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We can no longer afford to downplay the use of small ships in offensive roles. A fleet of “strike hydrofoils,” armed with cruise missiles and a close-in weapon system, is the missing link in NATO sea power. Not only does such a force recognize economic constraints of our European allies, but it also will be more tactically useful than the alliance’s current Standing Naval Force Atlantic.
If the North Atlantic Treaty Organization needed a theme song to describe its naval strategic situation, it probably would be “You Take the High Road and I’ll Take the Low Road.” The United States inherited a major share of the naval duties for NATO because of its dominant position after World War II, and has continued to take responsibility for the operation of several high-powered battle groups centered around aircraft carriers. These commitments have been retained despite a 50% reduction in the number of U. S. Navy ships over the last decade. Major ship construction is still an expensive, specialized business, and—in the austere economic climate of the Western world—there is little reason to believe that European members of NATO would be able to take up more of the load. However, a “missing link” that can recognize fiscal constraints and yet provide a tactically useful force— to which the United States and European members of NATO can both contribute—may provide a solution to the imbalance of naval responsibilities.
The only NATO naval force that conducts routine operations is the Standing Naval Force Atlantic, consisting of a handful of destroyers and frigates that do a good job showing the flag, but are operationally limited to fairly basic exercises. The force is a good investment for its six months of deployment time; however, it does not offer much as the core for a more effective combined battle force. If large ships are too expensive and current operations too limited, then a new concept must be explored that will provide a better link between the U. S. Navy and European NATO naval forces.
In trying to find this missing link, many have argued the U. S. force structure should be left alone; the missions of power projection and blue water sea control are jobs for which the U. S. Navy is best suited. Likewise it is held that other NATO navies have a particular flair for minesweeping, coastal operations, local convoy protection, and offensive mining. Although they have the capability to conduct more distant or complicated operations, their force structures are biased toward smaller-sized ships. The neat division of labor these differences imply is appealing and, for never having been tested in the crucible of war, appears to work well.
With the impending addition of Tomahawk cruise missiles to the U. S. naval inventory, the land attack power projection mission now can be achieved by the smallest ocean-capable ship. Although the same missile can be used for an extremely long-range ship attack mission, the land attack version has the greatest strategic implications. Tomahawk now has the potential to change NATO naval strategy. Some changes are already in the making, but most of them focus on the larger and more capable ships. A Sprit- ance-c\ass destroyer, for instance, can be modified by placing 50-100 Tomahawk missiles on board with the vertical launcher system (VLS).
Since the land attack version of the Tomahawk (TLAM) has the capability to hit targets 600 to 900 miles away with either a conventional or nuclear warhead (TLAM-C, TLAM-N), a single destroyer thus armed takes on considerable strategic importance in the minds of potential enemies. This strike destroyer (DDS) must be found, tracked, and perhaps targeted. Every such effort dilutes the targeting resources that are available to use against other val-
uable NATO forces, such as aircraft carriers. So, at a very small price compared with other strike assets, the DDS would actually improve the survivability of NATO forces. An additional advantage lies in strike planning that would combine Tomahawk launches with tactical air (TacAir) attacks. Even smaller ships could take advantage of the synergistic effects of TacAir/Tomahawk, as well as further the dilution of enemy targeting.
Small combatants are not a particularly “sexy” topic of conversation in the U. S. Navy. In any serious strategic conversation, the patrol gunboats (PGs) and hydrofoils of the world are dismissed from any real consideration with a mumbled “short-range weapons, no legs, easy target,” or some phrase designed to cut short such foolishness and get on with the important issues of big ships. From a pragmatic viewpoint, this is perhaps a wise decision; if U. S. naval strategists were to focus on small ship capabilities, Congress would be more than happy to grant the decade-old request for a 600-ship navy—one aircraft carrier and 599 gunboats! While perhaps a little exaggerated, the temptation to buy many small ships that make up numbers but lack combat capability might be too great. A way must be found to use small ships in offensive roles so that all NATO nations can share in their construction, operation, and control.
