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The inherent dangers of naval operations in close quarters and darkness are depicted graphically in this photo taken after the 1969 collision between the Australian aircraft carrier Melbourne and the USS Frank E. Evans. In the background can be seen the aft section of the U. S. destroyer. The bow sank almost immediately after the collision, carrying many crew members to their deaths. This was but one of three such carrier-destroyer collisions at night during the past 30 years. Despite the advances of technology, weather and darkness still have an enormous impact on the conduct of war at sea. Navymen must know well the effects of wind, waves, fog, darkness, sea state, electronic propagation anomalies, and other environmental factors if they are to employ their ships and aircraft to best advantage.
Throughout most of maritime history, naval operations have been conducted mainly in daylight, at the mercy of the weather. Sailing ships vied for the weather gauge, and entire fleet engagements were missed because of fickle winds. Cornered enemies escaped after nightfall, or into fog banks or rain showers. Recent advances, such as weather satellites and computer-assisted forests, have made major meteorological events more predictable. Radar and night vision devices have stripped away many of the hazards that once lurked in darkness. Consequently, today’s mar- mers tend to be more nonchalant about weather and darkness |han were their predecessors. (We are not oblivious, of course, °ut our attention falls far short of that of the sailing ship master ^ho had his bunk built a few inches shorter than his height to . eeP him from sleeping so soundly that he would miss a change m the wind or sea.)
This complacency is dangerous both operationally and from the standpoint of prudent seamanship. If we understand and use en- vmonmental factors properly, we can do a better job of fighting at sea. Naval officers need to understand the effects of weather jp use modern sensors and weapon systems to best advantage. h°r instance, surface warfare officers will have to become more familiar with weather than they are now in order to operate ef- ectively with LAMPS helicopters, cruise missiles, remotely pil- °ted vehicles, V/STOL aircraft, and the new generation of laser/ mfrared and millimeter wave sensors soon to enter the fleet.
Aviators already are well attuned to most meteorological ef- ects, but they can do still better. For example, recently developed Pr°grams for shipboard computers produce predictions of radar ^fraction that can be used to reduce aircraft detectability and juiprove jammer effectiveness. It is also worth remembering that disaster at Desert One in the spring of 1980, during the failed atternpt to rescue hostages in Iran, has been attributed in large jPeasure to the effects of a sandstorm and the requirement for otal darkness. Even submariners will need to add flight planning c°nsiderations to their already broad knowledge of the acoustic euvironment in order to make best use of Harpoon, Tomahawk, ar,d other subsurface-launched systems.
This article focuses on the tactical military implications of weather pnd darkness, rather than discussing general meteorology or subJects of broad interest to all mariners (such as tropical cyclone ^vasion or basic shiphandling). As a result, key oceanographic actors such as currents, sound velocity profiles, convergence °ne prerequisites, ambient noise, etc. must be excluded, or treated
Commander Linton Wells II is a 1967 graduate of the U. S. Naval Academy. He also holds an M.S.E. in mathematical sciences (1974) and a Ph.D. in international relations (1975). both from Johns Hopkins University. His shipboard tours have included the USS Marathon (PG-89). Josephus Daniels (DLG-27). Richard E. Byrd (DDG-23). and his recently completed duty as executive officer of the USS Lockwood (FF- 1064). While ashore, he has served in the office of the Secretary of Defense. Commander Wells is now taking a Japanese language refresher course in Yokohama and later this year will become a student in the Japanese National Defense College in Tokyo. His professional note on the USS Tucumcari was published in the September 1968 Proceedings, and his article “Maneuver in Naval Warfare" was in the December 1980 issue.
only in passing.1 Let us consider the tactical implications of various atmospheric phenomena.
Wind: Probably the most pervasive effect of wind on contemporary naval warfare involves flight operations. Modern steam catapults may be able to launch aircraft in no-wind conditions, but an aircraft carrier still will turn into the wind for flight operations on nearly every occasion. Wind over the deck becomes even more important as ambient temperature and aircraft loading increase.
The Battle of the Philippine Sea in June 1944 offers a classic example of the effect of wind on carrier warfare. The wind was from the east, while Japanese forces were approaching the Marianas from the west. Thus, they could launch and recover aircraft without deviating from their direction of advance. Admiral Raymond A. Spruance’s carriers, on the other hand, had to turn away from the Japanese during launches and recoveries. While this was not inconvenient from the standpoint of staying near U. S. landing forces, it did impede the pursuit of the Japanese forces once they were in retreat. Angled decks (which permit simultaneous launching and recovery) and steam catapults have eased these constraints somewhat, but it is likely that the movement of the carriers in a battle under equivalent wind conditions today would look remarkably similar.
The consequences of calm air also must be considered. With no true wind, the carrier must run fast to launch and recover. Thus, the effectiveness of her antisubmarine screen is degraded (if not completely negated). At the same time, the increased radiated noise makes the ship more vulnerable to counter-detection. If two-boiler frigates are part of the screen, their second boilers must be lit off above about 22 knots, with adverse consequences for engineering maintenance, fuel economy, and personnel heat stress. Such considerations must never be very far from a watch officer’s mind. Helicopter operating envelopes also may have a significant impact on the maneuverability of LAMPS ships.
Recent interest has focused on the effects of winds on carrier operations in restricted bodies of water (such as the Persian Gulf and, earlier, the Gulf of Tonkin). The use of a carrier in the Gulf itself certainly is one of the least attractive options facing a naval planner, if only because the ship has no place to hide, and little defense in depth. Wind considerations compound the problem since the land-launch cycle will make the ship’s movements predictable even if the winds blow along the major axis of the Gulf. If the winds blow across the Gulf, it might not even be possible for the ship to keep headed into the wind for a full land-launch cycle (generally an hour and a half to an hour and 45 minutes). Despite these factors, there may be cases in the future that demand a carrier’s presence in the Gulf. If so, the weather will be fully as much a constraint on its employment as the shoals, the dense shipping, and the offshore oil rigs.
Even if a ship is not operating aircraft herself, the wind will continue to affect routine operations. For example, ships must maintain minimum upwind separations from hovering helicopters. Successful use of chaff demands precise manipulation of the relative wind. The most effective position of the chaff relative to the ship will vary depending on the nature of the enemy missile seeker and the role envisioned for the chaff. In turn, this may limit the movements of a force while the chaff is airborne. Similar considerations apply to clearing gunnery smoke, or to the use of smoke screens. The latter, incidentally, are likely to recover some of their past importance as defenses are needed against electro-optic weapons and sensors. Detailed instructions for maneuvering with smoke are in ATP-31. U. S. officers should become more familiar with this book, for it places much more emphasis on environmental (atmospheric and sea surface) factors than do most U. S. surface warfare publications.
