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During the Vietnam War, engine rooms of Navy vessels—such as the one pictured at right—were dominated by the phrase, “keep ’em steaming.” But the creation of Propulsion Examining Boards (PEBs) turned the operation and management of propulsion plants into a more qualitative concern and demanded a sophisticated approach. Despite this change in philosophy, the engineering community’s development remains problematic.
In an attempt to correct major problems with 1,200- psi (pounds per square inch) propulsion plants, the Steam Propulsion Plant Improvement Program was created in October 1971. This action was directed by the Chief of Naval Operations because of inadequate logistic support, lack of trained personnel, and inadequate funding of 1,200-psi technical improvement programs. The Steam Propulsion Plant Improvement Program was designed to encompass the personnel, material, design, training, operational, and logistic areas related to the entire propulsion plant system. A program coordinator was established on the staff of the CNO (OP-04P) to provide overall coordinations, and a project group (PMS-301) was established in the Naval Ship Systems Command to carry out the program.
Propulsion Examining Boards (PEBs), which were established on the staffs of Commander in Chief Atlantic Fleet and Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet, constituted one of the program elements used to ensure safe and proper operation of the 1,200-psi propulsion plants. These boards were to play a key role in the overall plan by ensuring strict adherence to established engineering readiness criteria and training standards. Thus, the PEBs were to be management tools which assessed the status of engineering readiness for the chain of command.
Past: The PEBs were created in June 1972. Initially, five officers were assigned to each board, and they were tasked to examine all 1,200-psi engineering plants. The examinations consisted of light off examinations (LOE)—conducted prior to initial propulsion plant light off during regular overhaul, major conversion, or fitting out availability—and operational propulsion plant examinations (OPPE), conducted not later than 6 months after the LOE and every 18 months thereafter.
Each ship was evaluated or graded as satisfactory or unsatisfactory, and the examination results were reported to the appropriate fleet commander in chief. While these examinations assessed plant operation and safety, they were not intended to duplicate any existing examinations or inspections. Each ship’s propulsion plant material readiness and its engineering personnel were examined as follows:
►The material condition of each propulsion plant was inspected to ascertain the state of operational readiness, cleanliness, and preservation.
►Training and qualification of engineering personnel were reviewed and evaluated, based on written and oral examinations and the evaluation of each watchstander’s performance during routine propul' sion plant casualty control drills. Three full and adequate watch teams were required in order to qualify for a finding of satisfactory.
►The board reviewed and evaluated the administration of the engineering department and verified the completeness and accuracy of all propulsion plant records.
Contrary to the conception often encountered if the fleet today, the PEB was not another temporary “get-well” program. The conventional steam propulsion PEB was modeled after the nuclear PEB- to serve basically the same function—to ensure that steam (and, later, gas turbine) ships met a certain acceptable level of engineering readiness and were safe to operate. The concept of the PEB represented a dramatic departure from the “keep-’ern-steam' ing” philosophy of the Vietnam War years. Dealing with propulsion plants suffering from both neglect and poor engineering practices in the past required the immediate reestablishment of high standards and good engineering practices. These changes demanded a steep increase in engineering knowledge by propulsion plant operators and the ship repair
Machinery like the Spruance-c/as v gas turbine engine, below, can be replaced or repaired, but the competency of those who maintain it is the factor that can make or break a propulsion plant. Right: Working in the engineering spaces of Forrest Sherman-c/ass destroyers isn’t always this easy.
facilities supporting them. The requirement for more knowledge contributed to the initial traumatic experiences with the PEB.
In 1976, the Steam Propulsion Plant Improvement Program was expanded to include the “high-value” 600-psi ships. Membership of each of the PEBs was enlarged to 18 officers, headed by a captain as senior member, 2 deputies, and 4 senior examiners in the grade of commander. The remaining 11 members were to be lieutenants and lieutenant commanders. As a prerequisite for assignment to the PEB, the senior member, the deputies, and the senior examiners each had to have a tour as engineer officer and another as commanding officer. All other examiners were required to have served as engineer officer or, in certain cases, as main propulsion assistant. Eventually, all members assigned to the PEB will have experienced an LOE, OPPE, or both prior to joining the PEB. With the exception of the office clerical staff, there are no enlisted personnel assigned to the PEBs.
Initially, ships undergoing a LOE or OPPE were judged only “satisfactory” or “unsatisfactory.” A finding of “conditionally satisfactory” was introduced in 1977 to avoid burdening ships and their crews with the stigma of being “unsatisfactory” when most of the major examination criteria had, in fact, been satisfactorily achieved. In many cases, this finding also permitted the type commanders to certify that certain deficiencies had been corrected without the perturbations and trauma of a reexamination by the PEB.
