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Symbolic of the new possibilities opening up in naval warfare, the Spruance-c/dss destroyer Merrill (DD 976) fires a Tomahawk cruise missile from just off the California coast. With a l,000-pound warhead, the sea-war version of this missile has a range of about 350 miles. A version suited for attack upon targets ashore will have a range of about 600 miles. Armed with weapons such as this, surface ships once again will be able to take a primary offensive role, one long held solely by aircraft carriers and submarines. But before that comes to pass some problems must be solved. One has to do with the potential restrictions of arms limitations treaties. Another has to do with the provision of sensors able first to detect and identify distant enemy ships and then to guide the weapon faithfully toward them. Other new possibilities for surface ships lie in the development of really long-range air defense weapons and in the use of big guns firing extended-range shells under the direction of advanced fire-control instruments. | O ince before the Second World War U. S. naval officers h® O classified surface warships as either aircraft carriers or sut‘^ combatants. During this time, the aircraft displaced the gun as favored ordnance delivery system because it can fly farther than gun can shoot, and its approach to the target can be more ne* than a gun’s line of fire. These tactical advantages have long D ^ considered worth the cost despite the greater accuracy economies inherent in naval gunfire for targets both can engag^' Later, by combining precision guidance systems with r° and air-breathing engines, engineers added to naval magazmeS^ new kind of weapon of even longer range than sea-based a'rCf have. Partly as a result, nearly 20 years ago the Navy’s cont tion to long-range nuclear deterrence was shifted from carrier ^ craft to submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Now a similar of. some tactical offensive missions to cruise-missile-armea ,^s marines and surface combatants may be in progress. Submar t have their own qualities. I will examine this issue as it may a surface ships. g The success of precision-guided defensive munitions is 1t attack aircraft to employ their own precision-guided weapon5 can be fired from outside defense perimeters. In the future- some missions, ships could fire even longer-ranged missileS aircraft control, a tactic reminiscent of what we once called ^ range” gunfire, spotted by aircraft. On the defensive side. 10 ^ U. S. Navy, defending fighter aircraft have been armed medium-range air-to-air missiles. These fighter-launched rn's5 force enemy bombers to attack from even farther away than ^ But ship-launched, aircraft-controlled missiles promise a Iongef fensive reach than chis currently effective air defense system, it is needed. -ge Most naval officers don’t expect precision-guided long missiles of any sort to do away with manned aircraft. ®ut. f0r expect their advent to change naval warfare profoundly- Parofle this reason, in 1977, the Defense Department decided to P?Stjj,eif acquisition of the next generation of aircraft carriers unti required characteristics could be predicted with more assuram jS As in other navies, the U. S. Navy’s surface combatant n part of a strategic and conceptual whole. Its size and config ^ reflect the operational concepts of the present and the recent ^ To the same exent and for many of the same reasons it conce next generation of aircraft carriers, the debate over the imp ^ precision-guided munitions on naval warfare concerns t*ie, j[d' generation of surface combatants. The current Five Year bmp |
132 | • ifl8‘ Proceedings / Naval ReV* |
A. M. Bowen, Jr., who, among other tours afloat, commanded a minesweeper, two destroyers, and a cruiser during his 30-year career in the Navy, has been a naval affairs specialist with the U. S. Congressional Research Service since his retirement from active duty in 1975. His assignments ashore have included service as manpower manager in the Surface Missile Systems Project Office and as director of the Surface Warfare plans and programs division in OpNav, where he helped formulate long- range goals for the surface fleet. He holds a BS in naval science from the Naval Academy (1945) and an MS in international affairs from George Washington University (1970). He has published a number of papers on naval matters, mainly under the aegis of the Congressional Research Service.
carriers the U. S. Navy would be substantially in ferior to its chief rival, the Soviet Navy.
The current operational concept of Navy
mult**
purpose carrier battle group functions and the means of their implementation are depicted in my ^rSt chart. Gaining air superiority is entirely the resp°n sibility of aircraft. In anti-air warfare (AAW), s0^ aircraft perform surveillance beyond surface ra horizons and others provide the only means of dea ing with attacking aircraft which launch their m|S^ siles from outside the range of shipboard missiles afl guns. Without aircraft, a fleet formation’s air dele would consist only of medium- or short-m » weapons, and successive waves of unchallenged ^ sile launchers could continue to attack until 1
ing Plan projects the start of a new class of frigates (FFX) in FY 1984 and a new class of guided missile destroyer (DDGX) in FY 1986. Before designing these new surface combatant classes, the need to resolve some of the conceptual issues that caused postponement of the next generation of aircraft carriers should intensify this debate.
I will identify current operational concepts and, after analyzing their impact on surface combatant design, will explore the pressures for changing these concepts. I will also examine three possible new surface combatant functions: gaining air superiority, attacking targets ashore, and basing sensor aircraft. I will also discuss a modified operational concept that might result from these new capabilities. Finally, I will attempt to analyze the implications of the modified operational concept for surface combatant design.
