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\ye.(jCla* PurP0se forces” represent a serious threat to Particularly NATO—rear area security and for-
£ operation lifelines. re ?Vlet sPecial purpose forces are called by many names: sanc°V^ Riders), diversionary troops, and reconnais- as ^sabotage troops; but they are most popularly known sia£etsnaz' an acronym derived from the Russian ‘ ‘spet- Qril°ye mznachenie,” meaning “special designation” ek ,Si,ecial purpose.” The Warsaw Pact allies of the Sovi- Taave similar forces.2
that 6 ^0viet Union maintains several categories of forces ^ ^ either specifically structured for special operations S|0l0llS’ or may be designated for special operations miss by the Soviet Supreme High Command on an as-
, ^®Bh, surprise, and cold-blooded surgical rike are their tools. But the most ominous sset in the Spetsnaz arsenal may be the est’s inability to spot the threat in its familiar shadows.
n the evening of 27 December 1979, during the preliminary stages of the Soviet invasion of Af- By ~ §hanistan, a team of killers led by KGB Colonel an^ronov (head of the KGB’s terrorist-training school) the SU[)Porte<^ hy a company of Spetsnaz troops besieged Am ^a aCe president of Afghanistan, Hafizullah
feroln’ outside Kabul. The palace guard fought with such y Clty that Colonel Byeronov had to call in a second ■snaz company for reinforcement. Moscow’s orders °Us]e categorical: “The secret of our action must be rigor- aliv ^ ,?rotected. Do not let any person leave the palace and l ^ ^ayhreak, the president had been assassinated survi* m°St those inside the palace had been killed. One an Afghan captain trained in the Soviet Union, $peeecied in escaping the massacre and reported that “the dow^2 USec* weaP°ns equipped with silencers and shot n their adversaries like professional killers.”1
ne ,ls action, others like it, and potential attacks on vul- targ 16 llead9L|arters and logistics facilities—among other .. e s concern Western military planners. The qualita- and quantitative capabilities of the Soviet Union’s
needed basis. Committee for State Security (KGB) Border Guard troops, Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) Internal Security troops, and airborne troops are all sometimes categorized as Spetsnaz assets in the generic sense. In this article, however, “Spetsnaz” refers only to those select Soviet military personnel directly subordinate to the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU—Glavnoe Raz- vedyvatelnoe Upravlenie) of the Soviet General Staff who are capable of conducting sensitive operations in the enemy rear area.
Spetsnaz: A Profile _____________________________
Roles and Missions: The very existence of GRU Spetsnaz forces is cloaked in secrecy and deception. This aura of secrecy achieves two desired results. First, it minimizes the information available to the Soviet people— including all but the highest ranking officers in the military—and to the West, a definite advantage for units whose success in wartime is based upon surprise in clandestine operations. Second, under the truism that “a little information is a dangerous thing,” the small bits of information that are released or published by Soviet defectors or Western writers are likely prone to exaggeration. This also benefits Soviet propaganda and disinformation efforts. This deception has worked so successfully that, to date, much Western knowledge of Soviet Spetsnaz participation and employment in exercises and military interventions has been based on conjecture after the fact. Articles about sabotage, combat swimmer operations, and minisubmarines have appeared in Soviet military journals, but they are all written about “Western capabilities.” Spetsnaz forces conduct what the Soviets call “special reconnaissance” (spetsialnaya razvedka). The Soviet Military Encyclopedia defines special reconnaissance as:
“Reconnaissance carried out to subvert the political, economic and military potential and morale of a probable or actual enemy. The primary missions of special reconnaissance are: acquiring intelligence on major economic and military installations and either destroying them or putting them out of action; organizing sabotage and acts of subversion; carrying out punitive operations against rebels; conducting propaganda; forming and training insurgent detachments, etc. Special reconnaissance is . . . conducted by the forces of covert intelligence and special purpose troops.”3
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Within this broad definition, the main tasks of Spetsnaz units would be to operate as small groups in the enemy rear to:
- Gather and report intelligence on vital targets, including fixed and mobile missiles, air defenses, airfields, port facilities, command and control facilities, and lines of communication, as well as on the means to deliver nuclear weapons. Primary target emphasis would be placed on enemy nuclear platforms. Spetsnaz units would either locate them for attack by other forces, or if necessary, attack these targets themselves in order to prevent the war from escalating to the nuclear level in the initial stages of Western retaliation to Soviet conventional attack.