The last two U. S. Navy patrol gunboats were decommissioned last October. Their passing calls to mind their many missions that are found lacking in conventional blue water measures of effectiveness: coastal and river patrol in Vietnam, strait patrol in the Mediterranean, short-range attack in the Caribbean, a variety of amphibious missions, and finally a comfortable place in the Naval Reserve. Short operational ranges and small armament were judged to be their major weaknesses—reasons that are still good enough to stymie the resurrection of a small boat school in the U. S. Navy. But on a slightly larger scale, the same could be said of our frigate class when used beyond its original purpose and forced to steam in battle group operations.
Such criticism of small ships might suffice if the United States were to operate alone in oceans far from our home waters that required large, capable units. However, in most scenarios, the United States is joined by at least one ally. As a means of solidifying the alliance bond, the United States should take the initiative to form an allied fleet of small ships that can play a role in high end naval missions.
The missing link, then, is an affordable way for NATO navies to provide a useful strike warfare role. The goal is not to replace larger ships which can operate in many roles, but to carve out a new area of naval warfare that will bring the United States closer to its naval allies.
As an example, consider the European theater.
The two most difficult areas for the NATO alliance to operate in are the Eastern Mediterranean and the North Sea off Norway. Between two and four carriers are routinely assumed necessary to play an effective role in either vital area. If required to fight in both at the same time, as many as eight carriers could be used. In order to launch air strikes against targets on the European Central Front, control over both areas will be necessary. In this region, Soviet lines of communication are particularly short, air coverage is good, and surface action groups (SAGs) composed of missile ships can be deployed and reinforced quickly.
Now—as the conventional thinking goes—it will be necessary to take a bloody nose the first few days of a war, and then move into launch positions as soon as possible. The British through-deck cruisers may help, and if the French decide to add their > carriers to the NATO force, things could be a bit easier. Nevertheless, the Europeans cannot contribute much to the vital task of getting sea-based tactical air support into the battle during the critical early phases. Until recently, even the United States could do little in this area to dilute Soviet efforts. > Yet, with the introduction of the Tomahawk cruise missile and its ability to attack land targets from long ranges at sea, the balance may have tilted in favor of NATO.
Thus the Tomahawk land attack missile appears to have a great deal of utility for furthering the naval missions of NATO—at least as applied by the United States. Few of the allies have sea-based tactical air, and none have TLAMs. In order to supply the missing link between the highest end of the low mix and the mid-range of naval forces, the United States should provide TLAMs to NATO. This would help in a battle on the Central Front, further dilute Soviet targeting, and increase allied cooperation.
Yet a NATO force of small ships could operate in only a few places—blue water is not their forte.
The Baltic and the Black seas, however, would provide relatively protected waters; these seas are close to many lucrative targets, and any force there would act as a naval tripwire and, if attacked, alert NATO.
In the Baltic and Black seas, threats from aircraft, ships, missiles, and submarines are great; maneuverability, speed, and small radar profile are premium design qualities in such an environment. Speed and maneuverability are important because a primary use of these ships is to dilute enemy targeting efforts—the ability to go faster than 33 knots (normal surface ship speed) is critical. Despite the accurate tracking of modern antiship missiles, electronic warfare methods combined with high speeds and unusually high rates of turn can significantly lower the chances that a missile has of hitting a small ship. Size itself is therefore important. With a small radar cross section, it becomes difficult for an en-
emy to first detect and later complete a fire control solution. Stealth technology might be used to further complicate the enemy’s detection and tracking problem. In any case, a small ship will be an advantage because it will allow the ship to hide near land masses and also make the radar cross section similar to many coastal merchants and fishermen, especially during darkness.
As a model for further comparison, the Pegasus- class patrol hydrofoil missile ship (PHM) is useful.
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Originally conceived as a NATO project, the Pegasus (PHM-1) had a halting start; only recently have three more of the class been built in the United States. The Pegasus is a 230-ton ship designed to use either diesel or gas turbine power. The diesels power hull-mounted water jets that propel the ship at comfortable patrol speeds of 8-12 knots and maximize endurance.
