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Th
e Kidd DDG: The Non-Nuclear Standard.
“V Lie,
utenant Commander John G. Morgan, Jr., U. S. Navy
Irar)C ^ early 1970s, the late Shah of strov°r erec^ ^our guided missile de- 'itto^ d)DGs) t0 be constructed by rati0nS^n®a^s Shipbuilding Corpo- ar°und h S^‘PS were t0 be designed itlg j £ e Spruance hull and engineer- the and were to be armed with terns R available naval weapon sys- in ban e^ause cbe political upheaval
u
'"vse C^e S^*PS were never delivered, the U 'oI’IGs bave been repurchased for (t)ly. ‘ blavy, renamed the Kidd-class
■ .^-993-0
join fleet
Th,
th a "6b and are beginning to »,cet cu Cet' 'Pbeir contribution to our Wd-Ci °U*d significant. For the
I — *»*gnniv.aiiL. iui Luc
ampiesSS Dc>Gs are extraordinary ex” ° cost-efficient and battle-pro-
our dec^'^^U*^*n^ t^lat sb011!^ guide
fi,
c'erit ,
We b,ru'°nS as t0 what kind of ships
To 'n £^e Mature.
ships s^6 rbe impact of building
essayas t*le ff^-class ddg, this
grew. * rexaniine the following four > , ps of(
How
questions: valuable will the new Kidds be
Out th ^eet^ What is significant herL ■ e,r design? What utility will
into
? drived f o— ”““l be f]e . rr°m their introduction
^ ^hat ly30 We aff°rd them? sttaingcj ln<aS escorts are we con_ ^ afford? Restricted by costs,
ways to understand the value of the Kidd class is to contrast it with comparably equipped ships and examine the missions these types of ships are required to perform. This essay will limit the comparison to the Kidd DDG, the Virginia (CGN-38)-class nuclear- powered cruiser, and the Soviet Navy’s new Kirov-class nuclear-powered cruiser —see tables 1 and 2. The discussion of the cost issue will be broad because I believe that detailed construction and operating costs are subject to so many interpretations and so much manipulation that they can often obscure the argument.
The combat systems of the Kidd ddg and the Virginia CGN are nearly identical. Remarkably, the Kidd DDG also matches the Kirov CGN in every type of installed weapon system, and does so while using about a third of the Soviet crew size and roughly half of the overall ship size and displacement. While I have not calculated dollar-for-dollar savings of building a Kidd as compared with a Virginia or a Kirov, I suspect they
are significant. If that is the case, then the Kidd represents, in my estimation, the optimum size, cost, and armed capability for the price. She is capable of fighting in any mission area and, therefore, provides the type of utility the United States needs in its cruiser/de- stroyer force.
The Kidd is the best shipbuilding buy the surface Navy has made in recent times. Previously, we have built far less capable ships at what was presumed to be cost-effective savings. In the process, however, true utility has been sacrificed by designing ships for specialized missions. For example, review of the weapon capabilities of the Sprt/ance (DD- 963) and Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7) classes demonstrates that we are building surface combatants that possess a marginal capability to perform multiple missions.
In his September 1980 Proceedings article, “Planning for the Navy of the 1980s,” Vice Admiral M. Staser Holcomb explores several factors regarding the adequacy of today’s force levels and
INGALLS
a buju- Undertake? If not, do we have ^ Is Q 'n^ aiternative?
Ml bU,r CUrrent hi-lo mix of escorts buity aariCed? What costs of oppor- Hvestjjj 6 associated with our existing bips> t^nt posture? Would more vHe °u8h each is less capable, proions can be drawn from
be v at c°nclus
^'dd
tUr,
desi
ecisions^lpbuildin8/shiP
llue
*0,
ICee<U
-Phalanax Close-in Weapon - AN/SPS-55 'AN/SPG-60 ,AN/SPQ-9 ^AN/SPG-51D
Mk-26 Mod 0
Table 1 Platform Comparison
| Kidd DDG | Virginia CGN |
AAW Weapons (SAMs): | 2 Mk-26 Tartar/ASROC Launchers | 2 Mk-26 Tartar/ASROC Launchers |
ASUW Weapons: | 2 Quad Harpoon Canisters | 2 Quad Harpoon Canisters |
ASW Weapons: | 2 Mk-26 Tartar/ASROC Launchers 6 Torpedo Tubes | 2 Mk-26 Tartar/ASROC Launchers 6 Torpedo Tubes |
Guns: | 2 Mk-45 5-in./54-cal. Mounts | 2 Mk-45 5-in./54-cal. Mounts |
Close-in Weapon Systems: | 2 Vulcan/Phalanx | 2 Vulcan/Phalanx |
Helicopters: Towed Sonar Arrays: | 2 SH-2 LAMPS or 1 LAMPS 111 SQR-19 capable | 1 SH-2 LAMPS (Not Embarked) |
Length: | 563 ft. | 585 ft. |
Beam: | 55 ft. | 63 ft. |
Draft: | 30 ft. | 29.5 ft. |
Displacement: | 8,500 T. | 10,500 T. |
Crew Size: | 338 | 572 |
Propulsion: | Gas Turbine | Nuclear |
iirov Cffsfff^
M-4 Launche'S \ Vertical nch Systenl Vertical nch System 4-14 Launcb do Tubes j-1000
j-6000
-mm- ^ nm. Mou»tS
Hormone*
hi"
addresses the Navy’s investment posture. While voicing concern over the shrunken size of the Navy, Admiral Holcomb states, “These reductions may mask unmistakable qualitative improvements in our capabilities, but they do drive home how thinly the U. S. fleet must be spread to carry out commitments which have changed very little during the same period.” It is my worry that we have not been building enough of these improved capabilities into our surface combatants. Because we are stretched so thin, however, we
are going to require all of those ships to perform missions for which they were not intended.
To expand on my concern over the mission capabilities of the dd-963 and FFG-7 classes, Admiral Holcomb’s article defines the dilemma this way: “One can also see a clear shift from a cruiser and destroyer surface combatant force to one oriented more around frigates. In large part, the reason we have emphasized less capable and less costly ships and aircraft in recent years is affordability. As in many business oper-
ations, the Navy has to I‘v‘j l0cte>i' bounds of limited resources an „ ing demands on those resource^ ^
Admiral Holcomb makes
cuss"
jo"
point that is critical to the 15 of ship cost versus utility ‘■e’’ ability versus battle profic*en, ujlii)' A third factor of af*T -
states,
results from the need for Pr°
.duct
it"'
res"1
provement. Such improvem^^jjrf
J"'
in cost increases in real terms- the Forrest Sherman (DD-93 0
i-clasS
a"
e*'
----------------------- ----------- ' r £1*
stroyers, built in the 1950s ample of an ‘original type an
/juir
Table 2 Sensor Comparison
—-—..... | Kidd DDG | Virginia CGN |
'“Ornmand & Control Antia‘r Warfare | 4 Bay UYK-7 Mk-74 FCS | 4 Bay UYK-7 Mk-74 FCS |
| SPG-5 ID | SPG-5 ID |
| Mk-26 GMLS | Mk-26 GMLS |
| SPS-48C | SPS-48C |
Gunnery | Mk-86 FCS | SPS-40B Mk-86 FCS |
| SPG-60 | SPG-60 |
Ant,Submarine Warfare | SPQ-9 SQS-53A | SPQ-9 SQS-53A |
Warfare | Mk-116 FCS SLQ-32 | Mk-116 FCS SLQ-32 |
,re Control System; GMLS = Guided Missile-Launching System.
^°te: FcTT^ ~
rrtan ^,Cark°n C°PV tbe Forrest Sher- stattti |,e rriust have one that is sub- torno—y ,^etter in order to deal with
and can they be used
’ may be needed?
b,
#nce (rjp.
as a c*ass> built in the 1970s,
toestaeP.acen>ent type.”’ He goes on crage gr 'S l t^lat replacement costs av- Usefui pf ^6r ^Car throughout a ship’s "tye1 C an^ concludes by saying, that°u^n t get by with a new ship
*S a Carhr,^ ------------- , r, r..
Ce7s thr-"
Oliver ’ are ^Pruance destroyers and tially b a~ar^ Perry frigates “substan- vis the !i.eT replacement ships vis-a- they rv,„U^,^ *n ab the roles for which
4 rr
boohin„ versus Battle Proficiency:
ets/fti 0tliy at those cruisers/destroy- °Ur escQteSft^at we are building today, Oliver H f orces are being replaced by ance,Q^“Za’’^ Perry-class frigates, Spru- Il'issi|e j cstroyers, Kidd-c\&ss guided cWr crujseStr°^ers’ Virginia-class nu- The S/>r^S' and Aegis-class cruisers. Plete> an^,/le program is nearly com- Starrt tFle Oliver Hazard Perry pro- ubVj0 . 1 >nto its production run.
Pr°ximaty; 'V*t^1 -’0 DD-963S and ap- class^ ^ ^ FFG-7S planned, these Out CS ships represent the bulk ^ Vears C°rt ^°rces b°r the next 15 to
^“Zard trUance destroyers and Oliver |b'ps werfiy frigates are the kinds of ari!e nu ,ave been able to afford in °fshjps171 ers> but are they the kinds ^•nlc nee<^ t0 do the job? I do not eCaUseafe’ b°r two reasons. First, affordability constraints, we are forced to initially design “less capable and less costly ships," and then, we are further constrained to commission these ships with a mere fraction of their intended armaments. Second, and even more important, we design these ships based upon operational analysis which calls for them to perform only one major mission—i.e., ASW for the DD-963S and open-ocean convoy escorting for the FFG-7S.
Inevitably, these ships will be required to perform in a larger context than for which they were intended. Because these two classes represent such a large percentage of our surface combatants, they are going to see a great deal of action if we go to war. Commander James R. Stark, Commanding Officer, USS Julius A. Furer (FFG-6), summarizes the problem well. He states, “The rub comes when FFG-7S are used in a high-threat environment, and the real world, in contrast with ops analysis studies, dictates that we fight or employ in a crisis the units which are readily available. In many cases, these will be the FFG-7 ships; vessels designed for a mission which renders them inadequate for the demands of a world poorly attuned to the strictures of statistical analysis.”
Intended to be a cost-efficient, open- ocean escort, the FFG-7 succeeds in meeting her designers’ conception. But can she effectively perform in any other capacity if required to? Furthermore, what kind of battle utility have we planned into this class? Even presuming the FFG-7S will be backfitted with
Navy tactical data systems and close-in weapons, and that lamps detachments will be embarked, this class still has but one single-arm missile launcher, one single-barrel gun, a short-range hull-mounted sonar, and no ASROC capability. There is no weapon redundancy in any mission area, and in an ASW engagement, the FFG-7 is almost completely dependent upon other platforms to attack the threat. What battle utility will an FFG-7 provide to a convoy if ASW aircraft or direct-support submarines are not available to attack enemy submarines? How effective will an FFG-7 be in battle if she suffers even a minor casualty to her sole missile launcher or gun?
Turning to the Spruance destroyer, we have the potential for a great fighting ship. Indeed, both the Kidd DDG and the Aegis CG are built around the Spruance design. Their hull design and engineering plants are the best the surface Navy has ever produced. Also, the Spruance destroyers have been performing exceptionally well during demanding deployments, and they have set new standards for the cruiser/destroyer force in antisubmarine warfare, antisurface warfare and naval gunfire support mission areas. But they possess a very limited antiair warfare capability, and yet we expect those ships to support our battle groups in a multi-threat environment. We like to disguise the antiair warfare limitations of the Spruance by saying that she is principally an ASW platform. But, then, does the “Char- lie”-class nuclear-powered guided missile submarine represent only an ASW threat? The Spruance destroyers clearly need more muscle, and we should give it to them as quickly as possible so they can evolve into effective “replacement” ships.