Ballistic wind is the predicted wind that will act on a projectile in flight. Not only does it influence naval gunfire, but similar calculations also may be needed in conjunction with cruise missile employment. For example, a 20-knot cross-wind, during a 10-minute flight, can introduce better than a three- mile error into the missile’s initial search position- Depending on the seeker characteristics and the accuracy of the firing solution, this could be enough to cause the weapon to miss its target entirely. Although wind is included in the various planning manuals for antiship missiles, it is too often neglected in the firings simulated during fleet exercises. This is only one of the several factors that need to be given more attention in practice with antiship missiles. At present, simulated firings too often take the character of “push the button and assume the target will be hit.”
Effective fallout wind (EFW) is an integral part of nuclear weapons planning. It is a weighted average of winds at various altitudes designed to produce a single figure for use in making fallout predictions. At sea, EFW determines evasive maneuvers in the event of a nuclear attack, as well as post-attack rendezvous points. The collateral damage from fallout also is a factor in choosing targets, weapons yields, and burst heights. Radiological fallout predictions are issued by the Fleet Numerical Oceanography Center at Monterey. Wind is also a key dement in the use of chemical and biological weap- pns. Regrettably, no measure comparable to EFW is promulgated routinely for CBW planning. Let us hope the need will soon be met. Parenthetically, lack of central pressurized citadels in our ships to allow just as a man overboard demands immediate consideration of wind and sea to create a lee for the recovery, so should the planning for any military operation at sea include predicted wind as an important factor.
Temperature and Humidity: The most obvious (although not necessarily the most important) effects of temperature and humidity on board ship involve personal comfort. Excessively chilled watchstanders will be less alert than reasonably comfortable ones, for instance. Recognition of this fact (plus NBC defense considerations) has led to significant changes in warship design—witness the almost complete disappearance of open warship bridges since World War II. Similarly, heat stress, especially in steam engineering spaces, recently has become a source of increased concern. Obviously, this is more of a problem in warmer climates, but on some U. S. ships four-hour watches cannot be stood in many spaces because of high heat stress conditions.
Very cold weather brings equipment problems—
COURTESY COMMANDER CARRIER GROUP ONE
operations in contaminated environments is a grave esign deficiency that reportedly will be rectified in the DDGX.
The keys to using the wind to best tactical advantage are awareness and forethought. Winds in any given area of naval operations are generally pre- 'ctable, either through climatology (historical pat- erns) or local forecasts. Sometimes, there is little oat can be done about this since various constraints ^ay allow little latitude in positioning. However,
Replenishment courses are often chosen on the basis of those which will provide the safest ride for the ships involved. However, the best-riding course might take a carrier and her escorts well off her intended track; resulting catchup speeds could diminish the group’s /t.S’VV posture. Shown here operating in the Indian Ocean are the ships of Battle Group Charlie. The replenishment oiler Kansas City (AOR-3) is flanked by the cruiser Gridley (CG-21) and the aircraft carrier Coral Sea (CV-43).
standard ordnance lubricants must be changed below -18°C.2 Flexible couplings, hoses and gasket materials may become brittle and shatter. Even metal is affected, and guns are vulnerable to fracture. Storage batteries need special care below — 2°C. Each inch of ice that covers all the weather decks on a Knox (FF-1052)-class frigate adds about 34 tons of high topside weight, with a considerable loss of stability. Since fishing trawlers have reported accumulations of as much as two tons of ice per hour, this can be a considerable problem. With close attention. however, and almost continuous chipping, topside ice can be kept under control.
The Soviets almost certainly are better at cold weather operations than we. Geography will keep us from getting equivalent low temperature experience in home waters (for which we should be eternally grateful), but this same geography suggests that more U. S. Navy cold-weather operations would be beneficial if we plan to carry the fight to the enemy. Admittedly, inclement weather would cut into the completion of formal training exercises, could increase injuries and material damage, and would do nothing to help retention. Cold-weather maneuvers are conducted now and then, but an expanded series would give more people experience in such
operations and might provide doctrinal refinements for procedures in strategically important areas. Some improvements in ship design may also result.
At the other end of the temperature scale, heat accelerates the failure rate for electronic equipment.
Even in U. S. ships, which are designed for worldwide operations, many electronic equipment rooms are high in the superstructure, far from air conditioning units. They are particularly susceptible to heat stress in tropical waters. The problem is even more acute in ships designed for operations in northern areas (during a visit to Roosevelt Roads a few years ago, a West German frigate had to keep awnings rigged, and a continuous stream of water had to be run over decks above berthing compartments to keep them habitable). This may reduce the effectiveness of some NATO navies in the Caribbean or Indian Ocean areas, and certainly must affect the readiness of many Soviet combatants in those seas.3
Two significant operational effects of temperature and humidity often are overlooked, especially by non-aviators. These are the temperature and humidity profile with height and density altitude. Stable atmospheric conditions may develop when a body of warm air blows over a colder surface layer, or j when radiation losses cool the lower layers of air in the early morning. This creates what is known as a temperature inversion. Since the colder surface air J will not rise through the less-dense overlying layer, little mixing takes place. If an inversion persists for a few days, it can lead to reduced visibility, and severe smog in industrial areas. More militarily important, however, is that an inversion also leads to radar ducting for shipborne radars, and trapping layers of radar holes for airborne sensors.
VITRO LABORATOR*
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With ducting, surface search radars may detect contacts at ranges of a hundred miles or more.4 (In
'943, the "Battle of the Pips” in the Aleutians resulted when ducting caused U. S. radars to acquire fountain peaks in Alaska, some 1,200 miles away.)5 Respite the surface search advantages, however, air ?earch radars may have much of their energy trapped ln the duct and thus give relatively poor performance against all but low flyers. Abnormal propagation conditions also may degrade the performance radars on aircraft. A trapping layer at or below flight level may cause radar "holes” (equivalent to sonar "shadow zones”) through which only a small Part of the radar’s energy may penetrate. Thus, the maximum ranges for detecting surface contacts may not necessarily be achieved by flying higher. LAMPS helicopters, for example, frequently have to defend in order to pick up even destroyer-size targets 0r> radar. This is an oft-overlooked factor in surface surveillance and should be incorporated in planning '°r the use of E-2s or AWACS planes in such roles.
Even without ducting, the atmospheric tempera- JUre and humidity profile can distort the nulls and °bes of air search radars. Programs have been written for shipboard mini-computers to help attack airCraft fly profiles that minimize their detectability or to position jammers where they will do the most good. Not only should strike planners make use of hese programs, but defenders should also be aware the limitations of their sensors.
The North Atlantic in winter is a tough operating area, not only because of the unruliness of the sea but also because of the possibility of topside ice buildup. A ship’s stability can be adversely affected if the ice is not removed.
