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Four years’ service in command of “Sher- shen”-class torpedo boats such as these (with their M-57 torpedo tubes) gave this former Yugoslavian lieutenant commander the bedrock on which to build this assessment of Soviet torpedo warfare, which occupies so important a place in the tactical employment of their submarines, surface ships, and ASW aviation.
In the late 1950s and 1960s, the Soviets extolled the value of antiship cruise missiles for destroying enemy ships at sea. Not until the early 1970s did a more balanced view regarding the significance of cruise missiles and underwater weapons emerge among Soviet naval theoreticians. Since then, the Soviets have argued time and again that torpedoes have not lost their importance in conducting naval warfare, especially in carrying out missions aimed at destroying enemy surface combatants.
Torpedo-Armed Platforms: The attack submarines are the Soviet’s primary torpedo-armed platforms. The nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) and some modem classes of conventionally powered attack submarines (SSs) are principally intended to seek, detect, and destroy enemy, especially nuclear-powered, submarines. Other targets include aircraft carriers, major surface combatants, amphibious forces, naval auxiliaries, merchant vessels, and “coastal objectives.”
Soviet cruise missile-armed submarines will use their torpedoes to finish off enemy surface combatants or merchant ships already heavily damaged by missiles, and for defense against enemy escorts. Similarly, Soviet ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs/SSBs) will use torpedoes when pursued by enemy antisubmarine warfare (ASW) ships or submarines. The SSBNs, after carrying out their primary missions, can also use their torpedoes to conduct antisurface warfare (ASUW), anti-sea lines of communication (SLOC), or possibly ASW tasks.
Soviet major surface combatants will use their torpedoes against enemy submarines and, if the opportunity arises, against enemy warships. Large surface-to-surface missile-armed combatants can fire their torpedoes to finish off enemy surface ships previously damaged by antiship missiles. They are also expected to employ, besides their antiship missiles and guns, torpedoes to attack enemy amphibious forces, if the latter get close to Soviet-controlled shores. In this case, Soviet torpedo-armed fast attack craft will be used as well.
Soviet surface warships also are expected to conduct anti-SLOC missions in coastal waters close to enemy shipping terminals, as well as in choke points. The Soviets do not exclude the possibility of using their major surface combatants for performing commerce-raiding missions in distant areas of the world’s oceans.1
Finally, the Soviets envision using torpedo-armed platforms to conduct strikes against enemy “coastal objectives,” such as port jetties, oil terminals, and floating docks.
Soviet patrol aircraft and ASW helicopters will obviously use torpedoes principally against enemy submarines, and only exceptionally against surface ships.
Types of Torpedo Attack: A torpedo strike is defined in Soviet naval theory as “a strike conducted in respect to the time and fire of the torpedo weapons against formations of (1) combat ships, (2) transports in convoy, and (3) other targets, with the aim of destroying or forcing them out of service.”
In regard to the platform and launching position, the torpedo attack can be conducted from a submerged, surface, or air position. The torpedo attack can be conducted either at night or in daylight, and either in good or bad weather conditions. The Soviets emphasize the advantages offered by combat employment of their submarines and surface combatants at night or under bad weather conditions. Of course, the principal weather conditions a torpedo-firing unit considers are sea state and visibility.
In respect to forces employed, the Soviets distinguish between torpedo attacks conducted by a “single,” “combined,” or several tactical groups of surface ships or submarines. Torpedo attacks by single surface ships or submarines or “groups” (pairs) will be most common. Those conducted by several tactical-sized units of surface ships will be rare, except perhaps in the case of torpedo-armed fast attack craft. A surface ship strike force will usually be comprised of destroyers, “guard ships” (frigates and guided missile frigates), and “torpedo cutters” (torpedoarmed fast attack craft).2 In addition, one-type ship or submarine units or “mixed” (composite) forces can conduct torpedo attacks.