The surface community is not alone in facing these types of problems. There seems to be a growing concern over the adequacy of the new F/A-is Hornet aircraft to perform its mission in comparison to its F-14 and A-7 counterparts. However, a contrary trend exists in the submarine force. Presently, we are building bigger, better, and more expensive submarines as opposed to “less capable and less costly [surface] ships and aircraft.” Clearly, the Los Angeles- class SSNs and Obio-class SSBNs are sub-
stantially better “replacement types” than the “original” Skipjack! Permit ssns and George Washington!Ethan Allen SSBNS. This approach to shipbuilding appears to signify an implicit qualitative baseline below which the submarine force is not willing to explore when building submarines.
Opportunity Costs: As Admiral Holcomb points out, we cannot afford more capable ships in sufficient numbers. So the choice the surface community has made is to build large classes of less capable ships to be augmented by a few very capable, guided missile destroyers. Will 54 FFG-7S, 31 DD-963S, 4 DDG-993S, 6 CGN-36/-38S, and 16-26 CG-47S provide a balanced hi-lo mix? Approximately 75% of that mix is made up of FFG-7S and DD-963S. If we can judge the FFG-7 and dd-963 classes to be substantially better replacement ships, then the hi-lo mix we have built is well balanced. If not, then the cruiser/destroyer force mission will continue to be the most difficult mission in the Navy to perform. If the mix is out of balance, which means that cruiser/destroyer crews often will be required to fight in every warfare arena in inadequate ships, then we will have made a serious and potentially costly error.
Once again, during its recent evolution, the submarine force has faced the same decision as to what kinds of ships to build. It has not opted for a building plan which creates a hi-lo mix of ships by consciously building less capable ships; rather, it has decided to procure substantially better replacement ships and allow older generation submarines to represent the low side of the mix. In so doing, it has been forced to afford a smaller number of submarines.
In my mind, the submarine community’s approach is sound, and I think it is analogous to the introduction of the Kidd-class. Today, the Kidd-class represents the middle ground of the surface escort hi-lo mix. With the CGN- 38/CG-47 at the high end and the FFG- 7 on the low side, the DDG-993 not only occupies the well-balanced middle ground, but in so doing, it raises serious questions as to whether or not the low end of the mix is good enough.
The Kidd is a substantially better replacement ship and is significantly less expensive than existing ships of comparable capabilities. If, as a result of opting for surface combatants that are well balanced in terms of the reality of the missions they will be required to perform, we have to accept fewer ships, then so be it. At least as an adjunct to that choice in today’s world, we will also be able to better man more capable ships than we do today.
The consequence of not building substantially better replacement surface combatants and opting for large numbers of less capable ships is that we are forced to sacrifice the fighting utility required to support a variety of assignments which are consistent with the current definition of a surface combatant’s mission. That sacrifice is an opportunity cost we pay as soon as funds are committed to building ships like the Spruance destroyer and the Oliver Hazard Perry frigate. We tend to lose sight of those costs, and unfortunately, we neither have the flexibility nor the desire to forgo some of the opportunities. But, rest assured, we are giving something up. Let us hope that when it comes to fighting these ships, we will remember those costs and understand the limitations that are not so apparent in peacetime.
The introduction of the Kidd guided missile destroyers, however, affords us a great deal more optimism. We are getting a lot of utility in these ships. Their hull and engineering plants are already well proven. Their combat systems have performed extremely well during demanding deployments to the Indian Ocean in the USS Virginia (CGN- 38) and the USS Texas (CGN-39). There is a major weapon and sensor system for each mission area, and every weapon system has at least one backup battery. And we have every reason to believe that the combination of the proven CGN-38 combat systems suite and the venerable Spruance hull and engineering plant will be the best available ship for the money.
Should we build more Kidds and convert existing Spruances to DDGs? I think the critical need for these enhanced Spruances lies partially in the examination of the comparison among our existing escorts and the ships out
lined in Table 1. From that exam"^ tion flows at least the insight rbat^^ need to build surface combatants
can fight multi-mission engagerrien If it takes a Kidd or a Virginia to SUPP
a battle group or to stand up
Soviet threat, then those are
to
the
the tyPtJ
of ships we really should build- ^ always going to be constrained > fordability. The issues are costs o portunity and utility. The reS0 a lies partially in the realization £ * we sacrifice utility in the design o ^ batants we potentially incur enof costs.
-imally
Conclusions: The Kidds are opt' ^ a sized, properly armed, procure ^ reasonable cost, and capable st* 'S ing alone, if necessary, against to mutli-dimensional threat. iS
If the Kidds prove to be eclu* e)(. proficient as CGN-36/38S, then t pense of building future nuclear ered cruisers is prudent only f°r 1 ^efl
numbers of such ships. We shou
link the production of nuclear c ^
to the production of nuclear carrier5
build two such cruisers per
carriet'
ers-
We do not need cruisers/desrr° ^ or battleships for that matter, than the Kidd. The only reaS^>tgjp should build bigger surface com is not to permit them to be D powered but to carry more weap
more important, bigger magaz
ine5'
ship5
. -10
We need to procure more occupy the middle ground or c mix, as the Kidd does now. In_s0 ^ce we can correct the hi-lo mix im that exists today with the larS centage of low-mix escorts.
Before committing funds *or^nnjn? ing battleships to service or P $t follow-on surface combatant5’^ [t, should immediately allocate 1° ^ > convert Spruance-class destroyer ^ vCr- DDGconfiguration, perhaps using tical launching system. .. e (o<
The Kidd should be the base ^ the Navy’s next destroyer (D ^ jn we should prepare to build Qtr sufficient numbers to maxim*ze
omies of scale. Most important,
.id be
the Kidd sh^i|tUre ih5
the standard by which we bui ^ surface combatants. Future
must be capable of standing . . .. -—.al n
against a multi-dimension.
j 9*
shi Cn Start Holding these kinds of
Vt ey w‘h become the standard by
°ur capabilities are measured.
are committed in the foreseeable ‘uture m tu
tent ■ i Ctle C0ncept of a battle group the Crt • arouni^ the aircraft carrier, and
quatelUlSer/deStr°yer ^orce cannot ade- of c| y Perform its mission in support sh: 3 incept unless it procures more pS ‘>ke the Kidds.
k°ugh the Shah of Iran apparently
first appreciated the real cost-effectiveness and utility of the Kidds, the U. S. Navy designed and built these ships. One of the legacies of the Kidd class may be the realization that we in the surface community will have to become more persuasive in convincing those who allocate the shipbuilding funds. Procuring marginally capable ships will cost us far more than it will save when the time comes to use those ships for the mission they will finally have to accomplish. We must realize that the Kidd guided missile destroyer should represent the non-nuclear standard by which our shipbuilding and ship conversion policies should be governed for the next 10 to 15 years.
Commander Morgan has recently completed a tour as the operations officer of the USS Robert E. Peary (FF-1073).
N
ayal Reserve Officer Leadership: An Institutional Failure
cnant Douglas R. Burnett, U. S. Naval Reserve
ting °^cer attending a “wet-
reserv "r- party for newly promoted bitt(.rs ° ^cers would find the party’s o\vn e ,Weet atmosphere foreign to his rt>anntftr*ence' ^He party, in a familiar Halim | CXh'bits its traditional festive officer/f’ laudatory celebration of the pteSen ^rtunes in being selected. Also Culiar to °Wever’ *s cbc sad fact, pe- the cle° rtServe officer promotions, that ttiotej ^ ma*ority °f the newly pro- thejf utn‘or officers are forced out of "vo]us t0 a future without pay in officers ^ dr*d un*ts- Most of these they reachdr‘H as volunteers until aH the C| ■t*le 20'year retirement mark; ttiotiv... de> tbeir training, skills, and Thjatl°n wither.
acr0ss 5 Vent *s repeated and magnified °fficers6 United States as hundreds of tfsentgj3^ tttiHions of dollars rep- y the Navy’s training incareer with three to five years of active duty. During this period, the Navy makes a major investment by putting the officer through numerous schools, ranging from short-duration professional schools like 3M and damage control, to major programs in surface warfare, flight training, and nuclear propulsion. Add to this investment the irreplaceable gain to the Navy from the officer’s operational fleet experience, and it becomes obvious that when the officer leaves active duty and begins a reserve career his or her training and experience are valuable assets of mobilization defense. In my case, as a surface warfare officer, the Navy's investment in education amounts to four years of college, seven months of language school, and more than five months in schools like electronic warfare and drug abuse. Aviators and subjoins the reserve, he is a perfect match of experience, training, and rank, a basic tenet of sound leadership. As he proceeds in his reserve career, however, the gap between his rank and his experience and training widen. Annually, a reserve officer is limited to two weeks of active duty training or experience. This divergence continues until the officer is a commander or captain; his experience and training, however, are that of a lieutenant (junior grade) or lieutenant. Despite official myths to the contrary, any combination of civilian jobs and reserve duty cannot match a regular commander’s or captain’s training and experience. Presently, the Navy does not recognize that, in the absence of additional extended active duty training or experience, it is unrealistic for limited reserve officer training to do more than maintain the same level
Vestment
te Wasted- The Navy's ”up- °^cers c ^rorn°tion policy for reserve vad‘fieSsUtS *nt0 tke sinew of military kebi -d breeds poor leadership. UtlflrecjseSp ^oser is the Navy, not the bi[|e0 °fficers without meaningly tyS and Paychecks.
P*Cal reserve officer begins his
mariners show even higher training investments. Of course, there is no meaningful measure of an officer’s experience and leadership until he is mobilized, but they exist and must be counted in evaluating the officer’s value.
As the officer leaves active duty and
MARGARET MCWETHY
of training and experience that the officer had when he left active duty. When the reserves are mobilized, the Navy will find itself loaded with senior officers with the experience and training of junior officers, and very few junior officers of any sort.
An analysis of the reserve training
'seat
center in Denver, Colorado, as a typical reserve training establishment, makes this point. Of the 701 reservists attached to the center on 7 January 1981, 194 are officers broken down by rank as follows:
0-1 = 3
0-2 = 4 0-3 = 43 0-4 = 74 0-5=51 0-6 = 19
There is one lieutenant commander, commander, or captain for less than every 3.5 sailors. In some units, this rank imbalance is even more pronounced and makes a ridiculous military organization. For example, one naval control of shipping unit of 16 officers and 9 sailors includes 3 commanders and 9 lieutenant commanders, hardly a realistic manning, and far in excess of the specified manning of 1 captain, 1 commander, and 3 lieutenant commanders. This situation is typical of national reserve officer manning and contrasts sharply with the needs of the Navy. In an emergency, the Navy needs large numbers of experienced junior officers, and not inexperienced senior officers whose rank confines them to positions of leadership exceeding their experience and training. Only shortsighted management and foolish leadership place a reserve captain, who has not been on active duty since he was a junior officer 20 years before, in command of regular officers like, for
tion system achieves opposite results.
