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i lnterdiction tactics could be as effective as those of the old torpedo boats. The FFG-7s could provide the support to keep the PHMs on station for longer periods of time and could also enhance targeting and C3. The frigates’ missiles would augment firepower as well.
The Yucatan Channel, between Mexico and Cuba, is one area lhat could be controlled by the FAS AG. FFGs could enable PHMs to remain on station in this area for extended periods, an area some distance from the patrol hydrofoil home port and where endurance would normally be limited. The FASAG could spread its coverage across the wide area of the channel, positioning its units within surface radar range of each other. This barrier coverage would effectively ensure that all shipping passing through the area was positively identified.
^ Battle Group Support: While operating with a battle group and associated replenishment ships, the FASAG’s endurance can be extended. In addition, two ideas previously discussed in the Proceedings exemplify these tactical applications for the FASAG.
One such idea is that the FASAG could act as a screen against surface threats for a surface strike group (SSG), which would consist of “a battleship, cruisers, destroyers, and frigates, operating independently to conduct long-range strikes against land targets.”5 The accompanying FASAG could assist the SSG by protecting it against surface combatants and fast patrol boats. Although the SSG could certainly protect itself, the FFG-PHM team would enable the SSG to continue on its mission without Wasting missiles in self-defense. The FASAG could even be detached to engage enemy forces that did not merit the attention of the entire SSG.
Another idea where the FASAG can be valuable is in at-sea, guerrilla-type warfare, which does not presuppose a “presumed superiority or parity” with the enemy.6 The FASAG is mobile, and can operate independently and effectively with a relatively quiet emission profile. The group can attain tactical surprise through speed, or withdraw quickly if the situation is not in its favor. The FASAG appears to be ideally suited for this brand of warfare.
In support of a battle group, the FASAG can also demonstrate its worth. FFG-7s and PHMs could be detached to operate as a deception group, diverting attention from the main body. The FASAG could be employed as a surveillance group to conduct a “reconnaissance in force” type of operation. It could even provide escort services for an amphibious assault of air-cushion landing craft, covering their transit to the beaches.
Another tactic for FASAG employment would be that of a long-range sanitization sweep. The FASAG could precede a battle group by several hundred miles, clearing a swath of ocean before it. Again, by spreading out to surface radar range, a line of PHMs and FFG-7s could clear a path at least 100 miles wide with their active sensors. Wi.th the addition of LAMPS and the use of sprint-and-drift tactics by the flanking PHMs (extending the ends of the formation line for brief periods), the width of the operating area could be expanded. The employment of passive sensors, electronic support measures, and sonar expands the cleared area even farther. The real advantage of this tactic, so effectively performed by the FASAG, is that surface threats can be identified and countered before they can move into missilelaunching range against the main battle group.
Collectively, these ships reflect significant potential, especially when improvements embodied by the FFG-36 and subsequent ships of the class are taken into account. Perhaps even more important, however, is the fact that the large numbers of FFG-7s planned—including Naval Reserve units—ensure that the tactical pairing is feasible.
1P. T. Deutermann, “The Matched Pair: A Tactical Concept,” Proceedings, January 1982, p. 90.
J. D. Beecher, "FFG-7: The Concept and Design,” Proceedings, March 1978 p 150.
’D. G. Clark, “Destroyers for the 21st Century,” Proceedings, March 1979, p.
S. E. Morison, Leyte: The History of United States Naval Operations in World War It, Volume V (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1952), p. 223.
R. C. Powers, “Creating the Surface Strike Group,” Proceedings, August 1983,
p. 111.
F. J. Glaescr, “Guerrilla Warfare at Sea,” Proceedings, August 1983, p. 42.
Commander King earned a B.A. in history at Clarion State College, Pennsylvania, and an M.S. in management information systems at American University in Washington, D.C. He has held combat system billets in four ships, and currently is the tactics and doctrine requirements officer for Commander, Naval Surface Forces Atlantic.
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A Squadron of 7s
If we use FFG-7s in groups or squadrons comprised solely of themselves, the whole becomes greater than the sum of its parts. A collection of FFG-7s also could be thought of as a single, huge ship made up of modules which are the individual frigates. By thinking in terms of a greater ship comprised of modules, command, control, and communications (C3) among the frigates of the squadron become paramount. Without stringent C3, the squadron would degenerate into a rel-
By Bruce Friedman
atively ineffective grouping of forces.
Since C3 becomes more complicated as squadron size increases, one of the basic decisions to make about a squadron is to determine its size. The best size for a squadron would be three frigates. The only possible formation for such a triad are the line and the triangle. Station keeping would be more difficult for the line formation than for the triangle formations, since only the center ship can sight the other two ships in a line, whereas in a triangle each ship can sight the other two ships simultaneously. The line formation allows for variation of the spacing of the frigates, while the triangle formation allows the distance of the ships from each other and the shape and size of the triangle to vary. The triangle formation permits greater flexibility in emphasizing the various offensive and defensive capabilities of the FFG-7 frigates.
