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groups,” then the couple would not be so odd after all.
If—like Mary's little lamb—everywhere the FFG-7s went, the PHMs were sure to go, the Navy would have a rather odd couple on its hands. But if the duo could prove to be a powerful antisurface threat in the form of “fast attack surface action
The Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)-class frigate has been a much debated ship. Opinions of her value range from “torpedo absorber” to highly capable wartime escort. Delivered initially with austere capabilities in antiair, antisubmarine, and antisurface warfare, there has been difficulty in finding a suitable role for the Oliver Hazard Perry class; much of this difficulty seems to stem from thinking of the FFG-7 in purely defensive terms. However, if coupled with patrol hydrofoil combatants (missile)—PHMs—the class can expand its role, and become an offensive antisurface threat as part of the fast attack surface action group (FASAG).
The combination of two ship classes, as a tactical tandem, is not a new concept. The pairing of an antiair ship and an antisubmarine ship, for instance, has been previously proposed.1 In other areas as well, the tactical pair concept has been popular. The submarine hunter groups and destroyer-torpedo boat dual operations of World War II are successful examples.
The FFG-7 PHM pairing can be equally advantageous. Their dual operations will offset possible shortcomings and create tactics not previously feasible for these ships independently. The fast attack surface action group can take advantage of the PHM’s speed and FFG-7’s targeting capability and fuel support to create a potent antisurface force. The FAS AG can operate independently or in support of the battle group, conducting surface interdiction or controlling choke points. Combined in an optimum configuration of two FFG-7s and six PHMs, the FASAG can add a new role to these ship classes and a new dimension to surface warfare. To fully understand the advantages of this tactical pairing, a review of the ships’ capabilities is required; both classes enter the partnership with advantages which complement each other.
Antisurface Warfare: This is the key mission area of the PHM and, in combination with the FFG-7, forms the basis of the FASAG’s offensive potential. Both ships carry Harpoon missiles which provide a long-range antiship capability. The PHM is armed with eight missiles, but the FFG-7 can carry more because of her reload capability. Depending upon magazine loadout, the FFG-7 has a sufficient quantity to augment a Harpoon attack by PHMs, or to cover the PHMs’ withdrawal after launch. Although the frigate cannot resupply the PHMs, her missile loadout can certainly increase the volume of firepower.
Over-the-horizon targeting with an embarked LAMPS helicopter may be the frigate’s greatest contribution to the FASAG. LAMPS can rapidly provide long-range, accurate targeting data to complement the hydrofoil’s rapid ability to attack. Through radar search or visual means, the LAMPS can pinpoint targets beyond the normal targeting range of a PHM. Thus, a target can be engaged at the Harpoon’s maximum range or closed rapidly by the PHM. LAMPS expands the FASAG’s antisurface warfare range considerably.
Electronic support measure (ESM) equipment is another area where the FFG-7 complements the PHM. Both classes have ESM receivers, so the FASAG has significant means available for passive targeting by cross-fixing bearing lines. The FFG-7’s LAMPS has an ESM capability which can further facilitate targeting for the FASAG.
The proposed installation of a long-range passive sonar on the FFG-7 will also expand the FASAG’s over-the-horizon targeting capabilities. The SQR-19 sonar can detect surface contacts passively through target motion analysis; the LAMPS or the PHMs can then be vectored to the target for positive identification.
Antiair Warfare: The FFG-7 has an excellent antiair defense capability. Her SPS-49 long-range search radar can provide early warning of air threats for both the FFG-7 and accompanying PHMs. The frigate can take advantage of the warning by firing her Standard MR missiles against aircraft and incoming cruise missiles. Although the success rate against some targets may be scenario-dependent, the FFG-7’s surface-to-air missiles can compensate for the PHM’s limited air defense capability. The mixed magazine of 40 Standard and Harpoon missiles on board a frigate is adequate for air defense.
The Mk-92 weapon control system and associated Oto-Melara 76-mm. gun, carried in both classes, also add air defense capability. The Oto-Melara’s high rate of fire (90 rounds per minute) is indicative of the gun’s value against air threats. In addition, FFG-7s are being equipped with Phalanx close-in weapon systems for last-ditch air defense.
