v'et Union has not invaded strain!v!ntrieS Since Afghanistan, was re- P°Wer 'n,ltS public displays of military Peace ' ff ^aS rccent|y embarked on a ot,ensive of unprecedented vigor.
Soviet Seconc* reason is the context of the to p,, anpua' offering Whence the Threat
P'ctorH • t*1C batt*e °f military power van[a(,a S’ tbc Soviets have several ad- bein„8eS' 0ne is the Peace offensive best fpW|a®ed a Sov'et leader with the em c6- 'V6t ^or wbat P,ays well in West- GorbaaPhtalS’ General Secretary Mikhail fui j}ev bas been articulate, resource- arms n pers'stent *n advancing Soviet far bcontrol proposals and has enjoyed has pC tCr, Western press coverage than Past ,re.SltlentRooald Reagan during the
Star Wars space operas. In SDI, Whence the Threat has a hook on which to hang and distort its comparisons of U. S. and Soviet intentions.
An advantage more closely related to style and format is Soviet access to open sources for data on U. S. weapon systems. In Whence the Threat this edge is exploited fully. Most new U. S. weapons are illustrated with color photos obtained from U. S. periodicals (to whom credit is duly given). The data in the captions typically include such nuggets as the weapon’s range, payload, and probable circular error as well as the dollar cost. To underscore the mounting U. S. threat, the Soviets pick baselines dating back 25 years or more, thus being able to illustrate U. S. military increases in capability of hundreds of percent.
In contrast, Soviet Military Power must often make do with grainy black- and-white pictures or artists’ concepts that, while boldly wrought, do not confer reality on their subjects. Performance data are estimated or missing altogether, and Soviet budgetary information can only be estimated. Where it can, Soviet Military Power does offer comparisons between like U. S. and Soviet systems. In Whence the Threat only the numbers of Soviet strategic systems are set out for comparison. Data on Soviet conventional weapons numbers and performance are absent.
Despite its advantages, Whence the Threat labors under stylistic and factual shortcomings. The text is strewn with bold-faced (or bare-faced) assertions of U. S. aggressive intent that begin with the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and
The DoD’s latest “annual report” on the Soviet military—highlighted by a realistic bow-on view of the new Leonid Brezhnev—takes a more moderate tack than previous years’ editions.
Nagasaki and extend to the “bandit bombing” of Libya in 1986. The utter lack of comparable data on Soviet systems skews an already tilted analysis even further. In contrast to the new restraint of Soviet Military Power, emphatic pronouncements of indisputable conclusions still riddle Whence the Threat.
Of the two surveys, Whence the Threat to Peace proves more predictable, touting a mix of the Soviet Union’s peaceful intentions and its inflexible determination not to lose its military balance. Soviet Military Power, while saying that the Soviet Union is still improving its military forces, is the more surprising document for its moderation in presenting the threat.
Steve Llanso is assistant editor of the USNI Military Database. He holds masters degrees from the University of Delaware and Tufts University’s Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.
Norman Polmar, author of Guide to the Soviet Navy (Naval Institute Press, 1986) and The Ships and Aircraft of the U. S. Fleet (Naval Institute Press, 1984), writes the Soviet Navy and U. S. Navy columns of the Proceedings. He is director of the USNI Military Database.
The Cost of Seapower: The Influence of Money on Naval Affairs from 1815 to the Present Day
Philip Pugh. London: Conway Maritime Press, 1986. 423 pp. Fig. Charts. Append. Ind. $33.20 ($29.88).
Reviewed by Eric J. Grove
Once in a while a book appears that alters significantly the way we view the nature of maritime power and interpret the course of naval history. The last such work was Professor Paul M. Kennedy’s The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (Charles Scribner’s Sons, Pub., 1976), which changed the views of informed analysts about not only British naval decline, but the whole validity of the traditional Mahanian interpretation of sea power. Kennedy’s reinterpretation of the economic foundation of naval strength has now been joined by a notable analysis of the precise way economic factors affect sea power. This new work is remarkable both for its depth of percep-
______ __________ A
Ship and Aircraft
Photographs
Available
Choose from more than 35,000 photos dating back to 1883!