Regarding place and objective, torpedo attacks can be “concentrated” or “non-concentrated.” A torpedo strike is conducted from two or more directions. However, tach' cal groups of one-type ships or submarines normally carry out torpedo strikes from one direction. In addition, a torpedo strike can be carried out either simultaneously or 1° succession. The former method requires—when a large number of surface ships or submarines are employed--;3 well-organized and effective forces’ control. Hence, it's very difficult, if not impossible, to organize and carry °ut such torpedo strikes even in peacetime exercises. The Soviets prefer the successive torpedo attack—“wave torpedo attacks.” Each preceding strike must weaken the target’s defenses, creating more favorable conditions for the
Joint
attack can be employed in cooperation with one-type
craft. For example, strikes conducted by Soviet SSNs/ against enemy surface combatants or convoys may be
pi (le|ay after the target has been detected. It must em-
ween “independent” and “joint” torpedo attacks. The
^urface ships or submarines, surface ships and aircraft, bmarines and aircraft, or surface ships, submarines, and
§Ss
deeded by a strike conducted by air-to-surface missile- mted bombers or cruise missile submarines. Similarly, e Soviet torpedo-armed fast attack craft may strike after acks by missile-armed fast attack craft or aircraft.
.. °rces’ Control: The Soviets emphasize surprise, coor- Palatl0n’ an<^ mass use of forces and weapons. The princi- features of a torpedo strike are sudden and swift movent of the attacking forces toward the target, relative ]eubaneity of the torpedoes’ employment against the se- cted objective, and skillful maneuvering against weak ats in the enemy’s defenses, sub °Wever’ coordinating the movements of two or more 1'^ Marines during a torpedo strike is nearly impossible, tect ^°ats cou'^ not remain undetected, because no unde- Ihe’ 6 means for communication and coordination of *r movement exists.
by fording to the Soviets, an encounter will be won, not bm s'(Je that possesses the greater number of weapons, ty the one that detects the enemy forces first, uses its SpaP°ns first, and obtains a hit with the first salvo. De- Sal\,e lJ!'s Soviet fascination with the “battle of the first c°mb' ' '10wever’ the concept has never been tested in
> the Soviets maintain that a strike must occur with-
J superior forces from different directions and from the abig°ns’ maximum effective ranges. It must use all availed ^eaP°ns» and it must employ different types of weap- ' 1 he principal objective then is to overwhelm the opponent’s defenses, prevent the target from dodging the attack, and inflict losses and damages upon the opponent, while minimizing the same for its own forces.
By firing a torpedo from its maximum effective range, a Soviet submarine will reveal her position. Thereby, in a case of missing the target, she will be subjected to the enemy countermeasures, but without accomplishing her mission objective. In contrast, the risk of being detected when firing from a closer range is acceptable in order to achieve an optimal firing position. In other words, it is better to get a hit from close in rather than miss from further out and still reveal your position.
Torpedo Firings: A torpedo firing can take place for one of four reasons: (1) practice, (2) experiment, (3) preparation, or (4) “combat” testing. The practice torpedo firing trains the ship or submarine commanding officers (COs), group commanders (pair COs), and ship or submarine “torpedo-mine department” crews in practical and proper application of torpedo fire regulations and norms.
The experimental firing tests new torpedo models or new tactical procedures in the torpedoes’ use. The preparatory torpedo firing, usually organized within a ship or submarine “division” (squadron) or larger unit, trains COs and their crews in proper employment of torpedoes. Then, the best unit’s CO and his torpedo-mine department is directed to carry out the exercise, while other COs and respective departments observe.
will
zone of the ship’s movement” on the open ocean,
vef
must run on a zigzag course and when within range- their guns against the target or against the ships in target’s protective screen. . e
To carry out the closing-in phase, a ship or submar1^ must be positioned within the area limited by the siz® the “critical course’s target angle” (Qkr)- This is u. greatest course’s target angle value at which the man ^ vering ship [submarine] with a given speed can close-j0^ the [torpedo’s] firing position.” The size of the crl.tl0f course’s target angle is directly related to the speed ^at'^eCt the “maneuvering ship” (submarine) versus the ‘ 0 -1
The combat torpedo firing is conducted periodically in accordance with the annual plans of the ship’s or submarine’s tactical training. The combat firing checks the crew’s readiness in and proficiency for “torpedo activities in combat.”
Types of Torpedo Attack: Regarding time available to make an attack, there are either “prepared” or “urgent” torpedo attacks. The former includes all the prescribed procedures and attack phases and is usually conducted whenever the target is detected early, and there is sufficient room for the torpedo-firing platform to conduct required maneuvering.
When a target has been detected suddenly, the urgent attack is executed. In this form of attack, though, the submarine’s chance of scoring a hit will be low, and the torpedo complement probably will be depleted.
