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; the Northern Flank in Nor-
In time of war, all surface vessels passing
f the Soviet Union attacks the Northern Flank in Nor way, NATO’s strategy will be to immediately mobilize the Norwegians (whose constitution prohibits basing foreign troops in Norway in peacetime) and rapidly reinforce Norway with the Allied Command Europe (ACE) Mobile Force. Next, an airlifted U. S. Marine Corps brigade and a Canadian brigade would marry up with their prepositioned equipment. NATO’s Teamwork exercises test this concept each year; however, NATO does not maintain a credible naval force in the Norwegian Sea on a year-round basis. NATO’s successful defense of Norway hinges on control of the sea- and airspace north of the Greenland-Iceland-Norway (GIN) line to enable the rapid reinforcement of Norway.
In recent years and at an alarming rate, the Soviets have concentrated their most powerful all-Soviet naval force, the Northern Fleet, on the Northern Flank. As the Soviets’ naval strength has grown, so too has their presence in the Norwegian Sea. North of the GIN line, the Soviets now have predominance on, above, and beneath the sea. On land, the Soviet forces significantly outweigh the Norwegian forces tasked with defense of the northern region. With the balance of naval power on the Northern Flank in favor of the Soviets, the outcome of a Soviet thrust into Norway and the Norwegian Sea could easily be settled before NATO could respond. The possibility of this was highlighted in late March 1984 by the surprise admitted by U. S. and NATO defense officials that the Soviets had deployed, undetected, an unprecedented number of naval units in what turned out to be a major naval exercise—it could have been the real thing.
To overcome the Soviet dominance in peacetime and to strengthen the defenses of the Northern Flank in time of war, NATO’s peacetime naval presence in the region should be increased, and the time required to reinforce the region in time of crisis should be reduced.
Soviet Perspective of Norway and the Norwegian Sea
“In the Arctic wastelands between Norway and the Soviet port of Murmansk, the Soviets have amassed what has been described as the greatest concentration of naval, ground and air forces to be found anywhere in the world.”[I] There are 40 airfields (16 capable of all-weather operation), 700 aircraft (275 naval aircraft), and two motorized rifle divisions “equipped with special bridging equipment, amphibious tanks and special winter” items." An amphibious infantry brigade is based in Pechenga for operation with the fleet. In addition, there are an estimated 122 major Soviet combat ships in the Soviet Northern Fleet. This formidable force faces a 400-man Norwegian frontier patrol, which could be reinforced with a 5,000- man brigade located 400 miles away in Tromso; air sup-
tM
port is available from a field 200 miles away. At se^rJft Soviets are challenged by 40 Norwegian small, faS armed with Penguin surface-to-surface missiles. jcs- Because of sea ice, there is only about a 130-ni* free passage to Murmansk in the winter and a 3 ^ f0f passage in the summer. This ice provides ideal submarines deploying from northern bases, but it ‘ antS' restricts the freedom of movement of surface corn a^,3y, In addition, this passage, dominated by northern N® $ offers the NATO alliance the capability to mon1^ ^0fi movement of surface combatants traveling to an Murmansk. throUgb#
Hitler’s conquest of Norway in 1940 inspired the enduring “The flies have captured the fly paper.” Norwegians learned then that they could never go it alone; they needed friends. Air-lifted brigades of U. S. Marines and Canadians, seen here ' at Bardufoss, could be Norway’s best friends in time of their—and NATO’s—need.
Barents Sea and “all of those in the Norwegian °f north at r's'< to whomever possessed the airfields ^nCe, Norway. Submarine hunting would also be en- Pritip- hy aircraft based in north or west Norway.”4 The 3Hd jj 3 Bases in northern Norway, Bardufoss, Andpya, Sianc0- have tremendous strategic value. The Norwe- ^causSSt *rom Bergen to Tromso is particularly important H0f°f *ts Pr°ximity “to the North Atlantic waters, to Nom, Beninsula and to the transit routes from Kola into ^eled Atlantic. This gives strategic importance unpar- *‘*6 han't1 3n^ other Pad of Scandinavian territory.”5 In Pr0vit]es °i the Soviets, air bases in northern Norway s'tes frorT1 which strikes could be launched against the more southern Atlantic sea lines of communicatior used to resupply NATO.