For order form and information write to:
Photo Service U.S. Naval Institute
Annapolis, Maryland 21402 (301) 268-6110
since 1815. There is no better brief su mary in print. The focus does not s when Pugh moves on to discuss the s called “relative price effect,’ the e dency for defense expenditure to ahead of general inflation by about per annum. The author argues con'' cingly that this is a misperception ^
results from confusing input costs output values. .
The book also provides an aUt ^
NAVAL, MARITIME MILITARY & AVIATION BOOKS
Our quarterly catalogs contain 40pp. and over 1300 entries of mostly out- of-print books.
Our reasonable prices and excellent service are enjoyed by people like you who use and enjoy books. Judge for yourself. Send only $3 for the next 4 issues.
ANTHEIL
BOOKSELLERS
2177P Isabelle Court No. Bellmore, NY 11710
____________________ J
■* MAIL-ORDER FROM GERMANY *
SHIP MODELS IN 1:1250 and 1:12400 SCALE
Tired of the same old hobby—not satisfied with run-of- the-mill interests? Would you rather see a ship model i than read about one? Sound like you, read on! .
We have advertised our 1:1250 and 1:2400 Ship and Air- C craft Models in PROCEEDINGS since 1964-over 22 • years! During that time we have gained a lot of experi- i ence in “ACROSS THE OCEAN MAIL-ORDER.” } These ads have brought us many satisfied “friends.” 1 Many of them have been with us from the start. ?
Interested in becoming one of our friends? Send $2.00 for \ our 32 page Dollar Ship Catalog. In it you will find a Z large selection of ship and aircraft models cast in metal or \ resin. Freighters, liners, warships (ours and theirs), air- Z craft for your flattops and 1:200 scale tank models—from \ Columbus’ time to the present! Z
Also available are Continental Model Railroad Supplies; S ask for our Train Price List when ordering the Ship r Catalog. j
A U. S. Company with old-world efficiency, we promise I to satisfy you to the best of our ability. .
Leo J. Winkler and Crew at C
PRESTON HOBBY MODELS •
(Your friendly Hobby Shop across the Ocean) J P.O. Box 2280 [
8600 Bamberg, West Germany ’
Phone 0951-1 2222 " ^
tion and for its breadth of scope. It is also remarkable for its author, Philip Pugh: not a professional historian but a mechanical engineer, who works as a cost analyst with the British Ministry of Defence’s Procurement Executive.
This background, at first glance an unlikely one for such a task, actually stands the author in good stead to undertake it. Pugh understands, as an insider, the true nature of the interplay of technology and finance that lies at the heart of naval policy-making. His obvious natural feel for the subject overcomes any defects he may display as a historian in the academic sense. Anyone who judges this work by its bibliography, admittedly a limited and patchy collection of material, would fatally mistake the book’s overall quality. Pugh demonstrates a sagacity of historical judgement that is firm and sure. A wider reading of the sources could only have confirmed his main judgments and corrected one or two errors of fact and interpretation. The author, whose experience seems to lie more in aeronautics than the sea, gives the impression of being a “naval buff,” who finally grew tired of the superficiality of much naval literature. The latter too often concentrates on technical and operational factors, ignoring the economic and political realities that are the more crucial determinants of naval policy. It is regrettable that serious naval historians and analysts have not done more to provide the complete picture, leaving it to this brilliant “amateur” to produce such a seminal work.
Readers should not be put off by the book’s apparent bulk or its plethora of computer charts. The author has organized his work in self-contained chapters, but maintains a flow of stimulating ideas and enlightening interpretations that drives the reader to see what comes next through to the end. The layout of the pages is space-intensive, and this, combined with a thick paper stock, makes the volume seem more formidable than it really is.