- Prepare aircraft landing areas behind enemy lines
- Organize the possible use of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons
- Sabotage or disrupt key military facilities and/or neutralize (through assassination or kidnapping) political or military personnel.4
Spetsnaz troops have been deployed in several “peacetime” roles which indicate their capabilities for wartime employment. In May 1968, for example, a reconnaissance-sabotage group attached to the 103rd Guards Airborne Division seized Prague Airport in Czechoslovakia to enable the division to land. Prior to the operation, the Spetsnaz officers and men were familiarized with the airport and its defenses. They embarked on a plane that received permission to land at Prague, after a claim of engine trouble. As the aircraft touched down and slowed, Spetsnaz forces jumped out, seized guard posts, and helped to set up a control team to bring in the airborne division. They not only secured vital points until relieved by ground forces, but they also arrested Communist Party leader Aleksandr Dubcek and dispatched him, as a prisoner, to Moscow.5
In the December 1979 Afghan operation, success hinged on tactical deception. Spetsnaz forces had probably entered Afghanistan prior to the invasion disguised as part of the Soviet military advisory effort. The presidential palace assault force wore Afghan military uniforms and their vehicles had Afghan markings.6 Soviet military advisors neutralized Afghan Army units whose loyalty was questionable through such deceptions as having these units turn over their ammunition for inventory or having them turn in vehicle batteries for winterizing and by controlling the fuel supply.7 Thus, in only a few hours, two Spetsnaz companies were able not only to secure the airport, opening the runways to cargo planes and parachute assault brigades, but to liquidate the president of the Afghan Republic, permitting his replacement, Babrak Karmal, a Soviet-backed Afghan leader, to assume control.8
As the attacks on Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan indicate, Spetsnaz forces will likely spearhead Moscow’s future military operations in local or global conflicts. In both these “peacetime” employments, Spetsnaz forces operated under KGB supervision, probably because the KGB was already operating in these areas and could provide some specialized assistance. Experience suggests that the KGB is oriented toward peacetime political-military and political-economic objectives, while the GRU is directed
more specifically against adversary warfighting capa i1 ties. In wartime, however, as in the case of the Spets' forces currently operating in Afghanistan, the GRU control and supervise special purpose forces.
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, four-man Spets'u<- teams entered Vietnam clandestinely to test the then-1' Dragunov SVD sniper rifle in combat.9 It is believed t Spetsnaz forces are currently conducting insurgent trar and advisory efforts in Africa and possibly Cuba. 1 are approximately 20,000 Soviet military personnel s tioned abroad, outside the Soviet bloc (excluding forces ^ Afghanistan). Most of these are military aid person centrally controlled by the General Staffs Main Direc o^ ate for Foreign Military Assistance, but also comp mented by GRU and KGB cadres.10Spetsnaz troops c°3^ be among these Soviet military advisors present m s nations as Cuba, Vietnam, Libya, Peru, Ethiopia, S Yemen, Nicaragua, and Angola. . f
Any connection between Spetsnaz and the training foreign terrorist groups is murky. However, Spe*s forces, by virtue of their specialized training and po*1 reliability, could be logical candidates to conduct trai for terrorist cadres. Conjecture about Spetsnaz linkst0 eign terrorism is prevalent in the open press. The Year’s Eve 1983 demolition of the Cuscatlan Bridge m ^ Salvador is alleged to have been conducted by free' Italian mercenaries possibly trained by Spetsnaz per ^ nel.11 Another source claims that there are at least Spetsnaz troops in Managua, Nicaragua, who closely with the Cuban General Directorate of Intelhge and the Sandinista Interior Ministry. Sources say Spetsnaz unit has held joint training exercises with m bers of Puerto Rican terrorist groups flown into Mana§ from Cuba.12 Other reports indicate that NATO nn '3. intelligence is speculating that the increase in s°ph|S^_ cated, apparently coordinated, and unsolved terroris tacks against U. S. military personnel and sabotage NATO installations in Europe indicates Spetsnaz invo ^ ment or training. However, any conclusions shout tempered with caution and judgment, since these as tions stem from open press sources and not from verl intelligence.
Organization: The basic Spetsnaz operational unit is^ team of eight to ten men. The team is commanded y ^ officer, may have a warrant officer or senior sergea ^ deputy, and includes a radio operator, demolitions perts, snipers, and reconnaissance specialists. Team ^ bers have some degree of cross-training, so a missi°n continue if a specialist is lost.13
The most identifiable Spetsnaz formations belongt0 GRU. Spetsnaz diversionary brigades (with a wa strength ranging from 900-1,300 men) are suppo^^ assigned to each Soviet military district or front and Warsaw Pact group of forces outside the Soviet )4 (East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary^ Each brigade consists of a headquarters company,ttir . four parachute battalions, a signals company, and sUUjq„ units. These brigades, operating in small groups 1,000 kilometers behind enemy lines, pave the way
C](!"tal ^orces that will attack through areas cleared by nur action, air attacks, and sabotage, w, ac the four naval fleets also is assigned a naval Sea brigade. These brigades reflect the emphasis on hattar' trat*on’ w'th a headquarters company, a parachute froa 10n> a mini-submarine group, and two to three Cflmnieny,comhat swimmer battalions, as well as a signals In^a"y. an<t support elements.
Pend3 eacb small-arms or tank army has one inde-
meneat^etsnaz company, with a complement of 115 ters th n aiTn^ Spetsnaz company consists of a headquar- and s ree Paracbute platoons, a communication platoon, and units' There are generally three or four armies
fyet °nC tan^ army 'n each wartime front. Independent six comPanies would operate in small groups (five to rear ' 3t dcP^s 100 to 500 kilometers in the enemy Spe1ln suPPort of the armies.15 In addition, there are three aien wr2 'on8~range reconnaissance regiments (700-800 catedlrehct|y subordinate to the GRU that would be allo- ate ,,0 toe c°mmander-in-chief of each strategic director- Sp fee °r more fronts and a fleet).