Because of the nature of the three main types of weapons carried by FFG-7s, the
preferred formation for most combat situations would tend to be the equilateral triangle, wherein all ships are the same distance from each other. The Standard MR (medium range) antiaircraft missile attains a speed greater than Mach-2, a ceiling greater than 20,000 meters, and a range greater than 18 kilometers. The Harpoon antiship missile has a high explosive warhead and a range greater than 90 kilometers with a speed in the high subsonic range. The Tomahawk surface- to-surface missile has a cruising speed of 885 kilometers per hour, and a range of 2,500 kilometers in the land attack version and of 450 kilometers in the antiship model. The Tomahawk can have either a nuclear or a conventional high-explosive warhead for use against land targets and a high-explosive warhead for antiship use. For land attack use, the guidance system is inertial, while for the antiship model a modification of the Harpoon active radarhoming system is used.
The relative ranges of these three missiles would be a significant determinant in the tactical course to be followed. Suppose a triad of FFG-7s is in an equilateral triangle formation. If the side of the triangle is less than 18 kilometers, each ship can provide a certain amount of cover against air attack for the other two ships while maintaining her own defense. An enemy air attack against a triad would have to present a higher density of threat at a greater level of sophistication against this triad formation than if facing three separately commanded and uncoordinated FFG-7s. Furthermore, suppose that the triad’s ships are armed with both Harpoon and Tomahawk antiship missiles and that the triad is on an offensive mission against enemy surface vessels. With a range of between 90 kilometers and 450 kilometers from the center of the formation to the nearest enemy ship, the triad can bring Tomahawk missiles to bear. Within a range of 90 kilometers, both Harpoon and Tomahawk missiles can be brought into action. The closer the triad ships in the equilateral formation are to each other, the better will they be able to protect each other from enemy air attack up to a certain limit. This limit might occur if the frigates are so close to each other that their defensive and offensive missiles would interfere with one another and with the vessels that launched them. An additional factor to be taken into account, however, is the requirement to keep a certain minimum distance among the triad ships to reduce the chance that one nuclear weapon could destroy or disable all three members of the triad. The importance of a triad having the best possible C3 is demonstrated by this situation.
The ships must maneuver together as if they are one unit.
The determination of the best course of action for the commander of an FFG-7 squadron requires the use of the most sophisticated tools of analysis and mathematics. Each FFG-7 should eventually be given sufficient computer capacity to aid the squadron commander in making his decisions within the real-time constraints with which he is dealing. The tools should include the use of games and max- ima-minima (max-min) theory.
An illustration for a particular situation demonstrates the complexity involved. Consider the attack of an FFG-7 squadron on an enemy heavy guided missile cruiser. Before launching his attack, the commander must decide if he can afford to wait until both the Harpoon and Tomahawk missiles can be brought to bear or if he should launch his strike when the Tomahawk missiles would be his only effective weapons. The strike is designed to sufficiently cripple the cruiser so that she cannot return fire once hit. There will be a period of time between when the cruiser detects the incoming missiles and when she is struck wherein she can launch a retaliatory attack. Some estimate of the magnitude of the retaliatory threat must be made and steps taken to minimize damage to the squadron. The nature of the retaliatory threat would presumably be in the form of missiles. The retaliation might be countered by a combination of Standard missiles, guns, and electromagnetic countermeasures available to the squadron. The squadron must be prepared to launch a second strike if the cruiser can still fight after absorbing the first salvo. Before and during the engagement, the squadron must be prepared to continuously maneuver as a whole and in terms of the relative positions, speeds, and separations of the individual frigates. Contingency plans must be made in preparation for the possibility that the engagement will be broadened to include combatants in addition to the squadron and the cruiser.
The entire FFG-7 squadron-cruiser conflict can be described in terms of successive maxima and minima of a function. Consider the situation to be limited to only three phases, namely, the squadron attack, the cruiser retaliation, and a second (final) attack on the cruiser. The squadron commander chooses his tactics to maximize the chance of final success with the knowledge that there are still two more moves to be made. The enemy cruiser captain is assumed to choose his retaliatory and defensive tactics to minimize the chance that the results of the first strike of the squadron commander will give the squadron commander a triumph. The next step is the squadron commander’s maximum use of his remaining defensive and offensive capabilities to secure the victory in this final round. There are alternate ways of phrasing this max-min problem, and the scenario need not be limited to three moves.