Such air defense capabilities of the Oliver Hazard Perry class supplement an obvious limitation of the patrol hydrofoil. With only a single gun, the PHM must rely on speed and evasion to escape an air threat. But without early warning, even the PHM’s evasive ability may be an ineffective counter to the air threat. The FFG-7 can provide such early warning through the use of her air search radar, Link-14 capabilities, and electronic support measure receivers. With this advanced knowledge of the threat, the PHM can seek protection under the FFG-7’s short-range air defense umbrella. Any PHMs alongside the frigate for maintenance or replenishment during an air attack will be further protected by the ship’s close-in weapons.
As modifications are made to the FFG-7 class, antiair capabilities will be enhanced. The addition of the Link-11 Navy tactical data system will improve the early warning capabilities; planned upgrades to the fire control system will also be beneficial. Collectively, the FFG-7’s antiair suite can enable PHMs to operate at less risk than when they would operate outside the FASAG configuration.
Antisubmarine Warfare: Foilbome, PHMs. have little to fear from submarines. Even hullborne, the shallow draft of seven- and-a-half feet would create a targeting problem for submarine- launched torpedoes. Still, the addition of the frigate provides some advantages. For instance, the FFG-7’s hull-mounted sonar provides short-range submarine detection, and the LAMPS capa-
the FASAG’s antisubmarine warfare capabilities.
In one PHM mission area, sea-lane protection, antisubmarine defense is particularly valuable. Some scenarios require support ships, usually unarmed noncombatants, to remain on station for extended periods; these ships require protection against submarines. The FFG-7, as a support ship in the FASAG, solves this problem by being able to defend herself. For sea-lane defense, the PHM’s role is enhanced by adding the frigate’s assets to combat potential submarine threats. Together, the two classes can optimize sea-lane protection. Future enhancements of the Oliver Hazard Perry class in antisubmarine warfare, such as the installation of the SQR-19 sonar and deployment of the LAMPS Mk-III Seahawk, will further increase the advantages ot the two classes working together.
Command, Control, and Communications (C3): The frigate’s capabilities in this area are far superior to those of the PHM alone. A full FFG-7 communication suite is larger than that of the hydrofoil and ensures a greater probability that critical communications will be maintained. In turn, the frigate can relay relevant information to and from the PHMs, reducing the disadvantage of their limited communication assets. The Link-14 receiving capability of the FFG-7 can also provide essential information to the entire group. Certainly, the PHM could also monitor Link-14, but the ship’s captain would have to sacrifice the guarding of other communication circuits.
The C3 spaces of the frigate, although not flagship-configured, are much improved over those of a PHM's combat information center. A PHM squadron commander would have a better grasp
The fast attack surface action group will field a respectable air defense with eight 76-mm. guns and Mk-92 fire control systems, dozens of Standard surface-to-air missiles, two SPS-49 air search radars, and two Phalanx close-in weapon systems. Because the gun and fire control system are common to the Oliver Hazard Perry and Pegasus classes, maintenance and logistic support will be simplified.
of the tactical situation from the frigate, and would be better able to communicate than if he were confined to a PHM. The FFG-7’s additional sensors would provide the commander with better information for tactical decision making as well, enhancing the overall FASAG operation.
The inclusion of a tactical desktop computer in the frigate would provide a further boost to her C3 role; it could easily fit into the frigate, rather than in a PHM, where space is more limited. Such a computer could provide graphic displays of Link-14 and intelligence data. Various software programs would also be
available to aid the squadron commander for simplifying over- the-horizon targeting and weapon-firing solutions.
Fuel and Endurance: Endurance is a major limitation of the PHM, primarily because she was not designed for long-range, independent operations. Her ranges (about 1,700 miles hullbome or 700 miles foilbome) permit the PHM to operate effectively if fuel is conserved. But at 48 knots the PHM will exhaust her fuel in about 14 hours if she remains foilbome. The FFG-7 can offset this endurance problem as a support ship.
The Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigate has the same type of gas turbine engine as the hydrofoil, so fuel is compatible when properly purified. The frigate can refuel accompanying hydrofoils using alongside or astern methods, resulting in a great increase in
The frigate-hydrofoil combination, well suited for SLOC protection and choke-point control, could become even more versatile as a quick-response, low-commitment surface force. One of the first steps the Navy might consider taking is to revive its moribund PHM construction program.
range for the PHMs. For example, by dedicating 20% of her fuel supply for PHM refueling, an FFG-7 can approximately double the range of three patrol hydrofoils. The resultant decrease in FFG-7 range would be offset by the increase in hydrofoil endurance, enabling two FFG-7s and six PHMs to operate more than 3,500 miles during a two-week period.
