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A continuing theme through these ^ power commentaries of the past ^cral years has been that the determining international developments of 'he last quarter century have been ec- °nomic rather than military. The inducing factors in relations between na- (ions have not been the existence of nuclear weapons, Soviet-American polity, or Arab-Israeli intransigence..
They have been the economic growth °f Europe and Japan, the exploitation °f Middle East oil, and the discovery °f vast raw materials in Australia,
Africa, and South America. The trag- etty of the period has been that polices, which is not an element in itself but a derivative of both military and nconomic strength, has been focused primarily on the military. The resulting Wars, however, despite the existence °f nuclear weapons, have been local, and the rest of the world has been allowed to go about its business. Nor has the prosecution of these wars been allowed to interfere with ocean transport. In Vietnam the United States, despite its strength upon the seas, did not use such effective tools °f maritime warfare as blockade (except, at the very last, by mining), declaration of contraband, or visit and search.
•'I classic freighter of foreign build and foreign flag standing out of Baltimore symbolizes the supremacy of the commercial ship—but not the supremacy of the classic freighter herself whose fallen status is given away by her bureaucratic description, "break-bulker. ” Large, fast container ships have driven ships such as this from the lucrative North Atlantic and North Pacific trades, while the world’s grains and ores now are carried mainly by huge, unattractive bulkers.
Merchant ships rather than warships have become the tools of power upon the seas and therefore in the world. These ships are largely international in character, and haul any cargo anywhere. Those flying flags of convenience are completely international and their owners are men without any national points of view. Freedom, not command or control, is the order of the oceans. There is peace at sea because men seek profit from this last area of free enterprise.
This is the background against which the maritime world at this time should be viewed. To appraise it understandingly, it will be necessary to go back a few years.
In 1970 ocean transport enjoyed a banner year, with freight rates the highest since 1957. In 1971, however, came a serious slump, with the tanker index dropping from 286.3 in October 1970 to 69-4 (based on a 1965 average of 100) the following July. By May 1972 it was down to 54.6 with so little prospect of change that it was announced a recently completed very large crude carrier (VLCC) for one of Norway’s foremost ship operator would be laid up upon delivery and possibly sold. Shipbuilding was also in a depressed state due to acceptance of orders in previous years to secure employment and not taking sufficiently into account the effect of inflation on future costs.
The following month, June 1973, came the announcement of large orders of grains to be purchased in the United States by the Soviet Union. The enormous sea movement resulting was paralled by orders taking wheat and cotton to China and the Indian subcontinent, plus an increase in petroleum imports by the United States.
The Arab-Israeli conflict in Octo
ber 1973 had no immediate maritime impact because it was a desert war. But the action of the oil producing Arab nations after it, in curtailing oil shipments to the United States, Western Europe and Japan, had deep impact not only on ocean transport and world trade but on the economies of these areas. The whole nature of foreign relations radically and suddenly changed as it has not since the opening of World War II.
The Wheat Deal
One of the first consequences of President Richard M. Nixon’s visit to the Soviet Union in May 1972 was a request by Soviet officials to purchase feed grain for cattle from the United States. The proposal was part of a plan to improve the standard of living of the Soviet people by increasing the ratio of beef to fish eaten in Russia. Fish is now the major source of protein in the Soviet diet.
This approach, however, was soon changed to a request for wheat for human consumption. Soviet grain production, as a result of both bad weather and poor management, had dropped alarmingly from 82.9 million tons in 1971 to 62.3 million in 1972.
Agreement was reached in July 1972 for the United States to supply 750 million dollars’ worth of wheat to the Soviet Union over a three year period, with 19.1 million tons to be shipped the first year. Before a contract with the Soviets could be signed, however, the U. S. government had to obtain assurances from the maritime and longshore unions that deliveries would not be hazarded by strikes and picketing, because 50 per cent of the
grain was not being carried in American ships as was the case with a similar sale in 1963. Henry Kissinger, the Presidential Assistant for Foreign Affairs, was involved in these negotiations.
Since 1963, the Soviet merchant marine had grown to be one of the largest in the world and was entitled to a share in this trade. The agreement reached on flag carriage was that one third of the wheat would go in U. S. vessels, one third in Soviet ships, and one third in those of other countries. Except for some shipments in the third category, negotiations over sale price further delayed the general movement of the wheat until early in December because the Soviets
refused to assume any of the added cost involved in shipping wheat in U. S.-flag vessels at $15 per ton over that for other flag vessels of about $10 per ton. U. S. taxpayers were thus required to pay for this entire subsidy. This was the first sour note in what turned out to be, all around, an unhappy affair. However, the Soviets in their next price negotiations changed their stand on this.
