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of'tiCrisis facing the United States depends on the ability sup e Camer battle group (CVBG) to protect itself and theotber forces. Given the importance of the CVBGs,
/ December 1984
If *
UtH ^°°^S a sitting duck, waddles like a mng duck, and quacks like a sitting duck, atlces are that it is either a sitting duck or £ Qinraft carrier—both of which need all e Protection they can get.
[proposals calling for the abandonment of the U. S. ^^Navy’s modified local operations (ModLoc) strategy eSs111 favor of a less visible naval presence overlook an element of U. S. national and naval policy: the Acc 1S *ntenc^ec* t0 be a prominent worldwide influence. takin rtlPliShing today’s naval mission requires openly djjj ^ forces into situations presenting obvious tactical i°tiahirS’ anc* t*ie term “sitting duck” has become a fash- ■j. e description for deployed U. S. naval forces. tier •l^Sgest sitting duck in the pond is the aircraft car- fojj. “e Navy relies on carriers and their battle groups to C *5ac^one forward-deployed naval strategy, •4rv naV£d response to virtually every political or mili- pj Uestion of how well they can be defended is crucial. tiCjn^et URits spend a majority of their operating time prac- aiijjQ 0ne aspect or another of battle group defense, and reqUjSf a*i major fleet exercises are built around a situation r*n8 Protect'on °f a carrier battle group. U. S. tactical cep^ln8 has become hallmarked by set patterns and con- although the scope of the threat facing the Hot, , s changes, U. S. defense continues to rely on these ways-valid precepts.
<e. *~urrent Tactics: Breaking defensive measures mt0 the traditional areas of antiair warfare (AAW),
antisubmarine warfare (ASW), and antisurface warfare (ASUW), those tactical procedures forming the backbone of the battle group defense today are:
► AAW—Positive radar identification advisory zone
(PIRAZ)
► ASW—Long-range P-3 patrols; carrier-based S-3
patrols; close-in screening; nuclear attack submarine
in direct support (SSN[DS])
► ASUW—Surface/subsurface surveillance and coordi
nation (SSSC)
► Supporting all warfare areas—Emission control
(EmCon); tactical cover and deception (C&D)
The effectiveness of these defensive procedures depends on many variables: the state of training, material readiness, the adequacy of logistic support, and the availability of assets, to name a few. Table 1 represents an average degree of safety provided by these systems. The actual range and quality of the CVBG defense will vary from this average because of a wide range of factors, the most important being the actual mission the carrier battle group must undertake.
The Tasks at Hand: Regardless of specific tasking, there are five basic missions that CVBGs will be required to undertake, and during which protect themselves and other units from attack.
The Open Ocean Transit: This is a task obviously not unique to wartime. Routine deployments for CVBGs (excluding the Midway group, which is home-ported in the Far East) require an extensive transit to place them in their intended operating area. During wartime, this will mean that a battle group deployed from its home port, probably on short notice, may encounter hostile open-ocean forces prior to even reaching a point where it can undertake offensive operations. The CVBG commander trying to get from point A to point B has a large area in which to exercise his defensive options.
C&D efforts at hiding the battle group in the open ocean may be particularly effective since even an occasional spotting will not yield a targeting solution. With room to maneuver in midocean, the battle group can use contem-
specific missions may be concealed on a selected
unuu^uiig pci
valuable. Both the long-range P-3 and SSN(DS)^s
porary changes in the meteorological situation to mask its trail, and a shore-based intelligence system will have time to research and update potentially hostile activity directed at the battle group.
P-3 support in prosecuting known hostile submarines is vital. Similarly, the battle group’s own assets must devote considerable effort to continuous passive ASW surveillance along the CVBG’s track, and the battle group will have to maintain a limited but thorough SSSC picture of its path of advance. The use of full PIRAZ procedures could provide an enemy with a continuous updating of the battle group’s position, and air defense and EmCon in general must be carefully considered on the basis of an emerging threat.
