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The important consideration is what rapidly deployed forces will be able to do when they reach the scene of action. Naval and marine forces—because they are ready now, flexible in capability, and able to effect forcible entry in foreign lands—are best suited for the role of “unilateral intervention ” on behalf of IJ. S. national interests.
Few current defense programs have been criticized more than the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) and Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF). Because the RDF is not all things for all seasons, some commentators consider it a failure overall. Others criticize the RDJTF for not having forces assigned to it. Still others label it a slapdash organization created in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
In truth. “Rapid Deployment Force” is a euphemism conjured up overnight for the more inflammatory "Unilateral Intervention Force.” The UIF was a direct outgrowth of Presidential Review Memorandum 10 and Presidential Directive 18. papers which were issued in August 1977—before the fall of the Shah of Iran and the invasion of Afghanistan. These events did serve as catalysts to bring about the implementation of the concept.
The concept rests on the premise that the viability of U. S. alliances and a world system of public and economic order hinge upon stability. This system is in delicate balance at best. Because of the innumerable linkages of economic interdependence, destabilizing events in distant waters often affect the United States, even though the effects are sometimes not immediately felt. It is prudent, therefore, that the United States maintain a capability to help balance the scales of the world public order system when they shift. Bluntly speaking, the United States must maintain an intervention capability, to be used unilaterally if necessary.
The general capabilities described in 1977 took specific shape more than two years later. In his third annual report (dated 29 January 1980), Secretary0 Defense Harold Brown described the RDF in overview of “Non-Nuclear Capabilities.” In add1' tion to two hardware programs—the Maritime Pr°' positioning Ships and the CX transport aircraft— secretary reported the creation of a rapid depl°> ment joint task force. It was to be based in 1,1 continental United States and commanded by ** Marine Corps lieutenant general. Secretary BrovV stated that the RDF would not be established as separate force of a given size. Instead, exist,n- forces designated for the RDF would constitute joint “reservoir” from which to draw a specified > tailored capability. For example, the Army’s con tribution could vary in size from a platoon of rang0 to a multi-division corps. He made it clear that t was a four-service endeavor.
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Components: The U. S. nonnuclear power Pr°^Q{ tion system should be considered as comprise0 the following: rapid deployment (forcible en forces, rapid (light) reinforcement forces, delibe (heavy) reinforcement forces, and sustaining t°rC^e Four essential criteria characterize an immed reaction or rapid deployment force. First, the >° ^ must be in being, ready to move into combat at s notice. Second, it must be flexible enough to ta ^ its organization to the mission’s requirements to absorb other forward deployed forces and P, positioned/airlift-configured forces into a °n .x whole. That is, it must have an agreed d°c foundation such as the Doctrine for Amph^1 Operations (NWP 22). Third, it must be so n10^ strategically as to lend itself to deployment by { means available. Fourth, to be a useful instru of national security “in every clime and place.
must be tactically employable directly from its strategic lift into a chosen geographic area.
The RDF is made up principally of the following: Naval forces—carrier battle groups, surface ac- tlon groups, amphibious forces, and marine air- ®r°und task forces (MAGTFs)
* Tactical air forces—Air force fighter wings (if decoyed to assembly areas adjacent to the objective)
Land forces—Airborne division and air assault Vision (the latter if deployed to assembly areas ^jacent to the objective)
* Mobility forces—Military Sealift Command and Military Airlift Command
The rapid deployment forces must be capable of resPonding to a wide range of requirements involves independent ground combat operations for 30 to ® days, within 50 to 100 miles of a seaport. Both el°city and mass are important in this context; QWever, if one had to choose, the emphasis would e °n velocity. The RDF must also be capable of Pr°viding the full spectrum of military capability 'dependent of overseas basing in order to effect e8'onal force balance (presence) and hence stability; meeting the majority of non-NATO contingencies by itself; or of effecting the initial forcible response if necessary. Amphibious doctrine is a foundation on which this capability can be built. Amphibious warfare shipping is an essential sealift component—vessels specifically designed as naval combatants and characterized by the ability to remain on station with embarked troops for extended periods. These ships can operate under circumstances in which the enemy opposes the landing and there are no port facilities available.