The force/unit can conduct a torpedo strike either on a “parallel” course (toward the target) or on a “countermarch” course (away from the target). In the open ocean, the parallel course is the more common of the two. The countermarch course will be used by Soviet submarines fitted with stem 16-inch ASW torpedo tubes (“Novembers,” “Echo-Is,” “Foxtrots,” and “Romeos”), and it will be used against enemy submarines or escorts. Small ASW surface ships fitted with fixed 16-inch stem tubes can also practice the countermarch course, along with other surface ships that suddenly encounter enemy surface ships or submarines.
Considering the target’s movement, torpedo attacks can be conducted from “head-on” (bow), the flanks, or the stem. The time for the torpedo strike delivered from head- on courses generally is much shorter than that conducted from the flanks, because of the high rate of relative movement (provided the speeds of the torpedo-firing platform and the target are the same). Hence, attack from the head- on course enhances the valuable element of surprise.
However, a torpedo attack from head-on creates complications for a submerged submarine in an ambush position since her sonar cannot obtain accurate range and speed information from a target with a constant zero or close-to-zero bearing rate. In contrast, a maneuvering submarine can obtain precise range and speed measurements of the target because the head-on attack offers maximum generated bearing rate and Doppler effect. However, a conventionally powered submarine attacking high-speed surface warships from head-on on the open ocean will have difficulty in disengaging and successfully avoiding pursuit by ASW forces (unless she has much greater speed than the target). A submarine CO’s principal problem in carrying out a head-on attack is maintaining significant distance from the surface ship’s track to avoid being run down, detected, or driven off the firing solution.
Striking from the flanks is the most favored torpedo attack of the three since, at a given speed ratio for surface ship/submarine versus target, it offers a moderate rate of relative movement and enhances the chances of successful disengagement, even if the torpedo-firing platform is only slightly faster than the target. In addition, the target’s range and speed are more accurately obtained because of the steady change in the target’s bearing rate. In this type of torpedo strike, a submarine using straight-running torpedoes must not pass the closest point of approach (CPA)- The Soviets usually avoid torpedo attacks from the stern- Soviet SSNs attacking enemy surface ships capable0' making only 20 knots or less can deliver a torpedo strike within the effective range of their torpedoes from practl' cally any direction. The SSNs are particularly well-suite0 to conducting torpedo attacks from head-on directions °n the open ocean, where their high speed and deep-divu1? capabilities can be fully exploited.
Torpedo Attack Phases: A torpedo attack is normally comprised of four phases: (1) “sneaking-in” (approach)- (2) “closing-in for engagement” (attack), (3) “comhat course” (firing course), and (4) “withdrawal from the object of attack” (disengagement).*
Depending on the circumstances, a surface ship or sum marine can omit some or most of the prescribed tactic2 procedures for a torpedo attack. For example, if a torpedo armed fast attack craft or submarine conducts a torpe° attack in the coastal waters, then the sneaking-in phase may be much longer than the closing-in. Or if a target is suddenly encountered, there may be only a short closing in phase followed by a torpedo firing, and then an ener getic withdrawal from the object of attack. Soviet att°c submarines, when vectored by the command post ash°fe or flagman command post afloat toward the “probabe
begin the closing-in phase as soon as their own sens°r detect the target, thus eliminating the sneaking-in phaS^ During the sneaking-in phase, the torpedo-firing form obtains data on the target’s whereabouts and m ment, then sets a course toward assuming a position 0 tactical deployment. The target’s range at the point ofta deal deployment is chiefly selected with regard to thera of relative movement. When more than a single ship >s ^ attack, all participating units must assume their posih°n for the tactical deployment at the time assigned. Mtej ward, torpedo-armed ships set the closing-in course, & initiate “combat maneuvering” toward their respec*1 “salvo positions” (firing positions).
The closing-in phase is defined as “a tactical maneu of a ship/formation to close distance in order to enable 1 most effective use of weapons and combat means of s° tj formation.” A Soviet surface ship or fast attack craft’ detected by enemy surface combatants during this pha^
the *The corresponding U. S. Navy terms are given in parentheses.