The same promotion system ensures an annual migration of experienced officers from the reserves, and instills low morale in the remaining officers. As mentioned, the training and experience the Navy invests in these officers are lost as they are promoted out of their units and into no-pay volunteer units where their abilities are grossly underemployed. This expensive attrition is automatic and non-discretionary. There is no attempt to evaluate the officers’ fitness and qualifications against the needs of mobilization defense. It is simple; promotion to commander guarantees most reserve officers several years of duty without pay in billets with no practical mission.
Cuts into morale take place because the officer is not a true voluntary driller. The officer drills because he has no other alternative to avoid losing his retirement investment. The Navy takes advantage of the officer’s plight and uses him for free during the remainder of his career. Patriotism is alive and well among naval reserve officers, but it is difficult to eat patriotism or use it to send kids to college. The unavoidable result is that the reserve officer is pressured by his family or civilian job to quit the Navy as soon as he can retire, often years before the investment in training and experience justify the departure. Many reservists see the Navy as violating its unwritten commitment “to take care of its own.”
The up-and-out promotion policy for
fense questionable. Finally, this p° ^ forces officers out before they have 0,3 their full contribution to mobifi230^ defense in a manner which saps motivation and enthusiasm. These ^ suits cannot help but affect the man11 in which these officers lead.
The remedy to correct this delk1^ requires a revamping of the Ptotn. $ policy for reserve officers to maxi their utility to mobilization strengthening the institutional ra work in which reserve officers e .
leadership. First, pay scales muS^ separated from rank. Second,
,tions
be
there
for
should be no permanent promo1 reserve officers beyond the laSt , held by the officer on active ^ Thereafter, permanent pro010 would be based solely upon periods the reservist spends on ^ duty of an extended nature, jjfyin^ months to one year or more. Quaat tours would include attendant schools like the Department ^ course of Surface Warfare Scho° ^ ^ Naval War College, or a nor0111 ^ ployment with a ship or squadr00^
dentation P^jf
■tive
ISP
addition
act|Ve
easy short-term augme would be adopted which wou the reserve officer to return ^ duty whenever there was an °P and his civilian career allowe a tour. Similar programs are 10yje$i in the U. S. Army and othef n^aVy like the Royal New Zeala0 ^ fl0- which allows reservists, with s0(i tice, to sign on for deploy01^ a|So board warships. This policy w°u
Id P(
to *c'. ,
such effe£t
example, a lieutenant commander with 12 years of current operational experience. The technological changes in the intervening years alone make this possibility unrealistic. Effective leadership requires commanders with sufficient experience to evaluate and lead their subordinates. The up-and-out promo
naval reserve officers is an institutional failure of leadership. Regardless of the individual leadership ability of reserve officers, their best efforts fall short of their potential because they are promoted to ranks exceeding their training and experience, and in numbers which make their utility to mobilization de
tional pipeline for manpower ^ lieve the strain on regular om Jr
Ids0 -oOl
with difficult inspections ployments. This policy wou way in keeping permanent
rai
nk
reserve officers in step with the' ^ experience and training. Seni°r
res1
er
/ juW
t0 k‘-1 W^en rn°t>ilize<d would be able efk 3 t^lc'r active duty subordinates rrikCtlVely aru^ make a worthwhile con-
aviation TU ■
goal u 1 nis approach recognizes the w°uld ^ tra‘n‘n8 f°r reserve officers jRg e t0 mamrain the core of train- tj,e . experience they possess when thtd CaVe act‘ve dmy, and to improve the f rca<^’ness >n the units to which ^-signed for mobilization. ficefc'1 *n t*1e reserve organization, of- to se W°u*^ temporarily promoted desju.11101^ ran^s when they filled billets f°r senior officers. For ex- moted’ Wltf’ a new co temporarily pro-
f°rrncr ^ ^ rank commander, the nentT C° Would revert to his perma- tvithin^L^ heutenant, probably trainj e satne unit where his reserve is recalf |S most valuable. If the unit in e ’ aH officers will be called up that C^e kdlet they occupy at
This t016’ Perrnanent or temporary. offictrsnSUrtS t^lat the number of senior Navy'sm C^e reserves never exceeds the the actual needs, and provides what bers needs in wartime: large num-
quicj-i exPerienced junior officers
"I'll
officer1 t0 t^‘s P^an ‘s separating the ejtartiDl ^ ^rom h‘s rank. In the above resetyg6, t^le officer who finished his heyteCareer in the permanent rank of that a 101 receives the pay and benefits receiVeCOl?mander or captain currently *aiitL.rrdin.s a reserve officer was anteecj ^tS and qualified, he is guar- f hete years m the reserves with pay. w°uld be no need for “volun- sional and physical standards for all reserve officers drawing pay. The officer, in return for the Navy guaranteeing him a 20-year career with pay, agrees to keep his part of the bargain by maintaining his military readiness. Improving military readiness by providing better motivated leaders is the purpose of this plan, not giving reservists an unjustified secondary income at the taxpayer’s expense. Every officer must be ready for mobilization.
First, each officer must be physically fit. This system provides a large number of older junior officers. They have no mobilization value if they are physically unable to perform the tasks required of junior officers in the fleet. Therefore, the condition of the officer must be evaluated annually, both for medical and physical fitness. Existing medical examinations, with more attention to obesity, satisfy the medical standard; but there is currently no verification of the officer’s physical fitness. This needed evaluation can be easily carried out by an annual test for officers to include a timed-mile run, sit-ups, pull-ups, and dips. Unlike fleet units', reserve units have easy access to facilities for physical fitness testing and preparation. The benefit to the Navy in preventive medicine for heart attacks and other physical fitness-related illnesses and diseases would more than compensate for the single drill required to test a unit’s officers.
With physical and medical fitness covered, the next area of military prefare specialty in the fleet today. Thus, the test would be, as an example, one for a lieutenant, surface warfare specialist. Essentially, it would cover the personal qualification standards expected of an officer in that grade and warfare specialty. The second examination would apply specifically to the officer’s current mobilization billet and would be prepared by the unit's active duty parent organization. Thus, a naval control of shipping unit would be tested by the Military Sealift Command, while a unit assigned to a reserve frigate would be tested in an examination prepared by the ship’s commanding officer. Whenever possible, these examinations would be "hands on,” using, for example, Naval Reserve Force ships for ship units or shipboard simulators.
In order for the reserve officer to keep his billet and pay status, the officer would be required to prove his level of military preparedness by passing a medical examination, a physical fitness examination, an examination of knowledge and skill for an officer of his rank and warfare specialty, and an examination related to his specific mobilization billet. Officers failing any one of the four examinations would be given a specified amount of time to correct the deficiency before being dropped from the Naval Reserve.
Reforming the system as proposed here will keep officers with proven ability and enthusiasm for their mission in the Naval Reserve, for they will be
units;
COritinuc(|USed' ^ter 20 years’ service, reserve6 serv*ce would be limited to tank Qr . cers with permanent senior ^obii;, lUru°r reservists required by The ;t,0n ^e.
Troach rnaior element of this ap- t0 develop rigorous profes- paredness is professional competence. Annually, each reserve officer would be given two examinations. The first examination would test the officer’s maintenance of his core level of training and experience when he left active duty, and additional information required for a junior officer of the same rank and warready for the call to active service. These leadership qualities will not be lost on the sailors they lead.
Lieutenant Burnett was graduated from the U. S. Naval Academy in 1972 with a major in foreign affairs. A qualified surface warfare officer, he left active duty in 1978 and joined the Naval Reserve. He is a lawyer in civilian life.
laKS / JUly 198J
103
An Insider’s Look at the Navy’s Main Battery
By Lieutenant Richard T. McCrillis, U. S. Navy
Because the Navy's ability to wage war on the high seas is primarily vested in a nucleus of embarked attack aircraft, this force must routinely and carefully be scrutinized for its realistic and potential utility in battle. I suggest that, given current and proposed weaponry and the significant effort we expend on war-at-sea plans for seemingly modest gains, the attack airplane has seen its day as the heart of the naval strike force.
Current trends in defensive antiair missile and gun systems make the ap-
But does this really expose a problem? Yes. Let us take a cold look at some hard facts. First, Russian surface- to-air missile systems are good, and getting better. Although our approaches to their ships scrupulously avoid most of the longer range envelopes, we are constrained to maneuver our airplanes into the heart of multiple point defense systems to deliver the lion’s share of our load. Facing a formidable backup of naval antiaircraft fire, our brief exposure during weapons delivery is fraught with deadly odds.
lace
doff
j
munitions we have available, we p heavy reliance on our limited s£an weapon capability to generate the tial shock of the attack. This ^aCt° s critical unless terrible losses of aifP a and pilots are to be the rule. Ours cards, then, would seem to phT
the hand of standoff weapons. ^ pon appears t°
the salvation of the attack a‘rcri ^ allows the pilot the luxury of laun^ ^ a lethal weapon reasonably outsi range of most defensive systems- catch is, however, that in order to
The standoff weapon appears to ^
proach to enemy surface units a tenuous prospect indeed. Do not conclude, however, that we will not approach them. Many hours have been and will be spent devising cunning routes toward a given target. My own air wing even worked on a tactic last summer developed by one of Washington, D. C.’s beltway bandits. We in the attack community believe that a reasonable degree of surprise can be had, and present aircraft delivery systems give us good first-pass accuracy with even the simplest of weapons.
Second, the primary weapons load- out for our aircraft carriers are Mk-80 series general purpose bombs. They are fine bombs for general destruction, but basically very limited. Their inherent design requires that they be carried right to the target site and very carefully released if they are to do any good.
These factors have led to the development of various coordinated attacks, and careful orchestrations of anti-radiation missile and Walleye missile launches with the in-bound tracks of multiple strike divisions. With this tactic we can obtain remarkably good kill probabilities against single enemy warships. However, a complete surface action group (SAG) significantly lowers the strike’s effectiveness. Poor prelaunch targeting will destroy it altogether. We can ill afford to plan and execute such complex raids only to find our target to be the SS Exxon California.
Because of the very nature of the
range, one must know to with,n' ^
or so where the target really to
Shrike missile is flexible enoug ^
a wag—i.e., one can loft it)n: in
eral direction of the enemy P*at 0(\\t
hopes it will detect somethin# , ff r i -i Mpstanu.
way down. But other avanao* ^ ,|i systems are much more restnc
their release parameters.