The gas turbine engine and hydrofoils allow the craft to achieve speeds of more than 40 knots. Foil- borne, such speeds increase maneuverability and— when combined with chaff, electronic warfare, and small radar signature—should make these craft difficult targets for enemy systems designed to be used against conventional hulls.
The crew of four officers and fewer than 20 enlisted men live in tight quarters, which accounts for one of the craft’s major limitations: crew endurance. At patrol speeds, because she is hull-borne, she rides much like any other small ship—not very well! The sophisticated engineering and potential for high speeds require that half the crew stand watch at a time. Crew fatigue and the difficulty of routine maintenance while being buffeted about suggest that a patrol has a practical limit of about three cycles of five days at sea, interspersed with several days in port for rest and maintenance. At the end of this three-week cycle, a longer period in port would be required for more extensive repair and preventive maintenance. A slightly larger craft than Pegasus, that routinely operated with sister ships, might be able to extend the cycle by a few days; however, the gains would probably be small.
In any case, the Pegasus is not the missing link. Current PHMs are armed only with eight Harpoon antiship missiles and a 76-mm. gun. A NATO force of Tomahawk-capable units that could operate in the Baltic and Black seas would require a larger platform to accommodate at least several conventional land attack Tomahawk missiles. Because of the nature of its land attack mission, an appropriate designation for this NATO platform is the strike hydrofoil, missile (SHM).
In the intense missile environment of the two proposed operating areas, the best gun would probably be the Vulcan-Phalanx 20-mm. close-in weapon system (CIWS). This would reduce the weight, yet still allow the option of using the CIWS against radars and other topside space if placed in a tattletale role. The critical factor in ship size and number of missiles carried is the takeoff weight of the SHM. About 3,700 pounds would be saved by trading the CIWS for the 76-mm. The Tomahawks, however, weigh more than Harpoons and would use up this margin quickly. In order to have meaningful striking power, the ship should carry at least six TLAM-Cs—eight would certainly be better.
An important option to consider—to reduce the weight and improve self-defense—would be to carry two Harpoons (or other NATO surface-to-surface missile) and six TLAM-Cs. In either case, the ship will probably have to be somewhat larger than the Pegasus class.
If the deployment of the SHM. is to act as an aid in bringing NATO navies closer together operationally, as well as bolstering the capability of the alliance to strike back quickly in case of attack, then most of the countries must be able to participate. A common design is needed that will permit each indigenous shipbuilding industry to construct SHMs. A few high-technology items, such as gas turbine engines or single-piece foils, would probably require importation. Overall, however, the project should strengthen each country’s shipyards. National crews would man each of the country’s several ships. Aside from building its own ships, the United States would play a major role in supplying the TLAM-Cs and targeting information (coordinated through NATO headquarters). The nuclear version of the Tomahawk has not been discussed here because problems associated with NATO release authority and target selection would not fit this scheme.
Crew and fuel endurance should allow a deployment of the international SHM force to the Baltic and Black seas. If each ship mounted six TLAM- Cs and ten ships were always on station in each body of water, there would be 120 nonnuclear NATO missiles aimed at important Eastern military sites. While these weapons alone would not deter any hostile action, the knowledge that they could strike quickly and deeply into second- and third-echelon targets should give pause for thought.
Since the rule of thumb for naval forces is that roughly only one-third is deployed while the rest is in repair or training, each sea would require 30 ships. The exact apportionment of ships per country is less important than the burden shared. West Germany and Turkey might contribute only a few ships, yet provide a mother ship to tend the SHMs while deployed or perhaps modest base facilities in the Baltic and Black seas.