“The Soviet use of Norway’s numerous ice-free fjords for their submarines would greatly facilitate their passage into the North Atlantic and the subsequent interdiction ol the sea lanes. 6 Furthermore, the fjords would provide ideal dispersal facilities for the Soviet Northern Fleet and would place their ships 600 to 900 miles closer to the sea-lanes to Europe. But more important, the bases ir Norway would enable the Soviet ships to replenish closet to the point of need, therefore increasing the relative number of ships that could be on station at any one time.
Cruise missiles and ballistic missiles from sea-launched
■Si
platforms in the Atlantic and the Norwegian Sea track over Norway and place the Soviet Union at risk. This provides increased incentive for the Soviets to increase surveillance, early warning capability, and active air defense as far from home as possible.7
Soviet control of northern Norway virtually assures their dominance in the Norwegian Sea to the GIN line. Soviet presence pushes back the frontier of NATO sea- launched missiles into the North Atlantic. This provides for an in-depth Soviet projection of surface and subsurface interdiction of the NATO Atlantic lifeline.8 With this control, the amphibious seizure of southern Norway by Soviet troops is eased, and the door to the Baltic closes to NATO.
NATO’s Stake in the Norwegian Sea and Norway
directly threatened or are attacked.”11
Norway has faithfully adhered to this policy; however, it has left enough ambiguity in the policy to provide f°r flexible interpretations. Within the confines of this “gra-! area,” available options can be found, such as prestocking of equipment, varying the frequency and duration of exercises with foreign troops, abolishing or easing restrictions on the kinds and types of weapons introduced into the area, and conducting military exercises east of 24° eas longitude.12
As the Soviet threat increased, steps were taken to pre position NATO aircraft support equipment in Norway- Then, in the early 1980s, agreements were reached t0 preposition ground equipment for a U. S. Marine Corps brigade in the country. This agreement was protested w the Soviets, but the Norwegians held firm in their poSl tion. Although some people argue that the “no foreig basing policy” should be very explicitly defined, othe^ make a case that the ambiguity provides an addition strength to the alliance and uncertainty to the Soviet5’
: —.....................................................................
o
^ think that there is “reason to believe that the Rus- K0ls Perhaps are limiting their own tactical forces on the *• 4 Peninsula as long as Norway’s basing policy stands
"bn. ”13
tioi> by
A change in the policy may cause Soviet retalia- an increase in their forces.
Hit-and-run raids by British commandos against the Nazi occupiers of Norway, “too little and too late” though they were, cemented British-Norwegian friendship, and today, Royal Air Force Nimrods help neighboring Norwegians keep an eye on Soviet warships such as the carrier Kiev.
and v^en an<* Finland: The neutral position of Sweden ti°n tunland Prov'des a variable in NATO’s Nordic equa- cjw at cannot be ignored. Finland shares an extensive Vde°n k°rder with the Soviet Union to the east, and \y -rs °f lesser extent but of equal importance with Nor" ln *he north and Sweden in the west. Acknowledging
\Var .'PUe position and its defeat by the Soviets in World the 3 ’ .inland entered into a Treaty of Friendship with *0rces°Vlet Union in which it agreed to prevent German stage0r Germany’s allies from using Finnish territory to ^ed attac^ on l^e Soviet Union.14 adher ,en’ located in the center of the Nordic region, has str0np -° a completely neutral position backed up by a Only ° "’Hitary and naval posture. “Although Sweden has ^hterf116 miH10n people, it maintains a tactical ,,0rce nearly as large as those of the United King-
30 u . erni
ioT
^ens,
brj rrr>any or France and can quickly mobilize nearly I tJr . P'us some 100 separate battalions, another -<i$e r aH°ns and 400 separate companies of local de- ^ and 100,000 Home Guards—a total of some lU,;i, troops.”15 The general position of Sweden is that
3defee en(l against any violation of its neutrality. Being ^te, ^ alliance and content to use Sweden as a buffer TO believes that in a war with the Soviets, Swe-
November 1984
den’s neutrality will be violated by the Soviets, and Sweden will align with NATO countries. Finland’s probable response to Soviet encroachment is an open question.