The author’s aim is to “demystify costs, budgets, and like matters to show that financial and economic influences are as readily analyzed and understood by the general reader as are technical and operational issues.” He begins by examining the relationship of defense spending to national wealth, showing that the peacetime defense “burden” is remarkably constant from country to country and period to period. He also shows that it is a myth that defense budgets have declined in absolute terms. Understandably, perhaps, Pugh concentrates on the British example, and this emphasis continues as he summarizes the course of naval history
tive analysis of naval budgeting escalation; Pugh accounts for the 'atter noting the simple necessity of increast equipment performance to maintain ^ fectiveness over rivals—battleships aircraft carriers are offered as two caS.^ studies to support this general thes Next, the author examines the PresSU.iy for radical innovation, which usua comes from those who feel they caIirY_ win within the existing rules of compen tion. Usually, however, their innova i does little in the long term to overc0., the advantages of the economic3 strong. The rest of the book examines ^ vital problems of balancing quality w quantity in both peace and war and ma^ aging both cost escalation and rug development costs, especially for ae space equipment. Pugh concludes there is no easy way out of the inevi evolutionary process of abandoning most expensive capabilities and mcr ing the proportion of smaller ships m inventory. He is, however, quick to P out that trying to save money throug policy of deliberately building small ha disproportionately negative effect on pability. His explanation of the reas0 for different building policies in Pea^j and in war is especially interesting illuminating. Pugh is almost Marxian ' his economic determinism, but it is o cult to gainsay the explanation of nav ^ development that he provides and eve^ quantifies in numerical terms. He a offers telling strategic and operation insights, notably on the nature and el e tiveness of blockade tactics. ,
Everyone with an interest in naval a fairs, past and present, should read t ' important book. Readers will not get a before they ask, “Why didn’t I think o that before?” They will certainly P°® sess, as the author intends, the means understand the dynamics of naval deve opment a good deal more fully -
Mr. Grove is a freelance defense analyst, consu and writer. He teaches at the Royal Naval Co ^ Greenwich and is directing a research project Europe’s naval future for the newly formed Foun tion for International Security, of which he is asso ^ ate director. Mr. Grove is the author of Vanguar ^ Trident: British Naval Policy Since World War (Naval Institute Press, 19S7).
Books of Interest
By Lieutenant Commander Thomas J. Cutler, U. S. Navy
Japanese
Aircraft
SS-s He“ Cemetery: Shrine t0
IW EfQ^rd,Peters- Kensington, MD: Woodbine ($8.95’) 56' 340 PP' Illus- Ind- APPend. $9.95
■bore a^0rnP'ete history of the cemetery itself, mousnan/^ se*ect biographies of the fa- manv m°P 6 ^ur'ed tbere. information on the comtv>„ onuments> and a fold-out map, this ea’s m 1Um *S tbe def*nhive guide to Ameri- ost «lebrated national shrine.
k||| *
Exniim^etS and Boxers: Australia’s Naval JPedUton to the Boxer Uprising
164 ^,'Cmlls' Boston: Aden & Unwin, 1986. $29.95'($26S95 ^ ^ ^aPS- Append. Tables.
To ■
Chinp^D " 'nternat‘onal force in subduing the Austral Bver Rebellion, the colonies of South a 500- W Vlctor’a’ anc* New South Wales sent in 19oo'aT-|l3aVa' expedition to northern China Austral' • S 'S the story op that expedition, The h 'V ■BrSt mi'itary adventure in Asia. Photop00 u*S 'bustrated with more than 150 Publichii ’ •mos! op which have never been °n dia £ blicholls’ colorful narrative, based Pants rieS|anC* ftpubhshed memoirs of partici- sponde3"! *^e newsPaPer accounts of corre- tails a ?• S. accomPany>ng the expedition, de- ■ttle-known segment of naval history.