The timing involved in coor
dioat
silt*
in l
an1
the attack of our standoff rnlSS'jiat
manned aircraft is designed S°, 0fe^
two hit within a short interva ^
(lO1
at-
other. Thus, if the profiles are ecuted against a known position nd ^ tack will degenerate rapidly a j sllp- likely fail altogether. This disn^ ^ position is the product of m° ^.js 1 a few multi-division practice tarff1 have flown against non-hosti ^£(e ships, only to find the ship *s n° ^ tbe she was “supposed” to be, ^yoe event of a real contact, she vv
the
potential, the notion that an
ultra”
a'tack
Th«
artplaner* Of course not.
is „ Uyin« and shi| ^ ^
°bair.t0SU^rnarlne’ yet the very nature PendiV k>r°und combat invites the ex- S|ve air i 1 these increasingly expen- Credibl^> lnes' "hheir thin skins and intake t^0rnPhcated systems interfaces Hl-disposed to taking and A n8 hits, ngainsr . .
task force 3 defended SAG, a
c°mmander will dedicate and
^ ^ssed it the £xxgn California. ref ■ ’ °ne Can always hear the popular
had31" °f the attack Pilot: “If 1 onIV
belie1 Stanc^0^ weapon. . I do not real ^ t*1at tke stand°ff weapon is a .0 ut'°n, nor is it the reason attack 'rf1are built.
tn; are to fly rhe attack airplane 0 >rs full, 7 FrriUs . rHrssile will make it better jn„ discarded. That kind of think-
huneh ,UCeS tke attack aircraft to a oftL Platform" in the truest sense the p Worcl' Witness the outfitting of Port W'tk Harpoon—a patrol transWar- ‘nStant*y becomes an offensive -u sea platform. Is it, therefore, an p>t0s attack community faces the rti0reeCt °b passing the torch to other, at CaPable forces for the first strike and ff "at 1 see as tbe roost likely plarr oroable answer is: a manned
r4airQt--_ i
Where e Can know beyond a doubt that ca 6 tar8et *s’ a manned platform ta>ned 0 °Ut Pun*shment in a sus- ,1'anne'raccurate’ and unjammable can s ’ an<^ a manned platform that atmorere ln harm's way by being Tw ’ Slmple, and reliable. battle !^atb°rrns can fill this bill: a ^orthy *iP or an attack sub-
of buw SkoulA this be? The sheer cost
outfitting an air wing
niB ■ " much (if not more) than a
-F 0r subn very likely lose a significant portion of his total offensive strength. Would he not be more inclined to commit units that could make short work of enemy weapon systems, take some hits, and then withdraw for a massive and sudden follow-on by the carrier air group? Given current assets and future prospects, it seems to be the only reasonable alternative. Further, our present electronic warfare suites are woefully inadequate for actual threats; our airplanes are too slow; and our munitions too limiting to be effective in the high- threat environment.
I do not, however, advocate the abandonment of attack aviation, only a realignment of priorities in its use. Against land targets, there is nothing better. Known geographic references, terrain masking, and the relative nonmaneuverability of potential targets play right into the pocket of modern attack pilots. Even highly defended sites are fair game because, once established, their system weaknesses and fixed geographic surroundings can be effectively exploited.
Pilots who are given a reasonable chance of survival can devastate ground sites with tons of cheap bombs accurately delivered. The meticulously planned coordinated strike can be flown properly because the target is not going to move away or change its defensive disposition in the span of a few minutes, as can a SAG. Finally, there is the overwhelming psychological advantage of having death rain down from the sky.
I believe we have two choices.
► Attack aircraft will continue to draw first blood. If they do, a few things need to be improved. We do need a standoff weapon—one that is long range, fast, accurate, positively targeted, reliable,
. . . and devastating. Stockpile vast quantities of anti-personnel/anti-ma- terial and Rockeye cluster bombs. They are the number one semi-sophisticated air-mud weapons we have. Building in quantity will lower their overall cost and give attack aviation plenty of what we consider to be the best weapon for a wide variety of enticing targets. Send us an airplane that is: dependable, fast, maneuverable, cheap, fuel efficient, flexible with any weapon, accurate, and resistant to electronic warfare measures.
► Attack aircraft will be used in support of harder hitting surface and subsurface units. Given the previously discussed trends in the attack community, this is the way we are headed. What will this strike unit be? The nuclear-powered strike cruiser proposal of a few years ago was a step in the right direction—a high-endurance, hard-hitting, and autonomous platform well suited to the quick, bloody strike. The stealth, dependability, and astounding firepower of modern attack submarines probably make them the best anti-surface weapon the Navy can employ. Very real problems exist, though, in tactical coordination between submarines and a supporting air strike. This factor must be addressed in force planning.
If present trends continue, attack aviation’s advantage in tactics and equipment will be lost. The choice must be made soon and acted upon with vigor.
A 1975 graduate of the University of Idaho, Lieutenant McCrillis has more than just 1,200 hours and just shy of 400 carrier landings in the A-7 Corsair II. He is currently assigned to VA-174.
u
^er the Ice in Submarines
’ Ca,
Plain
Alfred S. McLaren, U. S. Navy
the ar •
sUccmment of the North Pole b$S AjS/eS^u^ transpolar cruises by the US ^SSN’571) and USS Skate Grid’s 'n AuSust 1958 focused the
nUciattention on tbe caPability °A
hlorg e^ar submarine to reach and ex- nsive areas within hitherto
inaccessible portions of the Arctic Basin. The achievement of the Nautilus, significant as it was, was not a culmination; but it was a major milestone in efforts which began as early as 1898 in the United States. In early 1903, off Newport, Rhode Island, a lake submarine, Protector, became the first submarine to cruise under and surface through ice. These explorations continue to the present day.
The first serious attempt to explore the Arctic with a submarine began in 1930 when Sir Hubert Wilkins con-
KARA SEA SEVERNAYA
"NOVAYA
ZEMLYA
The Arctic Ocean and contiguous marginal sea ice zones pictured bare long occupied the interests of submarines.
EAST SIBERIAN r* SEA
i ,«rf^ZEMUA
' * ’St
^SIBERIAN • ™
ISLANDS ^ . V '
tracted to outfit an obsolete U. S. submarine, the 0-12, for a polar crossing. The plans for this cruise included a number of controversial modifications to specially equip the 0-12, renamed the Nautilus. A wooden skid or “sled runner” was installed, supposedly to enable the submarine to glide along the underside of the ice while permitting automatic depth changes as ice thickness changed. A 30-inch elevating conning tower or “ice drill” with a rotating cutting head was also installed. This hydraulically raised tower was thought capable of cutting through 13 feet of ice to permit a person’s escape through the top upon completion of drilling. Two nine-inch drills were installed to provide engine in-take air and exhaust for charging the batteries while under the ice; for emergencies, both drills were designed to extend 60 feet upward by the addition of sections. The most successful modification was the installation of an airtight chamber with a hatch fitted into the bottom. The chamber could be pressurized and the hatch opened while the submarine rested against the underside of the ice. A winch could then be used to iower Nansen bottles, reversing thermometers, and bottom samplers (to bring up cores). A plankton-collecting device was also installed.
After many delays, the Nautilus arrived at the ice edge northwest of Spitsbergen on 19 August 1931. Although a polar crossing had become out of the question, Sir Hubert insisted on extensive oceanographic tests and an underice drive, despite the loss of the stern planes due to sabotage. On 3 1 August, the Nautilus was trimmed down by the bow, kept positively buoyant, and driven under a floe. Sir Hubert’s narrative reported:
“In my opinion, the negative angle was too small and the positive buoying too great to permit a fair test of the maneuver. The vessel went half its length under the ice and stuck. The noise of the ice scraping along the top of the vessel was ter-
BERINQf SEA j
f WRANGEL
ISLAND • <•
I kL -
■iy\ a
CHUKCHI '
- &
I V
y
V;
\ B
A
j
X.
rifying. It sounded as though the whole superstructure was being demolished. . . . We tried to work the large ice drill, but the drilling shaft gave way. ... We tried to work the drill with the emergency hand-drill gear, but this worked very poorly ... it was not possible to penetrate the ice. ...” (Sir G. H. Wilkins, "Nautilus Submarine Expedition” (Unpublished report, 1947).
The next recorded claim of a successful under-ice sailing was attributed to the Soviet submarine Krasnogvardeyets in the Denmark Strait in 1937. A few years later, during World War II, a significant number of German U-boats successfully operated along the Soviet northern sea route from the eastern Barents Sea to the Laptev Sea. They rounded Novaya Zemlya and penetrated the Kara and Vilkitski straits.
Germany’s Professor Hermann An- schutz-Kampfe (1872-1931), the inventor of the gyrocompass, reached the conclusion that while it would be possible to penetrate far into the Arctic with a submarine, a major difficulty in Arctic navigation would be course determination, because all compasses lose their directive force when near the poles, and at the North Pole all directions are south. Other problems and needs cited by experienced German submariners, such as suitable under-ice acoustic detection equipment, resulted in the development of the basic re
quirements for a special Arctic marine able to conduct non-c° )S operations in the Arctic regions- ^ interesting to note that most o requirements have been fully in ,„t
rated into modern nuclear submiir'
From 1946-51, the U-S-
ines-
■ A rc^c
committed several submarines to ,
and marginal sea ice zone (MSIZ) 0 j
ations. The USS Atule (SS-403),
with the first upward-beamed Fat
eter for measuring ice thickness ^ head, participated in “Operation ^ nook” between Greenland an j. Canadian Archipelago in 19^6 lect environmental and scientific In the winter of 1946—47, the Ps* ^ nett (ss-408) participated in Opera^ot High Jump” in the Antarctic- ^ only did the Sennett demonstrate
pability to track pieces of float<n?
she also defined the first basic
ice-
un^er’
the
ice sonar and solidly establish61 ^ feasibility of submarine operatic1 ice for the U. S. Navy. During d [,e
1947, the USS Boarfish (ss-327) made ^ first excursion under pack >ce
Chukchi Sea; her upward-beame sounder provided excellent traces f ice canopy overhead. In Sep ^4.
1948, the uss Carp (ss-338) made * ^ mile penetration inside the paC ^ the Chukchi Sea and develope . .q
areaS
,m^r
niques for making vertical ascents the descents from polynyas (i-e- of open water in sea ice). In the su of 1952, the uss Redfish (ss-395) ^ ducted extensive oceanography
SeaUSt'C °^servat‘ons *n the Beaufort Her upward-beamed c1U|pment
sounder was expanded to include
Potvs tUrn‘ng back only because of a ‘ r fai*ure in he)
Way f* J Nautilus cruise paved the
Thi
future under-ice expeditions orn the standpoint of operational y and that of scientific research
de‘tl0na‘ sounders along her main inwHich enabled her to perfect div- M's^ ascent procedures. The Red- corri |CrU*SC Was considered to have VYjtL 6te<a 'fie series of experiments peat COnvent'°nal submarines. A refee (;CrUlse ‘n next year resulted in rriertt "of ^°rma* proposal for develop- TK 1 P°*ar submarine, new 6 auturrin °f 1957 ushered in a submra W^en *fee world’s first nuclear penetarine’ 'he uss Nautilus (SSN-571), Spitsh^6^ beneath the pack ice near tquj Crgen- Carrying the Redfish’s before nt’.She reached 87° N Latitude
in her gyrocompasses.
CaPabilit.
^P^Cltv Q L
spee(j y ‘ ne was able to transit at high ^ould Un<^er *ce> find openings which U0Us ^errnit surfacings, take contin- andm °tt0rn and under-ice profiles, peratitaSure and record horizontal tem- In .an<^ sal>n*ty profiles. pteparaar ^ *958, the Nautilus began
feg '0ns ^or £he first polar cross-
tional *3erat'on Sunshine.” Addi- cludedeC*uiP>rnent and capabilities in- a high 3n 'nert‘a* navigation system, for UndeCS°^Ut'0n m'ne detection sonar Sai] t , 'lce w°tk, and a strengthened s°narc °f an effective ahead-looking fe JUnJXl3ility caused her to turn back btayy 6 *^^8 when she encountered fathomCe W*C^ drafts to 80 feet in 27 btyjnS °f water. In late July, by fol- b fee ru e<^*’e °f 'he ice pack eastward tow 5ea ^hchi Sea and using the Bar's pass'1 alley> the Nautilus was able Atctic !!n^er 'he ice pack and enter the ‘‘1^ b,aS*n’ ^ August, the Nau-
t'lr°uShCarne r^e **rst sb,‘P to Pass CtoSsin >t*le North Pole. Her total ^feenla [r0rn Point Barrow to the Qq^? 8ea took just 96 hours, fee ^ following the Nautilus was et)Ujp , 3?e(SSN-578) which, similarly tiSione, w‘th the addition of a pre- *VthePth recorder, reached the ^Octgj °'e °n 12 August and con- las. pjSorne nine surfacings in polyn- tnost significant accomplishment was being able to maneuver at will in high latitudes yet still maintain an accurate position. On 17 March 1959, in the first winter operation, the Skate became the first ship to surface at the North Pole, after breaking through hummocked ice about 12 inches thick in a small polynya.
