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Today’s convoys rely too heavily on VHF voice radio communication, but sometimes revert to the World War I and II use of signal flags as did this Navy crew member on the author’s ship during Ocean Safari 85.
Again, we exercised convoy fundamentals, including various random formations. The weather was nice the first few days, and there were no exercise attacks from our simulated enemy.
I suppose I have always been a little superstitious, but that did not come to mind when the convoy commodore duties were turned over to me on Friday the 13th. However, as I mentioned earlier, a Soviet destroyer visited the convoy, along with a Soviet intelligence ship and waves of British aircraft conducting simulated attacks on the convoy. By 14 September, the weather was similar to the storms we encountered en route to Iceland. The small Norwegian ship had serious problems keeping station in heavy weather. Again, the convoy had to slow, making little to no speed, and wait for better weather. We considered de-
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last goddamned walk you xoected take. As an officer, you’re exp to move ahead.” , ^ue
This pretty well took care o Army, and it certainly awaken ^ conference. Then he said:
Rear Admiral Cooper graduated from the Naval Academy with the Class of 1927 and, following service afloat in a battleship, two cruisers, and three destroyers, was assigned in June 1940 to the NROTC unit at Harvard. Immediately after Pearl Harbor, he assumed command of the USS Palmer (DMS-5) which ultimately joined the convoy that participated in the assault and occupation of Fedhala-Casablanca, Morocco, from 8 to 11 November 1942. The following was adapted from the nine interviews (1973-74) that John T.
Mason, Jr., conducted with Admiral Cooper.
On a Saturday morning in October 1942, the commanding officers and communications officers were summoned to the Army base at Norfolk and, for the first time, learned that we were going to Casablanca. Our beachhead was to be at a place called Fed- hala, a few miles northwest of Casablanca. The briefing went on for four or five hours, as we discussed the various annexes of the operation order and plan. After the first shock of hearing where we were going had passed, the proceedings had become quite dull. We had just finished discussing the graves registration detail, as I remember, when an Army officer wearing pistols and with a rather high falsetto voice got up and really brought the conference back to life. I found out later that this was Major General George S. Patton. While none of us in the Navy had ever heard of him before, the Army officers present knew who he was.
By one trick or another, he brought the thing into full perspective. He was asked whether he wanted to make these landings during daylight or darkness.
He said during darkness, because if the troops ever saw the beaches they’d never want to land. He also said, in jest I’m sure, “I’m under no illusion that the Goddamned Navy will get us within 100 miles of the beach or within a week of the date set for landing.”
Our landing force commander assured him that he would be put on the beach at the time and location indicated in the plan. He said, “It doesn’t matter, put us on Africa, we’ll walk.”
He then passed on some information particularly to the junior Army officers. He said:
“Now, if you have any doubts as to what you’re to do, I can put it very simply. The idea is to move ahead. You usually will know where the front is by the sound of gunfire, and that’s the direction you should proceed. Now, suppose you lose a hand or an ear is shot off, or perhaps a piece of your nose, and you think you should walk back to get first aid; if I see you, it will be the
‘I have
piece of information for the When you get back to your s k^rs please assemble your crews a pj, and read annex so-and-so, slire
so-and-so, signed by me. Ma ^eifl that everyone hears this and e that it means what it says. Q find We couldn’t wait to get aC „ to out what he wanted to pass a,^e the Navy and to everyone e s ■ ^
instruction read: “Any Amen ^orlian viceman molesting a M°roCpatton. will be shot.” Signed G. 6- eX_
It was interesting to watc ^
pressions on the faces of the ^ members as this was read jnfre
There was a little bit of a s , ,()0(j it-
ranks, but they certainly un ^owev61’ So far as we were concerned vVfi it had little application becau didn’t have liberty ashore t ^
By comparison, Rear A n ^ say Kent Hewitt had almost n0*f prelirn>' at the briefing, except for v calTieO nary remarks. Our briefing ander- on by the landing force co sve
rin a nassaee to Casablan
Proceedings
personnel ran my merchant ship.
0Ur final day at sea, as the convoy entered the south-
On
west
call‘^FrC)aCkes to the English Channel (which the British or,f SwaPPs”), British and Dutch ships and British air-
wdrt r~ ’
C 'n8 the two smallest and slowest ships to proceed CQUta through the Irish Sea, while the remainder of the ever t0 Prcscr'hcd track west of Ireland. How-
eetu’ Fecausc it was judged more important to stay to- er, we all rode out the storm. sj. §ain> I was fortunate to be in a large, comfortable 'P- Tonnage is misleading, but the merchant ship I rode ahout the size of an Iowa (BB-61)-class battleship.