°f maneuver” (VJVk). When a torpedo platform enjoys a margin of speed over the target, closing in to salvo posi- tl0n is possible in two courses. If the speed of the maneuVering ship equals that of the target, the approach to the target is possible in only one course. When the target posSesses superior speed over the maneuvering ship, closing 'n to the salvo position is impossible. In general, the n'gher the speed of the maneuvering ship or sub, the §reater the critical course’s target angle. Hence, a torpedo P^tform will have the greater choice of salvo positions.
For example, Soviet SSNs, because of their high speed, Can reach the firing area submerged from almost any point around a surface ship or formation within the effective range of their torpedoes. However, a submarine should be s°rnewhat inside the salvo position, because a zig away 'VlU carry the target outside torpedo range.
For a submarine, attacking a surface ship or formation als° depends on her position in respect to the “attack sector. ” The attack sector or “maximum target angle” (QpR) 'I* defined as “the greatest course’s target angle” value at ae target’s range, the speed ratio of the submarine versus . §et, and the torpedo’s range and speed allowing clos- tog-in at the maximum torpedo fire range. The maximum c°urse’s target angle” represents the sum of critical ^torse’s target angle and AQ (see Figure 1). The value of X *s directly dependent on the speed ratio of the subma- Ine versus target. The higher the submarine’s speed is °Ver that of the target, the greater the AQ value. In practi- Ca terms, “small course’s target angles” (0 to 0.5 QKR) °w a submarine to close in to a firing position from ead-on and either of the target’s flanks. From a “medium 'torse’s target angle” (0.5 to 1.0 Qkr), a submarine can tect a firing position on the target’s flank closest to the t “marine. Then, the submarine’s closing-in courses from
toe
target’s other flank will be limited. When a submarine
Positioned at great target angles (QKR - QPR), she can
ack the target only from the flank from which the target
sas detected. Then, the possibility for the submarine to
®ct the optimal torpedo fire range is decreased.
Shortly before reaching the computed salvo position, a
Jtece ship or submarine turns into a combat course.
cer five to ten seconds, when last-minute torpedo fire
c Sections are made, the torpedo is fired. The combat
traUrse for fast attack craft is identical with the torpedo’s
j ack- Larger surface ships, however, use a “gyro angle”
p eac* °f a “deflection angle” (lead angle) for torpedo
tty6 C0ntr°F The gyro angle is the computed angle be-
to 6en ax's °f thc torpedo tube and the final track of the
f0^d°’ port or starboard (taking into account corrections
■ latitude, torpedo deflection, maneuvering ship’s tum-
^8 rate, and gyro incaging time). The “angled fire” is
*>5n achieved in combination with the tube’s train and ba:
coa
,toc gyro angle.”
torpedoes can accept a gyro offset to run a true
aDg[Se' only reason large surface ships rely on gyro e character of the torpedo platform.
the ~ ratFer than the combat course method is because of subr
the "0rriar'nes are fitted with fixed torpedo tubes, but lack Maneuverability of torpedo-armed fast attack craft. ey seldom use the straight torpedo fire method, since
the entire boat would have to be trained to bring the tubes into the proper firing position, which is often an impracticable process. Hence, the torpedo must be made to move onto the correct course after it leaves the submarine’s tube. This is achieved by using the gyro angle in fire control. However, a submarine could use straight torpedo fire if necessary by steering to deflection course but leading it slightly, then holding steady and firing the torpedoes at the instant computed deflection angle equals the angle between the tube axis and line of sight to the target.
The withdrawal from the object of the attack will begin immediately after the platform fires her torpedoes against the maneuvering target on the open ocean. A Soviet surface ship or craft will turn away sharply from the target, increase her speed to the maximum possible in the given circumstances, and set a course providing the most rapid increase in distance from the target. A Soviet SSN will turn away from the target by using both her high speed underwater and her deep-diving capabilities in order to avoid pursuit by the enemy ASW forces.
Firing Position: A surface ship or submarine may assume salvo position from the bow, bow quarters, flanks, stem quarters, or stem. Theoretically, the course’s target angle of 90° on either of the target’s flanks is the most favorable for firing torpedoes, because the entire target’s length is exposed, the maximum margin for error in computing the torpedo fire elements is allowed, and the target, in taking evasive maneuvers, must run the greater distance. However, in practice, the torpedoes must be fired from a course’s target angle (angle on the bow) less than 90° (normally 60°-70°); otherwise, the torpedo would have much greater distance (hence much longer time) to run until its impact with the target.