In early I960, the USS&trgo (SSN-583) departed on the most arduous under-ice expedition to date. She entered the Arctic Ocean by transiting 900 miles across the very shallow water (depth 125 to 180 feet) of the Bering-Chukchi Shelf. During winter, this area is covered with drifting ice, including many ridges extending almost to the bottom. The Sargo was able to accomplish this crossing with the aid of an under-ice piloting sonar as she cruised 25 feet above sea bottom. The Sargo spent 31 days in the Arctic, surfacing in complete darkness some 16 times through thick ice. On the outbound transit, the inevitable occurred when she collided, south of the Bering Strait, with a deep pressure ridge. Jury-rigged repairs to her piloting sonar enabled her to clear the ice field.
Equipped with an improved underice sonar, the USS Seadragon (SSN-584) departed Portsmouth, New Hampshire, on 1 August I960, with two primary objectives. The first involved a thorough test of the new sonar in the iceberg-infested waters of Baffin Bay. Achievement of this objective resulted in the Seadragon's becoming the first submarine ever to pass beneath icebergs—some of quite deep draft and masses exceeding several million tons of ice.
The Seadragon's second objective was to be the first ship in history to complete the classic Northwest Passage by way of the Parry Channel. This second objective was also successfully achieved, but not without considerable risk. The route to be followed by the Seadragon had never been completed by any ship as the heavy ice encountered in the Barrow Strait had defeated them. In fact, the deepest penetration had been made by Parry in 1819.
The Parry Channel from the Barrow Strait west was essentially uncharted. The sum total of all information available upon the Seadragon s departure indicated only very sparse soundings, a high probability of shoal water, and the presence of uncharted pinnacles and inaccurately charted islands located within the strait. Finally, heavily ridged and hummocked ice with deep draft keels, some of which were aground on the pinnacles and shoals, were also expected.
The Seadragon's capabilities and superb under-ice seamanship enabled her to locate and survey thoroughly a safe
°66CU
ln8Ts / juiy 1081
107
Date | Submarine | Area | Major Accomplishments__ |
Feb. 1967 | USS Queenfish | Baffin Bay | First single-screw nuclear submarine operations in and under the ice |
Apr.—May 1969 | USS Whale USS Fargo | Arctic Basin | Surfacing through thick ice; ridge-busti^ experiments |
Aug. 1970 | USS Queenfish | Arctic Basin Siberian Shelf | Hydrographic surveys |
Nov. 1970 | USS Hammerhead | Nares Strait Arctic Basin | First autumn cruise; hydrographic survey |
Mar. 1971 | HMS Dreadnought | Arctic Basin North Pole | First U.K. Arctic operation |
Feb.—Mar. 1971 | USS Trepang | Denmark Strait Greenland Sea | Hydrographic surveys |
Mar.-Apr. 1972 | USS Hawkbill USS Seadragon | Northern Bering Sea | Oceanographic surveys |
Mar. 1975 | USS Bluefish | , Greenland Sea Arctic Basin | Hydrographic surveys |
Mar. 1976 | USS Gurnard | Arctic Basin Beaufort Sea | Shallow-water oceanographic operation5 |
Sep. 1976 | HMS Sovereign | Arctic Basin | Oceanographic surveys |
Mar. 1977 | USS Flying Fish | Arctic Basin and MSIZ | Oceanographic and hydrographic survey |
Oct. 1978 | USS Pintado | Arctic Basin and MSIZ | Oceanographic and hydrographic sur'e) |
Mar. 1979 | USS Archerfish | Baffin Bay Nares Strait | Oceanographic and hydrographic survey |
all-season deep-water passage through the Barrow Strait. Upon completion of the survey, she transited the remaining and largely unsounded 400 miles through the Northwest Passage, completely submerged under heavy ice, using her under-ice navigation sonar.
On 31 July 1962, the Skate and the Seadragon rendezvoused in the deep Arctic Basin and proceeded in company to the North Pole where they both surfaced in the same polynya. The Skate also made the first transit of the Nares Strait into the Lincoln Sea en route and later became the first ship to transit the Northwest Passage from west to east by way of the Parry Channel.
A four-year suspension of Arctic operations for the U. S. Navy appeared to result from restricted operations caused by the loss of the USS Thresher (SSN-593) in the Atlantic- in 1963. Meanwhile, in January 1963, the Soviet government newspaper Izvestia reported that the nuclear submarine Len-
L
inskiy Komsomol had reached the Pole in June 1962. j 0(i
When construction comment*-
a new class of U. S. nuclear atta< ^ marines in 1963, the U. S. ^aV^rctic
the capability to operate in
the
iiremel
.(its-
year round to the design require For instance, the top of the * ^
rudder of Sturgeon-class sU strengthened (with HY-80 stee j ^
masts have special ice caps, planes can be rotated for sUsSp through ice. This class also PoS[(jr a recessed secondary propulsi°n jSe that can be lowered and used f°r P tjs- maneuvering. The general cha ^ tic of the under-ice sonar can 0. in Figure 1. In a typical surfet^^jjje
, requn
lution, a polynya or tne ^ length is located, course is depth is decreased, and the s;n0si^ is maneuvered into a hovering P (o* beneath its center. The secon im
pulsion motor is used to m
ake
avo"
i a-
minute adjustments to ensure ^ ance of large blocks of ice °V
S'8nificant
alon,. ^ah>ng under-ice measurements
K
°n8 the
amu
exact track followed by the
Once fUi*
clear ” °C t0^ sounc^ers indicate ‘all 0vf’ or indicate ice sufficiently thin r ead, a vertical ascent is com-
,nced into the polynya.
isato1^6^ aS execut've °fficer a°d nav- to >°r °n r^e ^rst tilese Sturgeon-class com° t0 S6a’ ttle uss Queenfish (SSN-651), lat-l]ri'ss*oned 6 December 1966. In highlUary we departed for the
Ms ^ triable environment of the a tve k ^av's Strait. After spending der6 around the icebergs, in and unSin ^ac ’ the Qneenfish became the first thro6 fCrew submarine to surface acousf' *Ce’ and f°und that the best shaii IC COnditions in the MSIZ exist at
^ depths.
expeditions that followed the rnari Queenfsh cruise involved sub- ati0r^jS w‘th basically identical oper- iectio^ C^aracteristics and scientific col- ancj | CaPabilities. For these reasons,
I Canbecause of security constraints, All °n*y °utiine these expeditions. ^0rma°nt'nUe^ t0 c°dect scientific in- UHcj, n as they explored previously and its^1^ P°rt'ons °f the Arctic Basin cipai S Cbnt>guous ice zones. The prin- Sea jCeSU rnar‘ne Arctic and marginal l%yZ°ne cruises conducted between 1. and 1979 are outlined in Table
When u
Atctic ■ C”e Queenfish returned to the °fficer *» I was her commanding
5qq v n Edition to surfacing within the 0^ s°fthe geographic North Pole, accomplished two other Volved'an-t °h)ectives. The first in-
‘‘US \~) , .
analysis4 years earlier. Comparative s °f the information taken by
both ships provided clues to the change in the world heat balance during that interval. The second objective involved tracing of several different fathom curves—completely in international waters—along the entire Siberian Shelf from the Severnaya Zemlya Island group through the Laptev Sea, around the New Siberian Islands, and continuing through the East Siberian and Chukchi Seas. A combination of highly variable sound velocity profiles (often severely negative, resulting in significantly reduced under-ice sonar ranges), heavy ice, and an extremely irregular bottom made this a very challenging task.
While ice conditions were quite favorable in the Western Laptev Sea, they became increasingly severe (average drafts in excess of 70 feet) as the survey proceeded westward. Large icebergs were encountered throughout the Western Laptev Sea, and bottom conditions were discovered to be quite irregular, caused by many depressions and gouges, with the bottom shoaling up quite dramatically at times—e.g., over 50 feet in one ship length. More intriguing gouges were encountered in the East Siberian Sea as heavy deep draft ice was noted in the proximity.
Surfacings for satellite navigation fixes were difficult as a result of encountering heavily silted water with a thick upper layer of jellyfish and brine shrimp from 90 to 140 feet beneath the surface. A dramatic decrease in salinity just below the surface required considerable de-ballasting. Completing the survey with a high degree of accuracy, the Queenfuh exited the Bering Strait in early September.
The many expeditions undertaken by the nuclear submarine since 1957 have conclusively demonstrated her capability to operate in, accurately survey, and collect scientific information throughout all portions of the Arctic Ocean and its contiguous MSlZs. Although the submarine is particularly well suited to the collection of acoustic information (i.e., sound propagation and ambient noise measurements), which remains a first-priority research task, she is also well equipped for continuously measuring oceanographic parameters of temperature, sound velocity, electrical conductivity, ambient light, and ice profiles or wave heights. The submarine can also measure gravity anomalies and be used for "ground truthing” for over-flying sensor systems (i.e., laser determination of ice profiles).
Finally, nuclear submarines may one day be of invaluable assistance in the location of potential oil resources and their transportation from the Arctic. Let us hope that the world situation will one day be such that these magnificent vessels can be fully employed for scientific purposes for the betterment of mankind throughout the world.
Captain McLaren attended the U. S. Naval Academy, the Naval Submarine and Nuclear Power Schools, and, while at the Naval War College, earned a master's degree from George Washington University. He has also served touts on board numerous submarines, including a four-year tour as the CO of the USS Queenfish (SSN-651). He is presently on the Staff of the Naval War College.
°y c,
^sweeping Shrimp Boat? A What?_
aPtain
Cyrus R. Christensen, U. S. Navy
full tdc newspapers have been
abi
Out
the
President Reagan':
•'esj ‘ . ^atus of our military readi- 7) Corrlncreases in the defense budget ''ear teect s°rne of the problems in the ^eavof11 ot^er °f military than tjlereMuires remedial action more ^sur 6 Nayy’s m*ne counter-
Atthi f°rCeS'
rej'S P°‘nt *n time, our forces have Uced to 25 ocean minesweepers
(MSOs—22 are in the Naval Reserve Force), 7 minesweeping boats (MSBs), and 16 RH-53D minesweeping helicopters. These figures are alarming in view of an assessment of the mining capability of the Warsaw Pact and the results of "Solid Shield’’ fleet exercises in 1979 and .1980. All of the forces the U. S. Atlantic Fleet could bring to bear could not open one East Coast port in any acceptable period of time. New
mine countermeasures ships, equipment, and advancement of related state-of-the-art technology are clearly in order. We were recently reminded how rapidly a mining campaign could affect our country when it was only suggested that mines might be employed by the Iranians to block the Middle Eastern oil routes.