The need to meet commitments at the end of a transit may restrict the options a battle group commander has in maneuvering away from a threat. A high-speed transit may demand a high condition of defensive readiness that will drain the group’s resources. The vastness of the sea itself is a two-edged sword for the transiting battle group: enemy surface and subsurface units may have ample time to maneuver into position for an initial attack and for a reattack as well.
Extended Operations in a Restricted Area: These operations are at the heart of a CVBG’s ability to function effectively in a modem naval presence role. Conducting “routine” operations on the doorstep of a potential enemy is not only a show of force in peacetime, but the key to successful power projection in wartime. In the past, this has required that a CVBG be stationed 200-600 nautical miles from a hostile shore for an indefinite period of time.
sion that these operations must be conducted within of potential threats ashore. In such circumstances, need to provide a protracted defense and maintain an^e, fensive striking posture is a continuous drain on the ^ rial, personnel, and logistic resources of the battle S a. Establishing an effective PIRAZ is a primary const tion in either wartime or unstable peacetime, and n*an nance of this form of security will place a heavy bur ^ ^ the airborne early warning (AEW) and fighter assets ^ ^ CVBG. The missile-equipped gunboat capability most every Third World nation poses a significant su ^ threat, and the SSSC efforts required will result in ^ manding flight schedule for the carrier’s A-6 and sjve tack planes, which may also be called upon for of£ strikes in the event of open hostilities. C&D and En ^ on a large scale are impractical under such conditio0*’ -Sj
______________________ i-j __ -__ lasted
however the CVBG operating in a certain area >s constantly targeted by opposing forces. ejin
Since this scenario requires that the carrier be traPP can a geographic box for a length of time, the SSNIH ^ provide a viable long-term ASW patrol around the F^ -fl, ing area, and P-3 support in conducting ASW .a! ,,mPort
will benefit from increasingly accurate intelligent - ^ the CVBG and potential enemies operate in the sa for a period of time.
1 Average Ranges for Detection and Engagement by Units of a CVBG
Detection Engagement
(nautical miles) (nautical miles)
task-dependent task-dependent
100 100
platform-dependent 60
300
200
200
100
100
30
30
*<*nded operations in a given area will ultimately (L ,Ve into a war of attrition. Materially and logistically, $jvattie group will be hard-pressed to maintain its defen- °Pe ^0sture indefinitely, especially if full-scale offensive rations are required simultaneously.
^ ossage of the Battle Group through a Choke Point: cUrr 3 Partioniarly critical scenario since almost any reent mission conceivable for a U. S. battle group would 'VatUlre §rouP t0 negotiate a strait or narrow strip of |c ,er’ such as the Strait of Gibraltar, the Greenland- Ma,^-United Kingdom (GIUK) Gap, or the Straits of
negotiate any choke point, a CVBG will require
Hw
E'2/F-14
^G/DDG-37
QDq/ffg
*Sty
**-3
S-3
$H-3
^MPS-equipped
DD/FF/FFG
J'6/A-7/F/a.18
harpoon
maximum protection for a definite period of time and within a definite geographic area. Maintaining a thorough SSSC posture generally becomes increasingly difficult in the crowded waters of most choke points. Perhaps the greatest danger facing a CVBG in restricted neutral waters, however, is the possibility of an ambush by an enemy submarine. It is vital that U. S. SSN(DS) assets occupy the sea-lanes the CVBG must transit and be allowed sufficient opportunity to survey both the approaches and exit from the choke point prior to the battle group’s passage. P-3 support in the waters adjacent to the choke point must also be considered a necessity.
Since hiding a battle group during passage of a choke point is impossible, the best defense is extensive use of active surveillance throughout the short duration of the transit. Most essential is the use of a close-in active sonar screen, which may be the only means of countering the quiet torpedo-firing submarine in restricted waters.
