This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
f
ENTER THE FORUM
We welcome brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also brief discussion items on topics of naval, maritime, or military interest for possible publication on these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Sea Services can be exchanged. The Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion item published in the Proceedings.
Contents:
Naval Diplomacy in the Persian Gulf No Place for Women Photographic Library Are Our Boomers Vulnerable?
The Quality of the Officer Corps The Facts Behind the Thunder Uncle Carl
Pride, Professionalism, and Morality
A Critique of Flags of Convenience
U. S. Destroyer Memorials
The Navy and Directed Energy Weapons
Nothing Uniform About Uniforms
Fitness Reports and Personal Development
Thinking Offensively
Promoting Productivity
At Long Last: DOPMA
Sealift Readiness
Education of a Warrior
Unconventional Warfare Afloat
Energy: Essential Element
“Naval Diplomacy in the Persian
Gulf’
(See K. B. Jordan, pp. 26-31, November
1981 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Lars Wedin; Royal Swedish Navy, Commander HMS P-155 Vale—Captain Jordan’s article was very interesting, especially his analysis of the interaction between the strategies of the United States and the Soviet Union during previous interventions. But 1 do object to some of his conclusions. He is probably right about U. S. vital interests, but how can he be sure about those of the Soviet Union?
Concerning Afghanistan, the Soviet Union risked losing its hold over a friendly neighbor in which it had made heavy investments. The people in Afghanistan, as are a growing number of the Soviet people, are Muslim. The rising fundamentalist line among the Muslims might well have been considered a threat to Soviet internal security. Because of these reasons, it is possible to argue that the Soviet Union had a vital interest to defend in Afghanistan. Now, after its big military buildup in that country, it definitely has a vital interest to defend there.
Today, the Soviet Union doesn’t have a vital need for oil from the Persian Gulf area. Many experts, however, predict that it will in the next ten years—maybe not for its own use, but to export to get hard currency and to keep its grip on Eastern Europe.
The Soviet Union has made huge economic and military investments in many countries in the area. The People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen and Ethiopia are two good examples. Keeping this foothold is very important to the Soviets’ reputation among Third World countries.
Finally, the Persian Gulf area is close to the southern flank of the Soviet Union. The Soviets probably watch this area as anxiously as the Americans watch the Caribbean area.
For these reasons. 1 believe that it is quite possible the Soviet Union has vital interests in the Persian Gulf and northeast Indian Ocean areas.
The proposed U. S. strategy is built on the assumption that the countries around the Persian Gulf would consider a greater U. S. presence advantageous. This cannot be certain. The enmity between the Arab states and U. S.-sponsored Israel is of a fundamental nature because of historical, religious, foreign and domestic political reasons, and the animosity between these countries is not likely to disappear in the near future. Furthermore, the countries in the area have seen a U. S.-sponsored chief of state overthrown with the United States doing nothing to defend him. Many of the religious and political reasons for the revolution in Iran exist in the conservative Arab states. Furthermore, large Palestinian groups live in the Arab countries. Accordingly, it may be difficult for these states to accept a greater U. S. presence and to grant base rights to the United States. The U. S. ability to defend its interests in this area will demand much more than a greater military capability.
“No Place for Women”
(See D. Evans, pp. 53-56. November 1981
Proceedings)
Char Mollison, Executive Director, Women's Equity Action League—This article is replete with statistics and quotations for which not a single reference is provided. Furthermore, some of the statistics are misrepresented. An increase of 92% in the number of enlisted women marines, for example, appears to be a huge amount. But, the fact is, according to the special almanac issue of Defense/ 81 (September 1981, p. 26), only 3.7% of enlisted marines are women- Throughout the article, there is the implication that women marines cannot do the job. In fact, women marines are promoted faster than men from E- 3 through E-9 (Women in the Military,
Were you fascinated by Capt. J.W. Clark’s article “The Soviet Merchant Fleet wins by losing" in PROCEEDINGS/December 1981?
You will want to order these two fully illustrated reference books by Ambrose Greenway
SOVIET MERCHANT SHIPS
from general cargo to tankers, special service and research ships
COMECON MERCHANT SHIPS
Bulgarian, Czech, Cuban, East German, Hungarian, Polish, Romanian, Vietnamese
New editions $20 each
Order from the publisher or U.S.N.l.
SHERIDAN HOUSE INC.
175 Orawaupum St.
White Plains, N.Y. 10606
BATTLE OF BRITAIN — RAF pilots in Spitfires —their finest hour. How a handlul of brave lliers changed the course ol history over England.
DECEMBER 7th — The delinitive record ol the attack on Pearl Harbor — history's lirst carrier attack. An Academy Award tor director John Ford Special oiler — both films — 11 ? hours, only S89.95 plus shipping
ORDER TOLL-FREE ON OUR HOT-LINE
(800) 854-0561. ext. 925
In Calif. (800] 432-7257. ext. 925
U S and Canada, add S2.50 shipping. Other foreign orders, add S3 50. CA res. add 6% Sales Tax.
SPECIFY BETA or VHS. Visa & Master - incl no. & exp
Send to: FEROE GR0FE FILMS. Dept. N.
702 Washington St . Suite 168. Marina del Rey.CA 90291
October 1981, p. 130).
Colonel Evans is particularly concerned with attrition and lost time of women marines. He states that in sample populations of 100 non-prior- service, high school graduate marine enlistees, 24 males and 48 females will fail to complete a four-year enlistment. According to a DoD publication in Women in the Military, however, these are the figures for the first three years. Furthermore, since 1978, the first-term reenlistment rates have been higher for female marines than for male marines. For fiscal year 1981 (through March), the rate was 27.1 for males and 34.6 for females (Women in the Military, p. 54).
In discussing lost “man-hours,” Evans says, “While a male marine may break an arm or absent himself without authority, he does not get pregnant.” Further, he says the time lost because of pregnancy is “considerable.” Although data on lost time in the Marine Corps are unavailable, the Navy did a longitudinal study on the subject. Samples of 1,000 males and 1,000 females who entered the Navy in 1975 were used. The amount of lost time (including pregnancy-related absences) was 422 days per 100 women and 703 days per 100 men in one year (Women in the Militaiy, September 1978, p. 138). In addition, the Marine Corps’ 1980 statistics reveal that male marines are about three times as likely as female marines to lose time because of problems related to discipline. It is difficult to understand why it is worse to lose time for pregnancy than for some other reason.
Colonel Evans advocates excluding women from the Fleet Marine Force unless they are “going to be exposed to the rigors of combat." General Robert H. Barrow, Commandant of the Marine Corps, told Marine Corps Commanders in White Letter 18-80, “Women Marines and male Marines serve side by side in our ranks. . . . They are equal in every sense. They are Marines. They deserve nothing less than outstanding leadership, equal treatment, and equal opportunity for professional development.”
Frank R. Hamlett, Jr.—When I met the lady who became my bride, she was the deputy supply officer of a military post during wartime—within the continental United States. I am proud of her for having served and having done a competent job in a billet that would have usually been filled by a male officer. But I thank God she was not required to come under enemy fire or to kill in pursuit of her duty.
Considering all the problems associated with having women in “deployable” units, I agree with Colonel Evans. I think it is time for the women’s rights advocates to admit there is a biological difference between men and women that, in some cases, makes the pursuit of absolute equality impractical. Vive la difference!
Todd C. Nichols, Staff, U. S. House of Representatives—I must express sincere disappointment with "No Place for Women” for two fundamental reasons.
First, I believe Colonel Evans is mistaken in urging that we deny women the opportunity to serve their country in arduous positions. This nation needs in its military forces young people who are educated, qualified, and dedicated. To deny qualified women assignment to the Fleet Marine Force (FMF) and other strenuous units is a policy this country can no longer afford to follow. Both as a naval officer and a senior congressional aide, I have been confronted with shortages of skilled enlisted personnel and officers in virtually every branch of the service and most occupational specialties. I find it hard to believe that any military officer interested in accomplishing a mission well would not swap any three uneducated street toughs for one bright female high school graduate with a good attitude-
Second, Colonel Evans does a disservice to the level of professionalism expected in a magazine of the Proceedings' quality. His remarks about the ability of pregnant women to perform meaningful service in the FMF sound as though every woman’s goal is getting pregnant. His statement. “While a male marine may break an arm or absent himself without authority, he does not get pregnant” is rhetoric of another era. A more pertinent question might be “Do more marines become pregnant than desert or than engage in substance abuse in such a manner that they are unable to perform their jobs?”
The bottom line is that a marine should be a marine, not a male marine
°r a female marine. If Colonel Evans believes that certain marines are not Performing adequately in the FMF, then he should endeavor either to have qualification standards tightened or to ensure better enforcement of existing standards. It is incumbent on the military profession to prepare for Meaningful change rather than to resist the inevitable.
Photographic Library
H- A. Vadnais, Jr., Head Curator Branch, Naval Historical Center— May I take this opportunity to express °ur appreciation for the magnificent contribution your photographic library has been making to our efforts over the last several years. Thanks to your foresightedness, the Naval Institute acquired Jim Fahey’s great compilation of photographs as well as the very comprehensive collection of °ur Navy magazine. Your extremely capable, industrious, and responsive Photographic librarians have effectively massaged these collections into a meaningful unit, one which has been able to take up the slack where the official sources fall short of the target, as they so often do.
In Patty Maddocks and her associates, you have a well-trained and dedicated staff. Their response is always most gratifying, especially knowing that they are also involved with the myriad duties associated with Vour monthly publication, your book Publishing business, and the many Photographic requests received from members.
Thank you for the splendid photographic service you provide to the Navy community, to your members, and to the public. You are making a meaningful contribution in this as well as in many other areas, and I know that it will continue in the future.
is properly shrouded in secrecy, it is appalling that Proceedings should publish an article on this subject by someone who has no technical, military or intelligence credentials. Has Mr. Wit ever been aboard a submarine, either U. S. or Soviet? Would he know the difference between the sonar array and the head? Is he familiar with U. S. intelligence estimates of Soviet ASW capabilities? (If he were, and his article were accurate, then we would have other problems.) Yet Proceedings sees fit to publish his article anyway, presumably on the premise that anything well written must have merit.
Rather than point out the many useless generalizations and absurd arguments in the article (e.g., the assertion that ELF could be built in a relatively short time; he should tell that to the environmental groups which have been so successful in opposing it), I would like to call your readers’ attention to another article prepared by Mr. Wit, published in the February 1981 Scientific American. That article also dealt with U. S.-Soviet ASW capabilities, and included such startling assertions as:
► The Soviet Union has demonstrated a definite aversion in the past to placing greater reliance on sea-based nuclear weapons because of concern over U. S. ASW capabilities. (Note that Soviet forces went from about 200 SLBMs in 1969 to more than 950 SLBMs in 1981; this is “aversion?")