In another area, temperature and humidity are major factors in determining the density-altitude of the air mass. Density-altitude significantly affects aircraft performance, especially in the case of helicopters and V/STOLs, whose payload is reduced drastically in high-temperature, high-humidity, low- pressure environments. This is a particular concern in the desert or mountain regions along the Indian Ocean littoral and was a factor in the debate over whether to produce the AV-8B Harrier during the Carter Administration.
Cloud Cover and Local Weather: Frontal passages, high and low pressure systems, the presence of nearby land, etc., all can affect naval operations through localized weather. Discussion of these areas could be an article in itself, but the following points should suffice for illustration:
► Aircraft have hidden in clouds since the first days of aerial combat. Even today, because of IFF uncertainties, the use of beyond-visual-range missiles such as Sparrow and even Phoenix may be restricted until a target can be visually identified.6
► Clouds also inhibit aircraft surveillance of the surface. Ships have taken advantage of this many times, from the use of North Pacific cloud cover by Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo’s task force to hide its approach to Pearl Harbor in 1941, to the guided missile destroyer that operates along shipping lanes under overcast skies and downs an enemy patrol plane that has closed its position for visual identification.
► The passage of a frontal system will be characterized by changes in cloud cover, visibility, wind speed and direction, and signal propagation (especially in a warm front), thus affecting nearly all aspects of surface and air operations.
► The possibility that local conditions may quickly fall below flight minima results in a continuous concern for bingo fields when operating aircraft. This requirement may be eased in wartime, but it certainly is going to continue to be a factor in any pilot’s mind.
Tropical Cyclones: From the first issuance of a tropical cyclone formation alert to the final dissipation of the storm, its movements become of interest to all in the general area, and its avoidance becomes of paramount importance to all in its path. Battle groups sortie from long-awaited liberty ports, squadrons travel hundreds of miles out of their way to remain outside a storm’s forecast danger area,
and shore activities increase conditions of readiness days before the destructive winds are expected to arrive. Fleet commanders’ operation orders contain lengthy and explicit guidance on tropical cyclone evasion. Despite these precautions, the services still have suffered serious losses from tropical cyclones in recent years. Typhoon Tip caused a fire that seriously injured many Marines in Japan in 1979. Super typhoon Pamela devastated Guam in 1976. The USS Regains (AF-57) was irreparably damaged by a typhoon in Hong Kong in 1971.
In sum, tropical cyclones will continue to dominate their ocean areas for the foreseeable future. Ample guidance is available to avoid storm damage, but actions must be taken early.
Following are a number of factors to be considered under the general heading of reduced visibility:
Darkness: Most of history's night naval battles have involved attacks on shipping in or around anchorages. In the years before World War II, open- sea fleet engagements rarely were continued after sunset, although they were sometimes resumed the next day. By the 19th century, steam power made shipboard electricity possible, and the proliferation of searchlights reflected efforts to overcome the limitations of darkness. The Leigh light, introduced into Royal Air Force aircraft in 1942, brought a night aspect to airborne antisubmarine warfare. Today, many sensors are available to reduce the effects of darkness: radar, passive sonar, infrared devices, night vision scopes, etc. Night no longer is the opaque shield that it once was. Nevertheless, night operations still are more difficult than those in daytime.
It is no coincidence that nearly all of the Navy’s major post-World War II collisions have occurred at night—the Wasp (CV-18) and Hobson (DMS-26) in 1952, the Australian aircraft carrier Melbourne the USS Frank E. Evans (DD-754) in 1969, and the John F. Kennedy (CV-67) and Belknap (CG-26) in 1975. Moreover, a plausible (though unproved) case has been made that the second Gulf on Tonkin incident in 1964 may have been mostly a series ot illusions exacerbated by darkness and probably would not have happened had it been light.7
The key point about night operations (even on clear nights) is that any reduction of visual clues makes information harder to come by. Thus, operations in darkness or reduced visibility demand a higher level of attention to keep on top of a given tactical situation. If this concentration is broken— through watchstander fatigue, equipment malfunction, momentary inattentiveness, etc.—it is hard to regain control quickly. This can have disastrous consequences in a rapidly changing situation. Similarly, deception techniques also are more effective in reduced visibility.
New lighting measures for aircraft carriers should reduce the danger of collisions between that type of ship and escorts, but the lights will not change the basic complexities of combat at night or even the added vigilance needed when under way in darkness.
Other Impediments to Visibility: In addition to darkness, visibility may be restricted by more lo- | calized phenomena, such as precipitation, fog, haze, j sand clouds, etc. Each has been used at various times in war at sea. The North Sea haze was a critical factor at Jutland in 1916, and U. S. escort carriers off Samar in 1944 sought frequent shelter in rain squalls, to name but two. The distinction between impediments to surface visibility, vs visibility from the air, also has been alluded to earlier.
Fog is deserving of a study in itself.8 The curse of the mariner throughout history, fog often was a key element in North Atlantic convoy operations it1 j World War II. Even with modern sensors, fog has a profound effect on any operation at sea. During simple transits, a thick fog can slow the best-equipped
warship to a stop or a dead slow. Fog makes target discrimination virtually impossible, increases risk of collision, curtails flight operations, distorts atmospheric sound propagation, and makes operations very risky when radar is not operating. Certain types of low-lying surface fog may cover only ship’s hulls and superstructures, leaving their masts visible to aircraft but screening the aircraft from the ship’s lookouts.
There are important differences between the effects of these meteorological phenomena and simple darkness, however. Precipitation shows up on radar, and many a simulated Harpoon missile has been fired at rain squalls during exercises. Within rain storms, radar ranges are reduced. Moreover, precipitation increases the ambient noise level in the °cean, thus complicating acoustic detection. Most 'important, however, is that darkness is predictable and can be counted on in planning. Localized meteorological phenomena can be anticipated, and taken advantage of if present, but rarely can they be relied on very far in advance.
Atmospheric Transparency Beyond the Visible Spectrum: Naval warfare depends more and more °n sensors that operate between the visible spectrum and current radar frequencies. Infrared deuces, lasers, microwave radiometers, and other de- 'j1Ces play growing roles in missions ranging from detection, to target acquisition, to terminal homing. Successful use of these systems depends heavily on a range of atmospheric conditions, but especially on fiumidity and particulate matter. Thus, a laser operating at certain wavelengths would work fine in c ear weather, but it would be severely attenuated ■n clouds or rain. This has been one of the problems encountered by some new laser-guided projectiles, and reinforces the case for rigorous and realistic °Perational test and evaluation programs for new Wstems. In the meantime, recent progress in carbon dioxide lasers should offer devices within a few years that solve many of the problems associated with weather.9 They could, for example, operate satisfactorily about 90% of the time, even in Northern European weather.