Political considerations enter into the defense of a choke point in the application of several tactics. Since many of the countries straddling the world’s vital choke points may attempt to remain neutral, U. S. planning during wartime must regard these political considerations as more than just peacetime restrictions. The possibility of guerrilla- type attacks even in these “neutral” waters is a political and military reality. Nonetheless, choke points give our thinly stretched forces the most expedient means of reaching the extended operating areas discussed in the second scenario. Their denial to us implies an inability to conduct more vital missions.
Provide Defense for Friendly Merchant Shipping: Those who claim the Navy has no business trying to escort convoys have several valid points. For one, it will take time to organize convoys, and, for another, the naval resources allocated to convoy escort will be needed for other tasks in any large-scale conflict. Yet, keeping vital supply
69
The Myths: The compromises made in each of the Pr® q
of
abana
effective EmCon policy is knowing when to — jca- EmCon in favor of the protection sensors and comma j tions systems can provide. Once an enemy has c0lTin |3ns himself to an attack, he will be unable to alter his P j3 based on information gained by a last-minute chan£ ji- the CVBG’s EmCon posture. EmCon goals must ^(0 rected toward making this attack difficult for the enentjess stage, not difficult for the CVBG to counter. It *s P0' 0fdi'
and coo'
for the CVBG to disrupt its own surveillance
■ring
routes open is a major commitment the Navy has to U. S. allies.
In theory, the protection of merchant convoys should be allocated to Spruance (DD-963)-class destroyers supported by a mix of ASW-oriented Knox (FF-1052)-class frigates and AAW-capable Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)- class frigates. In reality, the paucity of these “low-mix” assets would most likely result in an Atlantic CVBG being assigned to support allied shipping attempting to resupply a European front. The sudden outbreak of hostilities may leave allied merchant shipping spread over a considerable distance, and the establishment of havens safe from already deployed Soviet surface and submarine forces will necessitate SSSC procedures and long-range air ASW patrols to be rapidly implemented in the known areas of Soviet concentration.
For surveillance against an airborne threat, Link 11 would be necessary to tie the CVBG with Air Force E-3s conducting surveillance of the western European coast and the British Isles. This support, in conjunction with the carrier’s E-2 surveillance, can shield the Atlantic shipping lanes from Soviet land-based air strikes, which must travel a considerable distance in attacking allied shipping in the North Atlantic.
The support of our U. S. attack submarines would best be directed toward blockading Soviet submarines attempting to negotiate the GIUK Gap or attempting to reach the mid-Atlantic shipping lanes. The need to provide surveillance in the shipping lanes rules out the practical application of large-scale EmCon policies. Cover and deception tactics will also prove impractical because of the large numbers of merchant ships involved and their obvious destinations.
The CVBG protecting merchant shipping must cope with defending both itself and its charges. The limited speed of the typical merchant vessel and the well-known trade routes she usually follows make the modem merchant as vulnerable as her predecessors in the two World Wars. Although optimistic construction plans call for sufficient escorts to ferry convoys in the future, the current fleet shortages will force the defense of shipping lanes anywhere in the world on the CVBG for at least the next eight to ten years.
Protection of an Amphibious Landing Force: The support that must be given the amphibious force takes on a complex nature. The need for long-range airborne ASW support is obvious in this scenario, but the hostilities presumed to require an amphibious assault pose a real threat to the relatively vulnerable P-3 attempting to survey waters contiguous to a hostile shore. Employing the SSN(DS) in covering the flanks of the amphibious assault area would be the most efficient way to protect against a submarine threat in the shallow waters off an enemy coast, however the limited U. S. SSN assets may be needed for landing area surveillance, intelligence gathering, and the deployment of special warfare teams.