In contrast, when firing from the bow quarters target angle, the target is relatively narrow (and narrower still with deflection angle), the torpedo mn is shorter than when fired from the flank target angles, the track angle is smaller, and the target, in taking evasive maneuvers, needs only a small course alteration.
When straight-running torpedoes are used, a firing position from the bow target’s angles is the most disadvantageous since the target’s length exposed is very small, the
on a surface target than to sink it.
The Soviet 21-inch caliber antishipping torpedoes ca be fitted with two- to 20-kiloton nuclear warheads. Thus>
track angle is small, and the target can avoid torpedoes with very small alteration in its course. However, if acoustic homing torpedoes are employed, this position increases the chances of obtaining a hit because the Doppler effect is the greatest.
Firing positions from the stem quarters and stern target angles have disadvantages similar to those of the bow quarters and bow target angles, respectively.
With wire-guided torpedoes, the gyro angle does not play a role in computing torpedo fire elements, since these torpedoes can be fired from practically any position. Hence, submarines and surface ships have far greater latitude in selecting a combat course. Also, the advantages and disadvantages of the firing position mentioned previously pertain to conventional nonhoming torpedoes fitted with a contact exploder. Wire-guided and acoustic homing torpedoes with the influence type of exploder approach the target in the terminal phase of trajectory from the stem and explode under the target’s keel.
Torpedo Fire Forms: The Soviets maintain that “experience of the war [World War II] showed the necessity of using varied methods of fire, combining them in range and number of torpedoes.”3 With straight-running torpedoes, the Soviets distinguish between “single torpedo fire” and “area fire with several torpedoes” (ripple torpedo fire). The latter includes “torpedo spread fire” and “method of successive torpedo launching” (longitudinal spread). Two methods are used in torpedo spread fire: “sector fire” (divergent spread) and parallel spread. In sector fire, two or more torpedoes are fired almost simultaneously, but so that their trajectories diverge for a certain angle (usually from 1° to 4°) called “spread angle.” The spread angle is the angle between the final tracks of any two adjacent torpedoes fired in salvo from the same tube mount (surface ships) or setting (submarines). By using the spread, fewer hits will be scored, but more error can be accommodated. However, acoustic homing torpedoes cover a much wider swath, and if they are wire-guided, they can follow nearly any detected maneuver of the target.
In a parallel spread, the torpedoes’ trajectories are parallel but so spaced that one torpedo will hit a point at the
target’s bow and the other at the stem.
In the method of successive torpedo launchings, torpedoes are fired in predetermined time intervals, depending on the target’s speed and length. The torpedoes can be set for straight bow or stem fire at zero angle, or each torpedo can be angled the same amount. Then, each torpedo is fired in succession at different portions of the target.
The purpose of a spread is to accommodate errors and target maneuvers. Spread and salvo firings refer to straight-running torpedoes. Acoustic homing torpedoes are difficult to fire in salvo because of acoustic interference problems in the water, and because the fire contro system may be capable of preparing only one torpedo at a time. There would be considerable delay in bringing UP the next one for firing.
When Soviet surface combatants attack enemy submarines, they will use all their antisubmarine weapons available to overwhelm the target’s defenses, maximize the odds of getting a hit, and limit the target’s evasive maneuvering. A ship will usually fire its ASW torpedoes fjrst- After the torpedoes reach the target’s computed positi°n’ the attacking ship will close at high speed and, when within range, fire a full salvo of antisubmarine rockets- Soviet surface ships armed with both the 6,000-meter-plu* range antisubmarine rocket launchers (RBU-6000s) an short-range ASW torpedoes apparently attack in the re verse order thus described.4
Torpedo Fire Volume: The number of torpedoes a ph form has to fire at a target depends on many factors, 1(1 eluding type of target, the target’s size and value, the taf get’s status prior to the torpedo’s firing, the attack objective, type of warhead used, and type of the torped° exploder.