Most naval officers are well aware that infrared radiation can be used to detect ships passively at night, to gather intelligence about engineering plants, and to guide precision guided munitions to their targets. Relatively few, on the other hand, know the frequencies on which their ships radiate, and the extent to which these wavelengths are affected by rain squalls, cloud cover, and so forth. FLIR (forward-looking infrared), for example, operates in the 8-to-12 micron range. It is affected by humidity but has demonstrated detections at 4 miles even in saturated air.10
Millimeter wave systems (sometimes called microwave radiometers in their passive incarnation) are immune from many of the weather-related side effects faced by infrared devices. Typically operating between about 30 and 300 GHz, these sensors have better resolution than radars, and are less susceptible to scattering and absorption than infrared or visual devices. One dramatic application of millimeter waves reportedly is in the Assault Breaker family of weapons, which uses passive seekers on precision-guided submunitions so that several tanks can be destroyed with a single bomb or artillery shell. Some of the seekers are infrared, but some may use millimeter waves. Designed to operate in the bad weather so often found in Northern and Central Europe, Assault Breaker offers a means to help offset NATO’s numerical inferiority in armor vis-a-vis the Warsaw Pact. It is not yet clear how this technology will affect naval warfare, for metals are much less easily distinguished from water at these frequencies than they are from dry land. However, the point is that attempts to overcome adverse weather conditions have led to the development of new sensor technologies with which many naval officers are still unfamiliar.
Weather and Satellite Surveillance: Beginning with simple daylight-only photographs and TV cameras in the early 1960s, satellites now have been deployed with all-weather, multispectral, high-resolution sensor packages capable of providing information on a near-real-time basis, day or night. Discussions of
While riding out Typhoon Rose at Hong Kong in August 1971, the store ship Regulus (AF-57) grounded on Kau 1 Chau Island and ripped open her hull. The damage was considered too great to warrant salvage, so she was decomissioned and struck from the Navy list.
military satellites are limited by security concerns, but a review of some recent unclassified launches (NOAA’s SeaSat A, LandSat D, and the Block 5D Defense Meteorological Satellite, for example) provides a hint of the technology now available." The equipment of some, or all, of these satellites includes the following:
► Synthetic Aperture Radar, an active sensor capable of providing 7-meter resolution over an area 100 kilometers by 100 kilometers long (25-meter resolution was used on SeaSat to reduce clutter) through cloud cover, or any weather, day and night.
► Infrared sensors to distinguish sea surface temperature differences down to 1°C (with sufficient distance resolution, this could be enough to see hot overboard discharges, or the night shadows of aircraft parked during the day on a hot runway)
► Microwave radiometers, to measure surface temperature, surface roughness, crop development, and atmospheric water vapor. An interesting application in SeaSat was the use of the radiometers to measure wind speed by looking at surface foam, which changes the ocean’s microwave emission characteristics.
► Near-real-time data links, transmitting directly to ships in some cases. For example, the AN/SMQ-10 weather terminal is on board several aircraft carriers and can deliver imagery within minutes of a weather satellite’s pass.
► Visual cameras (now largely replaced by TV data links)
► Radar altimeters capable of measuring sea surface heights with 10-centimeter (4-inch) accuracy
data processing centers to cover the whole world concurrently. Still, modern technology does mean that weather is less of an absolute cloak than it used to be and adds another dimension to the problems that naval officers must consider.
Operations in Reduced Visibility: Despite the host of exotic means available to expand the spectral range of our sensors, reductions in visibility almost always favor the side with the initiative. This initi' ative may be gained through superior technology- better tactics, or simple audacity, but the fact re-
Technology exists to overcome the most opaque atmosphere. This is not the same as saying that anything that moves in the air or the sea surface will be detected; there simply are not enough sensors or
Other Atmospheric Phenomena: Radio propaga- ■on characteristics vary significantly with the time °r day, especially in the 2 to 32 MHz range. Because the shifting of ionospheric layers, frequencies must c adjusted every few hours to achieve satisfactory bjgh-frequency communications. Historical exam- P|ps of skip zones and fade zones include the receipt °‘ the “Tora, tora, tora” signal from a Japanese Aircraft over Pearl Harbor by the battleship Nagato 'n the Inland Sea of Japan, and the USS Pueblo's, jAGER-2) difficulties in establishing communica- 'ons with Commander U. S. Naval Forces Japan, °nly a few hundred miles away.
Satellite communications are largely immune from ?Uch problems, but their use also has meant that °ng-held skills of shipboard radiomen in high-fre- ^ericy operations are growing dull. Periodic con- lr*gency tests ensure that they are not lost entirely, ut the relearning process during such exercises is Painfully obvious. Moreover, many automatic mesSage-handling systems require the high signal quality bormally found on satellite broadcasts in order to
mains that few contestants (at sea, at least) have emerged victorious after being surprised at night.
As mentioned earlier, darkness can be counted °n and planned for well in advance. Thus, surface action groups may have some hope of attacking a carrier before dawn if she has stood down from night aight operations. Amphibious operations (especially paids) have long been planned around the phases of lhe moon. Cover and deception measures will con- hnue to be aided by reduced visibility. Localized Phenomena, on the other hand, tend to complicate a commander’s problem rather than assist him. Current forecasting may not be able to assure a commander that he can make a three-day transit and then approach from a particular direction under the cover of a squall line, but that should never stop tmits from taking local weather factors into account tmce they are on the scene. For example, the di- mtion of targets caused by nearby rain squalls may delay an opponent’s decision-making long enough to cause him to lose the initiative.12 In sum, for the oreseeable future, reduced visibility will offer both drawbacks and opportunities that can be exploited oy the commander who is aware of his environment.
Finally, there is the essential point that attempts to monitor weather, and to overcome reductions in V|sibility, have led to development of new sensor technologies with which many naval officers are still tmtamiliar. Continued unfamiliarity may lead to misses similar to those made by the Germans in 1943 '''hen they attributed the increased detection of U- o°ats to new types of radar rather than British shipboard high-frequency direction-finding sets and Cryptanalysis.13 There is a similar analogy in the eventual negation of Japanese night-fighting supe- Fority by U. S. radar. We must know the sensors by which we will be detected.
process their data. In the event of a conflict severe enough to damage the satellites, it would be hard to carry wartime operational loads on high-frequency circuits without severe command and control disruptions. However, that prospect may one day be forced on us. If it is, weather again probably will play a central role in the direction of a naval conflict.
As stated before, this is not a treatise on the total environment. However, the atmosphere clearly does interact with the ocean’s surface in the form of waves, ice, temperature, and a variety of seasonal phenomena such as the monsoon winds. In turn, these affect every aspect of naval warfare.