Three quarters of the wheat for Russia has been exported from the Texas ports of Houston and Galveston. The movement had hardly begun before factors outside of shipping began to affect it unfavorably, primarily a shortage of railroad cars. Another was the number and variety of govern-
ginning of major U. S. participation in the Vietnamese War. Some ships were delayed as long as 45 days with charges for demurrage running as high as $2,500 per day for foreign ships to about $6,000 for U. S.-flag vessels.
quick delivery, three months were lost in negotiations, and 75 per cent of the shipments had been scheduled through one port area. This last will probably be corrected through increased movement by barges down the Mississippi River system to New Orleans from the new port of Tulsa which has easy access to the Kansas wheat area.
The freight car shortage was intensified by the simultaneous large shipments of grain and cotton to China, India, and elsewhere. The sequence of events made the Soviet wheat deal increasingly unpopular throughout the country. Only Watergate diverted press coverage and pub-
ment sponsoring and controlling agencies. Among these were the Department of Agriculture for purchase and grain elevator operations; Interstate Commerce Commission for the railroads; and the Maritime Administration for ocean shipping. Two results of all this were one of the worst freight car shortages in U. S. railroad history and a gigantic ship tie-up.
During the first three months of 1973, as many as fifty ships were anchored off Galveston awaiting berth calls, a situation not unlike that in Espiritu Santo in the South Pacific during World War II, in San Francisco Bay at the opening of the Korean War, or at Yung Tau at the be-
By the end of April 1973, the port situation began to show improvement as hopper type freight cars were sent to the Midwest-Gulf area and ships were scheduled more realistically. By early summer the ship-jam off Galveston Bay was over. The freight car disruption, however, brought bitter aftereffects on the economy and in the public mind. A congressional investigating subcommittee summarized that too much grain had been sold for too
The Maritime World in 1973 245
lie attention from the grain impasse tod perhaps delayed corrective action.
international Ships Versus Mag Discrimination
For the first time the United States, ty the stipulation in the Soviet wheat contract that shipments would go dually in American, Soviet and third flag ships, publicly subscribed to flag discrimination and thus reversed a i°ng time policy of freedom of ocean trade. This agreement became a matter of concern to such foreign maritime nations as Great Britain, Norway, and Greece and thus furthered the separation of the United States from its NATO partners. Specifically, however, flag discrimination in this case did not work, for neither the United States nor the Soviet Union have been able to furnish their quota °f ships. One reason was the large movement of cereals to Bangladesh. According to the Maritime Adminis- trator, Robert J. Blackwell, every seaworthy ship in the greatly reduced American merchant marine is now gainfully employed. The reasons for rhe Soviets not meeting their ship ‘Juota is more difficult to determine, but the myth of the highly touted merchant marine of the Soviet Union ls being dispelled as it becomes more evident that the Russians do not yet know how to operate commercial ships efficiently according to the standards of other maritime countries. Third nation ships—British, Norwegian, Japanese, Greek, and Liberian, the last named under the ownership °f both Americans and Greeks—are moving over three quarters of the what.
The international character of shipping is best exemplified by the growth of the Liberian fleet, 42 per cent in tonnage over the past three years. Nearly all the ships registered in this fleet are owned by citizens and corporations of other countries. U. S. nationals own 23 million tons under flags of other countries, mostly in bulk carriers. This American-owned fleet comprises 12 per cent of the World’s tonnage. In contrast, the ships flying the U. S. flag only total 9
million tons, about 3'/2 per cent of the total.1 Moreover, many ship owners in other maritime nations are shifting to new flags of convenience, either those of small countries like Cyprus or semi-independent colonies like Bermuda.
Ocean transport was virtually all private enterprise until the creation of the great U. S. merchant fleet of World War II. After that war, the U. S. government succeeded in selling only a fraction of those ships to its nationals. Soviet merchant vessels have always been nationally owned but before 1956 their number in world trade was small. Now the Soviet fleet is the sixth largest in the world.
The growing fleets of the developing countries are also national, either owned or controlled by the state.
Over 40 per cent of raw materials exported are from developing countries, but only 7 per cent is carried in ships under flags of these nations. Their leaders want to improve their share with bilateral agreements. An example is Brazil’s arrangement with the United States for the transport of coffee, 40 per cent each in Brazilian and U. S.-flag vessels, with 20 per cent left to the other flags.
As the shipping of the traditional maritime countries becomes freer by going under flags of convenience and as the nationally owned fleets of developing nations grow, the clash between these rival interests create a problem that international maritime conventions have yet to resolve.2
Men in Ships
Over the past decade, merchant ship voyages have become longer and port time shorter; automation has reduced crew size while ships have become larger. But the human beings in these ships remain the same as before and have the same problems, accentuated by these changing situations. Boredom and loneliness are the most
'Samuel A. Lawrence, International Sea Transport: The Years Ahead (Lexington Books, D. C. Heath, 1973, p. 16.