Table 1 Torpedo Fire Volume
__________________ Objective___________
Sinking Heavy Damage
Contact Influence Contact Influence
Ship Type | exploder | exploder | exploder | exploder |
Aircraft carrier | 5-6 | 4-5 | 3-4 | 2-3 |
Cruiser | 4-5 | 3-4 | 3-4 | 2-3 |
Destroyer | 2-3 | 1-2 | 1 | 1 |
Transport— |
|
|
|
|
18,000 tons | 3-4 | 2-3 | 1-2 | 1-2 |
Transport— |
|
|
|
|
10,000 tons | 1-2 | 1-2 | 1 | 1 |
Transport— |
|
|
|
|
5,000 tons | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
Many torpedoes are necessary to sink (or inflict heavy damages on) a surface target; while, in most cases, °nJ one torpedo can destroy an “underwater” target. Cons' ering the objective of the attack, Soviets believe that otl^ or two less torpedoes are required to inflict heavy damage
!’ne torpedo can sink or inflict heavy damages on even the argest enemy surface combatants.
The fire volume of torpedoes fitted with high-explosive "'arheads depends on whether contact or influence type of ®xPloders are used. When an influence type of exploder is 'tted, usually one torpedo less than prescribed is fired jj§ainst a target to accomplish a particular objective. (See •able 1).
Torpedo Launching: A heavy 21-inch torpedo fired by a _Urface ship or craft usually requires at least a depth of . ater of 100 feet at its launching point. An acoustic horn'll torpedo needs a minimum depth of about 60-85 feet riag its search phase, and at least 33 feet during the rrT1'nal phase of its trajectory.
^ ^ Soviet submarine can fire her torpedoes from either water (depth greater than 76 feet) or periscope depth t-76 feet). In peacetime training, Soviets emphasize rP£do firing from deep water.
ti^°nclusions: The Soviets have great faith in the effec- 0eness of torpedoes in a war at sea. Torpedo warfare CuPies an important place in the tactical employment of °viet submarines, surface ships and craft, and ASW avi- to°n- The Soviets devote much attention to developing ofJ*do weaponry and tactical training of commanding ’Cers and torpedo-mine departments.
Ufrently, the Soviet Navy possesses almost three times Vj ^any torpedo-armed platforms as the U. S. Navy. So- 'vitk Su^marines and surface ships are generally armed he .'arger caliber (21-inch) torpedoes and fitted with V y,er (presumably more destructive) high-explosive an .ads. Soviet torpedo warfare doctrine and tactics are integral part of their naval theory, as u1, ^ov*et torpedo warfare capabilities are not as great for , ^rst aPPear- The Soviet “operational-tactical” ^ Command and control are too rigid to effectively task naval forces, especially in antisurface warfare s- It is difficult, if not impossible, to control in a real
war the employment of torpedo-armed platforms and coordinate their movements in regard to time, place, and objective assigned. This is especially true when forces’ control is exercised by the command post ashore, and an engagement occurs far from the Soviet-controlled coast.
The Soviet emphasis on firing weapons from their maximum range to enhance the element of surprise and obtain a hit with the first salvo is another weakness in their torpedo warfare tactical doctrine.
The U. S. Navy can counter the Soviet torpedo threat by exercising more innovative tactical methods and procedures in employing its torpedoes and other weapons, by maintaining (and, if possible, widening) the current U. S. technological lead in quality of detection sensors, and by having longer-range, faster torpedoes fitted with more advanced guidance systems than their Soviet counterparts. But the key to success in neutralizing the Soviet torpedo threat is better tactics. The U. S. Navy must always be more creative, faster, and more flexible than its Soviet opponent.
*B. Balev, “Sea and Oceanic Communications and Warfare on Them,” Voyennaya mysl, October 1971, p. 47; G. Kostev, “Commerce Raiding as a Form of Combat Actions on the Oceanic Communications of an Adversary,” Morskoy Sbornik, February 1972, pp. 36-37.
2The Soviet Military Encyclopedia (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1980), vol. 8, p. 77. 3I. Kosikov, “Torpedo Weaponry in the Great Patriotic War,” Morskoy Sbornik, May 1976, p. 76.
4Krasnaya Zvezda (Moscow), 22 December 1976, p. 1; 26 July 1977, p. 2; 10 October 1977, p. 1; 21 June 1979, p. 1.
A graduate of the Yugoslav Naval Academy, Dr. Vego served 12 years in the Yugoslav Navy and attained the rank of lieutenant commander before coming to the United States. He served for four years as a CO/pair commander of Soviet-designed “Shershen”-class torpedo boats. Dr. Vego has been published widely in the Western press on naval matters.
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