Th
the*A!?fe"Se Game: A" Insider Explores Defp« t0IJ,,Shin8 Real'‘ies of America’s R nse Establishment
iW^lus' StubbinS- New York: Harper & Row, s ' 5 pP- No>es. Ind. $21.00 ($18.90).
formbiHng„COntends tba* "°ur inability to transties” • ° ar resources into military capabili- face tnH3t t*le r°0t °* The negative trends we viets ° u m °Ur military rival0' with the So- from' io^aVmg worked on the defense budget ysis to 1981, he supplies a critical anal- offerthe bl- S. defense establishment and Winn 3 number of revisions to “make us all ers m the defense game.”
^ Japanese Aircraft of the Pacific War
Insn 3 PranciHon. Annapolis. MD: Naval Ann!31? Press- 1987 • 570 PP- '"us. Gloss.
^PPend. Tables. $21.95 ($17.56).
this re*Ult years of thorough research, ls a comprehensive guide to Japanese aircraft production during the period leading up to and including World War II. Francillon uses Japanese documents confiscated by the U.S. Government after the Japanese surrender to construct the history of both the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy air arms. He explains their systems for designation, camouflage, and aircraft markings. Various chapters and appendices detail the many aircraft types, their engines and armament, and the carriers, transports, and submarines that carried them.
Managing Nuclear Operations
Ashton B. Carter, John D. Steinbruner, and Charles A. Zraket, Editors. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1987. 750 pp. Notes. Ind. Fig. Tables. $39.95 ($35.95) hardcover, $18.95 ($17.05) paper.
Most current studies of nuclear weapon systems analyze the weapons themselves or the strategies for their employment or prevention. This important study focuses instead on the warning systems, communication links, command centers, and operating organizations that make up the command and control portion of U. S. and Soviet nuclear weapon systems. Twenty-two authorities have contributed co
Ship of Gold
Thomas B. Allen and Norman Polmar. New York: Macmillan, 1987. 273 pp. $17.26 ($15.53).
The authors of the critically acclaimed biography, Rickover: Controversy and Genius (Simon and Schuster, .1982), have collaborated once again, this time to create an action- packed tale of intrigue. The storyline turns to World War II for its origins, but the action is contemporary and the fast-paced events involve a mounting confrontation among the Soviet Union, China, the United States, and Japan. Fans of Alistair MacLean and Tom Clancy will find this maritime thriller irresistible fiction.
U. S. Marines in Vietnam: Vietnamization and Redeployment 1970-1971
Graham A. Cosmas and LtCol. Terrence P.
Murray, USMC, Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps. 1986. 487 pp. Illus. Notes. Ind. Maps. Append. (Distributed by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office.) $29.00 ($26.10).
The fifth volume in a planned ten-volume series, this book recounts the period when Marine forces in Vietnam were ending their six- year combat commitment to the war. While the concentration is on the ground war and the role of the 3rd Marine Amphibious Force, there are chapters included on the advisors’ roles, Marine aviation, and the Seventh Fleet Special Landing Force. With useful appendices, extensive documentation, and thorough coverage, this volume, like the others in the series, is essential for a thorough understanding and appreciation of the Marine Corps’ role in this trying period of history.
War in the Third Dimension: Essays in Contemporary Air Rower
Air Vice-Marshal R. A. Mason, Editor. Washington, DC: Brasscy’s, 1986. 228 pp. Illus. Gloss. Notes. Ind. $30.00 ($27.00) hardcover, $16.95 ($15.25) paper.
This series of essays by leading academic and military specialists highlight significant aspects of the evolution of modem air power.
Book Order Service
USNI Members: Proceedings offers the books in the review sections at a discount as a benefit to Naval Institute members. (Prices enclosed by parentheses indicate the member price.) Members may also order most books of other publishers through customer service at a 10% discount off the list price. (Please note your membership number when ordering books.)
Non-members: Books marked Sj are the Naval Institute Press selections that may be purchased through customer service by nonmembers at list price.