This max-min approach to the examination of the use of an FFG-7 squadron indicates two major areas of improvement and modification that need to be made to the FFG-7s to answer the demand of C3. One area is computer capacity. There are now U. S. civilian and Department of Defense programs to develop so-called fifth-generation computers incorporating artificial intelligence. By 1990, the first fruits of this effort should be available for application to the FFG-7s. Such application is a necessity in order to obtain the most effective use of these frigates for the next several decades. The typical FFG-7 could probably incorporate a smart fifth-generation computer without any major changes to the physical structure of the ship or her auxiliary systems. It is conceivable that computer intelligence could aid in major, unforeseen ways in its own maintenance and in taking care of. the ship. A frigate commander and his smart computer could eventually become a team.
The second area of concern deals with intelligence and reconnaissance. There can be no such thing as having enough knowledge concerning any possible enemy fleet and land bases and installations. The already excellent U. S. electronics intelligence network should be further improved and expanded. The concept of the orbital emplacement of a large space structure for active and passive ocean surveillance which would keep track of ocean vessels above and below the surface of the sea should be more actively explored with actual use of this system planned to begin about 1990.
Consideration of the use of an advanced surveillance satellite for support of an FFG-7 squadron allows the entire arena of the interaction between space and fleet support to be considered, particularly in regard to the defense and support of FFG-7 operations. Considerable thought is now being given to the deployment of orbital battle stations in space. These battle stations would use directed- energy weapons, such as lasers and particle beams, and missiles for such functions as defense against intercontinental ballistic missiles. Thought has also been given concerning the use of these battle stations for attacks against high-flying aircraft and even to attack ground vehicles. It is logical, then, to conceive of using orbital battle stations which could be in action shortly after 1990 for support operations in conjunction with FFG-7 fleet squadron operations. An orbital battle station could be used to provide such a squadron with defensive support against enemy aircraft and missiles.
The addition of space defense support capability to those already inherent in the trigate squadron renders the domain of combat to be truly three-dimensional. A niax-min theory approach to the proper squadron tactics in the case of an FFG-7 squadron attack upon an enemy heavy cruiser would have to be considerably modified in this event. Whether or not the enemy vessel would have such battle stations to support herself would have a great effect on the outcome of the fight. The U. S. Navy must give more serious consideration to the use of the extraterrestrial environment for the support of fleet operations beyond the noncombatant missions now performed by satellites.
As another example of an FFG-7 squadron in action, consider a squadron cruising near a submerged submarine. “Near” means within the cruising range of the LAMPS helicopters which would be launched when the squadron commander believed danger was imminent. Assume that the squadron is operating under wartime conditions. If the helicopters can be operated sufficiently far from the threat and neutralize it beyond the range of the frigates’ torpedos, the relative positions and separations of the squadron would be irrelevant. If the submarine evades the helicopters, difficult choices would have to be made in accordance with the short-range capabilities of the torpedos. An equilateral formation might again be the best configuration. The distances would have to be a compromise between being close enough to protect each other, yet not so close as to make too tempting of a target.
The general-purpose FFG-7 must remain a general-purpose ship. In the next decade, this class should be increasingly battle hardened and its capabilities increased. A major strong point of the FFG-7 is her versatility. Operating this frigate primarily in the squadron mode allows as much emphasis to be placed on the most required aspects of the frigate as a specific mission demands. Then, for the next mission, other aspects of the ship can be brought to the fore without the necessity for equipment changes or structural modifications. Trying to divide this class of frigate into two or more subclasses would defeat the aim of accomplishing missions with a minimum of cost while maximizing the accomplishment of military goals. The logistics of any wartime situation are considerably simplified by maintaining the FFG-7 as a general- purpose vessel, reducing the stockpiles of supplies required by specialization.
In addition to their use in independent squadrons, the FFG-7s can be used as a squadron of squadrons: a triad of triads. That is, a triad of frigates could be operated with two other triads in order to attain greater offensive and defensive capa-
Operating three FFGs as a squadron allows for many tactics not thought feasible for these escorts. With improved communications and weapon systems, these squadrons could become formidable independent forces.
bility and enhanced flexibility. This squadron of squadrons might be termed to be a division. A division might be suitable for protecting large convoys and attacks on two or more enemy ships of a heavier weight than the FFG-7s. The tactics used by a division would be similar to those used by a squadron, although the C3 demands of division operation would be far greater than those required for the operation of a squadron. The reason for this enhanced C3 requirement is that demands for division operations can be divided into two levels. One level of operations entails the coordination of the frigates within a given squadron. The other level of operations entails the coordination of the squadrons within the division. Further complexity results from the interactions between the two levels.
ip
While the most effective use of the FFG-7s might be made by operating them only with their own kind more or less independently of the other types of fighting ships of the fleet, teaming these frigates either individually, as a squadron, or as a division with other vessels is a possi-
bility that could yield fruitful results. Consider an FFG-7 squadron on a mission with a nuclear-powered attack submarine. Such a mission would be worked out for a limited time frame and a specific geographic locale as a consequence of the FFG-7 being a limited-range conventionally fueled vessel. A possible submarine- FFG-7 squadron mission would be an attack on an enemy convoy. Prior to the main attack, the squadron could maintain a covering fire. This cover would assist the submarine in her maneuvers and tactics to execute an attack pattern with a minimum of interference. During and after the attack, the squadron and the submarine could render mutual protection such that the probability of both the submarine and the squadron escaping unscathed from the field of combat would be greater than the probability would be if they were operating independently of each other.