15 oo?- peacetime strength has been estimated from realisf V0’000’ a*though the lower range seems more sever-*|C accurate figure is difficult to ascertain for critic3, reasons- First, it is not certain that each of the less aremilitary districts (especially the interior ones) that full bri <)r'Cn|t^ci toward NATO or China would deploy a maim .^ade- Second, all Spetsnaz brigades may not be ets st3lne<* at fuh strength in peacetime. Third, the Sovi- r,Ve to conceal their true strengths. In order to limit
peacetjC e those aware of the GRU and Spetsnaz in tacbecj ?C’ ^dependent Spetsnaz companies are de-
fectiv . t^leir arrny-level commands and become di- 8r°ups70rdinate t0 staffs °f military districts and to form° ^0rces" The independent companies are grouped that le fn ^^hional battalion in the Spetsnaz brigade at ari<j th - ^lc event of war, this battalion is broken up, e independent companies report to the command of their respective armies.18 Soviet defector Viktor Suvorov states that during wartime mobilization, the total number of Spetsnaz forces could be increased four- to five-fold by recalling reservists who have previously served in Spetsnaz detachments.19
Most of the personnel in a Spetsnaz brigade are two- year conscripts. Individual Spetsnaz teams of these elite conscripts are led by professional officers. The headquarters company assigned to each brigade, on the other hand, is manned entirely by full-time professional soldiers— highly trained specialists. They are fluent in one or more languages of their areas of potential operations, and are trained and equipped to operate in these territories—not in camouflaged uniform, but in civilian clothing or in enemy military or police uniforms. These companies are also the only ones among Spetsnaz detachments that, in the course of military operations, may establish contact and act together with Spetsnaz agents in the field. Headquarters companies are maintained in the highest state of readiness. Their existence is cloaked in secrecy, and they are supposedly detached from their parent brigades, posing as parachutists, boxers, wrestlers, martial arts experts, marksmen, and sports teams of the military districts, groups of forces, and fleets. Allegedly, many officers and sergeants do not even suspect the existence of such companies within their brigades.20 The Spetsnaz regiments of the Strategic Directorates are similarly composed of full-time professionals.
There are even unconfirmed reports that the Soviet Union replaces members of its sports teams with Spetsnaz
schools
Spetsnaz does not have its own officer training
personnel. According to Suvorov, Senior Lieutenant Valentin Yerikalin, who won a silver medal for rowing at the 1968 Olympic Games, was an officer of the Black Sea Fleet naval Spetsnaz brigade. He was arrested by Turkish authorities several years later while trying to recruit agents in Istanbul.21
Personnel: Only the highest caliber officers and conscripts are recruited for Spetsnaz. Prior to being called for military service, every Soviet conscript is categorized according to his loyalty to the regime and his physical and intellectual development. Spetsnaz has priority in selection over such other elite forces as airborne units, strategic rocket troops, and nuclear submarine units.22 Stringent standards are required of all Spetsnaz conscripts. Candi-
dates must be secondary school graduates, intelligent, physically fit, and most important, politically reliable. When possible, draftees from rural areas are encouraged to volunteer for Spetsnaz. They are generally viewed to be less informed about foreign policy and the West and, therefore, are susceptible to the virulent propaganda of indoctrination. Upon induction, Spetsnaz conscripts sign a loyalty oath in which they acknowledge death as the punishment for divulging details about their service. During their two years of service, conscripts are not allowed leave or furloughs.23
After induction, some of the conscripts will be selected for an arduous six-month non-commissioned officers (NCO) school. Anticipating a high attrition rate, commanders may send as many as five conscripts for each NCO slot. In the event more NCOs graduate than there are slots available, the lower-ranked graduates are assigned to positions as private soldiers. The excess of trained NCOs provides a ready pool of leaders to replace casualties in the
field. Washouts and those conscripts not selected for NCO school receive training in their units.
and academies. In order to maintain the secrecy and am 1 guity of the organization, the best officers are recrui e from the other service branch schools. The reserve of o 1 cers and warrant officers is high in Spetsnaz units. Co pared to a normal Soviet Army company’s five °iric and one warrant officer, a Spetsnaz company has nine o cers and 11 warrant officers.24 This supply is necessary since Spetsnaz commanders generally operate indepea dently behind enemy lines, and team leaders are both quired and authorized to exercise more initiative and s * than the average Soviet officer.
Spetsnaz careerists (officers and warrant officers) a well compensated. Each year of service with a Sp?tsl unit counts as one and one-half years for pension P poses, and there is an incentive pay of 50% of salary- in other types of airborne units, all Spetsnaz person ^ receive jump pay, which varies with the total number parachute jumps. A conscript’s jump pay can exceed regular salary.
Although Spetsnaz personnel seem to be isolated r0 other military elements for operational security reaso ^ Spetsnaz facilities often appear to be positioned—albei enclosed and well-guarded compounds—with other m tary units. Spetsnaz ground forces usually adopt airb0^ or signal troop uniforms and naval Spetsnaz wear na infantry or submariner uniforms.25 Similarly, their et composition is not distinctive. To some degree, it ret e the ethnic characteristics of the intended target. For exa pie, Spetsnaz units in the Soviet Far East are allegecl ^ include North Koreans and Japanese from Manchuria the Kurile Islands.
