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There could be no calling out the U. S. Marines when, in April 1972, North Vietnamese armies muscled across the demilitarized zone into South Vietnam. Since the U. S. Marines were out of it—and political constraints demanded they stay out—South Vietnamese Marines would be put ashore behind enemy lines either from CH-53 helicopters, right, from CH-46s flying off such LSDs as the Anchorage, or from landing craft based on other U. S. amphibious ships.
On 1 April 1972, the armies of North Vietnam surged across Vietnam’s demilitarized zone (DMZ). The magnitude and force of the North Vietnamese attack indicated that they had come to settle the war—once and for all.
The NVA did not rely on new weaponry, but on surprise and overwhelming force. They were conventionally organized, equipped, and deployed; but with their in-depth strength of tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery, and antiaircraft systems, they foreshadowed the type of threat that can be expected in future mid-intensity conflicts and, indeed, some of their tactical maneuvers were repeated a year later in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war.
This attack clearly indicated a decision by the leaders
of North Vietnam to move into the final phase of the Communist strategy for revolutionary wars of national liberation. Emboldened now, they were finished with guerilla war, through with hiding like fishes in the seas of farmers. They were ready to meet—head on—the duly constituted government forces of South Vietnam, in open conflict, with well organized armies.
To achieve the goals of their invasion, the NVA followed Soviet-style tactics and patterns of attack and defense. Several divisions were employed with subordinate regiments in conventional two-up and one-back disposition. Attacks were made by troops equipped with the latest of Soviet-designed small arms and supported by armored personnel carriers and tanks. Heavy
volumes of precise indirect fire, delivered by a variety of weapons from 60-mm. mortars up to the long-range 130-mm. gun, supported all offensive and defensive operations. There was also an increase in antiaircraft gun defenses, both forward and in depth, which were supplemented by SA-7 heat-seeking missiles. Toward the rear, 57-mm. AA guns, placed in successive lines, protected command points, lines of communications, and logistics support. The concentration and depth of enemy forces, the coverage of North Vietnamese artillery, and the intensity of antiaircraft defense suddenly had made the Vietnam War a whole new ball game.
Initially, the forces of South Vietnam reeled under the fierce NVA attack. The North Vietnamese rolled into Dong Ha and occupied the abandoned city of Quang Tri. All that blocked the NVA from an open road to Hue were the Marines of South V ietnam (VNMC).
To help shore up the shattered defenses and allow time for regrouping and for civilians to flee to Hue, two brigades of South Vietnamese Marines were ordered to fight a delaying action. The plan then called for the Vietnamese Marines to fall back and hold at defensive positions along the My Chanh River Line.
The Marines executed the order brilliantly and although they were subjected to tremendous pressures from intensive artillery fire and tank and infantry attacks, their defensive lines held and were never broken.
This respite, in an otherwise deteriorating military situation, gave the South Vietnamese time to regroup and plan further actions.
The South Vietnamese Marine Division’s area of operations, north of Hue, extended from the Gulf of Tonkin to the foothills 18 kilometers to the west. The Marines had stopped the NVA’s advance on Hue from the north and were holding their assigned area; but, what was needed now was some dramatic initiative to prove to the NVA and the world that the South Vietnamese still constituted a viable fighting force, capable of offensive action.
The Seventh Fleet’s Amphibious Forces had been a dormant factor in the Vietnamese War since 1969. Constantly present, but essentially unused, they had contributed little more than the vague threat that is always implicit in a force in being. Still, because of the long inactivity of our Amphibious Forces, the North Vietnamese Army probably tended to discount any real threat from these ships and their embarked Marines.
Within two days after the North Vietnamese invasion, more than 3,000 U. S. Marines and 26 helicopters, embarked in seven amphibious ships, were on station off the DMZ ready to execute assigned contingency missions. While there was no immediate call for these
forces, they continued to build all through April. By early May, the commander of Task Force Seventy-Six (PhibForSeventhFlt) embarked in the command ship Blue Ridge with a total of 16 amphibious ships under his command and available for support operations. The embarked Fleet Marine Force consisted of Headquarters, 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade (9th MAB), two Marine Amphibious Units (MAUs), and two Battalion Landing Teams (BLTs). This was a formidable force in the type of war being fought but, even among the VNMC, there was doubt that the Seventh Fleet Amphibious Force would be allowed to participate actively in the fight.