I will leave it to others to discuss such issues as speed, propulsion systems, and hull forms.
succeeded. This same condition would obtain
enemy standoff ranges exceeded the reach of defen
fighters. ^
In antisubmarine warfare (ASW), fixed-wing
craft share their task with helicopters. Towed aff
and hull-mounted sonars in both surface comba ^
and submarines make the most significant contr
tion to surveillance against submerged submar ^
However, since snorkel equipped diesel-electrie
H FF .otem
marines constitute a substantial portion of the P1 tial undersea threat, aerial surveillance is also a F
- nem 1
thetf
mary means of detection. The localization of efl^
Current Operational Concepts
The U. S. Navy's tactical offensive capability is concentrated in a mere thirteen large aircraft carriers, the ships which provide the means of deploying manned aircraft at sea.1 During the past thirty-five years, the Navy’s other surface forces have been subordinated to sea-based aviation and, with the exception of amphibious assault shipping, have been optimized for roles that support carrier operations directly. Generally, it is recognized that without those
submarines and the delivery of weapons against - ,
outside the range of last-ditch defenses are airct" tasks. When carriers are engaged in sea control oP ations, AAW and ASW may be ends in themso But more often they are essentially defensive tions, enabling a battle group to remain in a cer r body of water to perform its offensive function5^ anti-surface ship warfare or attack against rarg ashore. [S
In anti-ship attack or attack against fixed taf^s, ashore, hit-and-run tactics with temporary supP ^ sion of enemy defenses are appropriate. In c*oS£tjng support of friendly troops or attacks on , e targets ashore, the attacking aircraft or ship rnuS^£<j able to stay on the scene, ready to strike when ca^ in, and this requires air superiority and the supP sion of enemy defense for extended periods of rI ^ Command and control of battle group op6*^1 have come to require prodigious amounts of m» ^ tion, a considerable part of which originates j
lveS- fiiitf' ceft:
storing
'For footnotes, please turn to page 149.
sources outside the force. It also requires S‘».~— - ^ manipulating a very large data base, including t. sions for segregating intelligence, and communl ing a lot of information per unit time to other ^ elements, and headquarters via ionospheric and sa lire communications circuits. The space, manpower, and expense these capabilities r4
19S>
)oi. j 6 ^
nient range. They escort logistic support ship- bl i' an<^ oaibtary and mercantile convoys. In close °f th^^ W^ere v‘s'c and search are an essential part su 6 °f>erat*on> surface combatants perform as the 5^ P°rted units. In this role they are often provided ' °t carrier-based aerial surveillance services for
nrleans we can provide them to only a few ships. ReCently there have been moves to centralize ashore a Portion of the collection, storage, and processing of Maritime strategic and tactical information, but so ^ these moves have not begun to affect practice, k ouSh plans call for some ships to be able to inter- e with central processing facilities ashore, for now, j0rnmanders afloat still rely primarily on shipboard ata bases and processors, primarily those installed in arr'ers, ships large enough to accommodate them out sacrificing some other combat capability.
^ ^ *c#tions of Current Concepts for Urjfce Combatant Design
fa rrent bJ. S. Navy operational concepts cast sur- tole COrn^atants almost exclusively in supporting s- Such ships provide close support for aircraft erat' ^ 10 ^att^e SrouPs, for amphibious assault op- ba ri°nS’ anc^ ^or Sround forces within shore bom- ing air superiority. Carrier-based aircraft perform key functions in strike warfare, anti-air warfare, and antisubmarine warfare. In addition, most of the command and control function that coordinates battle group operations ordinarily is performed on board the group’s carrier. As a result of these developments, often surface combatants cannot perform independently of the carrier and her air wing. This, in turn, necessitates assigning a carrier even where friendly air superiority already prevails.
Since surface combatants normally are cast in supporting roles, their designs have come to emphasize such roles, those of the escort (ASW, AAW, ASUW). For many years the short range at which a surface combatant could detect a submarine governed, and inflated, the numerical requirements for these ships. To minimize the expense this, in turn, led to stringent efforts to restrict surface ships’ cost by limiting their non-escort fighting capabilities. Because AAW sensors and weapons were able to provide coverage over larger areas than ASW sensors and weapons could, fewer AAW suites were needed and separate “area AAW” and “ASW” escort design evolved, the former tending to be the more expensive. The impact of improved passive ASW detection and engagement ranges, achievable with towed arrays and LAMPS
^hich ,
c°ntroi ney supply the necessary coordination and
If
base<jC°ntr°^ r^e a*r ‘s ‘n friendly hands, land- the$eaviat‘0n can play an important part in some of bJsed °berati°ns. But under present concepts sea- Whjc, aviat>on usually provides the air superiority 0ver berrn'ts other naval tasks to be accomplished. rierse years, the carriers’ air wings, and the car- JT»ariy ernselves, have been configured to perform Necessary functions other than merely achiev-
When this practice was fired in 1928, the range was perhaps ten miles and, if the target wasn’t risible through the optical range finders, it couldn't he hit. By means of the aircraft carrier, nat al forces would soon be able to strike targets far over the horizon. With the weapons and sensors available to them, surface warships had no way of keeping up with such developments.