With the introduction of gas turbine propulsion in the Spntance (DD-963) and Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7) classes, a gas turbine team was established on each PEB. Introduced into a Navy already experiencing the PEB program and with a well-defined training pipeline, the gas turbine ships have, on the whole, fared well in LOEs and OPPEs.
Since 1972, the Propulsion Examining Board has noted significant advancements in training and improvements in the capabilities of engineering personnel and in the material condition of the propulsion plants. The PEBs themselves became a beneficiary of the program as increasing numbers of board members became “veterans” of LOEs arid OPPEs. Their experiences, in most cases, permitted a more tempered and enlightened evaluation during examinations than had been the case previously.
During the period from 1972 to 1979, OPPEs were scheduled approximately 18 months apart, and a significant up-and-down pattern of ship activity related to the OPPE was noted. Satisfactory comply tion of the OPPE meant that a ship would not have to face another for 18 months or more. Examination of some shipboard administrative and training practices disclosed a significant increase in activity about four to six months prior to an anticipated exam if order to bring the ship to a peak of readiness for the OPPE. After the OPPE, many ships displayed a marked decrease in program emphasis and training and, in some cases, a complete collapse of both Programs was noted. The OPPE, after all, was 18 months in the future. This attitude significantly improved operational proficiency for only a brief period and it necessitated preexamination workups with major outside assistance, both in material and 'n training. This “business-as-usual” philosophy fhreatened to prevent any further significant gains >n operational proficiency and safety, and rapid crew turnover further aggravated the problem.
Present: Today most 600-psi and all 1,200-psi and Sas-turbine-powered ships are examined by the PEBs. Diesel-powered ships and a few of the older steam ships are exempt from the program. LOEs and OPPEs are still basically conducted as in the Past. In the Pacific Fleet, however, a recertification OPPE, or OPPRE, was introduced in late 1979. OPPREs are conducted at 6- to 18-month intervals after the post-overhaul OPPE.
The OPPRE is intended to be a short-notice examination which monitors and evaluates the level °f proficiency maintained in the fleet on a day-today basis. It is administered after the type or group commander has given the ship three working days’ uotice of the pending examination. This examination Program was implemented in an effort to eliminate °r at least minimize the “sine wave” readiness cycle and the urgent dedication of resources required to firing many ships back up to the required level. Criteria for a finding of “satisfactory” have also changed considerably. In view of the current man- n'ng environment, substantial consideration has been given as to what can be reasonably achieved, ^hile three qualified watch sections continue to be the goal, until manning and training problems are resolved, only two watch sections proficient in handling routine propulsion plant casualties are required.
Administrative programs reviewed by the PEBs have been reduced to only those directly related to the propulsion plants. The number of observed casualty control drills has been reduced to the minimum required to evaluate all watchstanders presented. Failure to achieve full power and/or satisfactory boiler flexibility, except when resulting from personnel inadequacies, no longer prevents a hading of satisfactory.
In another significant change, PEBs examine and rePort their recommended findings to the ship’s immediate superior in command only. The immediate superior then recommends a final examination grade and, if required, the imposition of operational lim- dations and reexamination requirements. The rec- °nunendations from these unit commanders are forwarded up the chain of command to the fleet commanders in chief. The chain of command is responsible for the ships’ disposition. Expanding upon lheir initial mission of examining propulsion plants, the PEBs are now providing assistance in the areas of training and material improvement. In the Pacific Fleet, the following training/assist programs have been instituted:
►Engineering Readiness Assessment Training (ERAT): Designed to teach immediate superior in command/group personnel and commanding officers and executive officers how the PEB examines the various aspects of a propulsion plant and thus enhance their ability to self-evaluate their own readiness in the areas of material, administration, and, to a lesser extent, training.
►Assist Visit Before Regular Overhaul: PEB members visit ships prior to entering overhaul and review the material condition and current state of engineering department administration. No external report is made. This program is designed to improve the management of the overhaul and assist in early preparation for the light off examination.
►PEB Workshops/Standardization Conference: Type commanders, immediate superiors in command, mobile training teams, and fleet training groups participate in PEB workshops intended to standardize evaluation procedures, highlight problem areas, initiate solutions, and open lines of communication among all groups.
►PEB Exam Guide, PEB Newsletters, and Seminars: All are designed to reduce recurring errors by promulgating to the deckplate level the accumulated experience and observations of the PEBs.