2See Chapter I, "International Shipping Developments, Maritime Transport, 1972, published by OECD, pp. 14-15.
acute. Attempts to reduce both consist of improving living conditions and recreation, moving crew reliefs by air, and permitting wives on board. The first seems to have brought little improvement. The second affords more family life at home, the third brings it aboard. Wives of senior officers now regularly sail with their husbands, those of juniors for specified periods. Air movement of merchant seamen has remarkably improved during the past few years with travel agencies and some airlines organized for the purpose and scheduled carriers awakening to this pressing merchant shipping need.
Owners still resist family living on board, for this brings problems and
PEILSM
Two able seamen aboard the elderly American cargo ship Pennmar secure a protective tarpaulin over one of the ship’s boats. Though many changes have occurred recently in merchant shipping, none of them appears much to have improved the lives of the men who man the ships.
added expense. But with ample room in the larger ships now building, the sea village is now a possibility. Family life has long existed on the barges of Europe’s inland waterways.
Unlicensed personnel, as yet, are a lesser problem. As career opportunities improve ashore in Northwestern Europe and Japan, fewer young men from those lands go to sea. Crews now come from the poor areas like Spain, Southern Italy, India, Okinawa, and Taiwan. The sea still offers these people a better livelihood than they can get at home.
Changes in the World Merchant Fleet
The figures in the Table disclose some interesting facts on the present world shipping situation. Most significant has been the recent increase in the size of the Greek-flag fleet. In two years it has gone from seventh place to fifth in size. In 1972 it passed the U. S. fleet and this year that of the Soviet Union. The surprisingly small increase in the size of the latter fleet in 1973 indicates that the phenomenal
growth of the Soviet merchant marine is now leveling off. Another remarkable maritime growth has been that of Spain, which has become both a shipping and shipbuilding country.
New flags-of-convenience fleets are appearing and growing such as those of Cyprus, Singapore, and the Somali Republic. The Cyprus fleet is an outcome of the blacklist by the United States of ships trading with Cuba. It has become an instrument for the ubiquitous Greek shipping entrepeneurs who now are able to trade with Cuba without endangering their rich tanker business with the United States. Singapore provides flag-of-convenience service for Japanese shipping interests. The Somali Republic, unheard of as a maritime nation five years ago, now provides a flag of convenience for overage shipping that formerly used the flags of Liberia and Lebanon.
U. S. Shipping and Shipbuilding
The most satisfying American maritime event of 1973 was the launching on 1 July at the old Brooklyn navy yard of the largest ship (by dead
weight tonnage) yet built in the United States, the 1,094-foot 225,000 ton tanker Brooklyn. This longtime naval facility is now operated by the Seatrain Shipbuilding Corporation for the city of New York. The Brooklyn will be followed by two more of the same size. These ships will be the first American-flag ships to transport Persian Gulf crude oil to Northern Europe, a major change in U. S. maritime policy. They will not, however, be able to supply the East Coast of the United States until a superport is constructed in that area, an enterprise that is still in the talking stage. Several other very large ships are building in other U. S. yards, notably in San Diego and Quincy, Massachusetts.
The most encouraging sign in U. S. shipbuilding is the drop in its construction subsidies from 55 to 34 per cent. Shipyards enjoyed a favorable year in 1973, and the U. S. fuel shortage gives promise that it will continue.
Principal Merchant Fleets of the World*
(<Compared with 1972)
Steam and motorships, 100 tons gross and upwards
| thousand tons gross |
| thousand tons gross | |||
Liberia | 49,905 | ( + 5,461) | India | 2,887 | ( + | 237) |
Japan | 36,785 | ( + 1,856) | Canada | 2,423 | ( + | 42) |
Great Britain and N. Ireland | 30,160 | (+ 1,535) | Brazil | 2,103 | ( + | 218) |
Norway | 23,621 | (+ 114) | Poland | 2,073 | ( + | 60) |
Greece | 19,295 | ( + 3,966) | Singapore | 2,004 | (+1,133) | |
Russia (USSR) | 17,397 | (+ 663) | Yugoslavia | 1,667 | ( + | 79) |
USA | 14,912 | (- H2) | Somali Republic | 1,613 | ( + | 740) |
Panama | 9,569 | ( + 1,775) | Finland | 1,546 | (- | 84) |
Italy | 8,867 | (+ 680) | China, People’s Rep. of | 1,479 | ( + | 298) |
France | 8,289 | (+ 869) | China (Taiwan) | 1,467 | (- | 28) |
Germany, Fed. Rep. of | 7,915 | (- 601) | Argentina | 1,453 | ( + | 52) |
Sweden | 5,669 | ( + 37) | Portugal | 1,272 | ( + | 245) |
Netherlands | 5,029 | (+ 57) | German Democratic Rep. | 1,219 | ( + | 21) |
Spain | 4,833 | (+ 533) | Belgium | 1,162 | (- | 30) |
Denmark | 4,107 | (+ 87) | Australia | 1,160 | (- | 24) |
Cyprus | 2,936 | (+ 921) | Korea (South) | 1,104 | ( + | 47) |
World Total 289,927,000 tons ( + 21,587,000)
Lloyds Register of Shipping.