Chart 1: Overview of Navy Multi-Purpose Battle Group Functions—Current Means For Implementation Function Current Means For Implementation
GAINING AIR SUPERIORITY Attacks on Air Bases Afloat and Ashore: Neutralization of Enemy Interceptors: Intercepting Enemy Bombers: ANTI-AIR WARFARE Surveillance: | Attack Aircraft Fighter Aircraft Fighter Aircraft, AEW Aircraft Airborne Early Warning (AEW) Aircraft Shipboard Radar |
Neutralization of Attacking Aircraft Neutralization of Enemy Missiles | Fighters Medium and Short-Range Surface-to-Ait Missiles and Guns |
ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE Surveillance: | Airborne Radar and EW Gear Sonobuoy Barriers Laid by ASW Aircraft Ship and Submarine Sonars |
Localization and Weapons Delivery: | Ship and Submarine Sonars Fixed Wing ASW Aircraft Helicopters Short-Range Shipboard Missiles and Torpe 0 |
ANTI-SURFACE SHIP AND LAND ATTACK Targeting: | Reconnaissance and Attack Aircraft LAMPS (For Harpoon) |
Weapons Delivery: | Attack Aircraft and Supporting Fighters and Jammer Aircraft Medium-Range Missiles (Harpoon) Guns |
COMMAND FUNCTIONS Information Gathering: | Air Wing and Shipboard Sensors, Flagship Communications Systems |
Information Processing: Dissemination: Direction: | Shipboard Data Bases and Processors Flagship Communications System Flagship Communications System |
helicopters, and the multiplication of the air threat, now that guided missiles are employed by submarines and surface combatants as well as by aircraft, are just beginning to be reflected in surface combatant planning. As the ASW escorts move outward from the carriers to take advantage of their improved pas- . sive acoustic detection ranges, they also move out of the umbrella provided by the carrier’s AAW escorts, become more vulnerable to air attack, and must be made more AAW-capable themselves. At the same time, now that the area AAW ships have moved closer to the formation center (because the threat axis | {C has become so diffuse), they must contribute , substantially to screening against torpedo 3 (which calls for active sonar search), and requ very capable ASW suite. While there is still a ^ requirement for separate, highly capable area ships and area ASW ships (because they are statl^|. differently) a need is re-emerging for a purpose escort with a good capability for both ^ and ASW to augment the highly capable, but ^ paratively few, AAW and ASW ships that can , forded. According to Navy witnesses before gress, AAW escort requirements as a prop°rtl |
136 | . l90i Proceedings / Naval Revie^ |
136
must either accept high losses if his aircraft
th;
1 A
dow 3eel< Yom Kippur war, some 600 were shot
etl)bodi,
Rasing costs of penetration to the target, as
as
syst(
tQtal surface combatant force levels are increasing 1 e the total number of surface combatants required for all purposes has been reduced.2
S^uresfor Change
°ng-range, precision-guided munitions have al- y created pressure for changing present opera- a concepts. The price of pressing home an air c through a barrage of surface-to-air missiles, gon erner|te<^ by fire from antiaircraft guns, has I UP, whether one measures the cost in aircraft
pric °r m ^e^ense suppression measures. And the cCe defending surface ships, including aircraft wers, against anti-shipping missiles is also on the Calculations have changed enough to raise con '°nS a^out: rbe desirability of continuing current
A/
r^aft Vulnerability to Air Defenses
attacker facing precision-guided air defense eapons
So i _ _
unaided, or he must provide them with pene-
^ assistance.
tQ er7 day after the North Vietnamese had learned d^nTh substantial aif defense material supplied y che Soviet Union, the United States found it tack.Safy t0 employ substantial numbers of the at- the ln^ a‘rP^anes 'n defensive electronic warfare and the S^Pressi°n of anti-air defenses. Even so, despite syStgenerally accia*med success of the “Wild Weasel” namem which used electronic intercepts of Viet- mis ^ tracbing radar signals to warn pilots when averCS Were about to be fired, U. S. combat losses ^aged two aircraft per day. begj^ae.b experience in 1973 was even worse. At the s°Uhinin^’ cbe Israelis were not able to cope with the ^Uez'r*Cated Soviet-supplied air defense along the sh0t,ana* and many of their pilots and aircraft were tem$ °Wn before new tactics and Wild Weasel sys- t0 CytrUS^efi fi°tn the United States, enabled them a'rcraft l°sses. Meanwhile Egyptian pilots and ’ unsupported by penetration aids, suffered s°«ieer°US attr‘fi°n fiona Israeli Hawk battalions. Of ->000 aircraft employed on both sides in the
J°Wn 3
In/
led in the B-l bomber, for example, were cited »temlnCipal reason b°r cancellation of that weapon < by President Carter in 1977 in favor of cruise itig .C ^evelopment. It may be argued that compet- eniands for federal budget dollars also influenced that decision, but the underlying trend is unmistakable: the expense of penetrating bomber operations is increasing and standoff weapons offer some hope of relief. Disclosures by Secretary of Defense Harold Brown during the 1980 presidential election campaign of progress toward reducing aircraft radar cross-sections (the so-called “Stealth” technology) do not appear to alter this judgment. The best evidence I can find indicates that usable results from this research are several years in the future and that physical laws limit the likely degree of success to considerably less than that administration spokesmen seemed to forecast. The techniques involved, apparently expensive themselves, may be subject to inexpensive countermeasures. Finally, any success achieved through Stealth techniques could be applied with at least the same effectiveness to standoff missiles.4
The survival considerations involved in penetration by guided missiles afe quite different from those involved in penetration by manned aircraft. In the latter case, almost all pilots and aircraft are expected to arrive at the target, survive, and return to their base. In the case of guided missiles, however, some attrition is acceptable, provided that enough survive to strike the target. Penetration tactics by manned aircraft involve suppressing the defense, while missile attacks depend more on saturating it.
Today the tactics used by the U. S. Navy’s manned aircraft appear to be undergoing a transition from those days when pilots pressed home their attacks to increase the probability that their bombs would hit, to the tactics of the future, when, to minimize their exposure to the foe s defensive systems, they will launch standoff weapons from ever- greater ranges (as the Soviets currently do).'1
Probably situations will always occur, particularly in attacks against fleeting targets ashore, when visual observation by the pilot and his judgment are so important to the success of the mission that he must penetrate the enemy’s target defenses. However, in other cases he can remain beyond the reach of the enemy’s defenses and fire his guided missiles from positions of relative safety. As defensive weapon ranges increase, the range of attacking standoff missiles must increase also, as has already occurred in the case of Soviet standoff missiles'. However, size limitations on carrier-based aircraft may preclude their employing air-launched missiles with performance matching those carried by land-based bombers. Eventually defensive missiles could outrange missiles launched from carrier-based aircraft. To overcome this possibility, the missiles could be taken off the carrier-based aircraft altogether and fired from a ship, with the aircraft performing targeting and missile-
nuclear propulsion, anti-ship missiles, ocean sut' ^ lance systems, and the concentration of Lh S- n ^ surface tactical offensive power into only tvvelve thirteen hulls. Part of the reason for this conce11 tion is economic—large ships generally provide & offensive capability than small ones do per dolla^^ vested. Part of the reason is fiscal—old carriers retired with less than one-for-one replacement cause larger replacements were more costly. An t of the reason is due to technical change.6 .