The obvious objective was to project this available seapower ashore and strike the enemy behind his lines. Such action was clearly within the capability of the available units, inasmuch as the coast line was lightly defended and the enemy was well extended. The tactical advantage of such operations was clear, but political constraints precluded the re-introduction of U. S. Marine Corps troops into South Vietnam in a land warfare role. Still, there were other alternatives to simply landing U. S. Marines.
These alternatives were examined and discussed by leaders of South Vietnamese and U. S. Forces. In the plan that was finally approved by U. S. and South Vietnamese higher headquarters, South Vietnamese Marines would be put ashore by U. S. Marine helicopters and from landing craft based on U. S. amphibious ships. In effect, every facet of U. S. Amphibious Forces, except the U. S. Marine, would be committed to action. It promised to be a textbook example of support for our allies under the Nixon Doctrine.
Acceptance of the basic objective, however, did not solve the immediate problems that faced the Navy and Marine Corps amphibious planners in implementing this unique support concept. One complication was that other forces—afloat and ashore, U. S. and Vietnamese—were already operating in the area, each with separate chains of command. It became apparent that methods had to be developed which would allow coordination of unit actions to provide a viable plan under the concept of supporting and supported forces in accordance with JCS Pub 2. Also, the methods used would have to provide for an overriding requirement that each operation must progress rapidly from plan to execution.
In developing such procedures, initial planning was greatly facilitated by the presence of the U. S. Marine Corps Advisory Detachment with the South Vietnamese Marine Division. Presentations concerning proposed operations normally were made by these advisors to the VNMC Division, in conjunction with Vietnamese members of the Division staff. These briefings would
Amphibious Forces: The Turning Point 29
include timing, objectives, ground scheme of maneuver, assault forces, a concept for supporting arms fires, and enemy opposition. Such support factors were then compared with the number of 9th MAB helicopters and tracked landing vehicles (LVT) and the amphibious shipping available in order to establish immediately the feasibility of supporting an operation.
These initial planning sessions were relatively informal, but most effective in adjusting conflicting factors between requirements and available assets.
With the initial concept plan developed, the next step was to work out the necessary refinements so that each participating command could develop a detailed supporting operation order.
With the stage thus set and requirements defined, the supporting elements prepared and coordinated a definitive plan to provide the Vietnamese Marines with their needs for specific objectives.
Each phase of the intended operation was briefed by the "duty-expert” in a particular area. The interaction of ideas, comments, recommendations, and suggestions among a small group of specialists, each geared toward providing the optimum plan, proved effective. For example, valuable current intelligence information was provided by the U. S. Army Air Cavalry representatives. This information, in consonance with predicted weather, assisted in defining helicopter approach headings, landing plans, and retirement routes. Representatives of the Seventh Fleet and of the Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company developed intensive naval gunfire plans to provide general support for an extended period of time prior to the assault. Corps Direct Air Support Center (I DASC) representatives responded by passing requests for B-52 "Arclight” support to the Seventh Air Force and assisted in preparing plans for landing zone preparation by tactical air. Forward air controllers, airborne, who would be directly involved, offered flight patterns, intended procedures and radio frequencies as input to the developing plan. U. S. Marine advisors, in conjunction with fire support coordination representatives from 9th MAB developed artillery fire plans in general and direct support of the assault force, coordinated to insure a fire support plan geared to maximum destruction of enemy resistance. Air Cavalry representatives provided specific and detailed planning guidance for direct support of the assault helicopters into and around the intended landing zones. And, Amphibious Force representatives provided necessary plans for the positioning of the support shipping for development of take-off and recovery evolutions.
No one was specifically designated as the person responsible for the output of this conglomerate of planners; however, the Commanding General, 9th MAB and Commander Task Force Seventy Six required assur
ance of the adequacy of the plans generated, as did the RVN Marine Division Commander.