► Sixteen percent of the overall Navy budget and 20% of the Navy R&D budget go for ASW work, which is disproportionately high. (Note that the Soviet submarine fleet of more than 300 ships comprises more than 50% of their major combatants; so 16 to 20% of our budget spent to counter that threat seems disproportionately low to me.)
► The United States should exercise unilateral restraint in ASW research, lest we alarm the Soviets. (This also seems to be implied in the final paragraph of the Proceedings article.)
“Are Our Boomers Vulnerable?”
(See J. S. Wit, pp. 62-69, November 1981 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Richard A. Guida, U. S. Naval Reserve—Considering the fact that the subject of U. S. and Soviet ASW capabilities is technically complex, and much of the information needed to make reasoned judgments
This photo was taken during a heavy snow storm on a cargo ship's run from Seattle to Alaska. The window on the left is unheated. The window on the right is a Kearfott de-icing and defogging heated window that was free of ice and snow throughout the storm.
KEARFOTT HEATED WINDOWS and rugged HEATED ARM WINDOW WIPERS are unsurpassed for year 'round use. Kearfott’s electrically heated windows are manufactured in complete assemblies, ready for installation in a ship’s structure or portable sub-frames in existing windows. Window frames may be of corrosion- resistant steel, bronze, or aluminum, and the glass is glazed within the frame by special rubber channel gaskets which are fully sealed against water penetration. Complete assemblies meet the requirements of MIL-W-18445A.
WRITE FOR CATALOG
550 S. Fulton Ave., Mt. Vernon, N Y. 10550 914-664-6033
a division of The SI NCE R Company ________
Weather conditions:
Heavy Snow
Pilot visibility:
Maximum
with KEARFOTT HEATED WINDOW
KEARFOTT DE-ICING AND DEFOGGING
HEATED WINDOWS
The Scientific American article demonstrates Mr. Wit’s opinions on submarine warfare and U. S. defense policy—opinions which are both unfounded and inconsistent with our best defense interests. As for the Pro-
feedings article, I hope that in the future you will ensure that the author is technically and professionally qualified to address the subject, and that the article adds to the reasoned discourse on naval matters to which Proceedings is presumably committed. On both counts, the subject article fails the test.
“The Quality of the Officer
Corps”
(See J. S. Winnefeld, pp. 32-38, September
1981; R. H. Purnell, pp. 17-19, November
1981; J. P. Hopkins, pp. 22-23, January 1982
Proceedings)
Major Kenneth W. Estes, U. S. Marine Corps—Admiral Winnefeld’s insight into the quandary of the contemporary officer corps should be applauded. The same goes for the Proceedings staff for choosing the highly appropriate photograph facing the article. The motley appearance of that group could have formed the beginning of Admiral Winnefeld’s discussion of cohesion and esprit de corps. A body of officers that cannot wear a uniform properly knows that it is in trouble. But 1 digress.
I believe that Admiral Winnefeld is absolutely correct when he hits the economic orientation of the officer corps as a key detriment to its corporate self-image. We have allowed our standards to decay to the point where we commission Madison Avenue to devise a new image for us. A glance at the latest Naval Academy catalogue demonstrates an alarming tendency to play down the military aspects of that institution and plug the vocational, economic, and social aspects. A 19 October 1981 Navy Times article promoting the new college officer program for nuclear power officer candidates states that “the student doesn’t even have to get a haircut” to receive the scholarship. Indeed! Bribery is already rampant in nuclear power officer programs (entry and retention), and there is consistent testimony on the Hill that all we need to do is produce the raise and officers will continue to serve. One cannot blame the officer corps for behaving like economic beasts.
These conditions are functions of modern life, to be sure, but are not the result of the Naval Academy no longer being the sole source for the officer corps. In fact, the Naval Academy today demonstrates the careerist and economic interests of the contemporary officer corps. Admiral Winnefeld confuses chicken and egg since the Academy, Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC), and Officer Candidate School (OCS) can only reflect the attitudes of the corps of serving officers.
Basic training reform is one of six variables Admiral Winnefeld sees as improving the character of the naval officer corps. The others are reforms in recruiting, retention, career education and training, quality control, and assignment policy. He thinks recruiting and quality control are sufficiently well adjusted. I cannot agree since the recruiting efforts of the four Navies—air, surface, submarine, and staff corps—pose the antithesis of cohesion. Quality control remains out of control not because of fitness report inflation—the truly inept still get weeded out—but because of our demand for numbers and seniority in staffing goals out of proportion to need.
Retention will continue to dog the service as long as Madison Avenue techniques dictate our actions. Neither increased sea pay nor politically unsound overseas basing will alleviate the problem posed by uncertainties in job satisfaction. Ending centralized personnel management to create true unit stability, and the reduction of our presently insane deployment rates will produce larger dividends. We must recognize that we have become our own worst enemy by championing our overseas presence far in excess of rational needs and capabilities.
Education and training must be recognized as separate functions, although the Naval Academy and NROTC might be capable of producing both. Our greatest task is to define the naval officer’s goals and the ways to prepare him best for his tasks. The fact that none of our “officer accession programs” (notice we don’t call them training programs) produces a fleet-ready officer demonstrates significant lack of purpose in our basic officer schools. Notice, however, that as long as we tout the naval officer as a manager of technology rather than as a combat leader, we will have no common ground upon which we can train our officer cadre.
Assignments may be a greater key than Admiral Winnefeld contends. The Navy needs to look closely at paring its numbers in rank and quantity of regular commissions if it seeks an officer corps of a new and revitalized character. Today, a reserve officer gains augmentation merely by application. The regular commission has become debased currency. We are so top-heavy in rank that line officers can evade command and still advance in service. Why are there so few commands today for lieutenants and lieutenant commanders? Why must commanders be so fearful of brushing buoys or hitting piers that only the most experienced personnel are entrusted with entering port? Nevertheless, nothing short of a complete overhaul of our creaking, shore-based naval bureaucracy can accomplish the needed reforms.
Having served on the staff of the Naval Academy during part of the time Admiral Winnefeld was Commandant of Midshipmen, I had hoped to read in the article some of the specific examples of the deficiencies which prompted him to grade his (and my) alma mater and other entry-level education and training institutions a disappointing “C” on his summary report card. But I found none. A description of these deficiencies would be helpful to people who have assumed or will assume positions of leadership at the entry-level education and training institutions. One hopes that we have not heard the last from the author on these and other points-
Lieutenant Harold C. Lowe, U. 5- Navy—In Admiral Winnefeld’s characterization of the problems of professionalism one of the areas which he cited as being most responsible for current deficiencies is the conversion of the naval person into an economic person. It is curious that many of the techniques which are advocated as solutions to the problems besetting the military forces put more dollars in the pocket now and enhance salability later.
The Navy remains competitive in attracting quality candidates for offi' cer commissions “because it offers a subsidized education and/or expensive skill training.” Yet, earlier in his article. Admiral Winnefeld made the statement that, “We buy him as a recruit. . . .” This statement is used to justify the assertion that self-image is deficient because the Navy has made its personnel economic persons. I do not believe that the educational benefit is a factor which has created a problem with self-image. 1 do agree that it has probably eliminated many recruiting difficulties. Without the military program, many of us could not have attended universities or would have spent much of our time working to pay the bills instead of studying. In fact, it is likely that dedication to the service is generally enhanced by the tremendous educational opportunities. The officer often recognizes that without the Navy’s help, a college education would not have been possible. The moral obligation is great.
The next comment which caught my attention asserted that pay scales must be high enough so that “compensation is not the principal reason for leaving the Navy.” Although it is not necessary to be completely competitive with civilian wage scales to retain top caliber personnel, order of magnitude differences in pay and vesting rights in retirement plans are unacceptable. I agree with the author that pay must be high enough to eliminate concern about compensation, but I do not see how this makes an officer less of an “economic person” who is a “source of instability.” Is it more important to have a competent engineer developing alternative fuel sources at $30,000 annually or directing paint chipping at $18,000?
The next point concerned the quality of life of military families. Pay must be high enough “to provide a decent living” for the military family. Officer personnel are generally able to provide a decent standard of living for their dependents. I distinguish here between “decent" and “desired” standard of living. However, enlisted personnel are often not able to provide a decent standard of living. Many qualify for food stamps, live in inadequate housing, have to work two jobs, and have to put their dependents to work to pay all the bills. High pay is not the proximate cause of instability in the Armed Forces. Inadequate pay is.
The next unusual recommendation to improve self-image was to pay more for sea duty so that prolonged family separations would be more “bearable.” This solution appeals to the economic person; it sets a dollar value on time with the family. The cause of instability is not removed. Dependents want to see the service member. He should be paid a premium for long separations because it is fair, not so he will find sea duty more bearable than being at home. Overseas home- porting, in addition to political and diplomatic pitfalls, is not the large- scale solution; it is only a Band-Aid patching up a small percentage of naval personnel with dubious benefits.
Admiral Winnefeld’s final suggestion to improve professionalism, and hence self-image, was to restore some “perks.” From the previous analysis, I interpret this to mean mess management specialists working in quarters, use of automobiles, first-class air tickets, space-available air travel reservations, and elimination of pay “caps.” I do not understand how this differs appreciably from “buying” recruits and demeaning self-image.
The statement of the problem and the proposed resolution were well described in this article. Unfortunately, the resolution appears to Be diametrically opposed to solving the self-image problem. My personal belief is that the statement of resolution is much more accurate than the statement of the problem. The quality, unity, and professionalism of the officer corps are deficient in many areas, but I doubt it is because naval persons have been made economic persons.
“The Facts Behind the Thunder”
(See S. L. Morison, pp. 97-101, August 1981;
J. W. Grace, pp. 86-88, September 1981; G.
Glines, p. 91, October 1981; E. J. Grove, p.
20, December 1981 Proceedings)
Captain W. J. Rithe, U. S. Navy (Retired)—The best argument, it would seem, for adding battleships to the U. S. Fleet is missing from “The Facts Behind the Thunder.”
The Soviets place major reliance for fighting fleet battles on their big antiship missiles that have fragmentation warheads which explode with a great production of heat. These missiles are designed primarily to sink U. S. aircraft carriers—not battleships.
The Battle of Midway proved the wisdom of such weapons against attack carriers. The U. S. aircraft-delivered fragmentation bombs which exploded high in the Japanese carriers started severe fires, eventually sinking them. The Japanese armor-piercing bombs proved less than fatal against the U. S. carriers.