Nuclear-tipped missiles, coupled with PreCl guidance, have placed a high premium on devel°P
guidance functions. Missiles of the kinds discussed here have not yet been developed, however. U. S. naval aircraft still use short- and medium-range missiles (that is, with ranges of less than 100 miles).
When the standoff range exceeds the visibility range, the identification of the target becomes a problem. In some situations the rules of engagement will require positive identification of the target (often achievable only by someone’s sighting it). Under these circumstances television or infrared imaging devices mounted in a reconnaissance drone or in a “pathfinder” missile may suffice, but there will probably always be cases when visual observation by a pilot is the only acceptable means of identification. Moreover, coordinating the employment of ship- launched, air-directed missiles is complex and therefore subject to countermeasures. This would require jam-proof data links between firing ship, controlling aircraft, and missile.
When enemy fighters are present, attacking aircraft need cover by their own fighters. The principal
limiting factor here has been fighter combat ra 1 which, when allowance is made for high-speed c°^ bat, typically is about half the bomber’s com radius. Standoff missiles will ease this requirement^ the extent that attack planes no longer need trave the way to the target. However, when attack P)a^s are engaged in missions against fleeting taf^re ashore, which as previously noted will still req ^ suppression of enemy defenses, air superiority ^ the target area must be achieved, even if it rec|U restricting attack bombers to the operating radms the available fighter aircraft.
Carrier Vulnerability ^
As in the case of aircraft, technological change increased the expense of defending surface ships^ the point where people question the good sense ^ concentrating all the Navy’s surfacetactical one^ ^ power in only a dozen hulls. David Kassing, 0 . f Center for Naval Analyses, has identified five ^ jt changes since World War II which have mad<^ more difficult to protect the fleet: nuclear vveaP
r i |
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|
|
|
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- | | If Jj | ji'it.' j |
airtight” air defense, because a hit by a single
tL °n ls both more likely and more devastating
an a hit with old-fashioned iron bombs. Anti-ship Missiles
from
enable aircraft to carry out saturation attacks
outside the defensive perimeters of current
shiPboard
by nuclear-powered submarines) to conduct more ertect'
Pedoi
Sl|es - -
of ?Se a ’•breat to carriers in the well-known ‘‘edge nav^ Cr'Ses 'n which Soviet and even Third World tyj . Cra‘r armed with anti-ship missiles intermingle Crta S. carriers at the scene of confrontation. In- and ocean surveillance and global command
tor ^°ntr°f systems are able to locate, track, and vec- t-u frces to intercept contacts on the broad oceans
weapons, and enable submarines (espe- ear-powered submarines) to conduct more r^tlVe SurPr'se attacks than are possible with tores- Even surface ships armed with anti-ship mis-
nat ft):...
is ~be attackers. The effectiveness of such systems tim^Uable today- but there is agreement that in pC they will become highly effective, hy ^Sent defensive concepts have been kept viable ptn • lnc°rporation of more capable, and more ex- theS|Vt’ katures than were needed in the past. Thus, than i14 f'ghter—larger, heavier, and more costly Sgy lts predecessor—can simultaneously attack
•. standoff bombers before they can launch their °n t^eS- But the F-14 imposes a minimum size limit Th° Carr'er and increases her cost. as (ii^e ^ore dangerous environment of today is cited cl,
trnerly presented difficult search problems for
areas; only nuclear-powered battle groups could operate in those waters. On the other hand, the threat of saturation attacks by air and surprise by submarine- launched anti-ship missiles is the primary rationale for the expensive Aegis weapon system. If it does what is claimed for it, this system will provide the coordination, short-reaction time and firepower needed to defeat both surprise and saturation attacks. To provide a measure of antisubmarine protection, carriers embark ASW aircraft, displacing attack aircraft and thus reducing their cost-effectiveness ratio against shipping and targets ashore (but saving money over the complete ASW task group that formerly operated nearby for the same purpose). The nuclear-powered attack submarines which are being introduced into battle groups for ASW protection cost more than the surface escort vessels they replace. As in the case of rising costs of target penetration by manned aircraft, the increasing cost of present defense concepts prompts proposals for change. Though some analysts seek alternatives to surface ships, most informed judges hold that there is no substitute for the essential functions such ships perform. Some way of keeping them afloat and in fighting shape in the face of their increased vulnerability to attack and destruction must be found.7
one nf u • • • • • •
ur the principal motivations for providing
ear • " - -
thjs . 0vver in carrier battle groups. According to
MeniIueW’ shiPs would be so vulnerable during re- battj^ rnent operations that conventionally-powered groups would have to be withheld from some
Alternative Approaches
Some people question present concepts for performing the Navy’s missions because of their increasing costs and doubts about their long-term viability.
surface combatants.
ri-ship
Others feel that the increasing cost of performing our Navy’s missions is not out of line with the costs to the Soviets in opposing them. They point to the Soviet Navy’s new air-capable ships as proof the Russians recognize the utility and believe in the viability of sea-based aircraft and their ship platforms. And they predict that soon the Soviets will build “real” aircraft carriers; if, indeed, the first ship of such a class is not already nearing completion. Nevertheless, there is so much uncertainty concerning present concepts that each year Navy programs are questioned seriously, both within the executive branch and in the Congress. Some key programs necessary to continue present concepts have not been funded.