Norway’s Resolve: While adhering to the policy that prohibits basing of foreign troops in peacetime, Norway has resolutely challenged Soviet threats and intimidations in the north. The country has initiated selective modernization of its armed forces to include acquisition of F-16 fighters, P-3B Orion maritime patrol aircraft, diesel submarines, and Hawk antiaircraft missiles. Norway’s defense expenditures have doubled since 1971. While other NATO countries have been struggling, Norway has “had the highest percentage growth rate in defense spending of any NATO country.” This has been accompanied by strong popular “support for Norway’s continued participation in NATO.”1(1 From the population of about four million people, a standing army of 43,000 is drawn, consisting of about 30,000 conscripts. Defense of the country relies upon a high state of readiness of the standing force
73
sir^rs^-.'r**'
to allow time for the full mobilization of the population, which is under standing orders to mobilize for defense of the homeland. NATO’s Maritime Theater: Norway is a unique theater of operations. The country has a coastline almost equal to the East Coast of the United States, but the distance from the sea to the inland border is, in most places, less than 100 miles. Norway is most important for its control of the adjacent sea and its control of the access to the Kola Peninsula, the Baltic Sea, and the North Atlantic approach to Europe. The principal defenders of this region—England, the Netherlands, Canada, and the United States—are all maritime nations. The principal adversary—the Soviet Union—is a major continental power. While the allies have been preparing to meet the Soviet challenge on land, the Soviets have been preparing to defeat the allies at sea. The Northern Flank is a maritime theater and the meeting ground for the continental and maritime powers. | manpower.”17 The principal strengths of the Baltic Flee1 are found in mine warfare and ground support operations- To threaten the U. S. support of NATO by sea, the Soviets have, contrary to past practice, provided their naval avi3' tion units with the newest and most capable long-range bombers. “With a maximum unrefueled combat radius o 3,000 miles, the Backfire can operate against shippinjj convoys from the United States . . . with great speed an devastating effectiveness.”18 “By exercising frequently and visibly in the Norwegian Sea-North Atlantic area, tn j Soviet Union has created the image of the dominant powef in the area, with a legitimate defense perimeter that e^ tends to the Greenland-Iceland-UK (GIUK) Gap- ( Today, northern Norway is outflanked by the S°vl Navy, and reinforcement at the time of imminent or actuaj conflict would require a significant naval and air effort- NATO’s Objective: Admiral Wesley L. McDonald Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLant), c0V^ |
| ' ... : • ... ' >' 2 |
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|
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MATO Naval Presence on the Northern Flank The Soviet Presence: The Soviet Northern Fleet “has the most powerful strike capability of the four fleets. Its major weapons are: cruise missile, ASW, and long-range jatrol submarines; ASW cruisers for its ACW [anticarrier warfare], ASW and strategic deterrent missions; and a considerable number of SSBNs .... The Baltic Fleet is the largest of the four fleets in total number of vessels and 7 A | .jng cedes that “we would have a definite problem gettoday teriel” to Europe. Although he is more confide11 than five or ten years ago, he stresses that egi^ Northern Fleet will have “to come from the N° It Sea if [it is] going to get into the Atlantic to pre^ g0vi' remains for NATO and the United States to deny lll^er of ets this capability in the northern maritime * NATO. “The concept of carrier battle group °Pefj seal the choke points of the Greenland-Icelan , / Novel"6*7 |
Northern Flank. They are hours away; we are days ai
aid
weeks away. The embarked Marine amphibious unit cou be put ashore within hours, followed by the airlifted °le ment of the prepositioned brigade. The capability to th^
aid
,ble
employment. Forward basing would enable the troops
tie groups in the Norwegian Sea stress the ships’ vulnerability to coordinated strikes of such a magnitude that they might saturate the shipbome antimissile and gun defenses. However, this vulnerability is being addressed with the phased-array radar and the other defensive systems of the carrier battle group. In addition, “the capabilities of the F-14 are seen as quite formidable against the Badgers and Backfires. . . . Thus, the key to battle for the Norwegian Sea would be the effectiveness of Soviet bomber coordination, on the one hand, and of allied antimissile systems”
Islands.
and fighter aircraft on the other.