Colocation of CTF-76 and CG, 9th MAB and their respective staffs during this period of high tempo operations proved to be a necessity. The need to closely coordinate the employment of U. S. Navy and Marine forces and the reporting requirements to higher headquarters required the presence of the two commands and their staffs on the scene, embarked in the same flagship.
The opening round in the projected series of operations took place on the morning of 13 May 1972, when two battalions of Vietnamese Marines were landed by U. S. Marine helicopters behind enemy lines in a spoiling attack. This first South Vietnamese offensive action
since the fall of Quang Tri, and the first such Navy/ Marine amphibious operation since 1969, caught the enemy completely by surprise. Over 240 enemy troops were killed at the cost of ten South Vietnamese. The operation was highly publicized in South Vietnam and visibly restored a sense of confidence in the defenders of Hue.
On 24 May, a second and even more ambitious operation was conducted. Within a 40-hour period, an operation was planned and executed which combined a helicopter assault by two battalions of Vietnamese Marines with a landing by a battalion of Vietnamese Marines in LVTs.
The enemy, surprised by the bold action, lost over 670 men. The precision with which the U. S. and Vietnamese air, sea, and ground forces conducted the complex operation heralded the arrival of a new combat capability in Northern MR-I, an announcement that the NVA could not fail to heed.
The next operation came on 29 June as a part of the general offensive to recapture Quang Tri. This large helicopter assault involved almost 1,500 Vietnamese Marines and required the helicopters and amphibious shipping of two MAUs in support. This operation, too, was a complete success and a rapid advance regained territory lost early in the offensive.
By July, the South Vietnamese offensive had slowed south of Quang Tri City. To regain momentum, on 11 July, one VNMC battalion was helilifted by 28 helicopters of the 9th MAB in an attempt to break the impasse. The landing zones selected were located 2,000 meters directly north of Quang Tri City in an area known to be heavily defended by the NVA and considered a high-risk SAM area. In spite of extensive preparatory fires, the helicopters encountered heavy fire entering and leaving the zones. One CH-53 was lost to an SA-7 (Strella) missile. All of the assault helicopters were struck by ground fire. The assaulting South Vietnamese Marines had to fight their way across two trench lines in order to secure a defensive perimeter and box themselves in with supporting arms fire. This heliborne assault succeeded in breaking the enemy’s Quang Tri defenses and paved the way for the subsequent capture of the city.
The final U. S. Marine Corps and Navy supported heliborne operation of the Vietnam war was executed on 22 July. One VNMC battalion was landed along the coast ten kilometers northeast of Quang Tri City behind the NVA’s front lines, interdicting their supply lines and causing the enemy to retain forces to the rear in anticipation of continued amphibious assaults.
30 U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November 1974
Extensive use of supporting arms probably contributed most to the success of these operations. Fire support was built around L-hour, in the case of helicopter assaults, and H-hour plus L-hour when both surface and heliborne assaults were conducted. A general procedure of identifying fire support assets and then assigning targets based on capability and availability was followed. This resulted in a distribution of targets across the longest period of time to the artillery, with naval gunfire used almost as extensively. Tactical air support was used sparingly in the preparation until immediately prior to touchdown. This was done primarily to conserve air assets and provide flexibility for
Amphibious Forces: The Turning Point 31
on-call air support to the RVN Marines immediately upon their arrival at the LZ/Beach.
While the primary purpose of this article concerns the contributions of the Amphibious Forces, Seventh Fleet, and the 9th MAB, a discussion of amphibious operations would be incomplete without recognition of the considerable contributions of the tactical air element of the Marine Corps combined arms air/ ground team.
Marine tactical air, by doctrine and training, is tailored for support of amphibious operations. Since the amphibious landing was nor made immediately, however, Marine tactical air could be employed effectively in support of other missions, while still ready to support a landing at the commander’s option. Thus, while the Navy/Marine amphibious force was off the DMZ in support of U. S. and allied operations, Marine tactical air was providing combat support to the land campaign and TF-77.