As we have seen, questions related to the future of sea-based aviation have resulted in the decision to extend the lives of our existing aircraft carriers through the end of the century and, thus, to gain time to discern more fully the true impact of long-range, precision-guided weapons on naval warfare. This decision requires that there be sufficient surface combatants in the fleet to keep current concepts viable. Table 1, which projects surface warship force levels to the year 2005 if the FFX and DDGX are not built, shows why naval planners propose to start these new classes during the next five years. The table projects
Table 1: Projected Surface Warship Force Levels
If FFX And DDGX Are Not Built*
| 1980 | 1985 | 1990 | 1995 | 2000 | 2005 |
CV/CVN | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 9 |
CG/CGN | 27 | 29 | 45 | 38 | 30 | 28 |
DD | 44 | 44 | 31 | 31 | 31 | 30 |
DDG | 37 | 41 | 29 | _4 | _4 | _4 |
| 108 | 114 | 105 | 73 | 65 | 62 |
FF | 59 | 59 | 51 | 28 | 0 | 0 |
FFG | 14 | 47 | 66 | 60 | 60 | 52 |
| 73 | 106 | 117 | 88 | 60 | 52 |
•Service life assumptions:
Carriers 45 years
Cruisers and Destroyers 30 years Frigates 25 years
a CG 47 class of 24 ships and 60 FFG 7 class ships- Some samples of ship classes begun in the m eighties should still be in service as late as the m twenties of the next century. Thus, their designS only must be suitable for their current combatan roles, but should incorporate enough flexibility they can be reconfigured for different roles shon ^ that be desirable when the future direction of sea based aviation is resolved. Insofar as surface comb1 ants are concerned, three pending key decisions ^ the extent to which they will participate in the n^ sions of (1) air superiority and (2) attack on targ j ashore and (3) the extent to which they will be use as aircraft platforms.
Surface Combatants and Air Superiority ■
Air superiority has been and still is the resp°nS bility of fighter and attack aircraft. The fighters ^ gage enemy interceptors in the target area or erie: bombers approaching the force. Attack aircraft stroy enemy aircraft at their bases, ashore or at and neutralize the bases themselves. Several ta have begun to influence air superiority operat* and some of them promise ways in which part o burden of achieving air superiority could be borne
Attacks on aircraft carriers are, of course, anti warfare. Surface combatants are already schedule receive a significant anti-ship capability with the vent of tactical Tomahawk, a w'eapon with a ra reported as 350 nautical miles (648 kilometers) an warhead of about 1,000 pounds. These long'ra(1^_ missiles could also enable a surface combatant to P
nil*
ticipate in airfield neutralization, which can be a V ticularly dangerous task for manned aircraft since tially the airfield defenses can be very p°wer ^ Many ships already have Harpoon, a 60-mile weap with a 500-pound warhead. ^
In any event, attacks on air bases ashore are coming less useful because the proliferation of ^ .j vidual aircraft shelters dispersed around the ai ^ makes destruction of aircraft on the ground very ficult. For this reason, in order to destroy enemy ^ craft in the future we may have to rely more than
armed
t)ctended
range (under 100 miles) SAM systems. They
>ger
s fined ■ • ■
Co Wltb over-the-horizon targeting and missile ;sr°* being provided by an aircraft. Such a system Stne °f the candidates being considered to deal with att i * iamrners, and could be employed against the ers as well, provided enough long-range SAMs
0n hand.
tange surface-to-air missiles could be de-
^ave in the past on air-to-air combat and surface- ased air defense systems.8
^ir-to-air combat seems to be changing from the ari° which places a premium on high perform- sh 6 ^sPeed> maneuverability), toward long-range erai°t 0LltS wbere a‘rcraft such as the F-14 engage sev- ^ fargets simultaneously with standoff missiles.
ere is, as yet, no substitute for fighters to engage 1 y 'nterceptors in the target area. But when the ^Ap ~fan^e s^oot"out becomes the primary mode of of °Perati°n there is no technical reason why some k e destruction of enemy attack aircraft could not su fCarr'ed out by surface-to-air missiles fired from the ^ Cornbatar>ts. This could free the air wing from rria,necessity of maintaining round-the-clock CAP, aj e tfore fighters available to accompany attack ^ a c to targets, or make more space available in carrier for attack aircraft.
ble tbere are n0 surface-to-air missiles of suita- range for this role. Current area AAW escorts are
with medium-range (under 50 miles) or
Could ) r . .
th . aestroy attacking aircraft that come within
all reacb’ hut Soviet air-to-surface missile ranges
C^e'r bombers to fire from outside the current
Stfo envefopes. Without fighters to discourage or de-
^ y attacking bombers before they can fire their
[j es> the shipboard SAM systems we have could
SjleSatLlrated and their magazines depleted in a mis-
ate attack °f even moderate intensity. Ship systems
sh' [a^ar~horizon limited because they depend on
C 0ard radars for targeting and fire control.
The 7,800-ton destroyer Spruance (far left) accompanying the 44,000-ton Soviet carrier Minsk in the Mediterranean in 1979. Lacking an appropriately equipped helicopter and armed only as she was when this photo was taken, the Spruance was no match for the Minsk. But, if she were provided with a modern helo, such as the SH-60B Lamps III (left), and a Tomahawk missile (below), she would he a formidable adversary to the Minsk. The coming of the cruise missile and the ship-based sensor-bearing aircraft have opened the way to a new balance among types of warships.
Because of the lengthy process involved, a long- range SAM system probably cannot be ready till the 1990s, though a strong commitment could speed that up. Meanwhile, the present evolutionary development of the AAW capabilities of surface combatants should be able to keep pace with the threat of “leakers” that make it through the long-range fighter screen unless (some would say, until) bomber standoff ranges exceed interceptor ranges. Then, the battle group could be subjected to repeated attacks by unchallenged enemy aircraft which sooner or later would overwhelm the ships defenses.
Surface Combatants and Attack on Targets Ashore
Many officers hold that the service’s offensive capability should be redistributed to improve its survivability and to enhance the effectiveness of the Fleet in the dangerous environment created at sea by modern weapons. The Navy’s leadership seems to be committed to such a redistribution.!l The long-range surface-to-surface missile appears destined to play a key role in this change within the next five or ten years, subject to some uncertainty posed by arms control considerations.