The drain on the carrier’s air wing will be even more acute. Fighter and attack missions over the beach will limit the forces available to conduct PIRAZ and air intercept missions. Even the E-2 will be called upon to perform
strike control missions against enemy defenses, results® in a drop in assets available for airborne early warning 3 interceptor control. . j
The considerable threat offered by missile-equipP patrol boats will require an extensive SSSC effort by 1 CVBG if the enemy’s naval bases cannot be neutrally prior to the force’s arrival in the assault area. This reqm', ment for the carrier’s attack resources must be balan^ against the tasking to provide close-in air support for landing force, a tasking that will continue to dilute at aircraft assets even after the initial beachhead is secur The relative immobility of the entire amphibious >° makes targeting of any enemy counterattack reasons easy. The submarine threat in particular will require,. „ surface escorts of the CVBG to screen the force, provi 1 not only ASW protection but close-in AAW Aiepo"' These escorts, however, are primary gunfire support the landing force (even light airborne multipurpose sysl^.f_ [LAMPS] helicopter crews are required to train as borne spotters), and this vital tasking is virtually inC° patible with any defensive mission. ,q.
The demand for battle group support during an amp ous landing makes defensive measures a difficultcomf’ s mise. As shown in the Grenada operation, amph> 1 operations remain an expensive undertaking, and the duct of any landing of a larger scale will require at two carriers and their respective groups.
ous scenarios are difficult and situational. Thus, e ^ the tactics discussed has both proponents and detfac among those in the fleet who must make these measures work. These planners have allowed theirt g ing to become dominated by a series of myths conce CVBG defensive measures. . aHy
Myth One: EmCon can protect CVBGs from every enemy threat. Efforts to develop an ene EmCon policy over the past several years have resu js a certain fascination with this tactic. The use of Em 6 a compromise that must be carefully considered. ce EmCon postures that restrict long-range survei ^ radars and command, control, and communication^^ systems are potentially the most dangerous. The key
nation in an attempt to keep an enemy from disC°^oUt. information he already knows or does not care (S Myth Two: Although U.S. C3 systems and Pr°Cjurift8 are vulnerable and likely to be rendered ineffectme ^p- an attack, those of an enemy will be perfect. This a^ tion receives almost casual acceptance among na jet cers in operational billets at sea where the threat o ^id tactical electronic countermeasures (ECM) has be
her ^ I Deceit
!Scalati,
supply of cruise missile platforms and, like • naval forces, they will be forced to respond to any
the
awe for the past few years. The emphasis the Soviets ljac’e on active electronic warfare is acknowledged, but ' experience at tactical ECM and the lessons of recent °nflicts indicate that rendering the C3 system completely e'fective would require extensive Soviet assets Ployed with precise coordination over an extended nod of time. That the Soviets or any opponents could do a's at will is unlikely, yet because U. S. naval officers SUtTle they can, a dangerous corollary to this myth su*ts: since the CVBG’s abilities at coordinating defense doomed to the point where any engagement will result a free-for-all, why bother to try to coordinate defensive o ®asures? Myth number one—the urge to turn everything anyway—supports this fallacy.
Ij ,^e vulnerability of CVBG communications and Link ls acknowledged, however a clear tactical picture is a 31 the outset of any engagement, and the better in- tj rrtled all units of the battle group are of the tactical situa- Perf ^r'or t0 ‘,s deterioration, the better each unit could dorm its mission should the group’s C3 actually fail. .Whatever capability the Soviets possess to disrupt U. S. ty-d'oiunications, the CVBG must counter their efforts fr ” solid countermeasures. For example, it must shift plenties often and use operational codes. In addition, operators must be aware of the threat. The CVBG’s C3 jtctUre is basically sound; it is the group’s ability to use *ectively more than an enemy’s ability to disrupt it that determine its success in battle. thr ^ Three: The Soviets can present a continuous 360°, ^^'dimensional threat to U. S. seagoing forces. As in tW°’ commonly held opinion credits the Soviets act ^e'r adies with more operational prowess than has ,icUal|y been observed. Although Soviet doctrine for an- sUH'Tier Wadare (ACW) includes coordinated attacks from air-, and submarine-launched antiship cruise cut S'*e.s’ d *s not reasonable to assume that they can exe- ^this policy with 100% accuracy. Their first problem 5 one of positioning forces. The Soviets do not have Witless
on to open conflict with what they have available tv - time. Soviet shore-based bombers, in particular, t0 ^ arrive just in time to miss the strike or early enough e the first casualties.