Training: Basic military training for conscripts is c°^ ducted within the unit. In addition, Spetsnaz personne a^ trained in: parachuting; hand-to-hand combat and si killing techniques; sabotage using explosives, cendiaries, acids, and abrasives; infiltration techmqu ’ which include defeating locks and security systems, eign languages and culture; survival; reconnaissance map reading; and rappelling. Specified naval Sp?ts personnel also conduct diving and mini-submarine tr ing activities. . ^
Parachute training begins with static line jumps, many soldiers will progress to high altitude, high-opeI}i^_f and high altitude, low-opening jumps to increase t ^ covert insertion capabilities. Jumps are made day a26 night, over all types of terrain, regardless of weather-^
The technical training schedule leaves time for ng°r , physical training involving obstacle courses and i° marches, which are often conducted wearing gas ^ Some units are also trained in mountain climbing and ing. Up to half the training year is spent out of garr*s -c Once or twice a year, selected teams engage in rea i unannounced exercises conducted under harsh 001^ conditions. Exercise objectives are often operationa stallations guarded by regular troops or soldiers o Ministry of Internal Affairs.
v- Petsnaz unit could be dropped anywhere in the So- nion and required to patrol or ski hundreds of kilome- „US I? an actua* Soviet military installation, neutralize the acar s’ atl(l assault the facility in a manner approaching ji Ua COmbat. At the same time, regular Soviet troops are the^at<”i, °n tra^ Spetsnaz forces, tracking
^throughout the region. Casualties often mark such Sp TClsts’ but the realism provides a dual service, the!SnUZ teams Practice their own tactics (confronting mov VU*nerab’ii ities to helicopters and guard dogs during h0mement> _wbile they raise the combat readiness of the purity forces to repel possible raids.27 mo k orate brigade training areas, containing full-scale bkel "*l>S enemy weapon systems and facilities from ous ^ tacaters °f action, are further indications of the seri- ^ATn^f1°^Petsnaz training. Brigades assigned against and *orces typically have models of Lance, Pershing, nUci^rount^'aunched cruise missiles, as well as airfields, tion Cfr St0ra^e shes, air defense sites, and communica- famir acillties- The mock-ups are used for both equipment •arization and demolition training.
^\ aP<m and Equipment: In keeping with their behind- armlaes.missi°ns, Spetsnaz teams are lightly equipped, be is W*t*1 ^est weaPons available. Each soldier will sisn °nC t'le vari°us Kalashnikov rifle models de-
0r thed for airbome/airmobile units—the AKM, AK-74, Wil] 6 neW sbort-barrelled AKR carbine. In addition, he SeveCaiTy a silenced 9-mm. pistol, ammunition, a knife, with "and grenades of various types, and rations, along 'nclud ^0rt'on tbe team’s gear, which might normally Bra6 an RPG-16 grenade launcher and rounds, a tadioUn°V sniper rifle, an R-350M burst transmission tionalVV't*1 3 ran^e °f m°re than 1,000 kilometers, direc- ’ttands0111168 ’ 3nd P^astic expl°sives. If the mission de- sUcl S l1, lbe team might also be assigned special weapons as the SA-7 or SA-14 surface-to-air missile.28
gence?^Petsnaz missions depend on up-to-date intelli- staff6 ^1C Intelligence Directorate of each front level deparJS resPonsible for intelligence. It includes separate na[s1 mcnts for reconnaissance, agent intelligence, sig- Units lnt^*8ence, information processing, and Spetsnaz Spet ’ ncler the Spetsnaz department are organized the aait TV ^r’l=ai^e and a dedicated Spetsnaz intelligence lects • fls Un*t recruits “sleeper” sabotage agents and col- per *n °rmation on potential targets and enemy military r nne* during peacetime.
agenf?S<;aZ sa*30ta8e agonts are not ordinary intelligence Wait f ^eePer agents might have no other mission than to tion f °r order to commit acts of sabotage in prepara- p0rt .r War- They might also acquire safehouses or trans- tCarri10a to support the eventual deployment of Spetsnaz c°ntrS l °6S'^eS s'eePers’ lbe Spetsnaz intelligence unit lectio*S an<^ “illegal” agents for information col-
their n , a8ents are accredited representatives of °r Aere^Pect‘ve countries (for example, military attaches Cove/0 '01 rePresentat>ves) who use their official roles as °Perat t0 COnduct intelligence activities. Illegal agents e under deep cover, with no apparent connection to the country to which they are sending intelligence information. Potential Spetsnaz agents include sailors on board merchant ships on trips to the West or truck drivers crossing international borders. A European customs agreement allows trucks marked “TIR” (Transport Intemationaux Routiers) to cross borders with minimum customs formalities. These vehicles can, and do, travel near sensitive installations and through areas off-limits to accredited Soviet military personnel.29
In the event of hostilities, the Spetsnaz intelligence network will become particularly active. As tensions rise, headquarters company specialists will infiltrate enemy territory, often through legal entry points with false papers or as members of Soviet legations. They will augment the intelligence collection effort, contacting in-place agents, if necessary, and prepare for the arrival of the ordinary Spetsnaz teams.
Massive clandestine infiltration of Spetsnaz personnel into enemy territory before the outbreak of hostilities would be risky, possibly alerting enemy forces to Soviet mobilization. Therefore, the majority of Spetsnaz teams would probably arrive by fixed-wing Aeroflot aircraft once hostilities had begun, using Soviet offensive air operations as cover. Other military transport aircraft would likely be dedicated to regular airborne divisions. Long- range Mi-6 or Mi-26 helicopters are also possible carriers for Spetsnaz infiltration teams. Once in the target area, the teams will bury their parachutes and organize a base. Teams will set up early-warning booby-traps on routes into the base camp and shift the location of the camp periodically. If the mission demands mobility, Spetsnaz forces will likely steal enemy vehicles or use transportation provided by the agent network.30
Naval Spetsnaz paratroop elements would infiltrate by airdrop in the same manner as the ground elements or on naval variants of the Mi-24 helicopter. Other naval elements would most likely be inserted using SCUBA, small boats, fishing or merchant vessels, or mini-submarines launched from an India-class “mother ship” submarine. Their efforts will concentrate on naval bases, with priority on nuclear submarines in port.31
Most Spetsnaz teams will use camouflage and avoid contact with enemy patrols. They will attack if ordered to do so by the brigade or in the event a nuclear missile is readied for firing. In that case, the team will try to destroy the missile by small arms fire, and, if not successful, will mount an all-out assault. Since Spetsnaz commanders operate independently, front headquarters keeps interference to a minimum during missions—relying on the initiative and skill of the team leaders. Sufficient coordination is maintained to order the teams out of the way of other Soviet attacks.