Long-range, precision-guided, surface-to-surface munitions will enable surface combatants and submarines to engage targets ashore previously considered suitable for attack only by aircraft. For many years to come, these weapons will probably be ineffective against moving targets ashore because of their long flight time. But fixed targets, particularly those known to be well defended against air attack, could be hit by surface-to-surface missiles without the loss of pilots. I have mentioned the use of SSMs in airfield neutralization. Ships could also fire such missiles to neutralize fixed air defenses and thus facilitate air strikes on other military and industrial targets. In this fashion, the concentration in only a dozen hulls of the U. S. Navy’s ability to make “tactical” attacks
on targets ashore would be alleviated.
A long-range (600-mile) version of Tomahawk lS under development with the enthusiastic endorse ment of the Navy’s leadership10 for use against targets ashore. There is, however, political sensitivity about developing a cruise missile for this purpose- Arms control considerations could restrict the number or nature (or both) of the weapon.
Ship-launc]-lecj cruise missiles were not addressed ln the SALT II treaty. But the protocol to the treaty H°uld have limited the range of sea-launched surface-to-surface cruise missiles to 600 kilometers J* °ut 324 nautical miles) until 31 December 1981.
cither the treaty nor its protocol differentiated be- Jen nuclear and conventionally armed missiles.
e 600 KM range limit, if accepted for future heaties, would restrict the utility of SSM missiles for nd attack to only about 10 percent of the Soviet Population and industrial targets (but a much larger are of the naval and military targets). More distant and5 C0U^ on*y be attacked by manned aircraft, these would have to be large enough to carry r standoff weapons part of the way. Defense sup- SSl°n would continue to be the responsibility of ^.tcraft for all targets beyond the 600 KM limit, th eSe considerations would affect the trade-offs when capabilities of surface combatants and sea-based
aviation units are decided.
Although many believe American acceptance of the 600 KM range limitation on ship-launched SSMs is unlikely, the Soviet Union has already made it plain that extension of the provisions of the protocol is one of its objectives. A showdown with the Soviets on the issue is probable, and the outcome is unpredictable. Given past U. S. concessions on the cruise missile, the United States would have to adopt a completely new negotiating stance if we intended to change the limit on the weapon’s range.
If continued range restrictions on ship-launched cruise missiles are rejected, then an effort might be made to limit the number of cruise missiles or the number of ships armed with such weapons. Numerical restrictions would impose a cost penalty that could make these weapons less attractive.
According to Seymour J. Deitchman of the Institute for Defense Analysis, the projected acquisition cost of a few thousand surface-to-surface cruise missiles would be about 500,000 fo one million dollars each, in 1978 dollars. At these prices, aircraft- delivered PGMs are considerably cheaper because aircraft are reusable and their missiles are smaller. But if cruise missiles are acquired in much larger quantities, for example in the order of 30,000 instead of 3,000, the cost per warhead on target for cruise missiles and PGMs delivered by aircraft would be comparable.11 Arms control restrictions on the numbers or capabilities of cruise missiles could thus have a profound effect on the role of future surface combatants and the size of their surface-to-surface missile allowances.
Aside from whatever tactical or strategic gains might arise from the advent of ship-launched precision-guided missiles, a very different advantage accrues immediately—the ability to modify quickly the ship’s characteristics by changing missiles. This is the same quality that has enabled aircraft carriers to keep up with the increasing threat and to respond to changing assignments.
Current planning calls for the Tomahawk missile to be put aboard existing ships in box launchers. For the future, a vertical-launch magazine is being developed that will accommodate SSMs, SAMs, and ASW missiles. The vertical launcher makes more efficient use of space than earlier models do and will permit either more missiles in the same space or smaller magazines for the same missile load. It will be able to handle a mixed load of missiles more efficiently than present launchers can. Moreover, fire control equipment that will allow the ship to accept and process over-the-horizon (OTH) targeting information should be indifferent to whether the target is a ship
or an airplane. Similarly, ship designers can be indifferent to whether their new ships will carry SSMs or SAMs, provided the dimensions of the missiles do not differ greatly one from the other. This is an important point, especially since the dimensions of a Tomahawk SSM are already known, a long-range ASW missile is under consideration, but not designed, and we have not yet even made a decision to develop a long-range SAM.
The emphasis on long-range missiles appears to downgrade the utility of naval gunfire against targets ashore. But guns, especially large ones, have not lost their effectiveness. They were left off surface combatants in favor of AAW and ASW weapons which were felt to be more relevant to the escort function. A modern surface combatant’s armament could include big guns which, for targets within their range, are more economical than guided missiles. Among other recent improvements, laser-guided projectiles ^nd the use of sabots to gain increased range will tend to make guns more attractive than they have been for many years.
Surface Combatants as Aircraft Platforms
Now it is time to consider proposals to relieve our carriers of some of their functions by basing, or staging, aircraft on board ships other than carriers, including some surface combatants. Precedent for this kind of shift already exists, as in the cases of ASW and SAR helicopters on escorts, logistics helos on underway replenishment ships, and aircraft for various purpose on amphibious assault ships. Almost all of the proposals depend to a large extent on improving or developing new kinds of powered-lift aircraft.
The origins of these recent proposals are partly vulnerability considerations and partly the pressures to reduce the size of aircraft carriers to make them more affordable. They also stem from expectations that in making aircraft available directly to surface combatants, by either basing or staging aircraft on board those ships, the fleet’s effectiveness will be
increased considerably.