Waves: Obviously, waves affect the day-to-day routine on board all ships—evolutions are cancelled because it is too rough, ships look for sheltered waters in which to conduct engineering casualty control drills, etc. An oft-overlooked factor in small ships, even in moderate seas, is crew fatigue. Quite simply, it is tiring to try to keep one’s equilibrium on board a moving ship. This translates into various results from less-alert watch standers, to shortened tempers, to slower-moving paperwork (no small matter in today’s Navy). There are few things quite so frustrating as clinging to a rolling desk with one hand, while trying to keep your administrative handiwork from sliding onto the deck with the other. More tactically oriented effects of waves on different types of naval operations are outlined below.
Antisubmarine Warfare: Helicopter-equipped ships have well-defined pitch and roll limits, outside of which the aircraft can be launched and recovered only at some peril. These typically are not very large, for example 4° of pitch and 10° of roll for many ships by day, and less by night. In wartime, these doubtless would be exceeded, but probably not without an increase in the accident rate. Various equipment improvements, such as fin stabilizers, stabilized glide slope indicators, or “Beartrap” helo recovery systems will help, but heavy weather still will constrain helo operations for nearly all destroyer-type ships.
Within the water column, waves contribute to mixing. The aftermath of a major storm often brings significant improvements in acoustic conditions. Last year, in the wake of a typhoon in the East China Sea, for example, a 700-foot layer depth persisted for several days, and acoustic detection ranges were exceptional. While they are present, however, waves generally are detrimental to surface ship antisubmarine warfare through several mechanisms, including increased ambient noise, greater ship selfnoise, and operator fatigue. Ambient noise in the ocean varies with the sound frequency; ship noise dominates the lower frequency ranges, while sea states or rain are the stronger influences above 100 Hz. Each increase in sea state (2 to 3, 4 to 5, etc., up to about 6) represents roughly a three-decibel increase in background noise, depending on the fre-
The RAST system, developed for frigates of the Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7) class, enables SH-60B helicopters to be tethered to the flight platform in heavy seas. Even so, ship commanding officers occasionally must restrain helicopter pilots who are eager to fly even when the weather isn’t cooperating.
quency. Waves also reduce both the visual and radar detectability of submarine periscopes, especially if whitecaps are present. Higher speeds and higher sea states also can lead to increases in own ship's noise, and "quenching” of the sonar dome. Excessive pitch and roll can preclude the launch or recovery of towed arrays. Moreover, the motion of the ship and the false targets can reduce operator alertness significantly. Twenty-knot winds around a low-pressure area in the open ocean could significantly reduce both the detection and helicopter reaction capabilities of a frigate in less than half a day. Thirty-knot winds (such as could be generated in a monsoon) could bring virtually all antisubmarine warfare operations by surface ships to a halt in about 24 hours.
At the same time, heavy weather is not an unambiguous benefit for the submariner. The damping of wave motion in the water column does make deep operations nearly motion-free, even in the worst weather. Below-layer antisubmarine missions are almost independent of wave action, although mixing increases layer depth. However, near the surface, ambient noise also is increased for the submarine, and surface ship counter-detection ranges are correspondingly reduced. Near-surface depth control is complicated, and shallow-running torpedoes may broach. Scope exposures must be higher and longer, and sea clutter will affect submarine radars as well as anyone else’s. Nevertheless, the initiative in heavy weather should shift even more to the side of the submarine, and with it, the tactical advantage.
Amphibious Operations: Waves are absolutely critical in amphibious warfare. In fact, a considerable amount of the work on wave forecasting grew out of potentially disastrous incidents early in World War II,14 Wave predictions influence the selection of beachheads, echelon areas, and even objectives themselves. Actual wave conditions can dominate the timing of the decision to land the landing force itself. For example, LCVPs typically were limited to sea states 0-1. LCM-6s can be beached in up to sea state 3. Vertical envelopment has reduced wave impact to some degree, but support equipment still must be landed, and ships must still be able to operate their aircraft offshore.
landing operations will continue to be sensitive to wave action. Early Marine Corps experiments with the use of containers (LOTS—logistics over the shore) pointed to the difficulties of handling large containers from rolling ships in open roadsteads. Hovercraft may offer some solutions, but even they will not be immune to wave effects. Vertical accelerations and longitudinal stability during the sea-shore transition appear to be the most serious problems- SEAL/UDT operations such as reconnaissance, obstacle clearance, etc., obviously are affected by wave action.
Amphibious operations remain vulnerable to the effects of weather even after the assault force >s ashore. Despite the extraordinary preparations made to protect the Operation Overlord supply effort in June 1944 through artificial harbors on the Not' mandy beaches, tremendous damage was suffered only a few days after the landing's when the beaches were struck by one of the worst channel storms >n memory. There is little new to be done in the are3 of wave prediction. Nearly all of the necessary pla*1' ning information is available to amphibious force staffs. It is up to us to use it properly.
Underway Replenishment: Militarily, replenishment at sea has always been somewhat risky. The force is very vulnerable while ships are alongside- and commanders traditionally have been careful t0 protect their ships. Wind and sea conditions are qmte important. In particular, with ships in close proximity, the yawing caused by following seas is unacceptable. Similarly, heavy rolling can part rigs add greatly increase the danger to personnel. Thus, re' plenishment courses usually head into the sea and swell, permitting operations even in surprising^ heavy seas, as many photos of flying spray and deck* awash confirm.
The key tactical point is that the sea-swell dimc' tion often is not the direction that the battle group wants to go. Since underway replenishments usualb take place every three days or so, and can last fodr or more hours for a single carrier battle group, the-! can have a significant impact on the battle group * PIM (position and intended movement). In turn, the,e are some fairly subtle tactical ramifications of fallin-
behind PIM that are not always appreciated in Peacetime. For example, with a 16-knot PIM to the north, a four-hour replenishment at 12 knots into the seas on course 120° would leave the battle group some 96 miles away from its intended position and miles behind PIM. At 22 knots, a 6-knot speed ndvantage, it would take nearly 15 hours to catch UP to track. However, during this high-speed run, the antisubmarine posture of the force would be severely degraded. Specifically, at 22 knots, both Passive and active sonar performance will be significantly reduced by self-noise. Moreover, battle group radiated noise (hence counter-detection ranges) '''ill increase markedly. If two-boiler ships such as trigates are among the escorts, they will be unable to patrol their screen sectors without lighting off their second boilers. Extended two-boiler opera- t'ons for these ships eventually will reduce tactical in war, it may be preferable to accept an increased risk of “kiss”-type collisions and choose courses downsea, rather than see the force’s antisubmarine capability degraded for a day or so afterward.
exibifity by reducing the time available for engi- eering maintenance, and hastening the time when °'lers must be taken down for cleaning. Finally, of c°urse, there is increased fuel usage. Since fuel consumption at 22 knots is nearly double that at 18, l16 savings during the replenishment at 12 knots will e more than offset by the fuel used during the higher Catch-up speeds.15
The point is that peacetime replenishment con- Nerations, with safety considered paramount, may ave serious tactical consequences in wartime. Thus,
Flight Operations: Although wind considerations dominate flight operations, waves also have an important influence. For example, carriers usually are limited to 3° heel during maneuvers to keep aircraft from sliding. Although light carriers such as the French Clemenceau and Australian Melbourne obviously are more likely to exceed these limits than a USS Nimitz (CVN-68)-class ship, weather conditions in the Norwegian Sea and other parts of the world can affect even the largest carriers. At the same time, however, it should be remembered that these are peacetime limits, and one need only to look as far as the photos of the pitching Hornet (CV-8) launching Jimmy Doolittle’s B-25s in April
1942 to see how far operational necessity will allow the rules to be changed in wartime.