Today, big fragmentation warheads would be equally effective against all U. S. warships—except for the battleship because of her heavy deck and side armor. It would take an armorpiercing warhead to breach her shell-
If a battleship were added to a task force as the command ship, the Soviets’ tactic of using the massive missile strike against “the enemy’s entire combat organization” would be greatly complicated. Some Soviet missiles would have to be armorpiercing while others would have to be fragmentation warheads. If the attack came from platforms well over 100 miles from their targets, the chances of the right missiles hitting the right targets decrease considerably. Armor-piercing warheads against cruisers and carriers are likely to be far less effective than the heat- producing warheads integral to the Soviets’ missile-strike strategy.
What would this do to the Soviets’ missile-logistic problem? The cost of recommissioning battleships would probably be far cheaper than it would be for the Soviets to have a ready mix of weapons. A few battleships integrated into the U. S. surface fleets would make a shambles of the Soviets’ massive missile-strike strategy!
“Uncle Carl”
(See J. F. Tarpey, pp. 38-44, January 1982
Proceedings)
Captain Robert C. Penis ton, U. S- Navy (Retired)—The passing of the Honorable Carl Vinson of Georgia called to mind an event of April 1957- I had the good fortune to be assigned as aide to Fleet Admiral Chester W- Nimitz during his visit to the Washington area. He asked me to arrange for him to call on the Secretary of Defense, the Chief of Naval Operations, Mr. Eugene Meyer of The Washington Post, and “Uncle Carl.'
I pleaded ignorance in the latter instance whereupon the admiral kindly advised that he was referring to the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee.
As Admiral Nimitz was being ushered into the chairman’s office, he told me to come along to prepare a memorandum for file of the visit. After a warm welcome from Mr.. Vinson, the admiral went right to the point. He asked that consideration be given to legislation that would raise Admiral Raymond A. Spruance to five-star rank. He pointed out that the passing of Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King could be construed as leaving a vacancy in that rank. But more importantly, Admiral Spruance had performed the same tasks as Fleet Admiral William F. Halsey in the war in the Pacific and there was little to choose between them save a few numbers in seniority. Further, Nimitz opined that he felt more at ease when Admiral Spruance had the helm because he believed he knew Spruance’s mind better than Halsey’s.
Mr. Vinson listened intently and said that such was certainly a reasonable request but did not believe that pay for the rank would stand up. Admiral Nimitz said that pay was not the issue but that he was making the request in order that Admiral Spruance might receive proper recognition for his services during the war.
The chairman closed out the visit with a warm exchange with the admiral, promising to look into the matter. Whether he did or not, I do not know. When 1 visited Admiral Nimitz in his home in Santa Barbara in the spring of 1958, he said that nothing to date had come of his request. However, I am left with the thought that Fleet Admiral Nimitz, perhaps the most towering naval officer of the 1950s, knew that the best way to get things done or undone in this man’s Navy was to “clear it with Uncle Carl.” “Pride, Professionalism, and
Morality”
(See D. A. Carroll, p. 77, November 1981
Proceedings)
Thomas P. Rack—In responding to Commander Carroll’s letter, I am compelled to point out three areas that he overlooked.
The First Amendment of the U. S. Constitution guarantees our citizens—military personnel in
cluded—the freedom of speech and press. In doing so, our founding fathers explicitly mandated the rights our citizenry shall possess concerning literature and censorship. As a naval officer who swore to uphold and defend the Constitution, I find it appalling that Commander Carroll would support selective enforcement of our constitutional provisions.
If military personnel wish to read literature such as Playboy, Penthouse, and similar publications, they should have the right to do so. I agree that reading such literature while on duty should be strictly prohibited. However, what off-duty personnel read is not the concern of any commanding officer. Expanding on Commander Carroll’s logic, a particular brand of shaving cream, a magazine such as Popular Mechanics, or any item could be banned at the whim of the commanding officer or those persons issuing the naval regulations.
Commander Carroll also fails to take into account the practical aspect of banning such publications from the ship’s store. Personnel on leave could purchase any of the magazines mentioned and bring them aboard ship. Such a practice would foster a black market operation whereby underground sales of these publications could occur. Such an operation would hardly be in the best interest of the Navy.
Further, the banning of such items from sale in the Navy stores would in no way affect shore-based personnel, who could still purchase this literature at any off-base store.
Finally, morale would probably suffer severely from the practices Commander Carroll suggests. The ship’s store affords sailors the opportunity to purchase items associated with civilian life, allowing the sailor to feel more at home. With the retention and staffing problems persistent in today’s military, banning the sale of the aforementioned publications would only serve as an additional deterrent to reenlistment. I am not suggesting that a sailor would fail to reenlist because he could not purchase particular items. This factor, however, along with others, would emphasize the benefits of civilian life.
“A Critique of Flags of Convenience”
(See B. Caplan and J. E. Ryan, pp. 78-85, October 1981; C. G. Burroughs, p. 23, December 1981: B. Thompson, p. 23,
January 1982 Proceedings)
W. O. Gray, Exxon Corporation—This article was more a criticism than a critique. I would, therefore, like to provide a measure of balance on the admittedly controversial subject of flags of convenience (FOC). Incidentally, it was good that you had the foresight to publish in the same issue other articles which refute most of the Caplan/Ryan allegations.
Caplan and Ryan, in common with other critics of flags of convenience, describe such vessels as unlikely to respond in wartime and as safety and pollution risks. This overlooks the fact that, almost without exception, U. S.-controlled FOC vessels have been available whenever needed in any conflict since World War II. The safety and environmental records of the effective U. S.-controlled vessels under Liberian and Panamanian flags are among the best in the world. At Exxon, we know that our ships, under 14 different flags, including Liberian, Panamanian, and U. S., have a record which we consider second to none, and over the years, no single flag is substantially better or worse than the others.
These authors evidently believe that large corporations such as Exxon should be instruments of U. S. foreign and economic policy, and they even go so far as to suggest that the desire for profits and corporate policy could have disastrous effects on American security. They suggest congressional action to “place such narrow concerns as oil company profits in a position subordinate to higher values.” Three other authors (Kendall, Manning, and Hiltzheimer) in the October issue, however, make it clear that the success in the maritime industry, as in any other commercial endeavor, is dependent upon profitability. Exxon and other multinational companies must either compete successfully on the world scene or be prepared to cease to exist. Size alone is a tempting target, but Caplan and Ryan might ponder on the present state of the U. S. automobile and steel industries before suggesting that corporate profits be used to subsidize inefficient operations.
In suggesting remedies for the poor state of the U. S. maritime industry, Caplan and Ryan repeat the prescription which has been so manifestly unsuccessful over the past 30 years: more subsidies, federal purchases of vessels, cargo preference, and greater control of corporate profits. By contrast, Kendall, Manning, Hiltzheimer, and Bess, writing in the October issue.
all see the matter differently. As Hiltz- heimer puts it, we must “examine the fundamental and overriding issue of cost competitiveness of U. S.-flag ships and the tie between building and operating subsidies should be completely severed.” These authors evidently recognize the necessity of allowing owners to build, operate, and rePair ships competitively. If the U- S. shipbuilding industry cannot Provide this service, then it must be obtained elsewhere.
For those interested in an in-depth study of the flag-of-coijvenience concept and the key role of the U. S. Government in creating it, I recommend Sovereignty for Sale by Professor Rodney Carlisle, recently published by the Naval Institute Press. Also, for any readers who might be 'nterested in reading Exxon’s “Tankers and the Flags They Fly,” a booklet •Pentioned by Caplan and Ryan, we would be happy to provide copies.
It seems very clear to me that a return toward market-force economics ls the direction in which solutions will be found. Artificial props and biased views of foreign enterprises will only continue to shield policymakers from (he harsh fact that many U. S. shipping and shipbuilding interests were bypassed years ago by foreign interests exhibiting greater entrepreneurial and technical initiative rather than simply low wages. If we are to compote, we must do it on the basis of excellence, not protection.
U. S. Destroyer Memorials
Samuel L. Morison—Only five of the ^0 U. S. Navy warships that have been memorialized are destroyers: The Sullivans (DD-537), the Cassin Young (DD-793), and the Kidd (DD- 061) of the Fletcher class; the Laffey (DD-724) of the Allen M. Sumner (FRAM-II) class; and the Jospeh P. Kennedy, Jr. (DD-850) of the Gearing 1FRAM-I) class. All five destroyers have been modified in varying degrees, ranging from moderate (the Cassin Young) to extensive, such as the FRAM-configured Laffey and Joseph P. Kennedy, Jr.
On 24 February 1982, the USS Vo- gelgesang (DD-862) of the Gearing class will be transferred to Mexico. She is the first of two scheduled transfers that will replace Mexico’s current destroyer force—two ex-U. S. ships
of the Fletcher class that were purchased by Mexico in August 1970. These ships are the Cuauhtemoc, formerly the USS Harrison (DD-573), and the Cuitlahuac, formerly the USS John Rodgers (DD-574). Both saw action in World War II and then were decommissioned in 1946. These two Fletcher-class DDs have been kept in mint condition by the Mexican Government—the only significant change has been the addition of a commercial, slotted waveguide navigational radar on the mast. The quintuple 21-inch torpedo tube mounts, twin 40-mm. gun mounts, fire control systems, and radars .installed during World War II have been retained.
The Mexican Navy announced in the fall of 1980 that both ships would be retired. With the Cuauhtemoc, a new training ship, under construction, it seems that the ex-USS Harrison will be the first to go.
It would be an irreplaceable historical loss if some association did not obtain one of these vessels for me- morialization in the United States. Granted, neither the Harrison nor John Rodgers has significant records, but the same holds true for the five destroyers mentioned above.
The historical value of these two mint-condition Fletcher-c\ass ships more than equals that of the five destroyers already memorialized. Because of that value, if a competent association can be found to meet naval donation requirements, perhaps the U. S. Navy should consider paying the cost of reacquisition and towing.
Preserving at least one of these two Fletcher- class destroyers—from a historical viewpoint—is vital. For as the years pass, these preserved units will stand out as the ultimate expression of the U. S. Navy destroyer. They will represent the time in naval warfare when ships and men fought each other from a toe-to-toe, eyeball- to-eyeball position—not from miles away with men pushing buttons to launch missiles.
“The Navy and Directed Energy Weapons”
(See W. J. Beane, pp. 47-52. November 1981 Proceedings)
Captain J. E. Lacouture, U. S. Navy (Retired)—Mr. Beane’s article is a fine one and should be read by all senior naval officers and officials in the hope that it spurs them to press harder for the accelerated development of high-energy laser and charged particle beam weapons systems, both ship- based and space-based. These systems, as Mr. Beane so ably put it, are urgently required by our Navy as the only means of defending our carriers and other high-value ships against the ever-increasing numbers of sophisticated, high-speed, high- performance “smart” missiles that will be used by the Soviets in attacking our ships. “Existing and planned surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles simply cannot do the job.”