Without over-the-horizon targeting and tm ^ course guidance for their missiles, combatants ariue with long-range SAMs and SSMs would still be e‘ e tive only to their radar horizons. At this time, sea- land-based AEW aircraft seem to many to be the candidates to provide these services for Iong'ra. SAMs and for SSMs employed in the anti-shipP111 mode.12 Against fixed targets ashore tert
contour-matching or some form of geographi
calif
ob'
any
oriented guidance system, supported by satellite servation, would make it unnecessary to expose aircraft to enemy defenses. Someday improvement^ satellite technology might eliminate the need for a .
sate1'
m°v'
craft OTH targeting altogether. But hopes for lite targeting and mid-course guidance against ing targets, particularly fast ones like bombers- not likely to be satisfied until the distant future-
Aerial targeting services are available now
from
1 V\£$C
the sensor aircraft in fhe carrier air wing, arid r ,
aircraft could be made capable of providing
course guidance. Under such an arrangement the face combatant hoping to launch long-range wea*\)fl. would be dependent on the carrier for a key fife c^.f, trol function. If the carrier were disabled or itS
craft depleted, a good bit of the surface ship s
ing capacity would be lost, too. If some surface co^ batants could serve as base for the targeting a*rCf js, the fleet would gain a safety factor. For some sions this would also permit surface combatants^ perform even in the absence of a carrier air wing- LAMPS III helicopter, scheduled to begin flying some surface ships in the mid-eighties may have
targeting as a secondary mission, in addition t0
riag
■{nee
primary ASW task. This extension of an eXlS^ capability will have small impact on future sur combatant design. But helicopters do not fly
3 5° bout
enough to extend the radar horizon even to miles. Indeed, the ceiling of the LAMPS III *s 10,000 feet, which yields a horizon range ° q( miles.13 If the Navy were to decide that a basing
tak’ing facility to accommodate higher-flying aircraft jert\ necessary, this could affect ship design more astically, the degree depending on the extent ASW rcraft basing facilities had already been planned and °uld be usable for the targeting aircraft, j and-based aircraft could also provide such target- iaf m'<-l'course guidance services. We are famil- with the debate over the relative merits of force- hon n'C Versus externally-provided targeting informa- • n' ”^be considerations are similar to those involv- th^an^'^ased ASW aircraft support of surface ships w' rnust operate iqdependently of a carrier air and^ ^ r^e ASW case’ t*le fleet uses carrier-based land-based fixed-wing aircraft and ship-based
heli
‘>ave
afi
^°pters. The missile targeting requirement may 0 be met the same way, at least initially, until
■Xed
"mg sensor aircraft capable of operating from a C unsteady deck of a surface combatant be-
^u>hec
B operational.
UP to four or even six sensor aircraft on a System COrnbatant would complete the new weapon rfrPlace ^roP°sa*s 8° beyond this; for example, to on se tbe carrier’s ASW aircraft with ASW aircraft ace combatants, or to station VSTOL fighters
on the pickets. But such action would have the effect of dispersing small, incomplete, and individually less effective detachments of our present integrated air wing about the force, requiring considerably more effort than the present arrangement does to coordinate operations and maintain the aircraft. Considerations of vulnerability may dictate acceptance of these disadvantages of dispersal to improve the survivability of some aviation capability, particularly in a tactical nuclear environment. However, one should grasp the fundamental difference between the goal of air wing dispersal and that of providing some surface combatants with their own targeting capability matched to the range of their weapons.
uid'
lizea
sp'
now, supplemented by input from the centra global surveillance system. Satellite surveillar*ce^ terns are becoming increasingly effective and eve ally may take over much of the surveillance tas •
changes, a prototype could be ready by the time
uncef'
aircraft would be ready.16 Considering the tainty surrounding the development of fixed-'''*11?’
powered-lift aircraft and the drastic impact on
ship
design necessary to accommodate these aircraft board surface combatants, ships soon to be on drawing board like the DDGX and the FFX will m likely be designed to base helicopters only.
Surface combatants that can accommodate helicopters have been around for a long time. Most advocates of fixed-wing, powered-lift aircraft intend that their platforms provide space for a short takeoff run to improve aircraft payload or endurance. Some espouse arrested landings also.14 To provide these capabilities would have a much greater impact on ship design than helo platforms and hangars have had, for they imply aircraft carrier flight decks and below-deck hangars. Aside from these changes, the size of the ship would have to be increased to provide sufficient stability and to allow for an optimum deck run.15 It might be better to start with a design for a small carrier and modify it to accommodate missiles than to modify a surface combatant design to accommodate fixed-wing aircraft.
Some advocate the SWATH concept as a way of gaining better stability in a relatively small hull. If studies in progress show its greater stability warrants accepting its complexity and sensitivity to weight
Over-the-Horizon Surveillance
Over-the-horizon targeting and mid-course S ance are most often thought of as part of fire c0 gu[ and we have considered them in that context- the associated over-the-horizon task, surveillan(-e^j part of command and control. Both carrier-base ^ land-based surveillance aircraft perform this ft**11". j
Modified Operational Concept
Chart 2: Overview of Navy Multi-Purpose Battle Group Functions—Possible Future Means of Implementation
Function_____________________________________ Possible Future Means For Implementation
atl0n Gathering:
Jnf(
°rrri;
Recce and Attack A/C Satellites
Attack Aircraft and Supporting Fighters and Jammer Aircraft, SSMs and Guns Fighter and Attack Aircraft, Guns
Air Wing and Shipboard Sensors, Flagship Communications System
Shipboard data bases and processors, central processing facilities ashore
Flagship Communications System Flagship Communications System
in some surface combatants.