The size of the U. S.-owned foreign flag fleet took a big drop in July when the Zapata-Naess Shipping Company, the marine section of the Zapata conglomerate of Houston,
The Maritime World in 197 3 247
In November 1973 the largest commercial ship yet built in the United States, the tanker Brooklyn of 225,000 deadweight tons, moves down the East River from the old Brooklyn Navy Yard where she was built by the Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp. When empty the ship floats almost like a leaf on the water’s surface but, when laden with oil, only the darkest portion of her great hull will be visible.
Texas, was sold to Peninsula and Oriental (P. & O.) Shipping Corporation °f London and to the Norwegian flag-of-convenience ship operator, Hel- mar Reksten, who is controlling stockholder of Palmerston Holdings, Ltd., a group of major shipping companies based in Bergen and London. The sale involving 37 foreign flag bulk carriers °f 2.25 million deadweight tons and five of 1.1 million deadweight tons under construction was one of the biggest transactions in American shipping history. The new company will have the name of Anglo Nordic Shipping, Ltd.
The sale ends Zapata’s foreign flag operation but not its interest in shipping. Before the sale was completed, Zapata made application to the Maritime Administration for a construction subsidy on three 390,000-ton tankers.
The retirement in March of Mr.
Joe Curran, founder and only president of the National Maritime Union, gives hope of a sea labor peace as his rival, the moderate and more statesmanlike Paul Hall, head of the Seafarers International Union, becomes the unquestioned sea labor leader. Appeals from shipping companies abroad to fill their critical shortages of deck officers in foreign flag ships is getting a favorable reaction from U. S. officer unions. These have been hurt by the decline of American-flag shipping and have heavy pension commitments to their retired members. American merchant marine personnel, due to the exacting requirements of the U. S.
Coast Guard, are the most proficient
on the oceans, and their increased presence in licensed billets abroad should do much to raise the level of officer competence and to improve sea safety.
Shipping companies continue to have financial difficulties, many of them stemming from involvement with conglomerates. Litigation, in which the U. S. shipping community always seems to be involved, took a new direction in 1973 in the form of the minibridge controversy. The term minibridge is a newly created derivative of land bridge which means the shipping of containers by railroad across land areas to reduce sea haul time. Minibridge refers specifically to the overland transport of containers from West Coast ports direct to eastern destinations, eliminating the use of East Coast ports. These ports, having made large capital investments in container handling, are fighting to retain this traffic and the jobs and revenues that go with it. They have asked for an injunction halting the minibridge process until its legality is ruled on by the Federal Maritime Commission. This could take a year or more.
Some Maritime Literature
Perhaps the one scholarly, articulate, and objective American observer of the world shipping scene is Samuel A. Lawrence, administrative vice president of Cornell University. He writes in his latest book, International Sea Transport: The Years Ahead, "By any standard the transformation
occurring in international shipping is impressive. Translated into personal terms, it has created a panorama of electrifying experiences: youthful managers catapulted into the presidencies of hoary old companies, other established personalities as rapidly let out, ex-truck drivers and fur merchants outperforming experienced professionals in organizing new services and whole companies bought and sold over breakfast.”
Lawrence’s new book observes that "One of the long range problems which face this industry and others is how enterprises of an essentially international character are to be licensed, taxed and regulated by appropriate public authorities.”[1][2]
The year 1973 saw two additional valuable books added to the sparse worthwhile maritime literature. The Business of Shipping (Cornell Maritime Press) is by Lane C. Kendall, well known to Naval Review readers. The second is the new edition of Big Load Afloat, the superbly illustrated trade volume of the American Waterways Operators, Inc., the association of the barge and towing industry. An earlier edition was examined in Naval Review 1973, pages 298-301.
The Arab Oil Embargo
ended on 21 October. That day nine Arab nations, seven in the Persian Gulf area plus Algeria and Libya, an nounced a ban on all shipments of petroleum to the United States because of that country’s support of Israel in the 1973 Middle East War. Eight of these nations similarly boycotted Holland. In addition, cutbacks of from 5 to 26 per cent were imposed on other countries in West Europe and Japan, ostensibly to prevent petroleum sold to these nations from being diverted to the United States but primarily to force them to take a determined stand against Israel. Shipments to South Africa were also
banned, in compliance with an earlier request from the Organization of African Unity. All the boycotting states were members of OAPEC, the politically motivated Arab element of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries.