Because this article is based on the authors’ firsthand knowledge, its treatment of the PEB process is generally limited to initiatives and developments in the Pacific Fleet. The Commander in Chief Atlantic Fleet, however, has also pursued an energetic experimental program in the conduct of OPPEs which ranges from total elimination of OPPEs for certain designated ships to achieving OPPE equivalency through other means.
Future: The future of the PEB appears to be one of full employment for several reasons. Eventually, a hard decision will have to be made to include diesel-powered ships in the LOE/OPPE program. Although diesel-powered ships appear to be safer than steam-driven to operate, the diverse quality of ship overhauls and the addition of new diesel ship classes may lead to operating and maintenance problems. The appearance of these kinds of problems in diesel propulsion plants would mandate the inclusion of these ships in the inspection program. If this occurs, the PEB will rapidly acquire a significant number of additional customers. Another and more pressing reason is that the Navy has not really come to grips with the people and management problem in the propulsion world. Machinery can be repaired or replaced, but it is people and their competency which will make or break our propulsion plants.
Casualty control proficiency is one indication of how well things are in the fleet. Our statistical reports make it appear that proficiency has rapidly improved over the past few years, but let’s look at the truth of the matter. Since 1979, the number of adequate watch sections required for a "satisfactory” finding has decreased. After February 1980, only two proficient sections were required on board each ship. The PEB has no way of verifying how many watch sections are actually used on board most ships, but comments have indicated that ships present two sections to the PEB while actually steaming three-section watches. Therefore, it is distinctly possible that the PEB is not observing actual watch practices in all cases, thus yielding a false sense of security. Reducing the standards, in an honest effort to reflect realistic fleet conditions, may really mean that these conditions in engineering will be perpetuated or improve only slightly. The long- range prognosis may not be good.
High personnel turnover and a lack of experienced middle and senior grade petty officers seriously limit the implementation of consistent management techniques. Present assignment policies contribute to a lack of qualified engineer officers and main propulsion assistants and portend a continuing lack of thorough understanding of propulsion engineering by those charged with managing them. PEB members continue to see the same errors that they themselves made years ago. In general, far too many shipboard engineers still do not understand their plants, cannot reliably conduct on board training programs, and cannot effectively administer their departments. The engineering corporate memory, in most cases, is far too short or nonexistent and, in any case, it does not appear to be improving.
Training and experience are two of the key elements in achieving the required level of knowledge and understanding of our large and increasingly complex engineering plants and programs. With today's training and detailing philosophy, no matter how the Navy’s officer and enlisted personnel are combined, the required level of training and experience is only rarely achieved. Our officers, who usually have the necessary desire and, at times, management skills, are given only cursory training in propulsion engineering without benefit of a sound theoretical foundation. There is no comprehensive training available for them in this area. Failing in this, they can rely only on their accumulated experience which, in a majority of the cases, is insufficient or acquired too late.
Many a chief engineer in the surface forces is in his initial engineering tour. This, of necessity, becomes a learning tour. The most senior person in engineering may be the least experienced and unable to instruct his subordinates properly. Thus, the chief engineer of most surface ships becomes an administrator rather than an engineer. The authors believe little significant improvement can be attained until the area of engineering officer technical competence is improved. Ideally, an engineer officer of a ship should have had a tour of duty as a main propulsion assistant (MPA) under an experienced chief engineer. After this learning tour, the MPA would logically go to a chief engineer tour in a similar ship via the department head course at the Surface Warfare Officers School. Chief engineers of small ships would progress to more complex ones. To do otherwise provides no opportunity to gain the experience and required engineering knowledge. A 1,200- psi, four-boiler ship represents one of the most demanding technical, leadership, and management platforms in the surface Navy today. It is no place for a novice.
Regrettably, the perception in the fleet, at least on the deckplate level, is that as things are progressing today, we cannot look for assistance from our engineering duty officer (EDO) community. In their withdrawal from surface ship engineering duty, especially as chief engineers, they will soon be unqualified for assignment as chief engineers of our most complex engineering plants in aircraft carriers. Only line transfer officers or direct accessions (officers graduating from the other commissioning sources directly into engineering duty) will be able to assume chief engineer billets. The MIT graduates and the engineering Ph.D. graduates will go directly into design or naval architecture, and thus the specially groomed engineers will be free to build and design ships unhampered by shipboard and seagoing experience. Should this be true, it would seem that by withdrawing from sea and fleet experience the ED officer would become the loser on all fronts- He would lose credibility with his seagoing line counterpart and his civilian technical colleague, 1° whom he becomes a civilian in uniform. The two engineering duty billets on the Pacific Fleet PEB are often challenged by the ED community as not being in the ED officers’ line of development. If this type of thinking reflects the EDs’ policy toward ship' board engineering, then it would seem that their rationale is flawed.