Current Operations and Threats
Afghanistan: The Soviet Union is undoubtedly gaining valuable combat experience at all levels in Afghanistan, but it is not winning the war there by any measurable standard, unless the slow extermination of rural life is considered “winning.” The Soviets are involved in a low-
intensity conflict that postulates a revolutionary client who looks to them for support against counter-revolutionary, reactionary forces. The Soviet counter-guerrilla war is suffering because of inexperience and a doctrine that emphasizes a centralized command. A counter-guerrilla war is the platoon and company commanders’ war, but the only Soviet officers encouraged to think in terms of independent operations are from airborne, airmobile, and Spetsnaz units.
As the most flexible, versatile, and independent of Soviet forces, Spetsnaz units are important in the Soviet search for a counter-insurgency doctrine that does not rely on “cookbook” warfare.32 Called “the black soldiers” by the Mujahideen, because their faces are darkened for night operations, Spetsnaz commandos are highly respected and feared. They continue to follow Spetsnaz doctrine—reconnaissance-oriented operations in the enemy rear—to subvert the enemy’s ability to resist. Spetsnaz missions in Afghanistan have included:
- Long-Range Patrolling: This involves extended dismounted independent operations to interdict Afghan supply routes and night movements. Spetsnaz commandos are not roadbound like most Soviet units, and often insert by helicopter.33 Their “search and destroy” missions identify Mujahideen resistance groups, which control 85% of Afghanistan. They can call in Soviet artillery fire or air- bome/airmobile troop landings to drive the rebels into more open areas where they are then struck by helicopter gunship and tactical aircraft fire.34
- Joint Operations with Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) Militia: These two forces are well-suited for independent dismounted operations: Spetsnaz troops because of their training and the militia forces because they provide intelligence, are knowledgeable about the terrain, and are armed and equipped like the Mujahideen. The guerrillas frequently make local non-aggression pacts with DRA forces, and Spetsnaz forces take advantage of this vulnerability. Afghan sources report that Soviet troops dressed as shepherds have driven herds of sheep up to Afghan positions before attacking. Spetsnaz troops dressed as guerrillas have been used to bum mosques and food supplies in areas not under Soviet control to discredit the Mujahideen. In addition, Spetsnaz teams have adopted this dress in attempts to assassinate Ahmed Shah Mas- soud, one of the more successful Afghan rebel leaders.
- Convoy Protection: Lightly armed, physically fit Spetsnaz troops are often used to establish outposts on hill crests ahead of Soviet vehicle convoys to prevent ambush. Helicopters are used for insertion and extraction.
Soviet special operations in Afghanistan foretell something of how they may operate in a major war in Europe or Asia. The Spetsnaz tactics now emerging complement the overall Soviet approach of using massive firepower, applied by large-scale mechanized ground offensives, bombing, or helicopter assaults to depopulate areas of the countryside.
Mini-submarine Intrusions: Extensive mini-submarine activity in Swedish and Norwegian territorial waters began in October 1982, and also commenced in the territorial
waters of Japan in August 1984. The mini-submarine^ probably belonged to naval Spetsnaz units and may hav been delivered to the target area by a specially equipP^ India-class submarine or fishing trawler. Reports claim mini-submarines are 20 to 50 feet long and carry three' ° seven personnel. They are propelled through the water^ screws, but crawl about freely on the sea-bottom on caterpillar treads. Sea-bottom submarine tracks discovere in Japanese territorial waters of the Soya and Tsug straits in August 1984 were identical to the tread tracks the mini-submarines identified by Sweden in 1982 an 1983.35 Sweden’s discovery also coincided with reports unknown divers appearing on their shores, leading speculation that Spetsnaz units were conducting penetra tion exercises into foreign territories.
The Soviets appear to be reconnoitering prospec ^ opponents: cataloguing the strength and disposition ^ their forces, assessing their strengths and weaknesses, a identifying promising avenues of approach for future tingency offensives. There are many theories about Soviet motives behind these peacetime mini-submar intrusions into the territorial waters of other nations, include: .