An inherent concern to operating in the Norwegian Sea is the arctic climate. The temperature in the eastern quadrant of the Norwegian Sea is generally about 0°-5° centigrade in February and 5°-15° centigrade in August; ice is restricted to the western and northern portions of the sea. The wind speed in the Tromso/central Norwegian Sea area is moderate, with only one or two gales pier month from October to March, and none during the warmer months. Although the North Atlantic seas are extremely rough, the Norwegian Sea is not as treacherous. From the standpoint of men and equipment, the environment is more tolerable to operate in the Norwegian Sea than to fight through the North Atlantic to recapture it.
Operation of carrier battle groups and an amphibious ready group in the Norwegian Sea would enhance the bilateral initiatives to preposition equipment in Norway- improve the perception of NATO’s resolve, and provioe greater assurance that the Marine brigade would have secure airfields from which to marry up with prepositione equipment.
Time is the Soviets’ greatest ally in any operation in further reinforce the flank with maritime preposition1 ships would be enhanced. This would require forwa deploying the Marine amphibious brigade headquartefS' which is at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, and gr°un and aviation support personnel nearer the area of proba
debark from amphibious shipping for training with0 removing them from the probable area of employ mem The use of forward bases for training overcome major disadvantage currently faced by Marines opera11j in a cold environment. Recently, Marines have increas^ their training periods in cold climates, but these Perl°[S usually last only one to three weeks, and then the °n return to the moderate climate of eastern North Caro before embarking for exercises. Areas in the non United States and the eastern provinces of Canada o ^ ideal sites to base a unit scheduled for operations in a f climate. But these areas do not overcome the problem distance to the operating area. jj
Either northern Scotland or the Orkney Islands c°^ provide an ideal forward base for Marines. This . boasts a “sparse population, weak economy, ruggecl .0 rough seas and a hard climate.”26 This area is also 500 miles of Trondheim, Norway, and Esbjerg, Penrj*tjng The transition to Norway would be rapid, and the fig ^ skills of the Marines would be well-honed by ^^Lgr- exercises in both the staging area and in Norway- Fu!y, more, by not basing the troops in Norway, the SA j. would still retain flexibility in employment of nava ing forces to support his naval campaign. iefi-
Should the basing policy in Norway be relaxed 0 ^ 0f sion increased to a point that would trigger deploy11^ forces, naval presence could be further enhanced deployment of Marines with at least a fixed-wing a'j0n group to an advance naval base in Norway. Coot 1 ^jgd of these naval aviation assets with the mobile carr^ri|gnge assets would certainly increase the capability to cha tj,g Soviet initiatives. “If you keep the Russians gueSSl ^tifid uncertainty will prey on their minds and act as a p° flo* deterrent to any action whose outcome to them clear.”27 oCdf'
For more than 35 years, NATO has maintained 1 ^ t[tf rier battle groups and an amphibious ready SroU Southern Flank in the Mediterranean Sea, an area s ^ able by extensive NATO land-based aviation, north, an area with limited land-based aviation an ^v
requiring support by carrier-based naval aviation- and the United States have not been equal to the c
it is necessary to exercise allied land, naval,
and
J line >ire;
grou^*°y carrier battle groups with an amphibious ready Mdit- -0rt.h of the GIN line on a more frequent basis. In
presence of NATO naval forces and their regular exer- ClSe during peacetime tend to reduce the likelihood of a in Europe and actively demonstrate NATO’s resolve. More practically, by foreclosing what an irresponsible °viet leadership might regard as ‘easy options’ in the to0rth—either in relation to flank operations or in relation ° offensive and defensive uses of various elements of the orthern Fleet—it weighs in the cost-gain calculation on e right side so far as Western interests are concerned. ”28
^elusion e the increasing Soviet naval presence on the North- a ^ank, the Norwegian Sea is becoming a Soviet lake (he <?ort^ern Norway is on the verge of being annexed by .e Soviets. To rectify this situation and instill confidence ln NATO
Ij air forces on an almost constant basis in this area. The Ujg to successful deterrence in this region is the ability and lari res°lve to retain control. The StaNavForLant, regular au§mented by carrier task forces and amphibious for- can 'h nS ’ Can m°bdize without becoming committed and Stat >m°nStrate most effectively NATO’s and the United fyjjes resolve. In this northern region, more so than any- t(jne|,e dse in Europe, “NATO can provide very finely c)e degrees of escalation in time of tension ... to give Cou v defined, delicately balanced and unequivocal rqg* indications to Warsaw Pact in the face of politico- ^ ary” threats or pressure.29 F| a lr|crease NATO’s naval presence on the Northern 'he f i ^TO and Allied Command Atlantic should take \ ^ullowing steps:
tiearepl°y the StaNavForLant north of the GIN line on a P0rf ferrnanent basis. The ideal would be to split StaNav- :».ant into a northern and southern element with the as the boundary of the two forces. This would HaVje " an increased commitment on the part of all NATO Certa‘S’i ^Ut benefits in increased naval readiness would ^ Dp, °f significant value to the alliance.