In reviewing the total line officer corps training and experience, we find that, in general, the officer is shortchanged under the current philosophy. By insisting on a "well-rounded” career so the officer can qualify for command, he becomes the proverbial “master of none.” Currently, it is virtually impossible for the upwardly mobile naval officer to get sufficient experience in the areas of engineering, weapons, and operations to be truly expert in any of these mission areas. Basically, he absorbs enough to “get by.” Aviators, submarine officers, and nuclear power officers do not subscribe to this philosophy, so they have developed a closed-loop detailing circuit to pump their experience back in while building corporate knowledge. They are specialists in their fields. The Navy might do well to look at
'he increasing specialization in navies of the free 'v°rld in this evermore complex environment— Specially in propulsion.
If the preceding is true, then how can the PEBs he considered effective monitors and evaluators of I°ssil propulsion engineering plants? As individuals, the PEB members cannot perform all the required 'asks. As individuals, they fall well short in the areas °f training and experience. In the Pacific Fleet, PEB Members receive as much as four or five additional Months of training, but that still leaves them short °n individual experience. Their collective expense makes up for individual deficiencies.
Upon completion of a PEB tour, each individual has acquired a wealth of knowledge and experience ar>d, in most cases, probably would be highly sucCessful as a propulsion engineer. His success or failUre at this juncture would generally be dependent uPon his management skills and, to a degree, for- 'une. However, because the “well-rounded” philosophy is so inculcated in the system, enlightened [Management is usually forsaken, and the PEB mem- her is not detailed back into engineering or engineering-related billets. Additionally, most individuals would not desire such reassignment, because 'hey believe the incentives offered are insufficient aMd such repeated tours would be career-limiting.
Having arrived at this dilemma, how do we get °ut of it? First, we must admit the obvious and recognize the need for increasing specialization in Surface ship propulsion systems. This specialization Cannot come from only one tour in that field. If split- 'ouring must continue, then we should split-tour officers within the same discipline, but with ever- •Mcreasing scope of responsibility. The main pro-
An engineering officer, center, monitors gauges in the propulsion control spaces of a guided missile destroyer. He may be hindered by crew limitations due to detailing practices and improper manning. He may also suffer from a lack of expertise in a particular propulsion plant because the engineering field is nonspecialized. PEBs, in existence for nearly 10 years, still must grapple with such issues.
pulsion assistant of a frigate should split-tour as the chief engineer of another frigate or single plant ship in the amphibious or service force. The chief engineer of the frigate should split-tour to a multi-plant ship. The practice of assigning engineer officers without previous engineering experience to such complex ships as cruisers must be stopped immediately. Retouring of officers in the same department should improve those officers’ professionalism within that specialty. It should also pay back in productivity because of his increased professional ability. To make assignments otherwise, or to continue as we do today, is an abuse and waste of very complex and expensive propulsion plants. The same plan should be followed for enlisted personnel, especially those in middle management positions. This means the reassignment of enlisted personnel to the same type of propulsion plant or the same class of ship whenever possible. The differences in propulsion plants would be relatively minor, and an individual’s proficiency in that type of plant should increase. Additionally, we must improve the training of our “oil kings” so that the individual becomes, in effect, a mini-chemist. Then we should require him to report to the main propulsion assistant rather than the senior boiler technician. This individual should be “fenced” so that he is used as an oil king and we do not trade short-term expediency for longterm disaster.
To summarize these recommendations for improved propulsion plant readiness and to decrease the trauma on ships and individuals we should:
►Continue to improve officer engineering training.
►Change policy so that officers split-tour in the same department with en route training and increasing responsibility.
►Require that all engineering duty officers serve as main propulsion assistants and chief engineers or in commensurate sea assignments if their speciality is weapons or electronics. Serving on board ship should enable that individual to subsequently design or build better ships or systems and eliminate, or at least reduce, the adversary relationship often encountered between line officers and the EDOs. It is particularly important that significant numbers of senior ED officers—commanders and captains— return to sea as chief engineers or as heads of other departments: combat systems, weapons, or electronics. Having gained the basic shipboard experi-
ence in their formative years, a return to sea duty would allow them to enjoy or curse their design, repair, and maintenance contributions. In either case, it should improve all three.