- Collecting intelligence on defensive installations a navigational conditions near naval bases
- Conducting new weapon systems trials
- Observing foreign military exercises
- Inserting/extracting Spetsnaz teams or agents
- Testing adversary military capabilities, detection sy terns, and crisis management techniques36
- Laying passive navigation devices as underwater ro markers to safe havens for Soviet nuclear-powered e ballistic missile submarines in Swedish and Norwegi fjords in the event of war
- Laying mines
- Removing mines or other underwater devices'
- Locating and tapping underwater communication ca - to collect intelligence or feed in false data38
All of these theories are plausible and possibly corre • and all are in keeping with the Spetsnaz doctrinal miss1 of special reconnaissance. In the event of war, such m sions will likely occur near key military objectives tor Soviets: the strategic Soya and Tsugaru straits off Jap ’ on which the Soviet Pacific Fleet depends; the strateg Skagerrak and Kattegat straits in the Baltic—gateways ^ the North Atlantic; and naval bases, airfields, and defens installations along the Baltic littoral. These current oper tions could be peacetime rehearsals of contingency P ^ to deploy Spetsnaz commandos against key political an military targets in the early stages of conflict. ^
The encroachments against Sweden have an addition ^ advantage. They form the basis of a psychological cam paign to intimidate the Swedish Government and con tion it to accept a status of virtual impotence toward bo military predominance in the area. The Soviets hope sustained encroachments will wear down the Swedish w to resist, crumbling the NATO Northern Flank, and al ° ing them to extort concessions—such as a tacit license operate in Swedish territory. Continuing these submart^ intrusions—even after a Whiskey-class submarine
l9§j_^ near Karlskrona Naval Base on 28 October At Serves to increase the intimidation factor further. N[ave outset of any conflict in Europe, the Swedish gajn j111181 be neutralized quickly for the Soviet Navy to best b rate®.'c suPremacy in the Baltic Sea. This would Navy 6 acbieved by sabotaging as much of the Swedish to nas P°ssible while in port. Deploying Spetsnaz teams c°ninv ^IZC ^we(iish minefields, early warning sites, c°uld n an<^ c°ntrol facilities, and coastal defenses Sabotaor°V'^e access t0 landing parties for diversionary trancesC rai(*s' ^ini-submarines could covertly mine en- Styjfj. anc* **ess routes to naval bases, while combat p0rtattacbed limpet mines to the hulls of ships in of tbe 5isu^cess of such an operation would be a function forts aC| ect’veness °f Soviet advance reconnaissance ef- The11- thoroughness of Swedish countermeasures.39 kn°Wnactual reasons for this activity may never be hartces hUt badness °f the operations undeniably en- Pencb 1 6 rePutation of Spetsnaz units. Given the Soviet the atfnt ^or c°ntingency planning, the same logic behind s^°Uld arCnt rn'ni'suhmarine incursions in Scandinavia stratep-^r°kak*y also he applied to other areas of wartime In c'C lmPortance to the Soviet Union.
°ns*dering the effectiveness of the Soviet Navy’s OperafZ °Perat'ons in the Northern Theater of Military bases ■l°nS’ 's imPortant not to lose sight of the fact that *ald ln j^e United Kingdom, and particularly in Scot- It is di°U • a*S° easi‘y become targets for such activities, tiorjs Sc^Ule^n8 to consider the possibility of such opera- burring in a harbor such as Holy Loch.
cifice , a> East: Spetsnaz targets in the Far East and Pa- egions might include U. S. military facilities and
command and control headquarters at Subic Bay, Philippines, Yokosuka, Japan, Guam, or Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. The Soviet Union currently maintains the world’s largest fishing fleet and the third largest merchant fleet (measured in ship numbers).40 These ubiquitous state-owned civilian vessels could provide unobtrusive clandestine insertion and support platforms for Spetsnaz teams or mini-submarines during the critical transition to warfare phase.
The projected Spetsnaz threat could be particularly acute against Japan, already alarmed over increasing Soviet Far East military buildup. Control of the Tsugaru, Soya, and Tsushima straits is important to the Soviet Union, to prevent its Pacific fleet from becoming bottled up in the Sea of Japan. Three-quarters of the Soviet Pacific Fleet operates in the Sea of Japan from Vladivostok. The other quarter is homeported in Petropavlovsk—an open- ocean port which is relatively ice-free in winter, but which is sufficiently isolated that it must be supplied by sea. Hence, the 24-mile-wide Soya Strait is particularly important to the Soviet Union in the event of war. The strait is only partially controlled by the Soviet Union (from the Sakhalin side), and is critical in supplying Petropavlovsk (a major submarine base) from Vladivostok.
Many U. S. and Japanese strategic planners believe that the Soviets probably have detailed contingency plans for ensuring control of the Soya Strait in wartime. The coinci-
dental Soviet fortification of the Northern Territories and the mini-submarine intrusions within Japanese territorial waters provide evidence that an invasion of Hokkaido from the north could be a Soviet priority.
Japan’s Self-Defense Forces are aware of this possibility, and have dedicated their best airplanes, best ground equipment, and most seasoned troops to the defense of Hokkaido. Spetsnaz forces could be crucial to the success of such an invasion by neutralizing airfields and air defense sites and by sabotaging logistic and transportation networks in the Hokkaido rear area to create confusion and disrupt reinforcement. Additionally, naval Spetsnaz teams, using mini-submarines, could conduct mining or mine countermeasure operations within the strategic straits. The multiplicity of Asian ethnic nationalities within the Soviet Union from which to draw Spetsnaz personnel, the alleged effective Soviet intelligence agent network within Japan, and the omnipresence of the Soviet merchant and fishing fleet would certainly contribute to the success of potential Spetsnaz operations.
An Appraisal
Strengths and Weaknesses: The average Spetsnaz commando is not ten feet tall. Despite their qualifications, rigorous training, and demonstrated value, Spetsnaz forces do have several weaknesses. Since most Spetsnaz personnel are conscripts on two-year tours of duty, there is limited opportunity for cross-training in specialties and languages, and some may lack the degree of motivation and professionalism that characterize Western unconventional warfare forces.
Much of the success of Spetsnaz infiltrations depends upon the degree of advance Soviet mobilization warning the West may receive. Although Spetsnaz forces may be composed of hundreds of teams, they cannot all be simultaneously inserted much before D-Day, because the chance of compromise is too great. In addition, once tensions increase or the West receives advance warning of impending hostilities, many of the clandestine means of insertion and support will be terminated. Legal agents will probably be expelled from Western countries; Aeroflot landing rights and Soviet merchant vessel port visits will be terminated; and TIR truck passage privileges will be curtailed.