MUlti “W 1111V VMI u uiwi^ 11UV/UI uasio. Ill
ible °n’ 'he United States should depart from the predict- hep, *ercise schedule it has adhered to in the past. These V^nts should be ordered by Allied Command At- ^rcpo°n an irregular basis and without prior notice to the
^ forwmployed'
gistjc sard deploy a Marine brigade headquarters and loD ^ ^PPoit units to northern Scotland or Orkney Islands deP*°ynient time for the geo-prepositioned ' fbis would also provide the deployed amphibious '1 Whicp°Up an area similar to that where it would deploy p l° cor|riuct training. For the deployed amphibious Srs Qf°Up’ training in Scotland would place it within N^-jv-. Norway, should it be required to land there. tmust fully accept the importance of the Northern ^PpQrt'* future viability of the alliance and should fe§ione deployment of the Standing Naval Force in the \tne_ n a more permanent basis. Routine but irregular 10n of the Standing Naval Force with carrier
battle groups and an amphibious ready group in the Norwegian Sea will assure NATO’s ability to support commitments in the region. “In international crisis management, as in local law enforcement, clearly anticipatory and preventive capabilities are more effective than a hurried and haphazard assembly of reactive forces once the crisis is raging and threatening to spread out of control.”30
'William J. Lewis, The Warsaw Pact: Arms, Doctrine, and Strategy (New York: McGraw-Hill Publications Co., 1982), p. 294.
2Lewis, p. 294.
3Ibid.
"Anthony Farrar-Hockley, “The Influence of the Northern Flank Upon the Mastery of the Sea." Naval War College Review, May-June 1982, p. 8.
5Iohn Kristen Skogan, “Scandinavia and War Operations in the North Atlantic,” Lars B. Wallin, ed., The Northern Flank in a Central European War (Stockholm: FOA Repro, 1982), p. 58.
6D.C. MacCaskill, “Norway’s Strategic Importance,” Marine Corps Gazette, February 1981, p. 29.
7P. H. Vigor, “The Soviet Union and the Northern Flank of NATO,” NATO's Fifteen Nations, April-May 1978, p. 60; Peter Whiteley, "Military Operations on the Northern Flank, Lars B. Wallin, ed., The Northern Flank in a Central European War (Stockholm: FOA Repro, 1982), p. 139.
8Peter Whiteley, “Military Operations on the Northern Flank,” Lars B. Wallin, ed., The Northern Flank in a Central European War (Stockholm: FOA Repro, 1982), p. 142.
9Peter Whiteley, “The Importance of the Northern Flank to NATO,” NATO’s Fifteen Nations, April-May 1978, p. 23.
‘"Skogan, p. 58.
“Whiteley, "The Importance of the Northern Flank to NATO,” p. 20.
“Lars B. Wallin, “A Summary of the Grainge Round Table,” LarsB. Wallin, ed., The Northern Flank in a Central European War (Stockholm: FOA Repro, 1982), pp. 168-169.
John Berg, Norway’s Vital Defense Changes,” Armed Forces Journal International, December 1980, p. 54.
“Farrar-Hockley, p. 6.
' Richard C. Bowman, “Soviet Options on NATO’s Northern Flank,” Armed Forces Journal International, April 1984, pp. 90 and 92.