A second problem facing the Soviets’ coordinated attack is that of C3. The Soviets will find it difficult to get everyone, especially their submarine commanders, to push the button at the same time and with the right target in mind. Finally, at least a few degrees of the Soviet 360° attack will fall victim to equipment failure at H-hour. Admittedly, a U. S. CVBG commander cannot plan on an enemy’s mechanical misfortune, but estimates of Soviet systems’ reliability may factor into a commander’s evaluation of his situation in an ongoing battle.
This myth has also resulted in a “target fixation” on the Soviets. Granted, the Soviet Union may be America’s most awesome potential competitor, but it is also the least likely. U. S. tactical doctrine, largely focused on Soviet tactics, must be expanded to consider other adversaries. America’s biggest threat does not necessarily wear a red star.
Myth Four: U. S. modern passive ASW techniques have made active sonar searches obsolete. U. S. success in developing and implementing long-range passive tracking of a hostile submarine has led naval planners to believe that passive prosecution of an opposing submarine offers the best measure of protection for the CVBG. Actually, the active close-in ASW screen has remained the most effective means of dealing with the hostile submarine that gets close enough to launch a torpedo attack, and the Soviet submarine-launched cruise missile threat notwithstanding, the Soviet submarine force is about two-thirds torpedo-equipped attack boats. Perhaps more important, the proliferation of torpedo-firing diesel submarines, such as the West German “Type-209,” throughout the smaller
navies of the world present a threat that is largely invisible to our passive detection systems.
The active sonar-equipped SH-3 helicopter has won the grudging respect of submarine commanders for its tenacity in pursuit. The modem diesel submarine, in particular, is so quiet that passive means often fail to locate it; active measures may be the only way to ferret out the diesel submarine prior to its attack.
Myth Five: U. S. CVBG forces can hunt enemy submarines. Prosecute, yes; hunt, no. The former is actively pursuing a submarine threatening the battle group and its mission. The latter is sending battle group ASW assets out of their way to find a target that may or may not even be present. Prosecuting is a necessity; hunting is a waste of CVBG resources. The need to keep tabs on large expanses of water for submarine activity is obvious, but it is better suited to P-3 forces than battle groups. Unfortunately, CVBG ASW elements are usually chomping at the bit to run off in search of a suspected submarine. Such enthusiasm generally results in a long wait for a contact that never develops. This occurs at the expense of the battle group’s overall defense. ASW at the battle group level should be largely reactive.
As a result of these myths, U. S. CVBGs routinely underestimate their own defensive capabilities, overestimate the threat they face, fail to structure realistic exercises, fail to exercise C3 options to the fullest, and fail to provide contingency plans to support their defenses.
Current Needs: Programs aimed at bolstering the CVBG’s ability to defend itself have been the subject of debate and compromise for the past 20 years. Ship construction is a particularly graphic example of the problems this controversy creates in major long-term procurement efforts. Table 2, for example, reveals the escorts required for protection of five different forces. The Navy, because of its restricted budget, will unlikely get everything envisioned, and in 1990, it will put to sea with the compromise. Looking at the immediate future, however, several systems and concepts should receive priority for final development and introduction to the fleet.
The medium-sized carrier (CW) and a forward deployed air wing: The CVV has been an occasional bargaining chip in the budget for almost eight years; her periodic proposal usually serves as a catalyst for the big-deck carrier debate. From a tactical standpoint, however, a single carrier battle group is hard-pressed to conduct extensive long-term operations and, in fact, the Navy has begun to conduct multicarrier operations.
Employing a 60,000-ton conventionally powered CVV to augment the CVBG’s air wing in specific areas makes sense. Ideally, three CVVs would be built for the East Coast and three for the West, with one deployed on each coast at all times. For flexibility and economy, a single large multipurpose air wing could be organized and forward deployed in the Sixth and Seventh fleet areas for use by the deployed CVV. Table 3 outlines a composition for this “super carrier air wing,” which could provide the medium-sized carrier with an air wing tailored for specific support missions.