Marine Corps tactical air response and readiness paralleled that of the sea-based Marine forces. A Marine all-weather attack squadron was conducting combat operations from a TF-77 carrier in the Gulf of Tonkin on 1 April. During the first week of April, two fighter-attack squadrons and one ECM detachment from the First Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW) in Japan were deployed to Danang AFB and NAS Cubi Pt., respectively.
On 10 April, a fighter-attack squadron was deployed from Hawaii to Danang. In mid-May, two 1st MAW light attack squadrons deployed to Bien Hoa AFB to bolster the close and direct air support capability in the southern region. Response time of the units based in Japan averaged less than nine hours from receipt of execute orders to arrival of the leading aircraft at the deployment base.
The diversity of the basing requirements and the combat support provided by Marine tactical air in Southeast Asia are illustrated in Figure 1 for the period 1 April through 31 July. Slightly over 10,000 combat and combat support sorties were provided from both land and sea bases during this period, with about 50 aircraft committed in the first few days of April, increasing to over 100 aircraft by mid-May.
Although Marine tactical air was deployed and engaged in combat in support of the land battle and TF-77 operations independently of the Naval amphibious force offshore, tactical air doctrine and aircrew training required in an amphibious operations environment proved combat capable, flexible, and responsive in the face of a variety of operational command requirements. This example of response and readiness of the elements of the Marine air/ground team leaves little doubt as to the validity of the Marine combined arms air/ground
concept in the amphibious role—the primary role—and the flexibility to effectively support and participate in other missions as well.
Arclight strikes were planned for both the primary and alternate LZs and beaches. Timing of the landing was scheduled to take advantage of the neutralization effect of the B-52 strikes. Because of the predominance of U. S. fire support assets, except for field artillery, the weight of carrying out fire support coordination fell heavily on the U. S. personnel located at the VNMC Brigade Command Posts. The principal coordinator was the Brigade Senior Advisor, aided by his assistants and by the Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (AN- GLICO) representatives. A 9th MAB liaison officer was positioned with the Assault Brigade and, as operations became larger, another liaison officer was located at the Division Command Post. At the battalion level, coordination was performed by U. S. advisors and AN- GLICO personnel. Seventh Air Force provided the Forward Air Controllers (airborne) supplemented by AN- GLICO air spotters.
U. S. Marine helicopter support included troop lift, emergency medical evacuation, logistic support, command and control, and visual reconnaissance. The helicopters of F Troop, U. S. Army Air Cavalry, assisted in helo route selection, medical evacuation, and last minute gun-ship support for the assault helos.
Marine helicopter squadrons assigned to the MAUs were trained for operating in a "conventional”
U. S. Marine Tactical Air Support in Southeast Asia 1 April-31 July 1972
Base | Type Aircraft | Mission |
USS Coral Sea | A-6A/B | Visual/all-weather attack |
| KA-6D | Aerial refueling |
Danang | F-4B/J | Fighter-attack |
Air Force Base | TA-4F | Naval gunfire spot/observation |
Cubi Point | EA-6A | ECM support |
Naval Air Station |
| of TF-77 |
Bien Hoa Air Force Base | A-4E | Light-attack |
Nam Phong, | F-4B/J | Fighter-attack |
Thailand* | A-6 A | Visual/all-weather attack |
| KC-130 | Aerial refueling |
USS America | F-4J | Fighter |
♦Marine tactical air operations mid-June. | shifted from Danang to Nam Phong in |
32 U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November 1974
(7.62-mm., 57-mm.) AA environment. Consequently, changes to doctrine were implemented immediately when it was realized that the enemy possessed an extensive anti-air capability not previously encountered. In addition to a quantitative increase in conventional AA weapons, the Strella missile provided the enemy with a weapon that could play havoc with slow moving helicopters. Standard flight altitudes cited in current doctrines would have proven catastrophic in view of this new enemy capability. Thus, low altitude, high speed "nape of the earth” tactics became the standard method of operation. Sand dunes, shrubs, low tree lines, or other topographical features were used to shield against the Strella.