The economics of Western Europe after the Marshall Plan and Japan after the Korean War had shifted from a coal to a petroleum basis. But, though Europe is finding some oil in the North Sea, Japan has none. Almost all of the crude it refines comes from the Arab states of the Persian Gulf. The cutbacks affected its economy seriously and forced an end to
The Arab oil cutbacks caused the demand for tankers to be reduced sharply. In one day freight rates for this type of ship dropped from $45 per ton to $20 and in some cases down to $10 for spot charters. The situation created problems never before experienced by independent tanker owners. What they feared was the declaration of force majeure, a legal term which means an unexpected and disruptive event that may operate to excuse a party from a contract. Indeed, Texaco used force majeure to cancel spot contracts on all shipments to South Africa, 25 per cent of those to Europe, and 10 per cent to destina-
The politics of the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf are symbolized by the 1,290-ton Iranian frigate Saam (left) as she passes the 5,850-ton Soviet destroyer Skritnii at Alassawa, Ethiopia, in March 1973. The ship in the background is the ancient Indian cruiser Mysore. Iran has acquired a substantial force of warships and aircraft and unlike Iraq, where the Soviet Union reportedly has gotten base rights, her position is a good one for dominating the Persian Gulf.
Japanese indifference to international politics. The government was confronted with the dilemma of offending either the Arabs or the powerful Jewish American business community. Heavy industry, directly affected by the oil cuts, favored a pro-Arab policy but because of the decline in Japan’s balance of payments light industry, exporters, and trading houses, wanted the government to oppose Arab demands. The Japanese cabinet took the step favoring the Arabs, stating Japan was no longer in agreement with the views of the United States and that Israel had unlawfully occupied Arab territories by use of force.
tions in the Indian Ocean. Most of all the independents dreaded the oil companies using this to abrogate lon5 time contracts, for the financing of new bulk carriers is based largely on time contracts of 10 to 15 years; it lS these contracts that are mortgaged and not the ships themselves.
By the beginning of the new yeaf the situation appeared to be sorting itself out. But in the meantime those tanker owners who shifted to the grain trade met the problem facing ■' ship owners, bunkering, especially in foreign ports. Before the October 'vjr' shipping companies had adopted the practice of taking fuel for only the
The Maritime World in 197 3 249
outward voyage to permit heavier loading, especially in the highly competitive container trade. One immediate result was a giant container ship stranded in Hong Kong where no fuel could be obtained to return to the United States.
Most of the U. S. Sixth Fleet’s oil came from Italian refineries which obtained their crude from the Middle East. Italy was forced to reduced oil shipments to the Fleet, and the Defense Department then placed big demands on U. S. oil companies which necessarily cut into the United Spates’ civilian supply.
The U. S. Navy suffered a far more serious and permanent setback in the loss of its one base in the Persian Gulf. On 20 October the United States was told by the Sheik of Bahrein that it had one year to get out. King Faisal of Saudi Arabia who has good political and family relations with the Sheik was asked by the United States to induce the latter to cancel the order, but the king refused Because he felt the United States was not doing enough to bring about a withdrawal from the sections of Jerusalem once held by Jordan. Meanwhile, the Soviets are assisting Iraq to build a naval base at Umm Qasr, near Basra 2nd Abadan in Iran, at the head of the Persian Gulf. At the same time ban, a non-Arab Persian Gulf country which did not cut its oil supply to the United States, is strengthening its oaval forces.
The strategic situation has been affected in another way to the disadvantage of the United States. The Warsaw Pact nations of East Europe cooperated energetically in Soviet assistance to Egypt and Syria in the latest Middle East War while NATO members, concerned over oil supplies, were reluctant to assist the United States.
But, as in the Cuban crisis, the American people neither knuckled under nor panicked.[3] Instead, they rightened their belts and took a critical look at their former wasteful petroleum-using practices. By the beginning of the new year OAPEC, after almost doubling the price of crude, an-
U'ecJ. D. Hayes, "Sea Power and Sea Law,” US.N.I. Proceedings, May 1964, pp. 61-62.
nounced that quotas to all European countries (except the Netherlands) and to Japan would be materially increased. Moreover, U. S. officials disclosed that considerable Arab oil was still reaching the United States, mostly from small states on the Persian Gulf plus from Iraq, Algeria, and Libya, all of whom need its revenue.
James Forrestal and the Oil Embargo
Naval Review, 1966, page 242, indicated that other countries besides the United States had sea power even though in that year our naval power was unchallenged in the world. One form was evidenced by the statement: "Some nations . . . have an influence on sea power because they possess raw materials essential to modern industrial societies. Canada, Venezuela, and the countries of the Middle East are in that category.”