Wever, while the Iowa carries a crew of about 1,500 men, 26 eon ant* sui5mar*nes conducted simulated attacks on the cal ^ater> ’n heavy fog, the Canadian officer in tacti- rtlinC°mmand passed control of the convoy to British anc^epers which guided us through safe channels to cult °ra^e areas °ff Portland, England. Boating was diffi- staffln t'le heavy chop, and it was after midnight when my Bin ,and * arrived at the hot wash-up meeting ashore at mleaves, Portland Harbor. e hot wash-up meeting marked the end of a long, rough transit for the convoy ships, and so the gathering took on a festive air. British, American, Canadian, German, and Norwegian seagoing officers enjoyed the refreshments provided by the Royal Navy.
There is always paperwork associated with fleet exercises, and Ocean Safari 85 was no exception. I submitted a report to the NATO command and another to the U. S. Navy, making the following recommendations to improve convoy procedures:
► Tactical Communications: In World Wars I and II, convoys used various visual methods as primary tactical communications, including flashing lights, colored lights, signal flags, and shapes. Since World War II, the bridge-to-bridge very high frequency (VHF) voice radio has become the primary means of communicating among merchant ships, just as truckers use the citizens band radio on our highways. The visual signals became secondary systems. Because modern merchant ships are so large and need dispersal as a means of protection, we have separated the ships from the former few hundred yards to the current few miles. This increased distance among ships—plus the obstructed views, scarcity of personnel, and lack of famil-
By Rear Admiral Joshua W. Cooper, U. S. Navy (Retired)
•Hander; .
(BB-3-2 *n tae °'d battleship Arkansas the fn ’ wh'ch rode in the center of by rrnation. The admiral talked to us CVery 24 rac*'0, * think, 18 hours out of niande4 ta,^ed t0 the screen com- scree,/’ Var*ous members of the oUs c ’ an<f others. There were numer- tive °ntacts> and he would take an ac- Was n^d 'n their development. This tJiuci) , 80()d procedure. There was too
voice r (ftter Were new t0 t*le vel0p ^i<ai0’ and it took us time to defer lSc'Phne and proper procedures Where US6' ^ had skip-distance vagaries Versatj SOlIlet’mes you could hear con- a\vay ?ns a couple of thousand miles c°nsi’t 0ud and clear- This wouldn’t be Suhrnarent’ ^Ut certainly the outlying attach f*neS W0Ldd be assisted in their Unde°rn,ation by this sort of chatter. Iem f0rrWa-’ fcplcnishment was a prob- C°Ukln’tUS' F°r exanlPlc’ my ship 'tig. ,mahe the trip without refuel- *’ve nwhen our time came to refuel &eeir Sger Seen a rougher day. With 't'e C]0sas coming over the forecastle hty ver,C dle oder and hooked up for Vvhich l lfSt evo'ut'°n of that kind for Alters ni'naS resP°nsible. I’d watched Ur,dersta h °^’ ^ut y°u don’t really 0,1 Vou d untd the whole'burden is 1?at'on a .1S’ °h course, involves organ- l<)h)re u *ots °f signals which here- and ,i-,1CCn managcd by flag sig- 'hat sort of thing. With our new toy, the voice radio, it took us time to develop proper discipline.
One highlight, as I recall, was that the USS Palmer (DMS-5), as the flagship of the squadron commander for minesweeping efforts, was in the van of the formation and made the first landfall on the coast of Africa. At about midnight of the day before the landing day, far out in the distance, we could see one light which went off abruptly, perhaps two hours before we had gotten to a beachhead position. At about this time, our formation was directed to sweep ahead of the transports, and we rigged for all three types of minesweeping—mechanical, electrical, and acoustic. We felt very confident but found no mines.
I thought we had been sweeping for about 20 minutes when a young engineer asked me when we were going to start sweeping. So far as magnetic mines were concerned we hadn’t been doing anything because the proper switches on his control panel in the engineroom had not been thrown.
Realizing that the squadron commander was on the other side of the bridge, I grabbed him by the throat to prevent any further speech and led him quickly off the side and said, “Get the hell down there and get the magnetic tail activated.” I felt it might upset the squadron commander a great deal to discover he hadn’t been sweeping all this time.