Chief engineers of carriers can and should be ED commanders or captains. This should also be a promotion path to flag, perhaps equal to a shipyard command or certainly in line to shipyard command. Weapon systems of major ships such as cruisers or larger should also enjoy senior specialists. As things stand now, only an insignificant number of EDs ever return to sea duty after the lieutenant commander stage. One tour as chief engineer of a carrier would rapidly convince anyone of how poorly these plants were laid out and structured. The designs would doubtless have been better if the designers had had more sea duty under their belts.
►Change the assignment policies of enlisted engineering ratings so that they remain in the same type of ship or same class whenever possible.
►Recognize the importance of enlisted specialists such as oil kings and automatic boiler control technicians and train and use these individuals in a closed-loop system.
►Have all officers attending the Senior Officer Ship Material Readiness Course (SOSMRC) observe an OPPE during their course of instruction. This would tie their theoretical knowledge nicely into the practical world to which they are heading. The participation of each SOSMRC student in an OPPE should have equal or greater long-range value than his school ship tour as now conducted.
►Put PMS-301 back on the LOE/OPPE message distribution. When the PEB-written letter reports were discontinued in August 1979, PMS-301, among others, was eliminated from a direct raw data input of LOE/OPPE results. PMS-301 now gets its distilled information through annual or semiannual meetings with the PEBs. Giving near real-time raw data to PMS-301 should help bring the fixers, main- tainers, and operators closer together.
►Bring engineering casualty control out of the closet and into fleet exercise legitimacy. The Navy should regularly schedule engineering casualty control exercises during each fleet exercise just as gunnery, missile, and operations exercises are now scheduled. These exercises should not be held between midnight and 0400; instead, they should be scheduled as part of the operation orders during the day and at conventional hours.
►Incorporate job design techniques to ensure that adequate attention is given human factors in plant machinery and system design, control systems, and operating procedures. This is now lacking in the fleet even in our newest ships. In far too many ships, the integration of design, which includes gauges, valves, controls, piping, and equipment layout, makes the propulsion plants not only difficult to operate, but often unsafe and virtually impossible to maintain. Here the sea-experienced ED could contribute greatly, either in a shipyard or design capacity. Overhauling or repacking valves on board a Forrest Sherman (DD-945)-class destroyer main feed booster pump is a “joy” hard to beat and a prime example of poor design and system integration.
► Set a goal to return to a three-section watch and gear examinations to that goal.
While these steps will not make the OPPE go away, they should certainly make it much less traumatic. Of greater importance, these steps should improve engineering readiness and make the OPPE program far more productive than it is now. The OPPE should then become a routine inspection.
Finally, after nearly ten years of existence, the PEB concept is ripe for quantitative analyses. While it serves to heighten engineering knowledge for a given period of time in any ship preparing for an OPPE, does this improved engineering knowledge result in an improved ship? During a deployment, does a ship which passed an OPPE “do better” than a ship that fails one? What are the basic differences between a successful and unsuccessful OPPE ship? It is not enough to put programs into being. We must constantly analyze them to determine if they are doing what we thought they should do. The valid ones will withstand the heat of scrutiny and the test of time. Programs that cannot do so should rapidly disappear into oblivion.
Captain Greenberg is a graduate of the University of Oklahoma and the Naval War College. His sea assignments include tours as damage control assistant and auxiliaries officer in the USS Paul Revere (APA-248), chief engineer of the USS Ruchamkin (APD-89), and commissioning chief engineer of the USS Garcia (DE-1040). His nonengineering assignments were as C1C officer of the USS Providence (CLG-6) and executive officer of the USS Orleck (DD-886). Captain Greenberg commanded the guided missile frigate Schofield (FFG-3) and was, until his retirement from active duty, a senior examiner of the Pacific Fleet Propulsion Examining Board.
Lieutenant Commander Blauvelt enlisted in the Navy in March 1962. Upon graduation from Miami University of Ohio, majoring in systems analysis, he was commissioned in 1971. He has served as electronics material officer and B Division officer of the USS Hanson (DD-832). executive officer of the USS Ute (ATF-76), first lieutenant of the USS Monticello (LSD-3.6), and engineer officer of the USS Hephnrn (FF-1055). He was assigned to the Pacific Fleet Propulsion Examining Board and has recently been reassigned to the 1,200-psi Mobile Training Team for Commander Naval Surface Force Pacific Fleet.
The authors are most grateful for the editorial assistance provided by Captain James F. Kelly, Jr., USN.