The Rapid (Light) Reinforcement Forces (RRF) differ from the RDF principally by the former's lack of a forcible entry capability, although the RDF would also be suited to the RRF role. In this category fit Army infantry and air assault divisions and Marine Corps air-ground task forces oriented on maritime prepositioning ships or inserted by follow- on amphibious shipping. The ships that are associated with the maritime prepositioning program should be specially designed with spread combat loading capability that permits simultaneous access to equipment in both horizontal and vertical planes.
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Training in this country prepares marines for potential use around the globe. Because of the heavy equipment prepositioned on board ships in the Indian Ocean, rapid deployment for these marines in California is only a plane ride away.
COURTESY OF
load
must be immediately available in U. S. ports to
COURTESY OF LEATHERNECK
They should also have the self-sustaining qualities that are the hallmark of amphibious warfare ships. The requirement for the prepositioned ships is independent of the level of amphibious lift.
The Deliberate Reinforcement Forces (DRF) consist of heavy land forces (armored and mechanized divisions). They require a more methodical deployment than the RDF or RRF. For any extended intervention or campaign, heavy forces are essential components that provide the momentum behind the rapid deployment/reinforcement spearhead. Large, fast, roll-on/roll-off vessels (for example, converted SL-7s) capable of rapid load and off-load and “dash” transit speeds are required to lift some of these forces, particularly for early deployment.
The Sustaining Forces are primarily combat service support oriented. They operate ports, airheads, and facilities within the communications zone and provide the line-haul transportation between the communications zone and the combat zone. They are predominantly Army and Navy forces which will be lifted mainly by ships recalled through the Sealift Readiness Program and from the Ready Reserve Fleet component of the National Defense Reserve Fleet. Because of the time lag in the availability of ships in the former category and only limited numbers of ships in the latter, the nation must ensure that it has sufficient sustaining sealift to support a
unilateral intervention in distant waters. This is Par ticularly true during the first critical days when ship* sustaining supplies for combat operations subse quent to day 30.
The rapid deployment forces must have the fleX ibility of organization and tactical mobility and hr power necessary to defeat armor-heavy oppunen without imposing the penalties in strategic mobih ) that the more heavy-equipment-laden deliberate r inforcement forces must pay. The RDF neel^ ,nnt and should not be capable of totally independe operations for an indefinite period. s
Given these criteria, how well do naval f°rC measure up? .y
Three decades ago, “rapid deployment” as fast as the fastest ship. Today, if “rapid’ |S key word, people all too often conclude that air^ is the way to go. The physical capability of anta. craft to lift a main battle tank is a mixed ^esSleS It is a superlative means of relocating war reser and spares (witness the airlift to Israel in ^cto^0 1973), but it also risks piecemeal commitment- maximize their effectiveness, ground combat n are usually committed to combat only after acm ^ ing a critical combat mass (that is, by brigau6^ divisions). Under these circumstances, sealift 1* (
so slow. In fact, a Military Traffic Manage ^ Command study showed that the entire 10^s qqO Assault Division would be ready for combat ^ miles from its home station, two days sooner deployed by sea than by air. . ^
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Proceedings / V>'el
Naval forces embody all the characteristic* j essary for a rapid deployment force. The fieet* 3|-d their Fleet Marine Forces are in being. F°rol)t afloat deployments in four oceans, m°^n boxes, operational readiness tests, and “c*10f up on the step” are all part of an accepted * \ (0 life. Marine air-ground task forces are des'g1) es fight as combined arms teams. Amphibious organized around joint doctrine, supported by ^ fleet deployments, and directed by an it1**-- command and control system, are sufficiently ^ ible to absorb other forces into a unified wbo A provides the capability to effect a forcible en
W **•« f.
truly expeditionary tactical aviation package that deludes a complete air command and control capability is an integral part of these forces. Furthermore, the air-ground task forces are supported by an integrated logistics system that assures efficient combat service to the Fleet Marine Forces and read- accommodates the maritime prepositioning ship c°ncept. Lastly and most importantly, air-ground task forces, with their organic helicopters and amphibian vehicles embarked in amphibious warfare ships and supported by carrier battle groups provide lhe most reliable—and, under most circumstances, ’he only—forcible entry capability in the U. S. arSenal. The capability is the more awesome if the a'rborne forces are committed as part of the total amphibious operation.