Another method for increasing the PHM’s range would be for the FFG-7 to tow the PHM. FFG-7s have effectively “tethered” PHMs for short periods and towed them at speeds above the normal PHM hullbome speed. In a FASAG, the six PHMs could be towed by their two frigates, extending the PHMs’ ranges.
Maintenance: This is another area where the FFG-7 can aid the patrol hydrofoil. Although the frigate has a small crew, she does have technicians who can work on compatible PHM systems: Mk-92 fire control system, 76-mm. gun, gas turbine engine, and Harpoon missiles. The FFG-7 also has space to carry additional support equipment and spare parts for other systems needed to maintain PHMs away from their home base.
Normally, PHMs operate from their home port or forward bases supported by a mobile logistic support group. For extended periods at sea, however, a support ship is needed to carry segments of the support group. Although one frigate could carry the required equipment, two frigates are recommended. One frigate could then carry support vans in her hangars and on the flight deck—sacrificing her LAMPS capability—while the second FFG-7 retained her LAMPS. This FASAG’s composition could effectively meet the maintenance requirements for extended operations, while still having one LAMPS-capable unit in the group.
Tactics: The complementary relationship of the FFG-7 and the PHM classes reaches fruition in a discussion of tactics. After all, speed and mobility are key ingredients to the success of any surface action; in the case of the FASAG, these ingredients create a potent offensive threat. The PHM’s speed is enhanced by the FFG-7’s endurance, targeting, and C3 support, enabling the group to operate independently or in support of a battle group.
Together, the two ship classes can serve as a surface screen for a battle group, or as a surface raider group detached from the main formation. This tactical duo can operate at potentially greater ranges than the traditional surface action group and can capitalize on the advantages of interdiction tactics. Specific FASAG tactics would involve refinements of routine mission areas. Sea-lane protection, choke-point control, and battle group support can be enhanced by the speed and mobility of the fast attack surface action group.
► Sea Lines of Communication Protection: The FFG-7 was designed primarily for escort duties. One author categorized the design as producing “a most capable ship for her assigned mission of ocean escort of convoys, task groups, and underway replenishment ships.”2 Another author labeled the design as “finely tuned for a supporting role in the open ocean and optimized to complement (or supplement) existing escorts in that mission.”3 In both cases, the FFG-7 is well suited for escort duty and protecting sea lines of communication.
The PHM can also perform such a role, but not as well as when she is an element of a FASAG. The FASAG has increased antisurface warfare capability and would be particularly valuable in restricted waters. The frigate can maintain the “big picture” and provide antiair and antisubmarine protection to some degree. Approaching surface threats can be identified by the LAMPS or by patrolling PHMs, and this contact information correlated with other sources. Suspicious contacts, localized by these means, can be investigated, sanitized, or engaged by the patrol hydrofoil. While the FFG enables the PHM to remain on station for longer periods of time, the PHM helps to expand the area of protective coverage.
► Choke-Point Control: The FASAG is ideally suited for choke- point control. Such a group can effectively guard a choke point for longer durations than it could if operating independently. The patrol hydrofoils can concentrate their firepower rapidly, with targeting provided from the frigate, to seal off a choke point. Or the FASAG could effectively screen the transit of a main body for a short period, then sprint back to rejoin the battle group when passage was completed.
Choke-point control with the FASAG is not a new concept; torpedo boats, working with destroyers, proved the merit of this tactic in World War II. In the Battle of Leyte Gulf, more than 30 torpedo boats engaged a Japanese battle group. The boats not only provided early warning to a U. S. destroyer group, but also harassed the enemy until 22 supporting destroyers were in position to attack the Japanese forces and counter the threat.4
FASAGs could duplicate such operations. Six PHMs with Harpoon missiles have greater firepower than 30 torpedo boats and longer detection ranges with the support of LAMPS. Their
i lnterdiction tactics could be as effective as those of the old torpedo boats. The FFG-7s could provide the support to keep the PHMs on station for longer periods of time and could also enhance targeting and C3. The frigates’ missiles would augment firepower as well.
The Yucatan Channel, between Mexico and Cuba, is one area lhat could be controlled by the FAS AG. FFGs could enable PHMs to remain on station in this area for extended periods, an area some distance from the patrol hydrofoil home port and where endurance would normally be limited. The FASAG could spread its coverage across the wide area of the channel, positioning its units within surface radar range of each other. This barrier coverage would effectively ensure that all shipping passing through the area was positively identified.