Even more severe than the effects of waves on the carriers themselves are likely to be the speed and performance limits imposed on the escorts. These have been discussed earlier.
Mine Warfare: Wave height limits the use of sweep gear, and also the use of mine countermeasures helicopters and sleds. The wave action also complicates both the use and sweeping of pressure-activated mines.
Search and Rescue: Waves clearly affect the ability to ditch an aircraft, although skillful flying can make the difference between life and death for the crew. The survival of most of the crew of a P-3 that ditched in high winds and seas in the North Pacific in December 1978 has been attributed to the fact that the pilot had recently completed rewriting a text on heavy weather ditching procedures.
In the case of shipboard rescues, little more need be said than to recall the achievement of the USS Tabberer (DE-418) which recovered 55 survivors from the USS Hull (DD-350) and USS Spence (DD- 512) after their loss in the December 1944 typhoon that devastated the Third Fleet. Even as the loss of the Spence, Hull and Monaghan (DD-354) stands as a reminder of the power of the sea, the Tabberer s rescue is an encouraging indicator of the capabilities of even a ship so small as a 1,400-ton destroyer escort. Good seamanship, individual heroism, and the ingenuity born of desperation can still work wonders, even in the face of the heaviest weather.
An interesting addition to new meteorological satellites will be transponders to detect and display
ELT (emergency locating transmitters) from life rafts or downed aircraft. This should have a significant impact on search-and-rescue operations. The syS' tern should be operational worldwide within the next few years.
Transits: All too often, especially in the Gearing (DD-710) and Allen M. Sumner (DD-692)-class destroyers, serious damage was sustained to forward gun mounts because of high seas encountered during transits. Some of these hazards can be reduced by the use of optimum track ship routing (OTSR). Mo®1
ships today also have higher bows and more buoy- ar>cy forward than the Gearings and Sumners as a faction to weather-induced effects. However, the | ■.mu**- '“r~ ’'\r ^ |
peed for caution during transits remains. After all, is hard to imagine a transit objective, especially *n Peacetime, that would justify any sort of damage from weather. Most destroyer and frigate com- landing officers now are attuned to these nrnhlems | — ^ — -*• ............................................................................................ m |
hut two communities that occasionally need more awareness are staff watch officers and shipboard helicopter detachments. The former usually are embarked in large units, and sometimes lose track of how badly the “small boys” are riding. The latter, |
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hy definition, like to fly. After long periods of non- hying because of weather, their desire to get airborne may override their judgment of the dangers involved. Weather that is clearly below minimum standards the first two days under way may seem Marginal by the third and fourth days, and downright attractive after a week or so. Resulting attempts to jbove a helicopter out on a rolling deck, just to “see °w things look” can lead all too quickly to aircraft amage if it gets away from handling crews while he chains are off during movement. Without im | NAVAL MISSILE CENTER. POINT MUGU The hydrofoil missile craft Pegasus (PHM-1) and her recently commissioned sisters have the ability to ride above the waves and thus offer stable platforms for missile firing even in relatively rough water. |
pugning for a moment the pilot’s desire to fly, ship- °ard officers must not allow their own judgment 0 be overruled on flight operations if they feel the c°nditions are too dangerous. Ship Design: A final point on waves concerns their euect on ship design itself. Much has been written !n the pages of the Proceedings comparing the sea- eeping abilities of U. S. and foreign warships. Fea- apes such as knuckles, wide afterbody sections, and he raised bows found on Britain’s Whitby and Lean- e,'-class frigates all are approaches to improve sea- eeping. Gun mount casualties induced by flooding ave prompted the addition of bulwarks and strakes ® Knox (FF-1052)-class ships. Main deck flooding ay pose real problems for vertical launch missile ^sterns. At the very least, it will require careful . aintenance attention to the watertight seals on all aunch tube covers. Among the more exotic ship designs, the fully .^merged hydrofoils, such as those of the Pegasus HM-1) class, have proved extraordinarily stable hen foil-borne in up to about sea state 5. On the j. her hand, prototype surface effect ships have suf- ered problems with wave-induced vertical accel- rations. This is not the place to weigh the pros and °ns of new ship designs, except to note that the erformance of a unit cannot be divorced from its ^keeping ability. In this context, the SWATH (Small saterplane, Twin Hull) concept continues to make ^ense. Not only does it offer greatly improved sta- ^ hty for flight operations and crew performance, it also promises considerably higher speeds in ^avy weather than conventional hulls. The Navy’s Uctance to proceed more rapidly with such ves- | sels remains puzzling. Ice: Excluding land ice (icebergs broken from glaciers), two types of ice concern the naval officer in northern waters—sea ice and topside icing. The latter was discussed earlier. The former can range from light patches of slush to fields several feet thick that can close off whole ocean areas to ships not being convoyed by icebreakers. In World War II, for example, the width of the German battleship Bismarck's escape route through the Denmark Strait was significantly reduced by sea ice. Naval operations in ice-filled waters involve many factors not encountered by U. S. ships in their normal operating areas. Melting ice makes salinity a much more important component in sound velocity calculations. The water column normally is almost isothermal as well as isohaline. Active sonar reverberations are greatly increased. Hulls and propeller blades must be protected. Speeds are reduced. Days or nights will be prolonged, depending on the season. Amphibious operations take on an entirely new character. Visual refraction can enormously distort lookout observations. Under-ice operations will become especially important should the United States choose to put Soviet ballistic missile submarines at risk.16 However, just as the Soviets are probably better prepared than we to operate in cold weather, so also do the Soviets have more experience with operations in ice. Sea Surface Temperature: Sea surface temperatures are functions of both the weather above the ocean and of the water characteristics themselves. In addition, of course, sea surface temperature also affects the weather above it. |
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Weather influences the seasonal and diurnal ther- moclines, both of great importance in antisubmarine warfare. The higher the surface water temperature, the sharper the thermocline is likely to be, and the stronger the sonar shadow zone. Wind waves promote mixing, which lowers the layer depth. High surface temperatures also increase the water depth needed to give enough depth excess for convergence zone conditions. This is one reason why convergence zones are present in the Mediterranean in the winter, but not in the summer.