'"Joseph H. Alexander, “The Role of U. S. Marines in the Defense of North Norway,” Proceedings, May 1984, p. 184.
“Lewis, p. 52.
18Lewis, p. 63.
“Kenneth A. Meyers, “U. S. Power in the Northern Flank,” Uri Ra’anan et al., ed.. Projection of Power Perspectives, Perceptions and Problems (Hamden, CN: The Shoestring Press, Inc., 1982), p. 202.
20Whiteley, “Military Operations on the Northern Flank,” p. 146.
“Berg, p. 54.
22Robert J. Plante, "Environmental Considerations for North Atlantic CV Battle Group Operations,” student research paper, U. S. Naval War College, Newport, RI: 1982, p. ii.
“James D. Watkins, “A Report by Admiral James D. Watkins, U. S. Navy CNO, on Posture of the Navy,” Department of the Navy Fiscal Year 1985 Report to Congress (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy, 1984), p. 17. “Alexander, p. 180.
“Meyers, p. 193.
“Frank Uhlig, Jr., “The Marine Corps’ Future May Lie North of the Artie Circle," Marine Corps Gazette, February 1980, p. 37.
“Whiteley, “Military Operations on the Northern Flank,” p. 149.
28David Greenwood, "Northern Waters and European Conflict.” Lars B. Wallin, ed.. The Northern Flank in a Central European War (Stockholm: FOA Repro 1982), p. 26.
29Whitely, "The Importance of the Northern Flank to NATO,” p. 20.
"Alvin J. Cottrell, “The Employment of Sea Power as an Instrument of National Policy,” Uri Ra’anan et al., ed.. Projection of Power Perspectives, Perceptions and Problems (Hamden, CN: The Shoestring Press, Inc., 1982), pp. 95-96.
Lieutenant Colonel Ingraham is the Chief, Clothing Branch, Clothing and Textiles Directorate at Defense Personnel Support Center, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. A graduate of the Naval War College, he has filled various supply and logistics billets including Assistant Division Supply Officer, Third Marine Division, and Director, Materiel Division, Marine Corps Supply Center, Barstow, California. He was a Marine officer instructor at the NROTC unit at the University of Missouri. Lieutenant Colonel Ingraham was assigned to Second Force Service Support Group where he served as the group transportation support officer and then commanded the Second Maintenance Battalion.
1 November 1984
Significance of the Region: “The resources of the continental shelf, stretching from Svalbard across the Barents Sea, down the Norwegian coastline and into the North Sea, whether they be fish, minerals, gas or oil, are of the greatest importance to the economies of western Europe.”9 Ownership of these assets may be easily defined in the southern reaches, but the issue becomes muddled as one moves closer to Svalbard. On this Norwegian island, both the Norwegians and the Soviets maintain economic enterprises. In addition, the definition of the seaward boundary of Norway and the Soviet Union has been a point of contention for years. These tensions present unwelcome possibilities to the NATO alliance.
Overhead reconnaissance systems cannot be relied upon to inform NATO of Soviet movements in this cloud-covered region. Northern Norway from Bergen to Tromso “can be used for surveillance of operations taking place in the Norwegian Sea and its North-Eastern approaches.”10 From the air bases in this region, fighter aircraft are in an excellent location to interdict long-range Soviet naval aviation missions into the North Atlantic. Also, these bases provide staging points for air attacks on Soviet naval forces operating in the North Atlantic, Norwegian Sea, and Barents Sea. With the numerous islands and fjords on the west coast of Norway, naval vessels are provided concealment and protection as well as bases for operations against the Soviet fleet.
Norwegian Basing Policy: Geographically and politically removed from the centuries-old ebb and flow of piower in Central Europe, the Nordic countries have historically embraced a policy of neutrality enforced by strong citizen armies dedicated to the defense of the homeland. But with the outbreak of World War II and the ruthless policies of the Germans, neutrality survived only if it was advantageous to the Germans; accordingly, Norway and Denmark were both occupied by Germany. Observing the growing menace of the Soviets following World War II, these countries cast their lots with NATO—but only partially. In response to Soviet pressure and in consideration of their historic neutral policies, Norway and Denmark adopted policies of not basing foreign troops “on their territory in time of peace, unless they consider themselves