Increasing force levels through the budgetary process is both time consum
ing and expensive. The first course of action, now ongoing, is to increase the combat readiness of the mine countermeasures forces we have. Even upon completion of this program, however, our force levels will be woefully inadequate. Therefore, an interim course of action to enhance our capability in the near term is necessary. A great deal of research into this matter has resulted in the conclusion that if the U. S. ports were mined an augmentation of our mine countermeasures forces could be made from the fishing and shrimping industry.
During “Solid Shield 80” (a port breakout scenario), a Charleston-based shrimp boat was rented at a cost of S2,000 per day and augmented into the exercise. Experiments were conducted with deep trawls, mine hunting, and the use of existing mine countermeasures equipment taken from the shelf. The results of these operations were encouraging and indicated the concept could and should be pursued in earnest.
The East and Gulf coast ports were surveyed from Maine to Texas to determine the availability of assets. It was found that a significant number of boats could be used with little or no reconfiguration. It was also determined that at least 50% of the boats could not be used because of inadequate deck equipment and shaft horsepower. A program to identify the usable assets on a continuing basis is now in the formative stages.
An encouraging aspect into commandeering civilian craft in a national emergency is the attitude of the boat owners and shipping companies. The few who have been interviewed indicated that not only would they volunteer their boats, but also they would volunteer themselves. Clearly, patriotism is not dead in this element of our society.
The opportunity to acquire a commercial shrimp boat for use by the U. S.
Navy on a permanent basis came when U. S. Customs seized the 63-foot Dixie in a drug raid off the coast of South Carolina in February 1980. The ship was carrying 12 tons of marijuana which was valued at $15 million. Subsequent to her seizure, the Dixie was held by U. S. Customs in litigation. The Atlantic Fleet mine countermeasures forces were informed that the boat could possibly be turned over to the Navy if she met the requirements of a mine countermeasures vessel.
A group of experts from Mine Squadron 12 boarded the Dixie and found her to be well equipped with the proper winches and deck gear. In fact, the outriggers had never been used—obviously, they were not required in the drug-running business. The boat had been operating for three years between Colombia and the Southeast United States. She had been crewed by 12 Colombians and 1 American. (All are now serving
terms in prison.)
The first order of business after t£ Dixie was turned over to the Navy September 1980 was to de-rat her aj1 clean her up to Navy stand*1 ^ Twenty-four rats were caught m engine room and the hold. The had to be completely stripped and infected. Two of the original c members were reported to have pulmonary tuberculosis. . '
The lessons learned from the shrit^, boat operations in “Solid Shield ^ were put to use on board the Dtx>e ^ the installation of paravanes and pressors on the fantail for mo0^(j minesweeping. The sweep wires ^ on coastal minesweepers (MSCs) found to be compatible with winches and were installed. An a ment of the power requirements
cated a need for a larger ship s se ^ generator, and one was obtained 1 an old decommissioned MSO hu •
a Iqq0113^ ^‘esel for a prime mover and The D'^ ®enerator were installed, 'he re **** 'S Soon t0 h>e drydocked, and COrnpl °n^£urat‘on program should be ^ceio^f ^ August. Upon official she „ rorn 'he U. S. Federal Courts, swegpj 'designated MSSB-1 (miners ^ s^r*mP boat), the first of her
There
fo * -
r 'he mssb-i involving deep
ulecj /e are many experiments sched-
"awis
^eervj10^ C^e development of types of
"'■nee „a^ainst close-tethered moored
^ps ~ ^vciupmciit ui iypcj> ui
'he a®a‘ns' moored mines close to '"'race a , ,
ial A sonar now used on the
cry vehVV^r^are 8rouP's swimmer deliv- heen r *C ® Tor obstacle avoidance has
SP«cial
hott0rnUn^ ehfoctive against moored and This s0fn’nes and will be installed.
was operated on the Shiekj gl ,r'mP boat during “Solid c°Ura,>^ and performed with en-
U^ug results.
SAtfrn^°rta^le information-gathering f°t uSe shack has been developed C°nsistsWl/^ t^*e MSSB_1- This system Magnet' ° an ^-foot by 10-foot non- sha<l0^, 'C dut from the Navy’s obsolete Sraph system equipped with a
fiav
^QS-i °n system (Raydist-T),
the
°nar console, vhf marine radii
T-Ofan '•q1,', a s*de-scan sonar, and taken All of this equipment was 'he shelf from other Navy
Pro
)grar^ 1V- ^neir rrorn other INavy ■tciai °r Was purchased from com-
P°ttableS°UrCes' The pigs is completely Sl)‘'ablean<^ Can T*e installed in an) ar> hoUrCraT' with a crane in less thar 1 Such an equipped boat ther
becomes a minehunter. With this installation, the MSSB-i will become a major player in the Navy’s channel conditioning program. This recently developed program searches known shipping routes on the East and Gulf coasts for mine-like objects on a continual basis. The job can be done with 13 men and 1 diesel engine instead of 60 men and 6 diesel engines used by an MSO. The savings in fuel and manpower are significant.
The use of trawlers and shrimp boats for mine countermeasures is not an original idea. The British Navy has expended a considerable amount of effort in this area. Mine countermeasures experts from England have been working very closely with American mine countermeasures forces in Charleston, South Carolina, for the past few months in developing deep trawl rigs for use on the mssb-i.
A new mine countermeasures program in the formative stages will involve about 200 shrimp and fishing boats in the East and Gulf coast ports manned by naval reservists. This force, when trained, will be able to load the boats with equipment which will have been stored in the same geographic area as the boats’ home-ports for rapid conversion to sweepers and hunters. These forces will augment the Navy’s mine countermeasures forces in the event of a major mining campaign against the United States.
Although her past leaves a great deal to be desired, the MSSB-1 has a future that can make our Navy proud of her.
Captain Christensen is Commander, Mine Squadron 12 in Charleston, South Carolina.
The Royal Australian Navy—A Progress Report_____________________
By Sub Lieutenant J. V. P. Goldrick, Royal Australian Navy, and Sub Lieutenant P. D. Jones, Royal Australian Navy
The Royal Australian Navy (ran) is presently involved in a large-scale program of replacement and reconstruction. Alarmed by the deteriorating world situation, notably the Russian invasion of Afghanistan, the Australian Government has substantially enlarged the defense vote and hastened a number of development programs. Areas of activity include the replacement of a large part of the surface fleet and modernization of the remainder. This discussion describes the various projects in hand and some aspects of the possibilities for future development.
The New Carrier: In September 1980, the Australian Government announced approval in principle for the construction of a new aircraft carrier to replace hmas Melbourne, the elderly Majestic- class light fleet carrier which is the flagship of the Australian fleet. Although the requirement for a new vessel was accepted, the Minister of Defense, Mr. Killen, declared that no decision as to whether or not to acquire v/stol aircraft for the ran would be made until 1983. The fact is that v/stol still remains to be proven operationally at sea. The two major contenders for any contract, the British Sea Harrier and the American AV-8B, will by then have advanced in development sufficiently to demonstrate which is the more suitable choice for Australia. It must be noted that the ran is not wealthy enough to afford by itself all the huge costs associated with the introduction of such novel systems.
The decision as to which design will be selected for the new carrier will be made in late 1981. Two contracts have been awarded for the detailed definition of designs from America: a gas turbine variant of the lwo Jima (LPH-2) class and a sea control ship (scs). One scs, scheduled for completion in 1984, is already under construction for the Spanish Navy, and the design is a modified and enlarged version of the original American project. Each of the designs is notable for its equipment compatibility with the American-built guided missile frigates presently being brought into service.
The Melbourne's decommissioning, scheduled 1985, will probably tie in very well with the acquisition of the new vessel, since the commissioning crew will have to be available for training and “standing by” well before completion of the latter. The old ship recently celebrated 25 years in commission, and with a hull and machinery of World War II vintage, enormous efforts are required to keep the Melbourne operational, placing a tremendous strain upon her crew and air group. The ship is due to undergo a refit next year which should see her through until the end.
The Escort Program: The Australian Government ordered four Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)-class guided missile frigates from the Todd Pacific Shipyard at Seattle. The lead ship, hmas Adelaide (f-oi), was recently commissioned and will shortly be followed into service by HMAS Canberra (F-02). The remaining ships, Sydney (f-03) and Darwin (F-o4), which are still on the slips, are of the improved FFG-7 type and will be commissioned equipped with the Vulcan/ Phalanx close-in weapon system (Ciws) and will be capable of operating LAMPS III helicopters. The two earlier vessels may receive these modifications during later refits.
Coinciding with the announcement of the new carrier came the decision, subject to certain arrangements yet to be concluded, that two and possibly six additional guided missile frigates are to be built at Williamstown Naval Dockyard in Victoria. It is proposed that the first two vessels will be largely identical to the second group of American-built Oliver Hazard Perrys. Details of the armament fit of the remainder have yet to be defined. A possible alternative includes the fitting of the Australian-designed and -built Mul- loka sonar system. A suggestion may also exist to fit the ships with a 5-inch gun and some kind of point defense missile system.
The existing escort force has as its mainstay three modified Charles F. Adams (DDG-2)-class guided missile de-
ex-
stroyers. American built, these
differ fro"1
tremely successful ships their U. S. Navy and West counterparts principally in mou ^ two Ikara asw systems in P^ , £ asroc. All ships of the class wi fitted with Harpoon surface-to-sur ^
missiles in the near future and are
SM-1
three
Ge rfl'sn anti#
ready equipped with Standard surface-to-air missiles. The
guided missile destroyers are sche u to serve well into the 1990s may be expected to undergo some ^ of extensive modernization and 0 ,
and thej
kind
tiy
u>
haul on the lines of that Presen
planned for the later units of the Navy’s DDG-2 class. ^rlf.
A major refit program for the ^ class destroyer escorts is presently
Nava'
conducted at Williamstown j Dockyard. The Parranuitta Stuart (de-48) are being °verhn^.^ with improvements to hull, rn3^jiey ery, habitability, and electronics- will receive the Dutch-built control system and be fitted with
to
32 antisubmarine torpedo tubes place the Mk-10 triple-barrefle ^ submarine mortar. Another innov,, will be the installation of the Mu
re-
ant*'
tion
note*
medium-range sonar, a system SP ^ ically designed for operation in the
in
v.u
ficult sonar conditions which P ^ around the Australian coast. The ^ (DE-45), another of this class, will not receive this modermza^ acted as the test bed for the sys hmas Derwent (DE-49) will rece'Vnre' refit after the Parramatta has ,r of * commissioned. The final Pair ^ -tns River class, Swan (DE-50) and ^ (DE-53), will be refitted some
time'1
completion of the present work-
forC«
of
Submarines: The RAN has a lljjeSel-
six Scottish-built Oberon-class (0 • • The nfS
electric patrol submarines. 111 jace undergo the submarine weapons
ons
program, hmas Otway, was
recoi
ni^1
iof
sioned in 1980. This moderm^p. included the installation of the Atlas sonar and the Singer-Li ^ CCS Mk-1 digital fire control s^tfd The latter is based upon the hre C Jjl system used in the U. S. NaxT
es (SSN-688) class. The weapons to cl _l,arrie<^ by the modified Oberons in- u e Mk-48 torpedoes, and Sub Har- Portly be fitted.
Out '6 rt^t Pro8ram *s being carried landnSytlney at ''hckers Cockatoo Is- ockyard. No replacement for the
W?0ti rloo~ u 1 i • i
but dSS haS ^et ^een designated, $tSUCCessor *s under consideration. 0n ‘CS are presently being conducted tv ,C br*tish “Type-2400” and the LCh. Walr«s class among others.