Table 2 Proposed Escort Requirements by Tasking
Force to be Protected | CG-47 | Number of Escorts CG/DDG-5/ DDG-993 DD-963 | FF/FFG | |
CVBG* | 3 | 5 | 4 | —- |
Surface Action Group (SAG) | 1 | 3 | — |
|
Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) |
| 8 | 4 | 5 |
Merchant Convoy | — | — | 1 | 9 |
Underway Replenishment Group (URG) |
| 1 |
| 3 |
♦Requirements based on a CVBG composed of two CV/CVNs. . g
Compiled from testimony before the HASC Research and Development Comm1 viewing escort requirements for the 1980s.
Table 3 Conceptual Forward Deployed Carrier Support Air Wing
ASW
S-3 | 1 | squadron |
SH-60 or SH-3 | 1 | squadron |
AAW | ||
F-14 | 2 | squadrons |
F/A-18 | 2 | squadrons |
ASUW/Strike | ||
A-6 | 1 | squadron |
EA-6 | 1 | squadron |
F/A-18 | 2 | squadrons |
AEW | ||
E-2 | 1 | squadron |
Miscellaneous Support | ||
KA-6 | 6 | aircraft |
C-2 | 2 | aircraft** |
Above wing represents approximately 82 date about 64 aircraft.
♦The two F/A-18 squadrons envisioned ♦♦Assignment of one US-3 in lieu of a
aircraft; CVV was designed to acC°
are dual purpose—fighter C-2 would be desirable.
and attach
Although the CVV cannot offer the uniformly c0ttl^ie capability of a big-deck carrier, she would be fully caP ■ $ of augmenting the battle group with the support re^Utj0li by specific missions. For example, in a power prop scenano (strikes ashore, amphibious task force sUPPaCk etc.), the CVV could virtually double the number of a ^ aircraft available to the battle group commander by f barking the attack elements of her wing. Should 3 I310. sea control operation be undertaken, the CVV coul Y vide additional air defense and ASW assets to those mally embarked on the battle group’s carrier. At r°^yV two-thirds the cost of a nuclear aircraft carrier, the would provide a modestly priced solution to the la
notice in the Third World’s hazardous waters represents „°nty a threat to the forces but to national policies as • U. S. influence in the world largely depends on the a(avy s ability to look trouble in the eye without blinking ^ne problems posed by terrorism
ffti
” * >'»« gc/ic/ uiit/n uj cdcvr i ArujJA. 111c ui <
a. 'iime data display on escorts like the Knox-c\ass frig 4c/S’ ^r°oke (FFG-l)-class frigates, and Charles F. C| (DDG-2)-class destroyers has left these essential ltlf,llents of battle group defense with only a fraction of the de°rynati°n necessary to make tactical decisions. This
l0ty-
^Pth U. S. battle groups have displayed in these disced missions.
The capability to conduct “doorstep warfare”: U. S. refsP°nse to Third World crises has evolved into a pattern stationing naval forces in situations of obvious danger.
U. S. Navy must be able to conduct a wide range of °Perations despite the threat from unconventional, terror, 'type attacks. The standard defense measures outlined re and in the fleet’s tactical doctrine are clearly mis- atched with such a threat. A new approach to protecting r§e naval forces forced to operate in troubled waters is leeded.
r faring CVBGs for “doorstep defense” will require a resh set of tactics designed to provide the most effective r°tection with the minimum of overt forces. CVBGs in °Se waters may need small patrol craft similar to those in Pecial boat units to guard against intruding small boats. a- 0(lem kamikazes in civilian aircraft may require carrier a r Wings to embark helicopters or light utility aircraft [/Ttled with small air-to-air missiles. Five years ago, the k °u8ht of arming major surface combatants with .50 cali- erniachine guns would have been laughable. Today, the ^CaP°n is enjoying a rebirth off the Lebanese coast. Per- Ps most important, existing command and intelligence ^nictures must be made flexible enough to cut across tra- *°nal lines. Battle group defense in contiguous waters y include support from such diverse sources as allied und-based air and “in-country” special warfare teams.