Commanders can take advantage of weather generated by and along major ocean currents, such as the Gulf Stream, Kuroshio, or Humboldt Current. In the area of more localized phenomena, fog is more likely to be present along the fringes of the warmer currents in northern waters. Moreover, relatively ice-free paths also are probable there. Parenthetically, submarines also may be present in such areas, for the turbulent boundary walls of major ocean currents provide excellent protection from sonars.
The power projection mission implies that weather ashore also must be an integral part of naval planning. From monsoon winds, to afternoon thundershowers, the weather over a target must be considered carefully.
Monsoons: The monsoon basically is a large scale,
Operations under the polar ice cap may take place with increasing frequency in the future. So far, U. S. experiments in the area of the North Pole have been limited. Shown here in August 1962 are the Skate (SSN- 578) and Seadragon (SSN-584) which surfaced at the pole following an undersea rendezvous.
semiannual reversal of air flow between the sea and the Asian continent. Such winds dominate the China Seas and the Indian Ocean. Since the monsoon brings land warfare virtually to a halt for half a year in various parts of the world and precludes most close air support because of cloud cover, no naval planner can afford to be ignorant of its effects. At sea, the shifting monsoon each June changes the Northwest Indian Ocean from a relatively tranquil body of water into a most uncomfortable operating area, with frequent gale force winds, and 11-12 foot seas. By October, the winds and seas have abated, with great improvements in operating conditions.
More Localized Meteorological Phenomena: When the wind is from the south in the Eastern Mediterranean, warm desert air produces extraordinary radar ducting. In the Arabian Sea, sandstorms a hundred miles at sea are not uncommon. In fact, pre-deployment guides for that region recommend load- outs of gauze or burlap to cover inlet ducts for air conditioning and equipment ventilation. In turn, this particulate matter cannot help but degrade mechanical equipment, and sometimes significantly reduces visibility.
Many other localized phenomena can affect naval operations in a given area: The Mistral winds in the Gulf of Lyon, the electric storms off Tampa Bay* the dramatically different precipitation conditions on the windward and leeward sides of mountain ranges. Simple coastal protrusions can distort wave patterns, and the choice of landing beaches on one side or the other of an otherwise innocuous peninsula can mean the difference between a successful landing and a failure. There are far too many cases to describe each in detail. The point is that the military planner can neglect these only at his peril.
In order to consolidate the previous discussions, consider the development of weather systems within three geographic areas.
Northwest Pacific Weather. The onset of winter finds weather fairly miserable throughout the NorthWest Pacific. The polar front in December passes across Northern Luzon and curves northeast out lnto the North Pacific, passing about 700 miles off Japan. Broken cloud cover is present over most of region, and average wave heights of 6-7 feet Prevail east of Japan and southwest along the China Coast. The Northeast Monsoon is well-developed. Operationally, surface ship helicopter operations ^ould be difficult; good convergence zone condi- fions should exist where the water is deep enough, aerial reconnaissance aircraft will have to close their Crrgets for visual identifications; and heavy cloud cover will envelop the East China and Eastern Vietnamese coastlines. Northerly and easterly c°urses will be preferable for flight operations and uoderway replenishments. Tropical cyclone activity generally is light (although December 1944 was the P'onth of the first of the Third Fleet’s typhoons).
By April, the polar front has moved north to the Taiwan area, cloud cover has become scattered south °f the front, wave heights have abated to 4-5 feet, and the monsoon is beginning to weaken. LAMPS fielicopter operations have become more likely, ships are less able to hide from aircraft, northern and Westerly courses remain preferable for flight operations and replenishments.
In August, the inter-tropical convergence zone IITCZ) has moved north to Taiwan, while the polar r°nt has retreated about 200 miles north of Yoko- sPka, Japan. Scattered clouds prevail over much of ne area between the front and the ICTZ, with bro-
Wave action can cause wet forecastles and topside damage in destroyer and frigate-size ships. One measure taken to correct the problem in the Spruance (DD-963) and Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7) is the incorporation of bows higher out of the water than on their predecessors.
ken clouds elsewhere. Mean wave height remains 4-5 feet. The southwest monsoon has been well- developed since June, bringing the rainy season to Cambodia and Southwest Vietnam. It will continue until about October. Flight conditions are quite good. Acoustic conditions are not very good because of strong seasonal and diurnal thermoclines. Southerly and southwesterly flight courses prevail west of 140° E, with southerly or easterly courses best farther east. There is a wide choice of underway replenishment courses due to generally calm seas. Typhoon season is in full swing.
Northwest Indian Ocean: The weather is divided into two seasons—the southwest monsoon from May or June through September, and the northeast monsoon for most of the rest of the year. From October through April, prevailing winds are from the northeast at about 10 knots, seas are 2-3 feet. Tropical cyclones are rare but do occur. Replenishment at sea courses are largely unrestricted, but carriers must often run fast to get enough wind across their decks, thus degrading antisubmarine postures. Strong thermoclines and insufficient depth excess for convergence zones make acoustic conditions relatively poor in most of the region. Sandstorms may be found 100 or more miles at sea off Arabia.
In May, the monsoon begins to shift. “Upwell- ing” of relatively cool water off the coast of Somalia increases the pressure gradient which intensifies the southwest monsoon. By June, gale force winds blow 20-30% of the time from the southwest across Socotra, toward the Asian mainland. Seas of 10-11 feet are common. Operating conditions are poor, although tropical cyclone activity is at a minimum. Underway replenishment and flight courses lead to the southwest. By late September, the monsoon again begins to shift, and seas and winds abate with the return of the northeast monsoon.
Mediterranean: Weather is dominated alternately by the Atlantic and the Sahara. Warm air from the desert spreads north and west quickly after the vernal equinox, and from late March to September- October, the weather is warm and generally pleasant. This “summer semester” historically has been “the best time for shipping, piracy and war.”17 Most of the Med’s great naval battles were fought between late March and early October; from Lepanto (Oc-
tober 1571) to Cape Matapan (March 1941). It was no accident that the landings on Sicily, Salerno, and Southern France also were conducted during these months. There have been exceptions, to be sure (such as Anzio in January 1944), but the fact remains that the “summer semester” in the Mediterranean has been most conducive to the conduct of combat afloat. Summer weather in the Eastern Med also is characterized by frequent radar ducting, as the Saharan air creates temperature inversions, but high surface temperatures preclude convergence zone operations.