With their maritime embargo the oil producing Arab states bested not only the heretofore invincible Israelis but also the powerful Americans. Resources, perhaps for the first time, have been used as a direct political weapon rather than simply for logistic support of military action. This is economic warfare in its most devastating form. There was daily evidence that its effects are the same as those predicted for a general maritime war, bringing vital overseas trade to a halt and changing an integrated thriving world into one separated and economically stagnant.[4] In this case, however, no suitable naval reaction is apparent.
A necessary and powerful navy has suddenly become powerless.
When ships with oil do not move neither do ships with other goods and a chaos of maritime want is added to the chaos of maritime order previously discussed. In this essentially civil area of maritime disorder, however, a remedy may be available in the experience and reputation of the U. S. Coast Guard.
The Coast Guard as an International Service?
The United States is uniquely blessed in having two sea arms, one of national defense and the other of humanitarian service and law enforcement. When Russian or Japanese fishermen violate the sovereignty of the United States by fishing in our territorial waters, it is U. S. Coast Guard cutters that take them into custody. Hence it has been the men of the Coast Guard, not those of the Navy,
5See Naval Review, 1973, page 309, "Ocean Warfare or Ocean Order,” first paragraph.
250
A Coast Guard HH-3F drops dry chemicals on the burned out wreck of a Liberian freighter grounded in the Mississippi River 50 miles below New Orleans in September 1973. The ship, which was carrying an assortment of hazardous cargoes, was a total loss.
who have had the confrontations with the Soviets.
In contrast, the United Kingdom, the senior maritime nation of the world, has no organization which encompasses the many areas of nautical jurisdiction as does the U. S. Coast Guard. The necessary duties are scattered over half a dozen agencies. Frigates of the Royal Navy served in Britain’s fisheries disputes with Iceland in ways that, had it been our country that was involved, would be the duty of Coast Guard ships.
The United States has a Coast Guard today, ready to assume additional worldwide responsibilities because Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce, U. S. Navy, the founder of the Naval War College and an outstanding maritime administrator, was able back in 1892 to make the distinction between the roles and missions of the Navy and those of the Revenue Cutter Service. Luce then opposed successfully a bill in Congress which would have amalgamated these two Services in order to improve professional opportunities for the officers of both.
This bill had the approval of the Secretaries of the Navy and the Treasury. Luce opposed it because he held that the funciton of the Navy was military, with its operating area on the high seas; the Revenue Cutter service was civilian, operating primarily within coastal waters. Much has changed since then. But what hasn’t changed is that in event of amalgama
tion, one of these functions would be neglected, and the necessary United States presence in both sea areas would not be fully evident to the Maritime world.
It is due to Luce’s outspoken action that the United States has its Coast Guard today, ready to assume the many jobs of service a maritime nation requires, while the Navy devotes itself to the single task of defense at sea.
The advantage in having a Coast Guard is that it is ready to meet the growing requirements of a maritime nation at sea as they become evident and demanding. This is done in two ways. First, a uniformed, disciplined service is available to accept maritime tasks that have been found to be beyond the capabilities of civilian agencies. Cases are the Life Boat Service, the Light House Service, the Bureau of Steam Navigation and the Steamboat Inspection Service, all of which were absorbed into the Coast Guard. The second is in having an organization ready to assume new duties as the need for them is recognized and authorized by Congress. Among these over the years have been search and rescue, icebreaking, marine assistance in floods and hurricanes, port security, the policing of marine regattas, the protection of fisheries, the operation of Loran, and the regulation of recreational motor boats and inland water traffic.
But now it is with the interna
tional activities and potentialities that ( we are concerned, for it is upon all f
the oceans, and not only those adja- ' cent to the American coast, that the service of the Coast Guard is so ut- t
gently needed. I
The Coast Guard has been associ- > 3
ated with international activities fori long time. Following the sinking of J the passenger liner Titanic in 1912, c
the U. S. Navy established an ice pa- (
trol. But the next year the Navy was t
reluctant to continue the patrol, and i American maritime interests prevailed upon the Treasury Department to as- i sign a couple of revenue cutters to 1
the task. In 1914 the patrol was estab- t
lished as an international activity, pai^ I
for by the world maritime community , but actually conducted by U. S. revenue cutters, as Coast Guard vessels then were styled.
The enormous growth of trans- i
oceanic aviation during and after ]
World War II led to a vast expansion of the need for weather information and for search and rescue forces.