^ Battle Group Support: While operating with a battle group and associated replenishment ships, the FASAG’s endurance can be extended. In addition, two ideas previously discussed in the Proceedings exemplify these tactical applications for the FASAG.
One such idea is that the FASAG could act as a screen against surface threats for a surface strike group (SSG), which would consist of “a battleship, cruisers, destroyers, and frigates, operating independently to conduct long-range strikes against land targets.”5 The accompanying FASAG could assist the SSG by protecting it against surface combatants and fast patrol boats. Although the SSG could certainly protect itself, the FFG-PHM team would enable the SSG to continue on its mission without Wasting missiles in self-defense. The FASAG could even be detached to engage enemy forces that did not merit the attention of the entire SSG.
Another idea where the FASAG can be valuable is in at-sea, guerrilla-type warfare, which does not presuppose a “presumed superiority or parity” with the enemy.6 The FASAG is mobile, and can operate independently and effectively with a relatively quiet emission profile. The group can attain tactical surprise through speed, or withdraw quickly if the situation is not in its favor. The FASAG appears to be ideally suited for this brand of warfare.
In support of a battle group, the FASAG can also demonstrate its worth. FFG-7s and PHMs could be detached to operate as a deception group, diverting attention from the main body. The FASAG could be employed as a surveillance group to conduct a “reconnaissance in force” type of operation. It could even provide escort services for an amphibious assault of air-cushion landing craft, covering their transit to the beaches.
Another tactic for FASAG employment would be that of a long-range sanitization sweep. The FASAG could precede a battle group by several hundred miles, clearing a swath of ocean before it. Again, by spreading out to surface radar range, a line of PHMs and FFG-7s could clear a path at least 100 miles wide with their active sensors. Wi.th the addition of LAMPS and the use of sprint-and-drift tactics by the flanking PHMs (extending the ends of the formation line for brief periods), the width of the operating area could be expanded. The employment of passive sensors, electronic support measures, and sonar expands the cleared area even farther. The real advantage of this tactic, so effectively performed by the FASAG, is that surface threats can be identified and countered before they can move into missilelaunching range against the main battle group.
Collectively, these ships reflect significant potential, especially when improvements embodied by the FFG-36 and subsequent ships of the class are taken into account. Perhaps even more important, however, is the fact that the large numbers of FFG-7s planned—including Naval Reserve units—ensure that the tactical pairing is feasible.
1P. T. Deutermann, “The Matched Pair: A Tactical Concept,” Proceedings, January 1982, p. 90.
J. D. Beecher, "FFG-7: The Concept and Design,” Proceedings, March 1978 p 150.
’D. G. Clark, “Destroyers for the 21st Century,” Proceedings, March 1979, p.
S. E. Morison, Leyte: The History of United States Naval Operations in World War It, Volume V (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1952), p. 223.
R. C. Powers, “Creating the Surface Strike Group,” Proceedings, August 1983,
p. 111.
F. J. Glaescr, “Guerrilla Warfare at Sea,” Proceedings, August 1983, p. 42.
Commander King earned a B.A. in history at Clarion State College, Pennsylvania, and an M.S. in management information systems at American University in Washington, D.C. He has held combat system billets in four ships, and currently is the tactics and doctrine requirements officer for Commander, Naval Surface Forces Atlantic.
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A Squadron of 7s
If we use FFG-7s in groups or squadrons comprised solely of themselves, the whole becomes greater than the sum of its parts. A collection of FFG-7s also could be thought of as a single, huge ship made up of modules which are the individual frigates. By thinking in terms of a greater ship comprised of modules, command, control, and communications (C3) among the frigates of the squadron become paramount. Without stringent C3, the squadron would degenerate into a rel-
By Bruce Friedman
atively ineffective grouping of forces.
Since C3 becomes more complicated as squadron size increases, one of the basic decisions to make about a squadron is to determine its size. The best size for a squadron would be three frigates. The only possible formation for such a triad are the line and the triangle. Station keeping would be more difficult for the line formation than for the triangle formations, since only the center ship can sight the other two ships in a line, whereas in a triangle each ship can sight the other two ships simultaneously. The line formation allows for variation of the spacing of the frigates, while the triangle formation allows the distance of the ships from each other and the shape and size of the triangle to vary. The triangle formation permits greater flexibility in emphasizing the various offensive and defensive capabilities of the FFG-7 frigates.
Because of the nature of the three main types of weapons carried by FFG-7s, the