Additionally, the enemy could concentrate rapidly large volumes of heavy artillery and antiaircraft fire in and around landing zones to counter a heliborne assault. To blunt this threat, helicopter assaults were planned so as to maximize the number of assault troops that could be placed into a landing zone in a single insertion. This eliminated the "daisy chain” tactical procedure. To accomplish this type of operation successfully, both medium and heavy helicopter assault assets were used in one wave. CH-46 medium helos led the assault, followed closely by CH-53 heavy support. This tactic gave the Vietnamese Marine commander the further advantage of having a good sized landing force inserted in one wave. Average aircraft availability provided the ground commander with 13 CH-46s and five CH-53s for single squadron operations and approximately twice that for dual squadron operations. Thus, approximately 600 assault troops or about double that number could be landed in a single lift, depending on whether one or two squadrons was employed.
The concept of multi-deck operations made this single wave type of operations possible. Use of all the helicopter spots available on accompanying amphibious shipping, in addition to the LPH, provided the available decks and time to lift an entire battalion into an LZ in one lift. These single wave operations deprived the enemy of his capability to concentrate artillery and antiaircraft on successive helicopter assault waves and greatly improved the probability of successful helicopter operations in a highly hostile environment.
Of all the lessons learned in this series of operations, however, one of the most important was that the complexity of amphibious operations has not changed, even when used in a support role. The fact that an Amphibious Task Force Commander was not designated did not negate the effectiveness of the planning
for, or direction of, the landings; rather, it increased the complexity of planning, required greater coordination and exposed clearly the variety of units that would normally be placed under one guiding authority. For example, nine separate commands and organizations actively participated in one operation in May 1972. Yet, the planning approach to Amphibious Operations outlined in NWP 22B worked.
Without the ships and without the Marine helicopters and LVTs more than 5,000 Vietnamese Marines could not have been put ashore where they were needed, when they were needed, to interdict and roll back the NVA forces. Had the same effort been expended on frontal assaults against the tenacious and sophisticated NVA forces, it is highly doubtful that South Vietnam would have regained control of territory as far north as Quang Tri City.
Undoubtedly, these operations marked a definite turning point in the war and accentuate the words of B. H. Liddell Hart: "Amphibious flexibility is the greatest strategic asset that a sea power possesses.”
Commissioned in 1946 from the NROTC Unit at the University of North Carolina, Rear Admiral Toole served in the USS Paul G. Baker (DE-642) and George Gymer (APA-27) before being assigned to the Naval Communication Station, Washington, D.C., in 1948. Designated a naval aviator in 1951, he flew with Patrol Squadron Ten until 1954, when he was assigned to the Office of the CNO as liaison officer with Headquarters, Directorate of Intelligence, U. S. Air Force. In 1957, he became Aide and Flag Lieutenant, Staff, ComMidEastFor. After flying two storm seasons with the Navy’s "Hurricane Hunters,” he became an assistant to the Director, Aviation Captains’ Detail in the Bureau of Personnel. He then served in and eventually commanded Patrol Squadron Seven. In February 1968, he became Naval Aide and Executive Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs). He is now Commander, Patrol and Reconnaissance Force, Seventh Fleet.
A graduate of the University of Maryland, Major General Miller was commissioned in June 1943 after enlisted service. Assigned to a parachute replacement battalion as a platoon commander, he later served with the 5th Marine Division in the campaign for Iwo Jima. After World War II he served in a variety of command and staff positions in China with the 11th Marines and the 4th Marines. He returned to Quantico where he taught at The Basic School. In 1952, he returned overseas, first to Japan, later to Korea, and then to Thailand as Senior Navy/Marine Corps Advisor. In 1957-59, he served on the Joint Staff at the Pentagon. Following attendance at the Armed Forces Staff College in 1965, he was ordered to Indonesia. After commanding the 4th Marines in Vietnam in 1968, he served on the staff of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific. From 1970-71 General Miller was the Marine Corps Liaison Officer in the Office of the CNO. His next tour was on Okinawa as ADC, 3d Marine Division, with additional duty as CG, 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade. In 1972, he came to HQMC, Washington, D.C., where he is the Deputy Chief of Staff for Installations and Logistics.
The authors wish to acknowledge the assistance of Colonel George Crist, HQMC, in preparing the article for publication.