H UP!
■ Fill our bright blue
^ and white mug with
your favorite hot brew...
It’s the perfect morning eye opener!
With the Naval Institute seal on the back, it’s stylish and sturdy. 11 oz. Send us your order today! $4.50
Use the handy order form in the “Books of Interest” Section.
Not only should naval officials be clamoring for urgent development of ship-based defensive directed energy weapons, but also for naval controlled space-based directed energy weapons systems that will be capable of carrying out the following missions: (a) air defense of the United States, (b) suppression of Soviet AWACS systems, (c) suppression of Soviet look down-shoot down interceptor aircraft, (d) Navy fleet defense, (e) airlift interdiction, (f) offensive antisatellite use, (g) defense of counterspace force, (h) defense of friendly space
SAVE
Mail-order from Germany z
assets, (i) antiballistic missile defense. Given these warfare capabilities, the overwhelming military advantages that will accrue for the nation first in space with operational directed-en- ergy weapons are obvious.
Yet, as Aviation Week editor William H. Gregory recently pointed out: “A massive Soviet bureaucracy is managing to move faster than a massive U. S. bureaucracy in developing directed-energy weapons—lasers or particle beams.” He goes on to say that while the Soviets, already out- spending the United States by a factor of 3 to 5 in directed energy weapons development, are pouring even more money into the accelerated development of actual beam weapons systems, the United States is reducing its spending in the field and orienting its spending toward technology development programs. He concludes that “If the Soviets gain a decisive lead in directed energy weapons, the United States will not be able to buy its way out of a position of strategic disadvantage at any price.”
Already the Soviets have tested high-energy laser ground-based weapons at several test sites. There is mounting evidence that at their test site at Saryshagan in Kazakhstan they repeatedly have destroyed ballistic missile reentry vehicles using what is thought to be a high-energy iodine- pulsed laser prototype weapon. They are also credited with an existing ground-based carbon dioxide gas dynamic laser weapon capable of de-
------------------
?
r 1:1250 Ships, over 1500 models to select. Also • > the new 1:2400 models. We have NAVIS, J r NEPTUN, HANSA, VIKING, MERCATOR, J 3 DELPHIN, ATLANTIC, SANTOS, FLEET- 3 i LINE, SEXTANT, FRAMBURG, EAGLE, i • STARCAST, MICRO-FLEET & even DE- • l GEN custom-made models, plus many others, j ( In model railroading we carry MAERK- i J LIN, FLEISCHMANN, ARNOLD-RAPIDO, J t TRIX, MINNITRIX, L1LIPUT, ROCO, \ j RIVAROSSI, LEHMANN, FALLER, KIBRI, • S BRAWA, BUSCH, HERKAT, HERPA, ' ( MERTENS, PREISER, POLA, VIKING, i J SEUTHE—everything in railroading. Also a 3 | large array of R/c equipment. We have the j : experience and the know-how, gained : j through many years of service to the model J » railroader, to assure safe delivery of your r j orders at the lowest possible cost. ]
t Send $1.00 for our complete catalog listing 3 | and ordering information by airmaiL ■
) PRESTON HOBBY M0DELLE oHG {
3 P. O. Box 2280—D86 Bamberg, West Germany 3 | Telephone 33343 ^ straying the sensitive optical systems in U. S. reconnaissance satellites such as Big Bird and the KH-11. Some U. S. intelligence analysts believe the Soviets are close to perfecting a laser capable of attacking spacecraft up to altitudes of 5,000 km, with other development programs aimed at laser weapons with ranges of 40,000 km, which would make satellites in geostationary orbit subject to attack.
More recently, there is growing concern at senior government levels that the Soviets have packaged a high- energy chemical laser weapon for space testing in the very near future. This system could well be capable of destroying U. S. satellites—including space shuttles—and could also be a threat to high-flying aircraft.
Caught in a shrinking budget to cover urgent requirements for ships, aircraft, weapons, space parts, salaries, and operational and maintenance costs, it is hard to divert funds for weapon systems involving new and state-of-the-art technologies. Yet, as Clausewitz once said, “For great aims we must dare great things.” Directed energy weapons will provide our ships with an effective defense and our Navy with the weapons needed to control the seas and effect landings on enemy-held shores. They warrant the highest development priorities.
Technologically speaking, the Navy Sea Lite program, which is oriented toward developing a weapon system to defend an aircraft carrier against missile attack, has already demonstrated the capability to shoot down missiles using a TRW 400 KW laser. This was followed up by a successful demonstration of a TRW 2.2 megawatt deuterium fluoride laser device clearly demonstrating the capability to scale up the power output of laser devices to that required for weapons applications. At the same time, Lockheed’s pointing and tracking system has far exceeded DARPA’s requirements for accuracy.
With the technology already in hand—given the will and additional funding—it is certain the United States could have operational land- based, ship-based, and space-based high-energy laser weapon systems within a few years from a top-priority go-ahead. As Major General George Keegan, former head of Air Force Intelligence warns: “The development of beam weapons is even more momentous than the development of the atomic bomb. Its implications for the security of the free world in this decade are so awesome that they are beyond the political comprehension of this government and most leaders of the free world.”
For U. S. military leaders to become so involved in their current problems that they fail to grasp the imminent importance of directed energy weapons could be disastrous. Soviet military leaders have grasped the importance of these new weapons and are determined to have directed energy weapons in operation in the very near future. This could result in a complete military domination of the United States and its allies.
“Nothing Uniform About
Uniforms”
(See R. P. Shipman, p. 102. September 1981;
D. L. Woods, p. 19, November 1981; G. D.
Bond. II, p. 89. December 1981 Proceedings)
Captain John D. Rohrbough, U. S. Navy—Prescriptions of uniforms are only as good as the senior- and middle-grade leadership make them. In April 1971, my ship was outboard in the nest of the four destroyers of Destroyer Division 222 and the deployed destroyer tender in Phaleron Bay near Athens, Greece. The first morning of the tender period, all officers and chief petty officers were simultaneously assembling for officers’ call on the 01 level aft of the forward stacks on the four small boys. My department heads had just presented their muster reports and were at attention in ranks when I suggested that everyone stand at ease, look to starboard, and observe the many variations of leather jackets, blue work jackets, short sleeve shirts, rolled-up long sleeve shirts without ties, baseball caps, fore-and-aft caps, and a scattering of combination caps all being worn in ranks by those on the other three ships. After about 30 seconds of contemplation by my group, I asked rhetorically if we didn’t feel proud as hell to be uniform and relatively formal. I heard no further gripes concerning the high uniform standards maintained on our ship during the remainder of my tenure as executive officer and, in fact, sensed a strong feeling of pride that our high uniform standard reflected the high morale of the ship.
“Fitness Reports and Personal Development”
(See D. G. McCarthy, pp. 67-72, July 1981 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander R. A. Flei- gel, U. S. Navy—Commander McCarthy’s plea for using the fitness report as the primary tool in personal development rekindled my own increasing cynicism over our officer evaluation system.
McCarthy feels cheated because reporting seniors don’t counsel their charges at fitrep time (or any other time). Criticize? Yes. Praise? Yes. Counsel? No. Why is this? Why don’t we, like big corporations, send our middle managers to Aspen, Colorado, every once in a while for therapeutic group encounter sessions? Why doesn’t your CO open his soul and tell you precisely why you’re not as good as his “golden boy?” Why doesn’t he admit to the grading system’s being prostituted and then say, “Be that as it may, Lieutenant Gazophsus, I’ve laid out this 18-week improvement program for you and I'll meet you in the ram room every Tuesday at 0300 for feed-back sessions.”
The fact is, we don’t have to motivate Gazophsus to ensure the Navy’s future leadership. Because, in the ship across the pier, there’s Lieutenant Schwantz, a Burke scholar. Schwantz has a relative motion computer implanted in his brain; he even traces steam lines during his leave periods. Last week, he was awarded a Navy and Marine Corps medal for pulling the commodore out of a burning golf cart. He got 4.0 fitreps as an ensign without the slightest bit of stroking and needs none now. Schwantz will be one of the fleet’s leaders 20 years from now.
But, let’s say it were necessary. Let’s assume that Gazophsus is really a latent Halsey, and we’re going to push him toward that potential no matter what the effort. How would we proceed? Commander McCarthy expresses the key to a solution when he writes, “Quite simply, people should be measured against the job, not against other people. The responsibilities of each job and collateral duty should be thoroughly described.”
Davie Shipbuilding.
The Canadian with the track record in meeting the highest U.S. MIL SPEC, and commercial standards.
Davie has a Master Contract for — and has participated in Ship Repair and Conversion with Military Sealift Command.
We have constructed aluminum elevators for Nimitz Class nuclear carriers and are involved in a series production of sonar domes.
Discuss it with your
friend up north.
I advocated this approach in my letter appearing in the April 1980 Proceedings: “If one is to determine degree of success or accomplishment, there must have been a kind of contract between the rater and ratee which informs the latter what is expected of him.” Detractors of such a system would say that the “Standard Organization and Regulations of the U. S. Navy” (OpNavInst 3120.32) and implementing ships’ organization manuals already contain billet descriptions tantamount to such contracts. They would argue that it’s unrealistic to prepare a separate list of objectives for each officer, and that nobody could be expected to anticipate all the areas of professional endeavor that, when measured as indices of success or failure, would provide promotion criteria. Too, the very concept of trying to quantify a
naval officer’s success belies the nature of the beast. We have no product e*cept combat readiness, and our output defies easy measurement. The objectives we set for ourselves, or that are set for us, are soon superseded by other requirements as circumstances change at the speed of light. It would oe difficult to identify more than a handful of officer billets adaptable to quantifiable performance standards. The Department of the Navy’s Merit Pay System—Administrative Cuide” lays out a three-stage development program consisting of: (1) discussing management guidance, (2) setting objectives, and (3) specifying target performance levels. The performance planning, appraisal, and compensation process follows an annual cycle of 16 steps. The following excerpt from the Merit Pay System IMPS) Guide’s discussion of step three— “Drafting of Objectives” reveals both the conceptual appeal of this sytem and its Achilles’ heel.
In many instances, measurement
standards will be based on readily determinable quantitative indicators. However, certain program areas do not lend themselves to quantifiable measures of performance. In such circumstances, it is the responsibility of both the supervisor and MPS member to reach an explicit understanding as to what constitutes acceptable and unacceptable performance. To do this, it is essential that the supervisor know what he/she wants and that this be clearly communicated to the member in writing. In some situations, the evaluation of performance against a qualitative measure may be totally the subjective assessment of the supervisor. When this is the case, it becomes even more important during the writing of such measurement standards to include a description of what standards of quality will be used as the indicators of attainment of the objective. While the description of what standards are to be used is itself the product of an agreement between the member and supervisor, it reflects the fact that agreement on exactly what constitutes 'quality' is not always possible.” (Emphasis added.)