Everything went quite well until about 0600, when there was a burst of gunfire from the beach and the signal— “play ball!” (i.e., “release your guns”)—was transmitted over all of our circuits. Suddenly, there was a great deal of noise, particularly from those whose principal function was to provide gunfire support. This went on sporadically throughout the first landing.
We got a lot of people ashore in the first landing, but we left a good many of the boats there, too. It was the first large landing we had made, and we learned a great many things that would help us later. There was a very bad following sea, which upset a lot of the boats about the time they hit the beach.
It was fairly quiet during the forenoon, which our squadron commander exploited to determine if any mines were close to shore. This was done to develop a safe anchorage for various ships. We were developing this area when we discovered a shore battery at point-blank range, about 3,000 yards, following us very methodically.
Since the shore battery wasn’t shooting at us, we kept creeping along, getting a little closer to it all the time, with our own fire-control officer calling down warnings to the effect that he was practically looking down the
iarity with visual methods—have made all visual means of communications impractical. We now have a usable primary system, the VHF voice radio, but no secondary means of tactical communications. The VHF voice radio is easy for an enemy to exploit. Often, we encounter interference from other ships or fishermen. The VHF voice radio should be relegated to a secondary status, and new technology should provide a primary tactical communications system for convoys. The new system might be electromagnetic or laser. It could be digital, burst transmission, or data stream. It should have a low probability of intercept and should be portable.
► Formations: Past convoys and convoy exercises have used the broad front rectangular formations developed during World Wars I and II. The threat then was the diesel- electric submarine, which generally used a tactic of positioning ahead of the convoy, letting the convoy run over her submerged position, and firing torpedoes as the target merchant ships passed. The broad front rectangular formation was designed to minimize the targets presented to the submarine. Today’s threat submarine has much more endurance and mobility and more sophisticated torpedoes.
The merchant ships are larger, faster, less maneuvera ^ and must be spaced further apart. New formations been developed which are more flexible, provide protection, and allow more maneuverability. These formations should become part of our convoy d°c r .fl
- Convoy Composition: Existing doctrine, learne ^ World Wars I and II, provides for forming convoy ^ slow, medium, or fast, based on the merchant ships ^ dared speeds. There are other important factors, s ^ the ships’ capability to proceed in heavy weather. ^ ships have to make more speed because of engine yP a the need to maintain control. The grouping of s 'Ps. convoy should take these considerations into acco ^
- Naval Liaison Officers: Masters and mates are n t() miliar with convoy procedures and cannot be expec j be. In Ocean Safari 85, each merchant ship had a liaison officer (NLO) provided by his country, ^eS proved quite valuable. In many cases, masters an ^ do not pass along information on convoy procedu ’ £S_ have language problems. The NLO can provide t e ^ ^ sary information to help the mates on watch. A P ^ NLOs should be established. They probably s 0
With the Atlantic crossing behind them, Rear Admiral H. Kent Hewitt and Major General George S. 1 atton the U. S. troops land on Moroccan beaches in November 1942.
Proceeding8
Va reservists, and perhaps they could be members of on h°^ cornmod°re staff units, to provide officers to go su n°art? merchant ships in convoy. There should be one e ■ ° lcer Per ship, familiar with convoy procedures and - PPed with the portable communications system rec-
k fended earlier. rEscort-
cort: The Boston-Iceland-United Kingdom convoys
oean Safari 85 received excellent escort services, pn-
S. Navy has appar- cting the sea lines of ited. The U. S. Navy ant shipping nor is it stro schools. The commanding officer of a Navy de-
nia i aidU receivea excellent escort service entl* ^ ^r°m t^lc Canadians. The U. S. Navy has appar-
a°r°gated its basic task of protecting the sea lines of
comm,-- ■ 6
does Unical'on- The doctrine is outdated. The U. S. Navy tau ,not Practice protection of merchant shipping nor is it
t St Schools Thp pnmmanHino r\ffir*F»r nf Maw Hp.-
tactical
r or frigate could very well find himself as officer in
command of a convoy, a role for which he is not
an<d has no documentation or background on of nto rely- The Navy should recognize the importance resouVal Protection of shipping, organize for it, dedicate nava]rCeS ’ anc^ tra'n in an(J develop procedures for modem ing Pr°tection of shipping. This should include convoy- i as WeH as other means of protection.