Under the sponsorship of the Interna- | ,
tional Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) quite a number of weather stations were established in the Atlantic. Again, though many countries i
contributed to the support of these stations only a few countries actually provided the necessary ships, and among these the United States was foremost. The ships contributed by this country were, of course, those of the Coast Guard. A similar agreement
The Maritime World in 1973 251
with Canada provided ocean station vessels in the Pacific. Only recently have the American ships been withdrawn from these weather stations.
The Coast Guard’s Automated Vessel Reporting System, in service in the Atlantic since 1958 and more recently in the Pacific, is a voluntary arrangement in which ships of all flags report their intended routing to the Coast Guard so that when a vessel is in distress the nearest suitable ship can be sent to the aid of those in trouble.
This increases greatly the ability of a rather small Service to help mariners in distress on the high seas. The Coast Guard, of course, employs its own ships, boats, and airplanes in rescue work without regard to the nationality of those in distress, but the Coast Guard’s numbers are small compared to the number of ships at sea which can also help.
The Coast Guard also provides medical advice to ships without doctors, in cooperation with physicians and surgeons from the Public Health Service. A private organization in Rome, the International Radio Medical Center (CIRM), partly financed by the Italian government, also gives medical advice by radio to mariners wherever they may be.
The world’s principal electronic navigation system, Loran, is another Coast Guard activity in the international arena. During World War II the development of Loran was assigned to the Coast Guard, and a former Lighthouse Service officer was put in charge. Nowadays most of the world’s sea lanes are covered by Loran stations. The North Atlantic and Mediterranean net includes Canadian, Danish, Norwegian, Icelandic, and American manned stations. Coordination is through the London headquarters of Coast Guard Activities, Europe.
In addition the Coast Guard maintains merchant marine details in principal seaports of the world in order to be of assistance to, and if necessary help maintain law and order aboard,
U. S.-flag merchant ships in the area;
‘t supervises construction of vessels being built overseas for U. S. flag use and, in the case of certain specialized ships such as liquified natural gas car
riers, even of foreign flag ships which intend to enter U. S. ports. It maintains connections with foreign government agencies, private agencies, and industries with which it shares professional interests, such as, in Britain, the National Life Boat Institute, Lloyd’s Register of Shipping, and the Royal Air Force. The services of the Coast Guard are so highly regarded that sometimes ship owners who have no intention of sending ships to American ports will ask to have their vessels under construction inspected by Coast Guard officers.
Clearly, then, the U. S. Coast Guard is highly experienced in the international arena and is well regarded by those with whom it comes in contact. Now, more must be done in that arena, not so much in the fields of safety and assistance to those in distress as in the critical area of law enforcement. Here, of course, nationalism and sovereignty stand in the way and countries are touchy about such things. Yet competence of crews is declining and the number of collisions, explosions and sinkings increases. The crowded waterways become more dangerous than ever, and the likelihood of pollution rises.
The reason for these unbearable conditions is the sterility of international law and the lack of any power of enforcement in agencies of the United Nations. An example of the former was the case of the American owned, Liberian flag tanker Torrey Canyon which, be it remembered, was wrecked in March 1967 on Seven Stone Rocks off Lands End, England, spewing 120,000 tons of oil on British and French beaches. The British government was unable to get any damages from the owners, the Union Oil Company of California, through international law tribunals. By chance, however, another ship of that company had to stop at Singapore for emergency repairs. National law then proved effective through an eight million dollar lien which British Treasury agents there placed on this vessel. The case was then quickly settled out of court with $7.5 million for damages going to the British and French governments.
On the record of its accom
plishments as a peace keeping organization, the United Nations offers little promise in the area of law enforcement. In the critical matter of oil pollution at sea, the convention in 1969 of the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (imco), an agency of the U.N., has so far been accepted by only 13 of its 44 members. Not until this convention is ratified by two thirds of the members can the shipping community be forced to take corrective action.
The U. S. Coast Guard has the know-how and the organization to bring order to the world ocean in all the categories where corrective action is urgently needed; in pollution control, crew competence, vessel inspection, and traffic control.
Traffic control systems in harbors and approaches are becoming common, both in the United States and in Europe, but are there any cases of traffic control in international waters? Yes—in the approaches to ports of the United States. The outstanding case is the Gulf of Mexico where petroleum drilling has been going on since the end of World War II.
About 2,500 hundred oil well structures are located offshore, some as far out as sixty miles. In one period of three years, fifty cases of ships hitting structures were reported. The chance of a ship being blown into the oil well area during a hurricane is a dread of masters and Coast Guardsmen.
Today this coastal area is divided equitably between fairlanes with anchorage areas and regions restricted to offshore drilling. The arrangements for this were made at low levels between maritime and petroleum interests. Had this been referred to IMCO, no more progress would probably have been made than has been with pollution. The U. S. Army Corps of Engineers, in this case, established regulations for drilling, and U. S. Coast and Geodetic charts show the shipping lanes and anchorage areas. Masters of foreign vessels and their owners are happy with this workable arrangement. At one time concern was felt whether the Soviets would respect this fencing off a portion of international waters. The U.S.A.-U.S.S.R. wheat deal settled that question when the Russian and Polish ships entering and leaving Gal- vestion Bay observed these safety arrangements.