Conditions change dramatically during the “winter semester”—roughly October through March. The Mediterranean is pounded by a succession of lows moving from West to East, usually through the Straits of Gibraltar, or from the Bay of Biscay across the Aquitaine. The seas are rough, and rain and overcast are frequent. Temperatures are much colder than the Cote d’ Azur travel posters would have one believe. In addition, the Mistral winds can raise severe seas very quickly in the Gulf of Lyons. Surface ship steaming often is uncomfortable, and aerial operations must contend with pitching decks and cloud cover. One operational advantage of the winter is that relatively cold surface water temperatures provide enough depth excess for short convergence zones (17-20 miles).
Weather and Naval Planning: Thus far, the focus of this article has been on specific operational consequences of weather and darkness. However, the anticipated effects of these conditions also have enormous influence on naval operations, since they condition the entire planning process. This may not be apparent to most of the operating forces, since staffs rarely get credit for avoiding bad weather, but the impact is there nonetheless. The fact that sig' nificant elements of the Normandy invasion force were turned back when already at sea on 4 June
1944 because the weather forecast turned bad is but °ne example of the staff meteorologist’s influence. More recently, the date of the Inchon landings in September 1950 was moved up a full month to reduce the risks inherent in the Korean winter, even though this left only about six weeks to plan a major umphibious operation. Weather over the beach was an integral part of target selection in Vietnam.
In sum, weather forecasting is an integral part of uaval planning. Weather and lighting considerations yell may provide the principal rationale for the tim- 'Ug and location of a particular operation, even if me forces concerned are unaware of it.
Conclusion: Naval operations no longer are completely at the mercy of darkness or the weather, but they still are greatly affected by them. Continued eniphasis on over-the-horizon (OTH) targeting eventually will diminish the impact of darkness somewhat, since OTH work includes training to avoid reliance on visual cues. New technologies will improve our ability to operate in adverse weather conditions, even as they add further to the technical details that a naval officer must master to practice P's Profession. However, weather will continue to define the battlefield on which war at sea is conducted. We may be able to forecast it better, avoid lts worst impacts to some degree, and perhaps even |Uake minor modifications to local conditions. But he total energy of weather systems is such that we Will never control them in our lifetimes. The best We can hope for is to use planning and forecasting 0 cope better with what nature deals us.
Specific areas in which we need better environment-related training include the following:
► The tactical use of wind to position chaff, avoid chemical and biological weapons, minimize the effects of gunnery smoke, lay smoke screens, etc.
► The effects of wind and sea on cruise missile employment
► The integration of environmental data into offensive and defensive planning (for example, radar refraction, weather over the target, etc.)
► Cold-weather and under-ice operations
► The capabilities and limitations of new sensors in various conditions of reduced visibility
In the area of ship design, SWATH-type hulls seem to offer significant promise, while the inability of our ships to operate for extended periods in contaminated environments is fraught with potentially serious consequences.
Both as prudent seamen and naval commanders, we must constantly be aware of the conditions of the environment around us and then take advantage of them. Much finer margins in the past have meant the difference between safety and shipwreck, between victory and defeat.
The author wishes to thank Professor Jerome Williams, U. S. Naval Academy, and Commander Del Schardt, USN,for their assistance in preparing this article. I also owe a great debt to the late Captain C. N. G. Hendrix, USN, whose teachings on the military implications of the environment inspired many classes of midshipmen. This article is dedicated to his memory.
^rank Uhlig. in "Naval Tactics: Examples and Analogies," Naval War ej° ege Review, March-April 1981. pp. 92-104, has identified eight natural nients that can affect or even govern, naval tactics. They are the pres- ^:Ce of land nearby, the depth of water, the force and direction of the the i t*Ie sea state' visibility from the surface, the visibility from aloft, dit
etectronic conditions, and the sonic (water conditions for sonar)
, 'ons. This article will touch on all but water depth, old weather operations are discussed in detail in the Naval Arctic Man- NWP-n (series).
e fact that the first Soviet hospital ship is extensively air conditioned I ; say much about her intended operating areas, a fact that has not been 4^’ °P Western observers.
sctln8 in the Eastern Mediterranean sometimes will allow an SPS-10 to 3Ce searc*1 radar- with a notional radar horizon of perhaps 15 miles, (a Paint targets all the way from the coast of Africa to Southern Greece , radius exceeding 100 miles).
p ear Admiral Bruce McCandless, USN (Ret.), "The Battle of the Pips" pr°\ee‘*'n8s- February 1958, pp. 48-56. The arrangement of the peaks tro| UCed radar reflections that resembled a formation of ships. Fire con- the ra<^ars teemed on "targets." Since a Japanese force was expected in area, the “targets" were taken under fire and soon disappeared as Pagation conditions changed, thus giving hollow evidence of a great •ictory
6| n J
lax 3 Wart'me environment, visual identification constraints may be re- (jaet^ indeed must be if the F-14 is to be used effectively. However, the ger to friendly forces is considerable, and the transition would not be ,aW to make.
°seph C. Goulden. Truth is the First Casaaltv (Chicago: Rand-McNally na Co., 1969), pp. 139-160.
“For a much more detailed discussion see S. E. Wheeler and D. F. Leip- per. Marine Fog Impact on Naval Operations. Naval Postgraduate School report 58 Wh7409l, (Monterey: NPS. 1974). 118 pp.
9Aviation Week & Space Technology, 16 March 1981, pp. 76-77.
111Aviation Week & Space Technology. 9 March 1981, p. 43.
"Data on SeaSat from Igor Lobanov. “SEASAT’s Fleeting Glimpse," Oceans. May-June 1979. pp. 8-13: LANDSAT information from Aviation Week & Space Technology (AW&ST), 20 April 1981, p. 46; DMS data also from AW&ST. 4 June 1979, pp. 47-58; MK IV information from Armed Forces Journal, February 1981, p. 24.
"Commander Linton Wells II, "Maneuver in Naval Warfare." Proceedings. December 1980, pp. 34-41. John Boyd’s observation-orientation- decision-action cycle provides a useful approach to tactical decision-making. The ability to use weather to draw out an opponent’s cycle should never be discounted.
"See Patrick Beesly. Very Special Intelligence: The Stor\' of the Admiralty's Operational Intelligence Centre 1939-1945 (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, 1978). pp. 180-211. Jurgen Rohwer, The Critical Convoy Battles of March 1943 (London: Ian Allan Ltd., 1977).
"Cited in Jerome Williams, Oceanography (Boston: Little, Brown and Company), p. 183. The sea. swell and surf prediction system developed by H. W. Sverdrup and W. H. Munk was first used during the allied landings in North Africa in the fall of 1942.
"R. W. Tripp, “Shipboard Fuel Economy," Proceedings, April 1981, pp. 98-101.
"Hamlin Caldwell, "The Empty Silo—Strategic ASW,” Naval War College Review, September-October 1981. pp. 4-14.
"Fernand Braudel. The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Phillip It (New York: Harper and Row, 1972) Vol. I. p. 234.