ISceIlaneous: Other recommendations include consid
erations of maneuvering a convoy under conditions of restrictive electronic emissions, the function of preparing the sailing folders for each ship, pre-exercise in-port training, and the equipment needed by a convoy commodore and staff at sea.
As one of the most active retired officers in the convoy commodore program, I have become an experienced convoy commodore. It is not a crowded field.
Perhaps we will never need convoy commodores in a real global conflict. I certainly hope not, but in case we do, the program deserves the best we can give it. Thousands of retired Navy people could provide worthwhile experience to the active forces in a crisis. There should be more programs that make use of the background and experience of these retired personnel.
Captain Landersman has commanded a frigate, destroyer, destroyer squadron, and tactical training group. He was a member of the first Strategic Studies Group at the Naval War College, and has written for the Proceedings in the past. He is currently employed by the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory in San Diego, California.
down our mainmast. Miracu-
loi
'Usly
We
"has
COlllH - 1111111.0, ia
e . teH- Ironically, the only
■ 4l“age h
ln ^asahi°ne ^ h1’1165 that I know of 0vvn minanca Was from some that our
^eiriv’u „ ,
hea^ a ^Un barrels. Suddenly, we WhiCh VeT *0U(1 crack- The first shot, judged to be a French 75- Was ju..etlt through a trash can that took a • our galley- Later, we c°°k s-^IctUre °f two men, one a ship’s anci^u'H^ on one s'de °f the trash stan<jin *ae °ther man, a fireman, the shof a*30ut where they were when Wasn’t l535561! through. Fortunately, it Becan explosive shell.
S° freemSe We ^ad l°st fuel-oil suction °n putt- ently I could not take a chance sUtge ■ n§ to° much of a demand for a "to cou,;^, although I wanted all Which w g6t' * ran8 UP "full speed,” started Tu-JUst enough to get us next skls seemed to do because the ‘tod t0ok ?10ved about 50 feet astern
The th- ?,ne was hit. ship, "o shot went just abaft the
^ktyttien ','ously the French ar- toeot, ana 'utl gotten a single adjust- Thisthey fired three fast ones. i'^CePinJ)f1^etet' our elose-in mine- e<lha|a r,°t Ihe day, and we reported aS Wa . arbor clear nf minpc cn far
min?!. lrom some lnat c tied an ,a^ers laid to make a pro- pSPitul sh °ra8e■ Later on, a Canadian °Ur en,>12*®nored a warning of one ^d'ng ships, the USS Auk (AM-3), and sailed through and set off a couple of them.
The Casablanca landings and those at Oran as well were well-kept secrets. I don’t know anybody who knew anything about them except the planners in the higher echelons.
About the equivalent of an Army division landed. 1 suppose the convoy numbered some 30 or 40 transports.
We had several squadrons of escorting ships. The principal escorts were the new destroyers. At that time, I was very envious of those because I had been promised a new ship some time before and had been told that in due course I would get one. Besides the battleships Arkansas (BB-33) and the Massachusetts (BB-59), we had some of the small carriers and new cruisers. However, they were not in our formation. They were some distance from us. They arrived at about the same time we did, though.
It wasn’t like the traditional landing which we developed pretty much as a power play both at Normandy and in the numerous ones in the Pacific. In these operations at D minus so-and-so many days we’d start our reconnoiter- ing work, reconnaissance work, and then at about D minus four we’d start softening up the landing area with air attacks and heavy artillery at prearranged targets. In theory, at least, our
troops then could land with minimum obstruction and minimum opposition.
In North Africa, our enemy just wasn’t well defined. We didn’t know how to treat him except to stand off at the ready and to fire only if fired upon, and that was exactly what we did at Casablanca. There were some tense moments. For example, we knew the French battleship Jean Bart was there and when she cut loose our ship happened to be rather close to the Augusta (CA-13), which was Admiral Hewitt’s flagship. I certainly was impressed with the height of those splashes that resulted from the Jean Bart's shells. However, after an exchange participated in by the new Massachusetts and the cruisers, the Jean Bart was reduced to silence. It was at about that time that the French decided that this phase had gone on long enough and called it quits. I guess, after sufficient bloodletting, French honor was assuaged. There was a joint ceremony attended by the senior French officers, General Patton, Admiral Hewitt, and many more. Then we were friends, or at least we weren’t shooting at each other.
Shortly after Casablanca was secured, my ship, together with the rest in what was then called Mine Squadron Seven, was attached to the Moroccan Sea Frontier.