Growing skepticism over the MPS stems primarily from the above italicized passages. Qualitative measuring is, in fact, the only recourse in more than just “some situations.” And, the question of “exactly what constitutes ‘quality’ ” is one that can either end up in the too-hard drawer or result in bitter confrontations between MPS member and supervisor.
DAVIE
DAVIE
SHIPBUILDING
LIMITED
A SUBSIDIARY OF DOME PETROLEUM LIMITED PO BOX 130. LEVIS,
QUEBEC G6V 6N7 TELEPHONE (410) 837-5841 TELEX 051-2254
Canada’s largest shipyard, Davie works extensively with U.S. Mil Spec., U.S. Coast Guard and A.B.S. standards for marine vessels. We also provide a full slate of sophisticated vessel inspection services.
Make a friendly south to north call — to Captain Alan E. Brian. You get a totally qualified shipyard with the experience to respond directly to your need.
If this is the case, should a similar system be adopted to evaluate naval officers? Yes, and with the knowledge that its worth would lie in having taken a single positive step: the recognition of a desperate need to focus more attention on honest self-appraisal and clearly communicated professional expectations. But don’t wait for anything of the sort to happen. It won’t. There will always be enough Schwantzes to lead the Navy in 2001. We can afford to lose Ga- zophsus when he checks out on 20.
“Thinking Offensively”
(■See T. W. Parker, pp. 26-31, April 1981:
T Q. O’Rourke. p.2l, June 1981; H. K.
Ullman, pp. 75-76, July 1981; S. K. Lee, pp.
25-28, August 1981; J. S. Brunner, p. 95.
December 1981 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Colonel David R. Mets, Li- S. Air Force (Retired)—This article is elegantly written and interest- ln8, but it is flawed by three attitudes that have been endemic to the U. S. armed forces since the birth of the Republic—and they are more dangerous now than ever before. First, there has always been a built-in preference ui our pragmatic culture for the offensive—for offensive tactics that confuse the clear benefits of fighting with an aggressive spirit (whether on the defensive or offensive) and the unproven rewards of the ill-considered Pursuit of offensive tactics and strategies. Second, all the services have been too quick to identify their bureaucratic needs with the good of the nation. What’s good for the U. S. Navy (or the U. S. Air Force or the U- S. Army) is automatically good for *he United States. The result is that Prize committees and editorial panels are too quick to accept essays that tell them what they want to hear. Third, ^0r a long time before Douglas j^acArthur asserted that America’s battles are won on the playing fields °f West Point, the military profession has unthinkingly drawn false analogs between war and games.
Commander Parker is arguing for the abolition of the defensive mindSet, protesting the need for an open m'nd. But he is really arguing for the replacement of that mind-set with an dually rigid one in favor of offensive tactics and weapons. If the protestations of von Clausewitz that the detensive is the stronger form of war and the gruesome experiences of World War I (on land and sea) are not enough t° induce caution in accepting Parer’s urging, then a quick look at some Df the defensive battles aggressively ‘ought and won in World War II ought t° do it: Midway, the Battle of the Atlantic, the Battle of Britain, Stalingrad, and El Alamein. That is not to say that Clausewitz was right in his assertion—far from it. Neither form °f War is stronger. It all depends on the time, the place, and the condi- t'ons. The Confederate defensive at Vicksburg was a disaster of the sort "arker fears; simultaneously, the Yankee defensive at Gettysburg was a triumph that changed the course of U. S. history.
What of the present time and place? Does it temporarily, at least, favor Parker’s preference? We have not had a good test for a long time. There has been no blue-water conflict since World War II, and as fearsome as the Soviet Navy seems to us, it is all founded on an untested doctrine and an untested technology. Clearly, even though the Soviets have a power-projection capability that exceeds anything they have had before, they still do not have the large-deck carriers or the amphibious warfare capability anywhere near that still possessed by the U. S. Navy. Further, the NATO navies are much superior to those of the non-Soviet members of the Warsaw Pact and that is a factor that is seldom counted by arguments like Parker’s. Finally, as impressive as the new carrier capability of the Soviet Navy is, it does seem that it is aimed at antisubmarine warfare and not at power projection. Until we have more information on the attack-type carrier that they are building, we still must assume that the adversary’s navy is basically a defensive fleet aimed at counterbalancing the offensive of the U. S. Navy.
The most recent combat experience that we have which entailed the use of the new technology is the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War; analysts of that conflict are almost uniform in their assertions that the defensive form of war is now in ascendancy. Of course, the field of defense analyses is very much a victim of fashion and conventional wisdom, and one must suppose that those assertions that the Blitzkrieg is dead are a bit exaggerated—but they should also be enough to induce caution against accepting uncritically any argument for an unbalanced commitment to offensive tactics and strategy.
Perhaps the most serious argument against Parker’s thesis is that his position is profoundly defensive, no matter what he calls it. Basically, he is arguing that we must implement a new commitment to “offensive thinking by buying more offensive capability for our surface naval units which will operate independently of carrier groups. This must, in the end, be done at the expense of ground and antisubmarine defenses, as the resources we have to put into the defense budget are finite, notwithstanding the current increases. The end result of the favoring of naval surface offensive forces over the NATO ground formations and the naval forces dedicated to the protection of the sea line of communications to Europe is the conceding of Western Europe to the Soviets. Parker argues that the Navy is not ready for theater nuclear war. Is the Army any better prepared for such warfare? To concede Europe to the Soviets is to undo the achievements of World Wars I and II and to turn the United States into an isolationist fortress with fewer friends than it had in the 1920s and 1930s.
Commander Parker approves of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) concept, though he gives no attention to the contradiction between his main argument and that approval. The RDJTF is so lightly equipped with armored vehicles that it is hardly competition for the main units of, say, the Egyptian or Syrian armies—not to mention whatever Soviet units might turn up in the area. Even as lightly equipped as it is, the United States possesses neither the airlift nor the sealift to provide the RDJTF with the rapid deployment it is supposed to have. If, then, we cannot move the RDJTF to the locations where it will be needed, and if we cannot hope for the RDJTF as it is presently equipped to stand up against the armored and mechanized units of even the Third World powers even if we could get it there, what in the world would be the point of providing the naval fire support for the RDJTF before we had given it the mobility and the armor that it needs to even survive? As if that were not enough, Parker seems to agree with the Soviets that our carriers in the Mediterranean are vulnerable. If the carriers are vulnerable, then how does he propose to protect the surface offensive forces that do not even enjoy the protective cover of a combat air patrol? If the present carrier forces in the Indian Ocean cannot go near the Persian Gulf, then how does Parker propose to move his surface offensive units (without air cover) to the far end of that narrow sea to support the RDJTF—where the oil fields are which shall have to be protected by the RDJTF?
The replacement of our defensive mind-set with an offensive mind-set so narrowly conceived would be to invite the transformation of both the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf into latter-day “iron bottom sounds!” (Continued on page 111)
“Promoting Productivity in Passed-Over Officers”
(See T. S. Moore, pp. 122-123, September *981 Proceedings)
“At Long Last: DOPMA . . .
How Long Will It Last?”
(See B. Harris, pp. 129-131, September 1981 Proceedings)
Captain R. S. Betts, U. S. Navy— Commander Moore and Captain Har- r|s address an institutional problem and the effort to ameliorate it. That problem is that we deny all but a ver- dable handful of men and women a full career in the Armed Forces. A full career ought to be from entry to real retirement—that is roughly 40 to 50 years. Can the military—in good con- Science—continue a system which Pays a healthy, competent, and willing w°rker more for not working than for Working?
Consider what we are losing when We force retirement after 30 or 35 years of commissioned service. In his early 50s, an officer has at least ten and probably more than 15 years of ^ry productive work left. Moreover, ne is not ready to simply quit and vegetate. He is an expert in at least one and probably several fields. He has t°o many financial needs to live off his Pension so he will have to find another Job, having been—in effect—fired, because most of his knowledge is in 8°vernment and particularly military- related matters, he will probably wind UP working for one of the many consulting or management organizations Which the Navy pays to do its studies. research. and management because there are not enough qualified active huty officers to do the work.
So the taxpayers wind up paying the j'etired officer 81 % of his active duty base pay, plus the cost of living increases to his pension, plus the salary he gets from the consulting or management organization, plus the orga- n*zation’s overhead, operating costs, travel, other salaries, advertising, office space, et cetera. And for all that additional expense, the government gets no more work than it would have gotten if the officer had remained on active duty in the first place.
The cost of retired military personnel pensions is already so large as to be a very tempting target for the budget-cutters. As life expectancy increases and service careers are ended by the “up or out” provisions of our officer personnel laws, military pensions are not likely to survive in their present form.
What can or should we do? Keeping everyone in service until age 62 would create problems. Achieving the rank of captain at age 42 (as the due course officer does these days) and then remaining a captain for the next 20 years would clog the promotion chain, as well as become very debilitating for the individual who would be serving with no hope of promotion.
Consider the advantages of slowing down regular promotions. Why not schedule the due course officer for promotion to the grade of captain at the 30-year point? Thirty years to make captain, followed by 10 oi 12 years in grade performing effectively, would make a very successful and satisfying career for the individual and the Navy. The same due course officer could have been scheduled to make commander in 20 years. Thus, 20 years to make commander followed by ten years to prove qualification lor promotion, sufficient effectiveness in a specialty area to justify an additional ten years in grade as a commander, or retirement after 30 years of service would make a reasonable and satisfactory career for the individual and the Navy.
This same schedule would have the due course officer spend two years as an ensign, four as a lieutenant (junior grade), six years as a lieutenant, and eight years as a lieutenant commander. For those who are not selected for promotion to the grade of commander after 20 years, there could be provided some sort of separation pay or gratuity—possibly a deferred pension. The same could be arranged for those who choose to leave the service before the 20-year point.
Only commanders, captains, and flag officers should be provided pensions and full retirement. Would that be cruel to the junior officers who would not qualify for pensions? Not really. One has only to look at the DOPMA promotion percentages to realize that only the unsat and marginal performers, or those who chose to forego the pension would fail to get one. And they would be young enough to have realistic prospects for an adequate second career.