^"f’Port: The fleet tanker classS uPPhi a modified British Tide- by t^an^er’ ‘s t0 he replaced in service uncjerC brench-designed Success, now Isla j instruction at Vickers Cockatoo a|mos . ockyard. The Success will be tank ^ lc^ent‘cal to the La Durance-class SchedrS, op tbe French Navy and is seCOnd ^ t0 *°'n tbe RAN ‘n 1^84. A nani. , unit °f the class, as yet un- rniSsj ’.w‘h also be built. The com- resentnin® °^tbe second ship will rep- a tw 1 ma)°r step toward achieving Tk~°Cean force.
i he j rv
beCaiJSea u'<rance design was selected
Australia’s major ports from mine attack. To facilitate this, the navy initiated studies to examine the feasibility of building a lower cost mine countermeasure vessel. The result is the projected 30-meter minehunting/sweep- ing catamaran. Bids for the first two prototype units have been called for; the intention is for eight of these vessels to enter service before 1985.
The design is centered around a computerized minehunting kit fitted in a container which can be airlifted with ease and fitted within a few hours. Cat-
yard. She was commissioned in July
1979.
The remaining patrol boats are under construction in Cairns. The Warrnam- bool will be completed this year and will be followed out at short intervals by the remainder. The last is scheduled for commissioning in 1985. A further batch of up to ten patrol boats is projected. These will probably be of the Fremantle type, but it is possible that some will be completed for transfer to neighboring powers under defense aid schemes. Twelve Attack-class patrol
abl,
represented the most favor-
ical|y ,'nat'on of size, being specif- gr0ut)es'8ned to replenish an escort Supply an<^ econorny °f personnel. The of 2o5y>reSentfy requires a complement only l5oWhile the Success will require Edition ' Wlt^ accommodations for an Under na- ^ Personnel on passage or ^ Gaining.
Sir j ^ '^‘ous: The Tobruk, a modified
is Ocelot. t
tlen,- ’type landing ship (heavy),
canng c
.South
Nevir completion in Newcastle, missi^b.Wales, and will be com-
this
>hiblni„
year. She will join the Moret(L,,10us squadron based at Hmas ° *n ®r*sbanc, Queensland. The °cean„ Wl11 he the ran’s first true th; 8011
ROYAL AUSTRALIAN NAVY
ln8 amphibious unit
tesetve /ears' hive operational and one St'tUte i?rCe beavy landing craft consign Sta ,C rernainder of the force. De- ^acernen'CS 3re 'n hand for their re-
X
sels
Ke
°n"-class
Warfare: The three
aging
mine countermeasure ves-
icem Vs^ are m urgent need of re- Vesfetr^1' a numher of other
Pla<
tai:
ned
navies, the ran has main-
hfe a ,State'°f-the-art mine war-
riorCapabil to
to
*ty, but it is now the inten
ds:
mcrease the MCMV force so as
1Sess the
potential to protect all
amarans without containers can be employed on inshore minesweeping. The minesweeping catamaran is the subject of some overseas interest, particularly among Australia's Southeast Asian neighbors.
The second aspect of the mcmv program concerns the provision of a capability for deep-water minesweeping. An option could be the modification of oil rig support vessels or large stern trawlers for such duties.
Patrol Boats: The program for 15 42- meter fast patrol boats is well under way. A prototype unit, hmas Fremantle (P-203), was built in Lowestoft, United Kingdom, at the Brooke Marine Ship-
When the Melbourne leaves active service, her A-4 attack aircraft will he beached. The replacement carrier will likely join the fleet in 1986.
boats should remain in service for some years, a number being allocated to the reserve forces. Preliminary studies have been conducted into the possibility of the construction of larger patrol vessels to meet the requirement imposed by the declaration of the 200-Mile Australian Fishing Zone and evolving law of the sea conventions.
General: Additional options for further developments are under consid-
to
the missile in the River-class PES Swan and Torrens could carry the poon. [s for
The requirement clearly eXlS surface units to be fitted with form of adequate close-in misshe || fense system. Although all the FFGS eventually carry Vulcan/Phafan*
rflaa
lose'
Australia is well on its way toward building a two-ocean navy. HMAS Adelaide (F-01) is the first of the U. S. - built FFG-7s to enter service. HMAS Swan (DE-50), a modified River-class escort, is similar to the British Leander- class frigates. HMAS Otway, the first of the Oberon-c/ass submarines to complete a weapons update, now sports a new bow sonar. HMAS Supply (AO-195), which no longer carries the twin Bofor 40-mm. guns forward, will be replaced in 1983. HMAS Fremantle (P203) and HMAS Adroit (P-82) represent the RAN’s two classes of patrol boats. The RAN’s lineup of helicopter types is pictured on the opposite page: (from top to bottom) Mk-50 Sea King, Wessex 31B, Iroquois, and a Bell Kiowa.
eration. These include the acquisition of a second aircraft carrier and the structuring of the fleet around a two-task group force. The resources of the ran are relatively limited, and a two-carrier fleet would certainly be created at the expense of other projects.
The alternatives include the construction of a second landing ship and expanding the helicopter-carrying capacity of other ships in the fleet—e.g., the Saccesr-class tankers could be modified to carry more than one aircraft.
The purchase of a new type of helicopter for the fleet is perhaps the most pressing RAN requirement needing a decision which must be made within the next few years. With the arrival of the FFGs, the RAN is faced with the dilemma of whether to wait for the very expensive LAMPS ill Seahawk helicopter or instead to opt for other, perhaps less sophisticated but less costly designs. Since the Royal Australian Air Force is also in need of a new helicopter, there is also the attractive possibility that some kind of combined, perhaps Australian-built purchase could be made, with all the accompanying economies of scale. Another option is to continue to purchase the Westland Sea King. The problem is extremely complicated, and it is presently impossible to determine which particular choice will be made.
By 1990, the RAN may be expected to consist of one helicopter/v/STOL aircraft carrier, three modified Charles F. Adams-clzss DDGs, six FFG-7- and modified FFG-7-class guided missile frigates,
four River-class destroyer escorts, ^ fleet replenishment ships, six con tional patrol submarines, one dest tender, a landing ship, and a vaf of smaller units. ngt
In the next few years, the surface
will receive a surface-to:surface w capability with the installation 0 .. jje poon in the DDGs and FFGS. t there presently are no plans rn 1110 terns, no announcement has been concerning the provision of the
0 ^ear>
rePlacer^n System f°r the ddgs or the shorc.raCnt the very elderly Seacat
■ ^sibT System in the DEs- >nclude for the patrol boat force
Surf£
ace
acquisition of a surface-to-
*h,
Sele<
triissile system for installation
eted
and
Ram<
Value
units of the Fremantle class.
°P>PO;
Patrol
however, continues to stress of light forces in surveillance
atound Australian waters as
Sttack Cra° the*r employment as fast
'topter^ Stuh'es are in hand for a hel- fsed as'carryfog ice patrol ship to be * research platform and as a Nc j. Vessel for the Australian Ant's altea(jtSearch Expeditions. The RAN 'Ce°per " accumulating experience in stas0r) In the 1979-80 summer
n the Antarctic, Australian of-
ficers served in a U. S. Coast Guard icebreaker, the British ice ship HMS Endurance, and on board the Danish merchant ships chartered by the Australian Government for the resupply mission. When completed, the Australian vessel will be a tremendous addition to the ran’s scientific research capability.
The base facilities for the RAN are no longer concentrated entirely upon the Southeastern coast. HMAS Stirling is now a major fleet base, and a chain of patrol boat bases is being established around the northern coasts. Although Sydney remains the home port for the bulk of the fleet, the allocation of support facilities is now much more in coincidence with strategic requirements.
Provided that satisfactory solutions
can be found to the problems apparent in regard to the replacement helicopter project, whether or not to have fixed- wing aircraft at sea and close-in missile defense systems, the programs discussed here should meet the perceived requirements of the Royal Australian Navy in the 1980s and 1990s. For the first time, the RAN will be capable of deploying forces simultaneously in the Indian Ocean and on the East Coast—a “two-ocean” navy.
Lieutenant Goldrick is currently serving on board HMAS Tarakan (a Ba/ikpapan-dass LCU), and Lieutenant Jones is on board HMAS Brisbane (a Charles F. Adams-dass DDG). Both authors have previously written for the Proceedings and have contributed to Jane's Fighting Ships.
ADT As You Like It! ________________
By Lieutenant Commander R. R. P. Spencer, Royal Australian Navy
The scene is the operations room (combat information center) of Her Majesty’s Australian Ship Perth (DDG- 38) off the Eastern Australian Coast, carrying out a night encounter exercise against two other destroyers. At the ship weapons coordinator's display console, a firm surface distant radar track keeps having an automatic tentative track being generated next to it. Suddenly, the assumed merchantman increases speed to 30 knots and splits into two—the orange force DDs! It transpires that they had been in close replenishment formation in an attempt to disguise their coordinated approach. But the dedicated black box tracker had detected them as two far before the naked eye could detect them in the prevailing super-refraction conditions.
This example of the impressive performance of the radar video processor (CV 2834/UYA-4 [v]) is now the accepted standard in the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) as fitted on three guided missile destroyers (Perth, Hobart, and Brisbane) and has made a major impact upon the detection-and-tracking capabilities of the radar sensor systems carried thereon, and consequently to reduced reaction times of their Tartar systems.
The RAN’s involvement with the radar video processor/automatic detection and tracking system (RVP/ADT) began in 1972 at the NTDS Development and Evaluation Site, Mare Island, California, prior to installation on board HMAS Perth as part of her modernization program to NTDS. From June to July 1975, RVP/ADT trials were conducted as part of the total combat system proving trials off the coast of Long Beach, California. Then came three-dimensional low- angle trials with the AN/SPS-52 radar before the development of full RVP automatic control and surface tracking in 1976. The radar sensor configuration of the RAN DDG is a three-dimensional AN/SPS-52, a two-dimensional AN/SPS-40, and the two-dimensional AN/SPS-10, with the RVP selectively processing their data, one radar at a time.
During 1974-75, although the system was working well and displaying good accuracy, it became obvious that the controls, while versatile, were most cumbersome. Three variable- action button (VAB) arrays were required on the OJ-194 consoles, and the main mode of operation was for manual initiation of tracks before automatic tracking commenced. The track management scheme was rather involved, and there was no provision for surface tracking. With an operator’s manual, it was a good research and development system, but not for sailors!
Thus, the RAN began an improved program to make the RVP system a truly automatic detection and tracking system. First, the controls were simplified and made easy for the operator to understand (one VAB array), and the computer program controlling the CV 2834 RVP (a module of the ship’s operational program hosted in a two-bay AN/UYK-7) was redesigned to allow for rapid automatic control of RVP sensitivities with manual override if and when desired. Additionally, three-dimensional radar processing was incorporated in order to use the AN/SPS-52 to provide automatic height input, and improved automatic surface tracking was made viable using the AN/SPS-10 radar. To cope with the operations in a poor Link-1 1 environment, adaptations also were made to the software to provide for efficient track management. These enhancements have assisted the operator’s task greatly, to the extent that the RVP operator’s actions consist of choosing the radar to be processed, achieving the optimum video on that radar, and depressing the VAB’s “on” and the RVP’s “auto control” buttons. Occasional reviews are only then required to check performance and adjustment processing areas as dictated by tactical, geographical, or environmental conditions. The operator is then free to carry out any other detection, tracking voice radio reporting, picture compilation, or classification tasks.