Naval forces, particularly elements of the FMF, a’e poised to carry out the rapid reinforcement mis- Sl°n as well. Continuously maintained air contin- 8ency battalion landing teams in each Marine divi- Sl°n have demonstrated their ability to make long- j'ange reinforcing deployments, with only a few °Urs’ notice, by way of the Military Airlift Command. Furthermore, the California-based personnel i ’he 7th Marine Amphibious Brigade stand ready °day to marry up with their heavy equipment that } °n board near-term prepositioning ships in the miian Ocean. Given that the pacing items in any ePloyment are the major items of equipment, it is m stretching the truth to say that, in a sense, the ( h Mab is already in the Indian Ocean area waiting 0 he committed.
Another area of contention is the type of warfare e RDF should be prepared to fight. Traditionally, (.e United States has applied a “firepower/attri- °n” style of war. As more and more sophisticated eapons have been accumulated during the past ten „ears ^ coun’r'es ‘n ’he Persian Gulf region, this of warfare becomes less and less attractive.
>. eiator Gary Hart espouses an alternative, the ^maneuver” style illuminated by retired Air Force °0r|el John Boyd. Hart explains:
. Briefly, Boyd has observed that in any conflict S|’uation (not just warfare), all parties go through r^Peated cycles of observation-orientation-deci- S|°n-action. The potentially victorious party is the
with an observation-orientation-decision-ac- ■on cycle consistently quicker than his oppo- n.en’’s. As the faster party repeatedly cycles in- s,c*e his opponent, the opponent finds he is losing mantrol of the situation. . . . Suddenly, he realizes ere is nothing he can do to control the situation,
,r ’urn it to his advantage. At that point, he has >Ost.”
a11 the U. S. forces, the Rapid Deployment ^ should be prepared to conduct maneuver kcare- That the force should be highly integrated Insistent with this theory. It is for these reasons several commentators have advocated giving
the entire RDF mission to the Marine Corps (that is, to the naval forces). When circumstances require forcible entry, this is the one force that is able to drive a spearhead into the objective area to enable the maritime prepositioned ship brigades and other U. S. components to come ashore or be airlifted initially as reinforcements before assuming the key ground combat role. Conversely, if the force of prepositioned ships is able to go in first—for example, to reinforce an ally rapidly—the amphibious capability provides a potent accompaniment.
A possible improvement would be the formation of a Marine expeditionary headquarters. It would facilitate the command and control of a Marine expeditionary force, built around the three maritime prepositioning ship brigades, and a composite marine amphibious force that is deployed incrementally (by amphibious brigade) for any force projection scenario. It would also provide a means to command and control elements of the other services until the joint task force headquarters is established for subsequent combat operations ashore. If the third active marine amphibious force, normally oriented on NATO, is released as an RDF or an RRF, it too could be placed under the command and control of the naval and marine forces.
In summary, it is clear that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan narrowed the focus of what had been a worldwide mission for a Rapid Deployment Force comprised primarily of light ground forces. The creation of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force changed the complexion of the force by including heavier ground forces and by adding to the total force level committed. In essence, the RDF encompasses the total U. S. force projection capability. A defensible proposition is that the RDF has been subsumed within the RDJTF. Where the RDJTF parts company with past performance is by maintaining an extant contingency headquarters that is prepared not next week, nor next month, but today to command forces in combat. Naval forces, including the Marine Corps, provide unique capabilities that suit them best for the role of rapid deployment.
Lieutenant Colonel Quinlan was graduated from the Naval Academy in 1960 with a B.S. in engi- ’ neering. He subsequently received an M.S. in systems analysis from the University of Rochester in 1970 and a J.D. in international law from The George Washington University in 1979. He attended the Industrial College of the Armed Forces in 1979-1980. He commanded a rifle company in Vietnam in the 1960s and the amphibious evacuation security force when that country fell in 1975. He was aide to the Commandant of the Marine Corps in 1973-1974. He has held various staff billets, among them duties at Headquarters Marine Corps and in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Colonel Quinlan is now Program Coordinator, Requirements and Programs Division, Headquarters Marine Corps.
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lnRs 1 No> ember 1981
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