Would we then have too old a group of senior officers? Would our flag officers be too old to carry out their difficult duties? One should not be too quick to ascribe inability to perform arduous duties as a function of age within hearing of the Commander-inChief. With the current emphasis on physical fitness, most of our personnel live healthier and longer lives. Moreover, there is no reason why—even with the schedule described for the due course officer—that there could not be continued 10% below-the-zone accelerated promotion for the truly outstanding few who should be our flag officers. There would still be opportunity to identify the few “head and shoulders” performers early enough to produce flag officers in their 40s. With longer in-grade requirements for the due course officers, accelerated promotion for the few truly outstanding officers would take on added value without damaging the morale/self-esteem of those not so selected.
Older, more experienced, and presumably wiser commanders and captains should prove to be very effective in a variety of jobs. The prestige of each rank would be enhanced by virtue of the more mature and experienced personnel in each grade. The growing cost of military retirement could be curtailed. The retained experience and mature judgment the Navy would be able to bring to bear “in house” on a variety of problems should increase our cost effectiveness and performance in every area.
“Sealift Readiness: You Don’t
Get What You Don’t Pay For”
(See L. C. Manning, pp. 34-43, October 1981
Proceedings)
Edward J. Bender, Jr.—Larry Manning's article is riddled with inaccuracies. For example, the Department of Defense does not have the authority to requisition U. S.-flag and U. S.- owned, foreign flag ships as Mr. Manning suggests. The power to requisition vessels owned by U. S. citizens is vested in the Secretary of Transportation by Section 902 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 and the Maritime Act of 1981 (which moved the Maritime Administration from the Department of Commerce to the Department of Transportation).
Requisitioning can deliver the entire U. S. active fleet, the National Defense Reserve Fleet, and the ships owned by U. S. citizens but under foreign registry. If those ships are insufficient—which might be the case in a NATO sealift scenario—over 4,000 dry cargo ships from the European NATO fleets can be made available to the United States in wartime. The 400 NATO ships mentioned by Mr. Manning are for a special assignment prior to full hostilities and do not reflect the actual situation in wartime.
The implementation of the Sealift Readiness Program (SRP) is dependent on the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Transportation. The Maritime Administration is not against the SRP. It has recommended its implementation during recent exercises on non- NATO contingencies that required a limited number of sealift ships. The procedure has been quick, and ships could be placed on berth well before Mr. Manning’s stated “30 to 45 days.”
“Education of a Warrior”
(See T. B. Buell, pp. 40-45, January 1981:
R. A. Dun, p. 21, February 1981; J. R. McDonnell, p. 15. March 1981: J. T. Hayward, pp. 21-23, April 1981; J. E. Lacouture, pp. 77-79, June 1981; A. T. Isaacson, pp. 78-80, July 1981; C. C. Holcomb, pp. 71-75. August 1981; D. I. Sloane. pp. 84-87. November 1981: M. Johnson, p. 76, January 1982 Proceedings)
Midshipman First Class Michael D. Barth, U. S. Navy—Reading Midshipman First Class Sloane’s comment on the type of education midshipmen at the Naval Academy received, I was compelled to read the comment Captain Holcomb wrote on midshipman training. After reading his comment, I asked myself, “What is the basis of training midshipmen at the Naval Academy?”
Being a midshipman first class at the U. S. Naval Academy, I found a very easy answer by merely looking at the mission of the Academy: “To prepare Midshipmen morally, mentally, and physically to be professional officers in the Naval Service.” I agree with Captain Holcomb that we are not being trained to become the admirals of the fleet. It would be great to get commissioned this May and become an admiral, but that is sheer nonsense. How many admirals or CNOs started someplace higher in the officer corps than ensign? Not many!
We all need to gain experience to become the tacticians and strategists the Navy will need in 20 or 30 years. Without starting at the division officer level and moving up, our tactics and strategy would be worthless because we wouldn’t know the basics of our ships, men, weapons, or Navy. I do not think any of my classmates are ready to become senior officers, but when we graduate we will be ready to become competent junior officers and eventually capable senior officers.
During my three and a half years at the Academy, I have taken one leadership course a year. Whether four leadership courses are enough to make an individual a competent leader can be debated. I look at my leadership education as something I can take in, evaluate, and apply to my needs here in the Academy and in the Fleet Marine Force, using the fundamentals I have learned as the basis—not as the ultimate source—for the decisions I will have to make as a junior officer.
I believe that the technical education I have received is a solid, useable foundation for a naval officer. If our curriculum were oriented toward training division officers, the Marine Corps would be getting some very poor marines, the air community would be getting great division officers, but with no general knowledge of technical aspects of naval aviation, and the nuclear power community would need to change its training program. I don’t want to graduate and get a commission in the U. S. Marine Corps. If I did want to become a qualified division officer, I would select surface line and go to Surface Warfare Officer School. We are here to become professional naval officers, not division officers.
“When the Going Gets Tough”
(See C. W. Koburger, pp. 125-127, October
1981; E. J. Bender, p. 17. November 1981; J-
D. Ferguson, p. 17, December 1981
Proceedings)
“Unconventional Warfare Afloat”
(See R. L. Crossland, pp. 36-41, November
1981 Proceedings)
Colonel Joseph H. Alexander, U. S- Marine Corps, Head, Joint Mattersl Strategic, Mobility Branch, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps—The vulnerability of our merchant ships to naval sabotage is worth serious thought. Many of our opponents and competitors have the capability of using sabotage techniques against our maritime interests as an extension of unresolved political contention. Captain Koburger’s description of the limpet mine as the “archetypal weapon” of naval unconventional warfare was a perceptive statement. And Commander Crossland’s examples of the successful use of limpet mines by British and Italian frogmen in World War II were illuminating.
As a matter of fact, limpet mines have a more recent history than World War II. On 2 May 1964, Viet Cong frogmen sank the USNS Card (AVG- 11) alongside a Saigon pier with command-detonated mines attached under her hull. On I November 1968, the USS Westchester County (LST-1167) sustained heavy damage and 26 men killed from two limpet mines placed under her hull while at anchor near My Tho, Vietnam, with the Mobile Riverine Force. More recently. Basque terrorists are alleged to have made similar attempts against a Spanish destroyer, and, in November 1981- Irish Republican Army divers attached a limpet mine to the British research ship Hecate docked in Nantes, France—with no success. A seems that ship vulnerability to this form of unconventional warfare remains high.
This vulnerability becomes a matter of concern in view of the nation’s recent initiation of a maritime prepositioning program in the Indian Ocean and, eventually, other trouble spots. Already we have a number of merchant ships of the “Near Term Prepositioned Force” at anchor in Diego Garcia, loaded with combat equipment, fuel, and ammunition for a Ma-
bel, can work more effectively than a nuclear attack submarine.
“None of the current generation of deep-draft nuclear submarines could duplicate the U-47's highly successful penetration of Scapa Flow ... to attack the Royal Oak." With cruise missiles—Flarpoon and Tomahawk —who needs to? And where is the Soviet Scapa Flow? Does Commander Crossland imply that a diesel could more effectively penetrate the White Sea than a nuclear-powered ship? Not even the most redoubtable advocate of American diesel boats, Commander Art Van Saun, would be
tfio nllnnotirtn
th#* cniirr.P
r'ne Amphibious Brigade and certain Army and Air Force units. Additional Maritime Prepositioning Ships (probably chartered merchantmen) are programmed for the next several years. This will represent a major concentration of combat power within the lhin hulls of merchantmen in international waters. Since these ships are key elements in our rapid deployment Panning, their protection against surprise attack by frogmen should receive priority emphasis. We’ve dealt ^'th this type threat before, but rarely ln “peacetime.” It’s time to give the Problem a fresh and innovative look.
Rear Admiral W. J. Holland, U. S. Ncivy—Several of the statements in this article simply cannot go unchallenged.
The first, . . someone must be available to sink merchant ships • • ■ raises the immediate question of whose? The most likely potential enemy has only four major open ocean shipping routes, the Northern Sea j'oute, the Baltic Sea and Black Sea kttorals, and the Sea of Okhotsk. Only the last would be a reasonable target k°r U. S. diesel submarines.
Commander Crossland’s next statement, “. . . the diesel submarine [is] ,ess restricted than nuclear subma- r,nes in the navigable waters available to her . . .” is patently false if the Arctic areas are included. Further, Presuming the statement applies to submerged operations, the minimum hepth for submerged operations of uuclear and fleet size (not midget) dieSel submarines are nearly identical. There is no body of water in which a lull-sized diesel submarine, e.g.. Barely to support that.
“Four to six diesel boats can be ilt for the cost of one nuclear sub- arine ... [a] Soviet ‘Foxtrot’ diesel n be built in 90 days by relatively ,skilled labor.” Regarding cost com- risons which have some reasonable ‘gree of comparability, Jane s Figlit- g Ships 1981, lists the fi^al year ig() Los Angeles at two for $809.6 illion The Dutch Walrus is listed at
,2 5 million guilders ($148.6 million).
hat’s three for one. This does not elude labor differential for U S. irds. Of more interest is the building -ne—four years from keel to comissioning for both ships. It is true ,at some parts of diesel submarines in be constructed with less skilled bor than some parts of nuclear sub- larines, and that some parts of nu- ear submarines are not replicated in iesel boats. However, there is not a raight line reduction in costs. The lore capable the diesel boat, the more killed the labor required to build her. ubmarines are not manufactured by heap labor in any event. I do not
The Grayback (left) and the two Barbels caught here represent 60% of the U. S. Navy’s nonnuclear- powered submarine force.
about building a “Foxtrot” in 90 days with unskilled labor, but I seriously question its accuracy. If there is such a submarine, I do not believe I would care to crew first sea trial:, in her.
Finally, Commander Crossland comments that . . a fleet diesel submarine is a mobile minefield which can harass enemy supply lines.” Two points are relevant—first, given the limited sea lines of the most likely potential enemy outlined above, real minefields are cheaper and easier to lay to limit access and choke narrows, and second, our allies have diesel submarines quite capable and experienced in operating in the areas of concern, which do not have the long transit times to station inherent in U. S. diesel submarine deployments to these areas of operation.
Commander Crossland has invoked the commerce raiding success of the past to substantiate his claims for more attention to guerre de course. But those commerce raiders, German and American, were operating against an enemy whose lines of communication made them vulnerable to such raids. A more misplaced invocation of history for selection of a weapon system cannot be imagined. He is fighting the last war, not the next one.
I
The article implies that diesel submarines are somehow necessary or better for unconventional warfare operations than are nuclear submarines. Such is not the case. Experience has shown that nuclear submarines have
Our durable Library Case, custom- designed for the Proceedings, allows you to organize your valuable back issues chronologically while protecting them from dust and wear. While conserving shelf space, this is a handsome addition to the home or office library in blue simulated leather with a gold embossed spine. (Each case includes a gold transfer sheet so you can identify the volume and year.)