In comparison to Western unconventional warfare forces, Spetsnaz units lack specialized infiltration aircraft like the U. S. Air Force MC-130E Combat Talon. This shortage severely limits Spetsnaz capabilities for clandestine insertion, particularly just prior to the start of hostilities. As a result, Spetsnaz units must rely upon the brute force of the Soviet air campaign to cover most infiltration. If Soviet fighter-bombers and other means do not inflict the necessary damage to enemy air defenses, unarmed transports would prove sitting ducks before the teams even arrive on target.
Despite these limitations, Spetsnaz forces pose a formidable wartime threat to Western, particularly NATO’s, rear areas. From the Soviet perspective, a force of several thousand highly trained men is a small investment for the
potential payoff of neutralizing enemy nuclear delivery capabilities, degrading air defense and communicai systems, and, indirectly, enhancing the effectiveness Soviet aircraft, missiles, and ground forces t^oU®n Spetsnaz-assisted targeting. Spetsnaz teams provide effective force multiplier. By neutralizing enemy nuC systems, they enhance the surprise of the main attac ■ allowing Soviet forces to exploit superior margins of c ventional military power. By creating panic and disrup1 in the rear areas, they decrease the enemy’s ability to re by causing forces to be withdrawn from the front lines meet the rear area threat. , •
The Afghanistan experience has given Soviet leaders a greater degree of operational confidence to assert itse especially in situations it may have previously avoids • should no longer be assumed that the Soviet Union conduct power projection with the same conservatism all instances. The strength and varied capabilities Spetsnaz forces allow Moscow an effective instrumen advance its strategic interests in the Third World throug direct political action operations against unstable regi or through more indirect means, such as training and s V port of anti-Western insurgencies, wars of national h ^ tion, or terrorism. In many Third World conflicts, eve modest military interposition could influence the outco Indigenous revolutionary elements could quickly be s^F plemented by an on-ground Soviet Spetsnaz presence fore the arrival of U. S. or allied rapid deployment f°rC presenting the West with a fait accompli.41 Since the ^ of surprise is their trademark, a lack of information an lack of readiness by the West can become two of the sp cial purpose forces’ greatest weapons.
Western Countermeasures: The size and the quality the Spetsnaz establishment point out the need for effec security of key Western installations. Awareness 01 threat is crucial and demands: ~ jn
- Continued education of the military audience, NAJ
particular ..j,
► Realistic integration of Spetsnaz play into Western m tary exercises
- Continued research into Spetsnaz capabilities, taC
tated by better cooperation among Western intelhge services z
- Identification of facilities that might be likely Spets ^
targets and the development of appropriate security them (possibly mobilizing reserve personnel as rear security forces) u,
- Monitoring Soviet Spetsnaz activity—including its \
ing and merchant fleet—worldwide, which reClu^r, greater international cooperation among intelligence s vices. Although it would be impossible to keep suffjcl^e forces available to track and target all of the vessels m Soviet Union’s fishing and merchant fleet, a priority ^ tern might be established to monitor the activities o larger and more important vessels. At the very least, 0 security forces should be on guard when Soviet ships ger in the area. jn
The Soviet Union has made an enormous investme . special purpose forces. The West must also dedicate i
e 'mProvement of its own special operations forces to t0 resP°nd rapidly, flexibly, and appro- intp6 ^ t0 'evc*s ar|d types of aggression from low- nsity conflict to global confrontation. This is essential, the ^'fft kfcause the Soviet Union is doing it, but because e fectiveness of such forces has been proven.
“tyhe
tion frorn^F ^^TSNAZ Come,” Le Figaro, 6 September 1984 (English transla-
1 French).
Robert c d ”
(SpETSNA7w’°yd USAF/INEGT), “Soviet Special Purpose Forces
Review ) ’ ^ ^une 1985. (Unpublished article submitted to Air University
Sovlet i#>■,
4John J ^ncyc^°Pe^a< Vol. 7, Voyendizdat: Moscow, 1979, p. 493.
B. Hugh TZlak’ ^ov*et Approach to Special Operations,” Frank R. Barnett, egy (Wash°Var’ ^ ^c*lar£^ Schultz, Editors, Special Operations in U. S. Strat- SAleksei National Defense University Press, 1984), p. 112.
20 Dero^kya^°V’ ^ov‘et Sabotage Training for World War III,” Soviet Analyst, 6p member 1979, p. 3.
Joseph jepd/p’ pouPs and Killings in Kabul,” Time, 22 November 1982, p. 34. ^euman Fh° 1DS' Soviet-Afghan War,” Robert G. Harkavy & Stephanie G. ■ngton . ,t°rs’ The Lessons of Recent Wars in the Third World, Volume / (Lex- D C. Heath & Co., 1985), p. 193.
’Ross S loi ,7^^ ^ome,” Le Figaro, 6 September 1984.
Roreipn y* Spetsnaz: Special Operations Forces of the USSR,” Defense &
Decembcr 1984, p. 28.
<*mZaryPower
lyTO), p. 126.
tt,„
1984. Jj^chael
^ho Blew the Bridge?”