Incoming and outgoing sea lanes have been established off other ports, avoiding more such disasters as the sinking of the Italian liner Andrea Doria near New York in 1956. This is one case of national jurisdiction being extended and accepted amicably beyond the three or twelve mile limit because of urgent need.
Regulation and order are now com
ing to the growing barge traffic in the inland waters of the United States. Enlightened maritime legislation and rigorous Coast Guard enforcement is bringing this about.
All of this indicates that IMCO or some more effective agency must without delay provide a uniform code for law and order upon the surface of the world’s oceans. A new legal system with its own courts more related to municipal law than to international law will probably be required. The law enforcement arm already functioning on a national and, to a limited extent, on an international level, is available in the U. S. Coast Guard with its traditions, experience, and especially the respect that it has gained within the world shipping community.
But how is the Coast Guard to be given the authority to police the oceans of the world? It is one thing for a nation to participate in the organization of an ocean search and rescue force on a worldwide basis, it is something else again to give up its sovereignty to bring order upon the seas— especially when the nations that would be foremost in having to do so would be maritime Britain and proud France.
The smaller maritime nations could become advocates of Coast Guard policing the oceans, especially those who are carriers of U. S. trade such as Norway and Greece. The nation that most needs law enforcement for its ships is non-maritime Liberia. But the men and corporations that own these flag-of-convenience ships must first be convinced that such policing of the seas does not mean loss of their unbounded and cherished freedom thereon.
Perhaps, therefore, only another great calamity like the Titanic disaster will bring this about. Every safety precaution, it seems, has to be written in blood.
Tragedy that it is, the Arab oil embargo may provide the chance for extending the U. S. Coast Guard’s capabilities. The Sheik of Bahrein may be induced, at the urging of King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, to permit the United States to keep the naval facility there as a Coast Guard base, thereby offering to this dangerous, easily polluted
sea area the benefits of pollution control, law enforcement, and safety at sea. The King is reported anxious to maintain good relations with the United States as a counterweight to Soviet influence in the Persian Gulf which will certainly be enhanced by the reopening of the Suez Canal. Faisal, a devout Moslem, is a zealous anti-Communist. Iran, growing in naval power in the Persian Gulf and on friendly terms with Saudi Arabia, may see the need for a Coast Guard similar to that organized for South Korea as a means of maintaining maritime instead of just naval control of Gulf waters.
Some countries in South America, especially the developing maritime nations of Brazil and Peru, should also perceive the advantages of having an American type of Coast Guard. Perhaps a Coast Guard officer could profit' ably be assigned to the U. S. naval mission in each of these countries.
Of more consequence would be the establishment of an international planning section at Coast Guard headquarters with a dynamic flag officer in charge. This office would extend world-wide liaison now being performed for Europe by U. S. Coast Guard Activities, London, as detailed above. It could provide the representatives at all international conventions and meetings and foster, even instigate, them in the many areas where they are now badly needed. Above all it would develop internationally minded officers who would be ready with plans and programs whenever opportunities permitted.
The dream of continued prosperity for the world shipping community
[2] International Sea Transport: The Years Ahead. (Lexington Books; D. C. Heath, 1973), pp. 192, 253.
James Forrestal, first Secretary of Defense, tragic hero and Pentagon casualty, had he lived to 1974, would have been 84 years of age. Today he could have every right to say "I told you so,” although he probably would not.
As early as May 1947, Forrestal warned that Middle East oil "was going to be necessary for this country not merely in wartime but in peacetime.” It was for this reason that he openly opposed the partition of Palestine until a year later when the nation of Israel was officially recognized by the United States. In cabinet meetings he fought for allocations of steel for the Arabian pipeline to Lebanon which finally was completed in 1950. He also argued that without access to Middle East oil the Marshall plan could not succeed, and we would not be able to fight a war or even maintain the increasing tempo of our peacetime economy. He predicted that "within ten years” American motor car manufacturers would have to convert to four cylinder cars. Until his death on 22 May 1949, he believed the partition to be a mistake. In January of that year, however, he did state to the National Security Council that we could fight a war for a considerable period without access to Middle East oil. But that was 25 years ago.
Forrestal, like most Americans, viewed events in a short time-frame.
He was also by nature impatient. He therefore had assumed that Arab anger over the 1948 partition would bring immediate reaction, probably in the form of guerrilla warfare. Instead the backlash took almost a generation to come, but when it did, it came with crushing economic force.