Proceedings Library Cases are available in two sizes, to accommodate both the current size and the pre-1970 small size of the journal. The larger size measures 11" x 83/s" X 4" and the smaller 10" x 7" x 43/8", with each holding 12 issues. When ordering below, please specify size.
$4.95 each.
To: Jesse Jones Box Corp., P.O. Box 5120, Dept. NI, Philadelphia, Pa. 19141
Please send me_______ U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings Library Cases. Prices: $4.95 each; 3 for $14.00; 6 for $24.00. My check (or money order) for
$--------- is enclosed. Only U.S. orders accepted.
[ ] Large size. [ ] Small Size.
NAME______ ______________________________________________________ _________
ADDRESS__________________________________________________________________
CITY_______________________________________________________________________
STATE---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ZIP_______
Please allow three weeks for delivery.
the space, flexibility, and maneuverability to perform functions other than antisubmarine and antisurface warfare as well as or better than diesel submarines. The type of propulsion is not significant in mine warfare and Special Forces operations beyond those advantages that are inherent in nuclear submarines—greater endurance, higher transit speeds, less vulnerability, greater maneuverability and power—all of which provide a superior platform for every submarine mission.
“Energy: Essential Element of
National Security”
(See F. C. Collins, pp. 79-83, December 1981
Proceedings)
Roger Staiger, Jr.—This article on energy and national security made the rather obvious link between U. S. energy needs and national security requirements. While not quarreling with the conclusions of the article, 1 would recommend strongly checking the accuracy in energy data before drawing these conclusions. Precision in energy information is exceedingly important.
Admiral Collins attributes to an unnamed DoD analyst the statement that a one-cent rise in fuel costs would add $80 million daily to DoD operating costs. It is unclear how this figure was obtained. DoD requires 150 million barrels of all types of liquid fuel annually, or 400-450,000 barrels per day. This translates into about $200,000 per day for each one-cent rise in fuel prices. Perhaps other indirect costs —such as increased cost of services and hardware—were included, but even then the figure appears to be off by at least two orders of magnitude.
The article also cites, without attribution, U. S. oil imports as being 49 % of U. S. oil requirements. This figure is too high for recent years. The Department of Energy's Energy Information Administration reports that for the four-week period ending on 27 November 1981, the United States imported an average of 5.5 million barrels per day (four million barrels of crude oil and 1.5 million of petroleum products).
Petroleum usage can be estimated at 15.3 million barrels per day (12.2 million barrels of crude oil inputs to refineries, the previously mentioned 1.5 million of petroleum products and 1.6 million of natural gas liquids). This yields a first order approximation of import petroleum dependence of 36 %. These figures do not totally account for Strategic Petroleum Reserve imports, directly consumed crude, processing gains, or other minor adjustments which—although important—are small enough not to substantially change the percentages.
The first table, with a figure of 34 % of oil imported from the Persian Gulf, is misleading. This table contains two compounding errors. First, a clearer statement would be "34 % of U. S. imported oil is from the Persian Gulf,” or that about 17 % of total U. S. petroleum requirements comes from the Persian Gulf. The absence of any year from the table is an unfortunate oversight, since these figures have varied widely in the last five years.
Second, in addition to the label being misleading, the 34 % or 17 % figures are too high and not representative of recent import experience. For the first six months of 1981, the United States imported slightly more than one million barrels per day from the Persian Gulf area. This means that less than eight % of U. S. petroleum requirements came from the Persian Gulf area (as separate and distinct from all Arab imports or all OPEC imports which are substantially higher). By extension, Persian Gulf oil represents about three % of total U. S. energy requirements. Virtually all other numbers in that table are similarly too high to reflect current world oil trade.
The Saudis have recognized the limitations on Persian Gulf oil. This understanding partially accounts for their decision in 1978 to start construction of a major 48-inch pipeline from their Abqaiq oil field in eastern Saudi Arabia to Yanbu on the Red Sea. Unlike the earlier Trans-Arabia pipeline to the Mediterranean Sea, the new pipeline will be entirely within the Saudis’ own geographic borders, providing increased security for Saudi oil exports.
These changes in percentages and numbers don’t change the overall conclusions or implications of the article. Nonetheless, accuracy is important in order to evaluate the true extent of import dependence. Incorrect data could render a conclusion that is false, or at least subject to the kind of critical review that can weaken an otherwise strong case.
| ■ ■m , .................. ■ |
| \w:~tt i | BH if |
|
|
| liPP |
|
|
| ||
|
| - - % |
|
|
| |
| (P-HsaRag | . ■ ^ - ., , .. ■ » *«•’. |
|
|
| , i |
By Captain J. W. Kehoe, U. S. Navy, . and K. S. Brower
I
Another new major surface combatant has joined the Soviet ^avy. The Udaloy is the lead ship of what is expected to be a large class of destroyers. Like other new Soviet warships, such as the Kirov-class nuclear-powered cruiser* and the Sovremen- Ayy-class destroyer,* the Udaloy ls an impressive illustration of the Soviet Union’s commitment to naval power.
Many observers have concluded that the Udaloy is the Soviet Navy’s equivalent of the hi- S. Navy’s Spruance (DD-963)- class destroyer. Like the Spru- at*ce, the Udaloy mounts an impressive suite of ASW weapons a°d sensors. She is clearly suited to function as a large, seaworthy, battle group ASW escort.
much more fuel oil than the Spru- ance to achieve equal range. The characteristics of the Udaloy, reported here, are based on an assumed range of 6,000 nautical miles at 20 knots, calculated using standard U. S. Navy criteria. The Udaloy's actual range could differ. If, for example, the Udaloy had less range, her full load displacement and draft would decrease. Under these circumstances, lightship displacement and beam would decrease, and her speed would increase somewhat.
The combat systems of the Spruance and the Udaloy are compared in Table 2. It is interesting to note that the Udaloy lacks the surface-to-surface missiles, area air defense missile systems, and large-caliber gun mounts which the Sovremennyy carries. Instead, on the Udaloy, capable ASW sensors and weapons are substituted. In effect, the Soviets designed two separate ships of about 8,000 tons for specific surface warfare and ASW missions rather than developing a single larger multipurpose ship which combines these weapons on one platform.
The Udaloy combines long- range ASW sensors, similar to those on the much larger Kirov, with long-range ASW weapons and helicopters on an economically sized hull. The new destroyer’s characteristics are ideal for her to be a high-endurance, highspeed , battle group AS W escort.
Table 1 Comparative Ship Characteristics
Udaloy* Spruance
492 | 529 |
56 | 55.17 |
54 | 55 |
20 | 19.5 |
41 | 42 |
5,600 | 5,875 |
8,200 | 7,879 |
1,095,000 | 1,016,000 |
300 | 296 |
4 Gas Turbines | 4 Gas Turbines |
120,000 s.h.p. | 80,000 s.h.p. |
Twin Screw | Twin Screw |
33 + | 30 + |
Ship Characteristics: The estimated characteristics of the Uda- ‘°y are compared with those of the Spruance in Table 1. Like the Spruance, the Udaloy has a gas turbine propulsion plant. It is behaved that the Udaloy uses gas ^rbine engines that have a higher sPecific fuel consumption rate ^Pounds of fuel oil/s.h.p./hour) than the LM2500 gas turbine endues used in the Spruance. Therefore, the Udaloy would require
^or similar reports on the Kirov and the Sovre- Hiynyy see Captain Kehoe's and K. S. Brower's . Their New Cruiser" (December 1980 Proceed- pp. 121-1261 and "One of Their New Destroyers: Sovremennyv" (June 1981 Proceed- pp. 121-125).
Length Between Perpendiculars, It. Beam at Weatherdeck, ft.
Beam at Design Waterline, ft. Draft, Full Load Displacement, ft. Depth, Amidships, ft.
Lightship Displacement, l.t.
Full Load Displacement, l.t.
Total Enclosed Volume, cu. ft.
Accommodations
Power Plant
Speed, kts.
♦Estimated
Table 2 Comparison of Weapons and Sensors
necessary separation between the anchor chain and the dome to prevent damage to the sonar. The ship also has the characteristic bow wave, originating at a point
General Arrangements and Appearance: The Udaloy's protruding bow, which is typical of ships with a large, low-frequency bow sonar dome, would provide the
with the Udaloy. See "Ka-? ‘Helix’
*Not yet installed.
**The new “Helix” helicopter has operated (pages 120-121) for details on this helicopter.
2 5-in./54 cal.
Single Mounts 2 20-mm. Vulcan/ Phalanx CIWS* Mk-86 Mod-3
SPS-40
SPS-55
SQS-53
SQR-19*
8 ASROC Missiles + Reloads 6 Mk-46 Torpedoes + Reloads
2 LAMPS Mk-1 NATO Sea Sparrow 8 Harpoon
SLQ-32 Mk-36 SRBOC
Spruance
Guns
Gun Fire Control System
Air Search Radar Surface Search Radar Sonar
ASW Weapons
Helicopters
Surface-to-Air
Missiles
Surface-to-Surface
Missiles
ECM
Udaloy
2 100-mm. Single Mounts
4 30-mm. Gatling Gun CIWS
1 100-mm.
2 30-mm.
2
3
Bow Sonar Variable-Depth Sonar 8 ASW Missiles (with 2 Directors)
2 RBU-6000 8 21-in. Torpedoes + Reloads
2 “Hormone”**
8 SAM Systems*
None 2 Decoy Launchers about 15% of the ship’s length aft of the bow, which is associated with the large bow domes.
Like recent French ships, the Udaloy's weather deck has a reverse shear at the bow, probably to improve the line-of-fire of the forward 100-mm. gun mount. There are canister launchers for antisubmarine missiles port and starboard like those on other large Soviet ASW ships, with cantilevered bridge wings located above the launchers. The relatively small forward deckhouse supports gun and ASW missile fire control radars and a short truss-type main mast.
The ship has four free-standing stacks above the weather deck- Two deckhouses, amidships and outboard of the after set of stacks, support the 30-mm. Gatling-type gun mounts and fire control radars. Just aft of the destroyer’s forecastle, the Udaloy has quadruple 21-inch torpedo tubes port and starboard and a centerline stores handling crane.
The ship has a large hangar, with two separate helicopter bays, aft. The flight deck is at the 01 level over a large VDS well. The hangars themselves extend down to the main deck level. Special ramps and hangar top closures are provided to enable the helicopters to reach the flight deck.