Prices quoted in these columns are subject to change and will be reflected in our billing. Please allow for delays when ordering nonNaval Institute titles. When air mail or other special handling is requested, actual postage and handling costs will be billed to the member. For further information, please call customer service at (301) 224-3378. Use the order form provided in this section.
“The Air War in Vietnam, 1961-1973,” “Moscow’s Lessons from the 1982 Lebanon Air War,” and “Maritime Air Power” are among the ten essays presented.
Women and War
Jean Bethke Elshtain. New York: Basic Books. 1987. 288 pp. Illus. Notes. Ind. $19.95 ($17.95).
This original effort challenges the traditional concepts of man as “Just Warrior” and woman as “Beautiful Soul” and persuasively proposes some new ideas about the origins of war and the causes and effects of the gender gap. By incorporating history, cultural anthropology, feminist theory, and popular culture in support of her theses, Elshtain not only redefines the roots of war and the roles of men and women, she proposes some radical changes to current and future politics, arguing for a revitalized and redefined patriotism.
Other Titles of Interest
Airlift: A History of Military Air Transport
David W. Wragg. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1986. 159 pp. Photos. Ind. $25.00 ($22.50).
Civil War Generals: Categorical Listings and a Biographical Directory
James Spencer, Compiler. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, Inc., 1986. 333 pp. Ind. $39.95 ($35.95).
Commander in Chief: Franklin Delano Roosevelt, His Lieutenants, and Their War
Eric Larrabee. New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1987. 723 pp. Maps. Notes. Ind. $24.50 ($22.05).
Life and Death in Shanghai
(An Autobiography)
Nien Cheng. New York: Grove Press, 1987. 547 pp. Ind. $19.95 ($17.95).
The Odds Against Us: Memoirs of Aerial Combat at Night During the Battle of Britain
Peter Townsend. New York: William Morrow
and Company, Inc., 1987. 240 pp- Ph°,i; Bib. Ind. $16.95 ($15.25).
The U. S. Rapid Deployment Forces
LtCol. David Eshel, IDF (Ret.). NevVY°* Arco Publishing, Inc., 1985. 208 PP- P ” ^ Map. Charts. Gloss. Bib. Ind. » ' ($13.45).
The World and Richard Nixon: Ihe Former President Offers New Insights Into the Shaping of America’s Foreign
P0HCy ■ Hall
C. L. Sulzberger. New York: Prentice
Press, 1987. 269 pp. Notes. Bib. Ind. ($16.60).
Videos__________________
Always Ready: The United States Coast Guard Story
Fred Warshofsky. An MPI home video release o Science Communications presentation in association with Turner Broadcasting Systems. 1985. 45 mins. Color. $29.95. (Order directly from Promotions Plus, 6730 North St., Dept. J ’ Tinley Park, II 60477.) ^
Relying on modem film footage juxtapo^®.^ with colorful paintings of bygone days, history of the U. S. Coast Guard is a production. The film, produced as part o In Defense of Freedom series, begins wit
origins of the Coast Guard, provides high tg
of that service’s long and proud h’s*orjLn
including those periods during war time w
the Coast Guard operated as part of the Navy and concludes with a look at its commitme in the 1980s.
Order Form
YA71 U.S. Naval Institute
Qty-
FOR OFFICE USE ONLY
-1
2062 General's Highway Annapolis, Maryland 21401
Book Titles/ltem | ISBN/ITEM # |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Maryland residents, please add 5% sales tax. _ Shipping fees (refer to shipping chart). _
Name---------------------
Address-------------------
City, State. FPO----------
Membership No______
- Check or money order enclosed
- Charge it to my □
- Bill me
. Zip Code.
Total $_
Account Number
Expiration Date
SHIPPING CHART
Add postage and handling to each order for Naval Institute books, special book selections, prints, and insignia items according to the following schedule:
Orders up to $15.00........................................... $2.25
$15.01 to $30.00.............................................. 3-°®
more than $30.00.............................................. 3.75
Signature