A frigate squadron could also serve in association with a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. Possibly, in this case, a full division of frigates would be more suitable. For long-duration patrols, provisions would have to be made for refueling at sea. The frigates could provide a widespread network of antisubmarine and antiaircraft capability, so that the carrier could concentrate more of her attention and resources on her primary objective of projecting strategic air power onto the enemy’s fleet and territory. If it is not desired to use the FFG-7 squadron with the carrier over an extended period of time, then the refueling capability can be eliminated and the division-carrier combination can be used for a specific limited duration mission.
An intriguing concept is to use the FFG-7s as a strategic strike force in the same sense as land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched missiles, and bombers. An FFG-7 flotilla equipped with nuclear-armed Tomahawk missiles could launch a devastating attack against the military installations and cities along an enemy coast and deep into that territory. This option would put both a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier and a nuclear-powered attack submarine in supporting role for the frigate strike force by providing a protective umbrella.
It is thus seen that by using the FFG-7s under the fundamental organization of strategic principles and by the application of appropriate and innovative tactics, this class of vessel should occupy an important role in the defense structure of the United States for the remainder of the 20th century and into the early years of the next century.
Dr. Friedman earned his Ph.D. in physics at Syracuse University in New York. Currently, he works at the David W Taylor Naval Ship Research and Development Center in Annapolis, Maryland.
Battle Frigate
By Captain Robert C. Powers, U. S. Navy
Is the Oliver Hazard Perry a capable ship? Potentially, yes. With LAMPS and a towed passive array, she is a very useful multipurpose ship that nicely complements the capabilities of the Knox (FF- 1052)-class frigate. Together, the two make a “battle group-capable” ship that has the advantage of being able to be in two places at once.
Is the Oliver Hazard Perry a good ship? Yes, she is proving to be a reliable ship with good speed and flexibility from her gas turbine engines. The Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7) class has no more problems than any other new class of ships. She is a seaworthy ship; but stabilizer fins would improve her LAMPS helicopter capability greatly.
How is she best used as she exists right now?
► Asa missile “shotgun” for an aircraft carrier or battleship
► Asa missile “shotgun” for a non-missile passive towed array sonar ship ► As a local antiair ship in a close-in antisubmarine screen
► As a primary, Harpoon-firing unit in a surface attack group
► As a means to “herd” a submarine into a passive sonar trap using active sonar (since the Oliver Hazard Perry- class frigate currently has no passive sonar capability)
► As an antisubmarine assist ship to a Knox-class frigate (high-powered sonar and passive sonar), using the higher frequency sonar of the Oliver Hazard Perry class for classification and close-in holddown tactics
► As a primary LAMPS helicopter platform for antisubmarine operations and antisurface over-the-horizon targeting
► As an antiair picket ship However, frigates need the protection
and support of the aircraft carrier. Now there’s a twist! Since frigates are less capable and less redundant than destroyers, they need to operate under the umbrella of the carrier’s air superiority, and to have the advantage of repair support available from the carrier and parts support available via the carrier’s flight deck. Neither the Knox class nor the Oliver Hazard Perry class alone would be enough escort strength for the battle group. But together, they are a matched pair, and the carrier needs their capabilities. Together, you have two screws, a large and small sonar, a medium and a small caliber gun, four sets of torpedo tubes, an ASROC missile system, a basic point defense Sea Sparrow missile system, a Standard missile system, a Phalanx close-in weapon system, and space for three helicopters. Both ships are designated to receive passive towed array sonar systems. Three pairs of these ships, plus one or two guided missile cruisers for long-range antiair missilery, would make a formidable battle group escort.
If employed in this manner, the frigates become “battle frigates.” An official declaration along these lines reversing existing policy makes sense when one then considers what can be done with the destroyers that are freed from battle group escort duty.
Destroyers should operate in squadrons that take the offensive against the enemy. independent of carriers and their cruiser/ frigate escorts. There are many reasons for doing this. First, the U. S. Navy has an insufficient number of offensively capable ship groups that are organized and trained to fight together. (Today, only the 12 carrier battle groups fit that description.)
Second, destroyers were originally designed to be operated in squadrons to provide an offensive capability independent of the “heavies” that could strike rapidly on the flanks of enemy groups, and later to carry out independent offen-