1. Helicopter platform (VDS beneath)
2. Twin helicopter hangars
3. RBU-6000
4. 533-mm. torpedo tubes
5. 30-mm. Gatling AA guns
6. “Strut Pair”
7. “Palm Frond”
8. “Kite Screech”
9. “Eye Bowl”
10. “SS-N-14” SSMS
11. 100-mm. AA guns
12. Vertical-launch SAM positions
Weapons and Sensors: The Udaloy's major weapons and sensors are identified in Figure I. The combat suites of the Udaloy and lhe Spruance are similar. The Udaloy appears to have a large how sonar like the Spruance. The Soviet destroyer also has a variable-depth sonar (VDS) installation. The opening in the Udaloy's transom is about the same size as the Kirov's, which suggests that the Udaloy carries the same impressive variable-depth sonar system carried by the cruiser. (Later Versions of the Spruance will be outfitted with the SQR-19 towed Passive array.) Both the Udaloy and the Spruance carry ASW missiles, two ASW helicopters, and ship-launched ASW torpedoes. The Udaloy is the first Soviet ASW destroyer to carry two hel- •copters. Like the Spruance, the Udaloy has two large gun mounts. The Udaloy has four 30-mm. Gat- hng-type gun mounts for close-in defense. (In the future, the Sprtt- ance class will be fitted with 20- ^rn. Gatling-type Phalanx guns f°r point defense.) The Udaloy also has two major unoccupied foundations topside for electronic systems! one forward above the pilothouse and one aft over the hangar. These may be the locations for fire control systems tor a new, as yet uninstalled surface- to-air missile (SAM) system. There are eight openings on the Udaloy—four forward and four aft—which may be the locations for the future installation ot a SAM system. The Spruance is fitted with an intermediate range NATO Sea Sparrow launcher and a single channel fire control system. Compared with the U. S. ship, the Udaloy's combat system features much larger and longer range ASW weapons and automated guns with local control stations. The Spruance, however, will be better outfitted for long- range passive detection of submarines with her towed an ay when the system is installed. The Spruance is also a very quiet ship, having very low self-noise characteristics. She has large, low r.p.m. propellers, acoustically mounted machinery, and a Prairie-Masker air-emission noise suppression system. It should be noted that the provision of a low self-noise signature had a major impact on the size of the Spruance. It affected the weight and space provided for propulsion and auxiliary machinery, which had a cascading effect on overall ship size.
Hull Form: The Udaloy illustrates the Soviets’ continued preference for a large waterplane area type of hull form. This hull form is characterized by a wide water- plane aft; flare in the sides of the hull through the waterline; high, straight deadrise amidships with a hard turn to the bilge; a long cut-up to the transom; and vee-shaped sections forward. This typeofhullformhasexcellent highspeed powering characteristics and tends to reduce ship motions, especially heave and pitch. However, because the large water- plane area hull form has a relatively large wetted surface area, its powering characteristics at low to medium speeds are in-
ferior to those of U. S. Navy hull forms with finer lines and a minimum of wetted surface area.
Propulsion: The Soviets are now producing two destroyersized ships with different propulsion plants: the Sovremennyy with a modern, pressure-fired steam plant; the Udaloy with a gas turbine plant. All current-production U. S. Navy destroyers, frigates, and cruisers that are conventionally powered use the LM2500 gas turbine. As a result of the estimated poor SFC rate of the Soviet engines, the Udaloy requires a large quantity of fuel to achieve a given range. In the past, the Soviets have compensated for the poor specific fuel consumption rates of their engines by trailing one shaft and cruising on a one- shaft, one-engine combination at cruising speeds. This doubles the load on the engaged engine, thereby reducing the SFC, which more than compensates for the added drag of the trailing shaft.
For example, at 15 knots, it is estimated that the Udaloy"s range would increase by approximately 30% in the trail-shaft mode of operation. It should be noted that the Spruance can also benefit from this practice, although to a lesser degree since her fuel consumption rate increases less dramatically at partial power levels. Trail-shaft operations, however, are reportedly quite noisy and may be incompatible with ASW operations.
The Spruance uses large, controllable-pitch propellers for reversing. It is not thought that the Soviets have yet developed large, controllable-pitch propellers for warships.
Weight and Space: The estimated characteristics presented here for the Udaloy are based on an assumed range of 6,000 nautical miles for the ship operating at 20 knots and calculated using standard U. S. Navy margins. If the range of the ship is greater, then: (a) the full-load displacement is greater; (b) the sustained speed is less; or (c) the draft and beam are probably greater.
If the initial estimates of the Udaloy's hull form coefficients were not changed and her draft were increased, her full-load displacement would increase. However, an increase in draft would result in only a small increase in lightship displacement. Thus, in ' this case, an increase in draft should reflect an increase in fuel oil load. Therefore, it is extremely difficult to accurately estimate the full-load displacement of a conventionally powered ship, like the Udaloy, because there are numerous full-load displacements that are all equally feasible. On the other hand, the lightship displacement of the ship does not vary much, and, therefore, a reasonable lightship weight estimate for these displacements can be more readily determined. The estimated characteristics of the Udaloy are also based on the assumption that U. S. Navy parametric lightship and load-weight and center-of- gravity data can be applied to Soviet warships, with appropriate adjustments made for differences in design practices.
The Udaloy’s estimated beam and draft are sensitive to the initial estimates of the waterplane inertia coefficient (Cj) and midship coefficient (Cx), respectively. For the large waterplane area-type hull form used by the Soviets, the initially estimated values for these coefficients could be in error by approximately 5%. However, the impact of changes to the initial estimates for these coefficients on the full-load displacement would
c TC2S=^J| |
|
|
|
|
be minimal, although the beam ar|d draft might change somewhat.
The estimated weights of the Udaloy are compared with those °f the Spruance in Figure 2. The auxiliary and outfit weights shown the JJdaloy are based on the ^esign standards used for the Ital- lan Maestrale-dass frigate, which are thought to be similar to those used by the Soviets. They are generally comparable with U. S. Navy practices. The Udciloy does suPport a heavier load of sensors dnd weapons than does the Spru- °nce: approximately 10% of light- N*'P displacement in the Soviet versus 7.6% for the U. S. DD.
The estimated volume distribution of the Udaloy is compared ^'th that of the Spruance in Figure T The Udaloy's design continues me Soviet trend toward larger, btore spacious warships. The 1ddaloy has about the same enclosed volume as the Spruance. bailable data suggest that the y°lume distribution of the Udaloy !s generally similar to current u- S. Navy design practice. The sPecific volume, or volume per ton lightship displacement, of the Udaloy is 195 cubic feet/ton, cornered with 173 cubic feet/ton for ae Spruance.
if any single ship in the current
Soviet inventory provides an insight into their naval missions, it is the Udaloy, which has the potential to be a battle group ASW escort. At present, the Soviets have the following under construction: nuclear and conventionally powered, multipurpose strike cruisers; a steam-powered guided missile destroyer for surface warfare; and the Udaloy in addition to a myriad of smaller combatants and auxiliaries. These new Soviet ships are impressive. They reflect the fact that the Soviets are developing large, seaworthy, sustainable ships with formidable capabilities foi all modes of naval warfare and power projection.
The Udaloy, like the Sovremen- nyy and Kirov, cannot be described as a tight, austere ship. The sustainability characteristics of these new Soviet ships reflect the recent experience of the Soviet fleet since about 1965 in conducting extended deployments at long distances from the homeland. In many ways, they are reminiscent of U. S. Navy design practices. For example, the Udcdoy has about twice the internal volume of the earlier, 1960s’ vintage, “Kashin”-class destroyer.
The Udaloy is the product of a society dedicated to developing an impressive naval capability. More significantly, she represents the product of first-rate naval engineers who are no longer simply mass producing obsolescent technology but are developing naval systems that impress the experienced naval engineer. The Uda- loy's characteristics are a clear sign of the type of Soviet surface warfare strike groups or carrier task forces that we may see in the near future.
Captain Kchoe has served in three aircraft carriers and three destroyers, most recently commanding the USS John R. Pierce (DD-753). Ashore, he has worked in the Polaris missile program and taught project management. He is now serving at the Naval Sea Systems Command. Washington, D. C.
Kenneth S. Brower is President of Spectrum Associates Incorporated. Falls Church. Virginia. Over the last nine years he has supported the Naval Sea Systems Command's Comparative Naval Architecture Program, contributing to numerous assessments of U. S. and foreign warships and weapon systems. Mr. Brower has specialized in the feasibility design of warships and has recently supported the development of the U. S. Navy's DDGX and FFX designs, as well as the NATO Frigate Replacement for the 1990s.
Western observers got their first look at the Soviet Navy’s new antisubmarine warfare helicopter, the "Helix,” during the Zapad-81 exercise, held from 4 to 12 September 1981 in the Baltic Sea. Two of these aircraft operated from the new guided missile destroyer Udaloy: one helicopter in the standard colors of Soviet Naval Aviation (SNA), and the other in Aeroflot markings. Both aircraft were configured for the antisubmarine warfare role, indicating that “Helix” is probably the shipboard replacement for the Kamov Ka-25 “Hormone.”
The Udaloy's two helicopter hangars appear to be virtually identical in size to the hangars on the "Kresta I” and “II” and “Kara"-class cruisers, current operators of “Hormones,” and the physical dimensions of “Helix” also appear quite compatible with the elevators on the Moskva and Kiev- class carriers.
Generally similar in appearance to the “Hormone,” the “Helix” has a pod and boom fuselage configuration, with the pod being of considerably larger dimensions, and therefore having a much larger capacity than that of the “Hormone.” The empennage has a horizontal stabilizer with twin tailplanes. Two contrarotating three- bladed rotors are powered by a pair of turboshaft engines mounted atop the fuselage; both sets of blades fold aft for storage. The quadricycle landing gear is virtually identical to that of the “Hormone:” The main gear is attached to outrigger struts on either side of the fuselage pod, and the dual nose gear struts appear to have free-
|t
castoring, rather than steerable, wheels. Both aircraft observed were equipped with a chin-mounted surface search radar and had large box-like projections between the nose and main landing gear low on both sides of the fuselage. The function of these protrusions is unknown. A smaller blister on the underside of the tail boom resembles one located in a similar position on the Mil Mi-14 “Haze," the purpose of which is also unknown- The appearance of “Helix” on board the Udaloy would indicate that the electronics suites of both platforms were developed concurrently- Both are probably still in the operational evaluation stage. Missions other than ASW are also possible for a shipboard helicopter with the generous internal capacity of the “Helix.” A troop transport variant for vertical envelopment operations of an amphibious assault would meet an unfulfilled Soviet Naval Infantry requirement. “Helix” variants could also serve on board the Berezina-class replenishment ships in the vertical replenishment role.
t------ Sliding Roof | ||
| •i ——— |
|
Landing Deck | —J | Hangar |
| /X |
|
\ v“” | Elevator |
|
—^ | Platform |
|
Helicopter Hangar Arrangement | --------- Shell ------------------------------------------ |