The Soviet Union has sought to establish both bodies of water as satellite seas, yet has been resisted by international law since the days of Peter the Great. As a formal constraint, only the Mon- treux Convention of 1936 covering the Black Sea has any standing. Even so, nine warships with a total tonnage of less than 15,000 tons are permitted in the Dardanelles at one time. The total tonnage of foreign warships permitted in the Black Sea is generous by the standards of the proposed SHM scheme: 45,000 tons. Ten SHMs would probably displace no more than 4,000 tons. An additional restriction is that, regardless of the size of the fleet, a foreign ship cannot stay in the Black Sea for more than 21 days. This consideration actually fits the proposed deployment pattern of three cycles of five days at sea with two- or three-day breaks rather well.
Although there is no such formal restriction on operations in the Baltic, similar rotational patterns would be maintained. Ships would rotate from an intermediate base, perhaps close to each of the straits, before returning to their own country.
Growth versions of the TLAM are expected to push ranges well beyond 600-900 miles, yet for simplicity and to demonstrate the lucrative sites within the minimum range, a 600-nautical mile radius will be used. This proposed multinational strike force is useful as a deterrent, yet too much should not be expected from the relatively modest expenditures required to constitute the force of strike hydrofoils. They are meant to augment and not replace existing forces.
The mission of the force is to provide launch platforms that can strike quickly and deeply enough to blunt an attack on NATO and to act as a tripwire to warn other forces in case of a surprise attack. For this reason, the conventional Tomahawk should not be integrated with any nuclear strategic strike plan. Because an attack that combines both tactical air and TLAM-C strikes should have a greater combined effect than either separately, they should be carefully melded into plans for naval and land-based strikes.
The 1,000-pound warhead planned for the TLAM- C is made particularly effective by the extreme accuracy of the missile. Even after 600 miles of flight, the digital scene-matching correlator can guide the warhead to within a few yards of the target. With such accuracy, explosive power becomes less important; even for such difficult targets as runways, specialized warheads can be developed.
From international waters in the Baltic, four out of the five primary Soviet airfields can be reached; Pechenga, Belusha-Guba, Severomorsk, and the Northern Fleet Headquarters at Murmansk. Altogether, the Kola Peninsula has more than 40 airfields, where more than 700 aircraft are based. Along the Baltic coast, three airfields near Riga, Baltysk, and Kaliningrad are vulnerable because of the short, over-water attack routes. Offensive forces flying from these bases would play an important role in a North Atlantic sea battle and in the Central Front. Signifi
cant logistical points in and around Leningrad and Murmansk could also be easily considered, such as oil-pumping stations, shipyards, and thermal-electric and hydro-electric plants.
Of the four Soviet fleets, the Black Sea Fleet has the largest contingent of naval aviation. More than 300 aircraft of all types operate from four primary fields at Nikolayev, Oktyabryskoe, Gvardeyskoe, and Donuzlav Lake—all within TLAM-C range of the NATO strike hydrofoil force in the Black Sea. In addition, much of the important logistic infrastructure for the Soviet battle fleet can be easily reached by a land attack Tomahawk.
Regardless of the targeting, the ships themselves could" be useful during crises. The normal force of ten in each sea could be rapidly expanded to show collective NATO concern for Warsaw Pact actions. The high speed and large strike potential, compared with their small size, make them very useful for a combined crisis management response.
The current tenuous link between the high and lower ends of NATO naval forces occurs only during annual exercises and to an almost insignificant degree with the Standing Naval Force Atlantic. That bond must be strengthened by routine operations between the U. S. Navy and other NATO navies. In addition, NATO should have a naval force capable of showing resolve in times of crisis and able to react rapidly and powerfully in case of war.
With only a modest investment from each country. NATO can buy an impressive force to forge the missing link. The Tomahawk land attack missilearmed strike hydrofoil offers the ability to deploy suddenly during crises, destroy important second- and third-echelon sites in war, and dilute targeting efforts on higher-cost ships like aircraft carriers. The obvious spinoff of strengthening the NATO naval bond through routine operations is, in itself, worth the building of an SHM force.
Commander Libbey earned his Ph.D. from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy as the first Samuel Eliot Morison Scholar in Naval History. A former member of the Naval Institute Board of Control, he is CO of the USS Nicholson (DD-982).
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