a sense, gunboat diplomacy is dead; the U. S. war- r P no longer intimidates either small governments or - lcal political factions. The challenge to U. S. naval
, Navy tactical data system (NTDS) link capability for current generation of escort ships: The absence of a
of information is particularly harmful since these ,,'mtx escorts often assume more significant tasks f0rIn CVBG than their original plans may have called > such as assignment as a primary or alternate warfare gander.
ers assignment of air targets to guided missile destroyed frigates is difficult and cumbersome, yet these las and their Tartar launchers are designed to provide tg '‘diteh defense for the carrier. Non-NTDS units, at- ^ Pting to assimilate tactical information via Link 14 v4st Cast or vo'ce radio circuits, are usually so lost in the de„ body of data available that their weapon systems are tlaf d£d simPty because of the inability to process infor- of '°n already known on board the NTDS-equipped units Pe battle group.
WjtLbe installation of a display system in destroyer types is *n the Navy’s capability and need not require full- scale rebuilding of a ship’s combat systems. The installation of a large “stand alone” NTDS display similar to the operations summary console (OSC) of the Spruance-class destroyer will provide the commanding officer of the smaller escort with sufficient Link 11 data in a readily accessible form. There is no reason one cannot be added to all of the CVBG’s escorts.
Antisubmarine rocket-equipped Oliver Hazard Perry- class guided missile frigates: The antisubmarine rocket (ASROC) has been the Navy’s principal surface-launched ASW weapon since the early 1960s and has been installed (sometimes crammed) in almost every class of surface escort in the Navy. Its absence on the Oliver Hazard Perry- class frigate leaves a serious gap in this escort’s ability to provide close-in defense. The ASROC provides a credible quick response to the torpedo-firing submarine that manages to find its way into the carrier’s screen. Admittedly, the ASROC suffers from the same problems the current generation of Mk-46 torpedo does, and U. S. naval doctrine calls for employing airborne ASW platforms to deliver standoff attacks against an opposing submarine. It is unwise, however, to abandon the ASROC. Compared to both air-launched and tube-fired weapons, it is capable of depositing its payload on a suddenly discovered submarine located on the perimeter of the carrier’s screen in a matter of seconds vice minutes.
Naval strategists and planners confronting the problem of protecting the CVBG lean toward either confident optimism or dismal pessimism. Optimistic planners emphasize the impressive offensive power of the carrier’s air wing as the battle group’s promise of safety. Pessimistic planners cite the dwindling resources available for allocation to the battle group as sufficient cause to abandon the CVBG concept entirely. Neither approach is entirely practical. The “sitting ducks” must ply dangerous waters in the pursuit of larger goals. However, the mission and the defense of the CVBG are responsibilities shared throughout the group; therefore, a broader base of tactical knowledge and experience must be shared among all elements within the battle group.
As naval warfare becomes more complex, line officers are becoming more specialized within their primary field, and overall defensive posture is weakening because of a lack of common understanding of each other’s capabilities, limitations, priorities, and problems. The most critical of U. S. defensive resources is experience and skill at using the resources at hand. Pooling this experience and collectively developing it into a well-defined set of operating standards is the only means of ensuring the safety of the “sitting ducks” and their battle groups.
Commander McKeamey graduated from the Naval Academy in 1973. A surface warfare officer, he has served in the operations and engineering departments in the USS Edson (DD-946), as operations officer in the USS John S. McCain (DDG-36) and USS Berkeley (DDG-15), and as first lieutenant/operations officer in the USS Alamo (LSD-33). Commander McKeamey earned a master’s degree in national security affairs from the Naval Postgraduate School and is a strategic planning subspecialist and the prospective executive officer of the USS Germantown (LSD-42).