1986 (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing
Defense & Foreign Affairs Weekly, 12-18 November
'Boyd C ^U^*van» “Soviet Army Saboteurs,” Insight, 23 September 1985.
l4n°yd-
Stor’
24Suvorov, “Spetsnaz,” p. 1212.
25Ibid., p. 1211.
26Chris Burton, “The Myth and Reality of the Soviet Paratrooper,” Military Review, January 1985, p. 35.
27Aleksei Myagkov, “Soviet Sabotage Training for World War 111,” Soviet Analyst, 20 December 1979, p. 4.
28Kelly, p. 29; Suvorov, “Spetsnaz,” p. 1215.
29“Soviet Truckers Suspected of Spying,” Washington Times, 23 December 1982,
p. 8.
30Suvorov, “Spetsnaz,” p. 1215.
31Kelly, p. 29.
32Ross S. Kelly, “Soviet Low-Intensity Operations: Moving to Center Stage,” Defense & Foreign Affairs, January 1985, p. 37.
33David C. Isby, “SPETSNAZ in Afghanistan: Soviet Special Operations Forces in Action,” 12 March 1985. (Unpublished article received from intelligence files of HQ USAF/INEG, Bolling AFB, Washington, D. C.).
34Kelly, “Soviet Low-Intensity Operations,” p. 29.
35“Tracks of Soviet Mini-Submarines? On Seabed of Tsugaru and Soya Straits; Even Suspicion of Trepassing into Territorial Waters; Government Source Discloses,” Mainichi, 31 August 1984, p. 3. (From Daily Summary of the Japanese Press, American Embassy, Tokyo, Political Section—Office of Translation Services, 1 September 1984).
^Thomas Ries, “Soviet Submarines in Sweden: Psychological Warfare in the Nordic Region?” International Defense Review, 6/1984, p. 695.
37Edgar O'Ballance, “Underwater Hide-and-Seek,” Military Review, April 1984, p. 73.
38Viktor Suvorov, “Soviet Special Forces at Work in the Baltic?” John Moore, Editor, Jane's Naval Review (London: Jane’s Publishing Co., Ltd., 1985), p. 149. 39Lynn M. Hansen, Soviet Navy Spetsnaz Operations on the Northern Flank: Implications for the Defense of Western Europe (College Station, Texas: Center for Strategic Technology of Texas, A&M University Press. 1984), p. 52.
■“Tames John Tritten, “The Soviet Civilian Fleet: A Threat to the West?” Defense d Foreign Affairs, February 1985, p. 31.
4,Dziak, p. 117.
P- 112.
lishino r^UV(?l?v’ ^ns^e Soviet Military Intelligence (New York: Macmillan Pub-
‘Vdo 1984)' P- 151.
jjpziak p0t^2°W ^1®ure’ Suvorov quotes high figure.
>«Yikt *
^feniP DUV.0rov’ Spetsnaz: the Soviet Union’s Special Forces,” International >Von^,9/J983,p. ^
1212.
‘“Ibid ’’Soviet Military Intelligence, p. 151.
’ r- t52.
C ’ikt “
^82), p^j1Q^r°V’ ^ns^e the Soviet Army (New York: Berkley Publishing Co., S"WhItV Spetsnaz-” P- 1212.
Wt, ’ 0P>=isnaz,” p ,,,, h " the SPETSNAZ Come.'
Commander Kohler is currently a member of the Strategy and Tactics Group of the Naval Special Warfare Center, Coronado, CA. A 1973 graduate of the U. S. Naval Academy, he is a naval special warfare officer who has served multiple tours in Underwater Demolition Teams and SEAL (sea, air, land) teams. Commander Kohler received his M.A. in national security affairs from the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, in 1985, with subspecialties in strategic planning and Far East, Southeast Asia, and Pacific studies. In 1985, he received the U. S. Naval Institute Postgraduate School Award for his master’s thesis, “Soviet Special Purpose Forces: Their Organization, Capabilities, and Limitations.”
You Know When You’re Beaten
My new Japanese friend smiled, and said: “Yes, I know that Corsair.”
The time was the mid-1950s. I was in Tokyo for a few days on my annual two-week active duty training stint as a Naval Reserve pilot with VR-7, out of Honolulu.
My dinner host had also invited a Japanese friend who, it turned out, had been a midshipman in the Imperial Japanese Naval Academy in the waning days of World War II.
1 mentioned my flying days in World War II, including my last active flying duty in the prop Corsair fighter. He looked at me, and told this story:
The naval academy personnel had been bombed out of their normal quarters and relocated in temporary quarters along Tokyo Bay. His general quarters station was in one of a number of machine gun emplacements located along the top of a sheer cliff rising from the bay. Each position was manned, as he put it, by two scared midshipmen, and commanded by a tough petty officer.
American carrier planes were ranging up and down the bay, looking for increasingly scarce targets. On this particular day, my friend said, a flight of four Corsairs spotted the cliff-top emplacements and swung around to attack.
Four or five runs ensued—the four strafing Corsairs sweeping in from the bay into the return fire from the Japanese positions. Neither side really did much damage.
Finally, the Corsairs wheeled into a last attack. My friend noted that one of the planes did not fire, but nevertheless made its run in with the others. As the non-firing Corsair bore in upon the midshipman’s position, it racked up on one wing and roared past only ten feet overhead—with the hatch open and the pilot waving and smiling at my friend’s gun crew cowering below.
“At that moment,” he said, “I knew Japan had lost the war. Yes, 1 know that Corsair.”
Lieutenant Commander James W. Spencer, U. S. Naval Reserve (Retired)