The RAN experience has indicat^ that the RVP (used continuously’ sea) is kept in automatic control of the time. Plotting tables and c<> ventional radar displays are not for surface tracking. Resultant tion, course, and speed of con
roo111
tha»
emanating from the operations
to the bridge are generally better
plotting-table or some fire-contr ^
lutions, and win most compe
• The true
surface-plotting exercises, n®
the officer
the watch and the commanding are kept informed, as surface traC yi is a continual task while under
value of the system is evident ^ normal steaming where the
kin?
ehereas air tracking is
more
in-
jjgflt
frequent. Target resolution is e5tce at long range, and a vastly sUP^,,| detection capability over rna ^ operators is obtained on the ord ^ j
probability of detection
in<
crease
sevenfold on a given opportunity ^ decrease in weapon reaction (j,e most succinctly demonstrated J
fact that with RVP on and all sy in the automatic mode, the dete range required to obtain a high P bility of a kill at minimum rangec0|ji- one Tartar missile on a Mach 2 ing target would be appr°x* half that required in the totally ual mode. r0|-
Other command and con j oriented automatic detectm0^^
tracking systems, existing >n ’ yji, • ' '
developmental stages, are
AN/SPS-48C, sensor inte
rface
sen: >ass 1
iSOf
system (SIDS), and the AeglS system. The former two encomp' integrated package of radar mated detection and tracking display and management a
comprising a tailored radar s dedicated computer, and disp ‘ [fl,o soles and operators. The latte^ ust' (with the exception of AN/SP^ (i the simpler building block, ^e 2834 and a computer to Pr° "JV automatic detection and trackiuS.^r RVP, when assigned to a Parcjoii radar, will perform its ADT u^.2 js
lUt°'
efl1’
and provide tracking data would the manual operator.
to
As P1
^sterns UvK-20
COnfigured for the U. S. Navy
ofth * system lies in the cleverness usinJ SCftWare first in obtaining, then
ate. At the heart of these
hyK 2'“ ls the AN/UYK-7 and/or AN/ grarnsc°mputers. Computer pro- ti0n ’ a varying degree of automa- sem.t^11 Selettively control detection ptO(juc _ltles ‘n tfie surveillance area to ‘ttitlni C ,tbe optimum conditions for
.if
speed.
^ a*«n, the granularity and refill the tracking algorithm
Aft-y p^ect the ability of the particular
di
maneuvering targets,
of
the air and surface tactical
the RVP is driven by an AN/ data f cornPuter being fed the raw
tw°-dir0ni the AN/SPS'49 or AN/SPS-55 the (■.2lniens'onal radars, and services
°r tlj Scions either directly (FFG-7)
(^Gnjr(°U®^ a sensor synthesizer, SIDS
the rv CG'26)' Another application of
Xfk , GYK-20 combination is in the
Whicu tar8et acquisition system (TAS)
coUp| Prov'des ADT, but is directly
siu 6 t0 the NATO Sea Sparrow mis-
jystem. 1
any art ar|d sophistication of
ng ti — ............. o’ ----
the K i e track reports gleaned from
fardw: ystems tections. Once a piece of
tar,. determined to be meeting , 8et-ljup” .... ,
alorigr t criteria, it is passed
terming0 ■t'le track‘n8 function to de- that u.ii 'ts movement conforms to tiovjr. 'Cl one would expect from a tour,/ 0fiject, then to determine its
ieterr ®rarn to maintain tracks, i.e., c and '
'r5by contribute to the mainte-
This t . ■
tt‘rnai actical picture is not only in- sVstemt0 the ship carrying the ADT ’ tit affects the force picture
when one considers data link operations. Students of the antiair warfare game will immediately perceive the correlation dilemma in deciding, internally, are the two, three, or four sensors reporting the same track and which one will be displayed, and externally, is one reporting the same track that someone else is, or are they two close tracks? It becomes more complicated the more one tries to make remote track correlation automatic.
The management problem would appear even more horrendous if one projected several years hence to a force consisting of the CGN-9, CG-26S, CGN-38S, CG-47S, and FFG-7S all with their ADT systems frantically pulling flying and sailing objects into their track stores, with some units experiencing overloads while others await gainful employment. Indeed, HMAS Perth when exercising off the U. S. West Coast with other non-ADT fitted NTDS units took reporting responsibility for all tracks, making the other manual trackers job a breeze. However, this ostensibly salubrious situation exemplifies the very kernel of the man-machine interface problem associated with ADT.
As researchers have been aware since World War II, the vigilance decrement is the true enemy, especially in today’s anti-ship missile defense (ASMD) environment. How many times have you stood watching over the shoulder of an apparently alert and motivated tracker when a piece of target video paints for 10 or 12 scans before he puts a track on it? Most studies indicate that, for tasks similar to radar tracking, the vigilance decrement becomes apparent (through the operator’s diminished sensorimotor performance) after approximately 20 minutes. One attempts to counter this by changing personnel around regularly in the combat information center (CIC), thereby introducing variety to simulate motivational and attentional factors. Unfortunately, the complexity of modern naval warfare is such that the task to which the perceptually fatigued tracker is moved is just as demanding, and when coupled with the dwindling human resources available to man ships (as reflected in minimum-sized crews), the feedback is such that the task demand, hence fatigue, is increased. Thus, one looks to the skillful engineers of Hughes Aircraft Company to produce the CV 2834 RVP, and to artful programmers to make it perform as a black-box tracker which never tires, detects everything, and position corrects every track very accurately.
But then the swings-and-round- abouts principle comes into effect in that what one has gained in de- tection-and-tracking capability, one loses in human motivational areas, as our once active tracker, who took delight in his ability to contribute to the compilation of the antiair warfare or surface warfare picture, finds himself sitting on his hands with nothing to do. It could be said that one has finally lifted the human from performing mundane and menial tasks, and freed him for higher-order mental processes. Having an ADT system does this. Nonetheless, it was (and still sometimes is) an unanticipated problem in the RAN DDGs. Additionally, it has the side effect of inducing a learning decrement in the operator’s ability to perform manual tracking, and, still further back along the NTDS evolu-
nance of software. The adage “Better is the enemy of g
of good enof?h
pecifc
application, machine and per-- j
spe' ersoon'l
demands, sophistication require1 subsequent life-cycle rnainte0'1 costs, the choice of the particular
,tio»-
nce
which was originally conceive'
latter
dimensional picture comp* suiting in reduced manp°" quirements and accurate tracking l(1 with the consequential bene c, weapon designation, accuracy, quisition times. This has achieved in the RAN applie3110^’ ejir the Australian Navy places gr?(1<) phasis upon RVP/ADT in the D ^ [() its new FFG-7S. With ap°l°£‘ n, William Shakespeare (or Francis^ ,.^s as the case may be) ’tis verily you like it.”
A graduate of the Royal Australian
in 1967, Commander Spencer obtain‘d ^ [j
............. '----------- , taCtica-
Navy, and completed courses and jug0
ing in the Royal Navy. He i board HMAS Brisbane (DDG-4 D-
tionary path, the requisite skills for plot compilation are in danger of being lost.
On the other hand, having the ADT system on board forces operators to acquire a better understanding of the ship’s sensor systems. The first essential in setting up any ADT system is to ensure that the input sensor is operating optimally according to the tactical, geographical, and environmental conditions. This necessitates a thorough understanding of basic radar theory, operator controls, and their effects, and use of electronic counter countermeasure features. Paradoxically, the formal, classroom operator training can be reduced by the extent to which automation of the ADT system is achieved. With the RAN, full automatic control of the CV 2834 RVP, by pressing of two buttons, makes for lighter training costs. The maintainer, however, has a different problem in that his skills, learned on his six-week course, are seldom used, and thereby may be lost, as the CV 2834 hardware has proved to be extremely reliable.
Essentially, then, the Australian approach has been a pragmatic one: a relatively cheap but highly reliable piece of hardware has been software controlled to perform the job it was intended to (with a little extra to incorporate height information). The faith in the black box, assuming the mundane human task within the environmental bounds, has been rewarded by allocating to it full automatic control. Human reaction times and the demands of other ancillary tasks, coupled with vigilance decrement, preclude the requisite sampling, monitoring, and review of the RVP’s operation and its sensitivity controls to allow for adequate manual operation.
This eulogy must, alas, have its bounds, because as well as it may perform the basic RVP/ADT system has its foibles. To overcome them, one requires a combination of manual and automatic tracking, permitting a smooth transition between each. Alternatively, one purchases more RVPs or resorts to the more sophisticated AN/SYS-l or SIDS systems, necessitating more operators and computers (the extra computers not necessarily being an obvious expense as the time is fast approaching when computer manufacturers will offer their hardware free to the purchaser). The real and not immediately obvious cost lies in the supporting software, in its initial production, and in its subsequent life-cycle maintenance. While core is cheap, the coding and associated documentation are expensive in human resources, and the direct relationship between efficiency of programming and its subsequent maintenance costs is a very difficult trade-off to assess.
The next factor to consider is the application to which one intends for ADT. By the very nature of their combat role, the larger CGs and DDGs must possess a complex sensor control system processing full automatic de- tection-and-tracking functions and requiring minimal human intervention. Here the AN/SPS-48C, AN/SPY-1, AN/ SYS-i, and SIDS systems are appropriate, if their capacities are fully realized. But when considering a ship of the size of, for example, the FFG-7 class, the solution per force is the simpler and less expensive one, the CV2834/UYK-20 combination. The two factors militating against any other viable contender are the concept of minimum manning employed on this ship class and the paucity of radar display consoles. Six consoles are presently in the FFG-7 S CIC of which only two can realistically be expected to be devoted to the detection-and-tracking functions. Unfortunately, the tasks of picture compilation, track management, voice radio reporting, and identification friend or foe interrogation do not go away with the advent of this ship class and only serve to increase the aforementioned requisite sensorimotor skills to the overload condition on CIC operators. Introduction of the RVP/ADT system operating on either the AN/SPS-49 or AN/SPS-55 radars is therefore a mandatory requirement on the austerely manned and configured FFG-7. Aegis and SIDS eagerly await the successful evaluation of the RVP/ADT in the USS Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7) as theirs is a significant vested interest.
ADT can thus be seen to be a particular example of the technological revolution into the NTDS arena by successfully automating menial hum5 tasks, requiring and also inducing degree of expertise challenging best of programmers and enginee^ ADT however, is a microcosm o ^ foreboding future facing NTDS, tj1®* cost in computers, core, and 11 requirements and in the high costs volved in the production and ma> ^ slips easily off the tongue when sidering ADT systems, but when templating development costs o of the alternatives, the comple*^_ associated with the achievable
tions, proven performance,
■d, o'10
tern and its configuration “°es lend itself to simplistic interpret8 ^ The RAN developments of what considered to be the basic bui -
block of an RVP/ADT system- ‘
•d
'''
abandoned for the U. S. Navy ^ class, has significant bearing j the system which is being deve for the FFG-7 class. This, in turn’)fpo- pacts on that which will be in£ .. rated into the Aegis and SIDS con lotions. gpcM
The aim is to produce highly rate surface and air tracking 'vl()V£t ly superior detection capabilit"-5^^, manual operators, with tireless
re-
ing in the Royal Australian Navy a ^ triJin 1 ta(“
, is currently ^