SUPERIORITY
ck on Air Bases afloat and ashore:
in UtraFzation of Enemy 'hterceptors:
ercepting Enemy Bombers:
J^I-AIR WARFARE 6urveillance:
^ utralization of attacking aircraft: Utralization of Enemy SAMs:
^submarine WARFARE Urveillance:
lization and Weapons ‘•very;
o??;SURface ship warfare w * Targeting;
eaPons Delivery:
ATTACK
C*ARGETS
eaP°ns Delivery:
CqE^Ting targets W0ri^ANIDfunctions at‘0n Processing: ^1Sserhination:
ltecti0n.
lew***! asllore or possibly based aircraft based ashore.
Carrier Battle Group
SSMs, AEW Aircraft, Satellites Attack Aircraft
Fighter Aircraft,
Saturation Techniques
AEW Aircraft, Long-Range SAM
AEW Aircraft, Shipboard Radar AEW Aircraft, Long-Range SAM Medium and Short-Range SAMs and Guns
Airborne Radar and EW Gear, Surface Ship and Submarine, Passive Towed Arrays,
Shipboard Active Sonar
Fixed-Wing ASW Aircraft, Helicopters, Short-Range Shipboard Missiles and Torpedoes
AEW Aircraft
SSM, Attack Aircraft and Supporting Jammer Aircraft
__________ Surface Battle Group
SSMs AEW Aircraft,1 Satellites
Saturation Techniques
AEW Aircraft,1 Long-Range SAM
AEW Aircraft,1 Shipboard Radar AEW Aircraft,1 Long-Range SAM Medium and Short-Range SAMs and Guns
Airborne Radar and EW Gear,2 Surface Ship and Submarine,
Passive Towed Arrays,
Shipboard Active Sonar
Fixed-Wing ASW Aircraft2 Helicopters, Short-Range Shipboard Missiles and Torpedoes
AEW Aircraft1 SSMs and Guns
Satellites SSMs and Guns
Guns
AEW Aircraft,1 Shipboard Sensors, Flagship Communications System
Shipboard data bases and processors, central processing facilities ashore
Flagship Communications System Flagship Communications System
basing surveillance and targeting aircraft. The second chart shows how the first one might be modified if we made these improvements in surface combatant designs. I have added a new column to indicate that even without a carrier air wing a surface battle group having substantial fighting capabilities could be organized. In the second chart, long-range guided missiles share key tasks with manned aircraft in every mission area.
Not only would this concept provide a hedge against the loss of a battle group’s entire offensive power and much of its defensive strength, but, by increasing the number of targets an enemy must take under fire, it cuts into his chances of success. As a result, of course, the likelihood of the carriers surviving would be greatly improved.17
Implications of Modified Concepts on Surface Combatant Design
An assumption underlying this essay is that the U. S. Navy’s operational concepts will continue to center on carrier-based aircraft. Those aircraft will be the major weapon delivery systems for the rest of the century and probably for some time after that. The purpose of the surface combatants will be, as now, to complement the carriers. During this period their escort functions will probably continue to dominate their design and employment.
Super AAW ships such as the Aegis cruisers will be needed. So will super ASW ships that can extend the battle group’s passive surveillance zone beyond the firing range of submarine-launched cruise missiles. The Spruance class fills the latter requirement but, for them to continue being able to do so, the AAW batteries on this class of ship need to be strengthened. Submarines also perform this function but, despite their nuclear power plants, their short reach and surface/subsurface coordination problems will prevent them from replacing surface ships altogether for this purpose. Finally, the emerging need for a surface combatant effective in both AAW and ASW is likely to be filled by the DDGX. There will have to be enough such ships using active sonar to protect the carriers from torpedo attack by submarines which have gotten through the outer screen. Most of these escorts will also be armed with Tomahawk surface- to-surface missiles.
With a carrier battle group escorted by ships such as these, the Navy would have scant need to change its operational concepts. The contribution of these ships to the suppression of enemy air defenses, to the neutralization of enemy air fields, or to the attack upon other targets ashore would probably be limited by the ships’ small magazines (fewer than 100 mis
siles per ship). They must carry in those magazine* enough AAW and ASW weapons to last for the severs days the group might be within reach of power enemy forces while closing (or opening out from) lC*
filled
val
objective. Even if the escorts’ magazines were with AAW missiles, the group’s likelihood of survW would be low if the carriers could not operate theif fighters. Except where friendly control of the air Pre vails, one should not expect such surface combatant* to succeed in battle without a carrier.
For 40 years we have relied mainly on fighters destroy attacking enemy aircraft. This has been an will remain acceptable as long as the fighter intercep ranges keep up with enemy airborne weapon range* But the trend has not been good. When stan ^ ranges come to exceed the intercept ranges of f current generation of fighters, either we will have provide ourselves with a new generation of fig111 (and probably their carriers as well) or we will a to develop another way of dealing with attacking craft. When the time for decision on this rna ^ draws near, the long-range SAM could be attractive this role. To be so, it will need two things. The ^ is that the over-the-horizon targeting and rnis __
control techniques being developed for long-
range
SSMs also be applicable to SAMs. The second is c ^ the vertical launcher systems now being designe missile ships be able to handle such SAMs as we our other missiles.
Over the years cruiser and destroyer designs
have
the
afld
become so much alike that now the Navy, using same hull, designates some ships as cruisers ^ others as destroyers, with the difference lying 10 -
<4
coh
the ship is fitted out. The designs for the CG -i7
-design
963, and DDG 993 (as well as the separately CGN 36 and CGN 38 classes) emphasize their functions. Even if some operational concepts cna these functions will still be required and so wi ships that implement them. For the reasons a*ft‘ zC given, the DDGX design will probably emp a those very same functions. t0
However, none of these ships is large enoug^ ^ perform the historic role of a cruiser, a ship " filled the offensive and defensive capability gaP y tween the fleet’s few major combatants and its 1117 small screening ships. But, if the operational c°ne outlined in the second chart is to be adopted ^ cruisers will be needed. Such a ship would be with surface-to-surface missiles and a major
es>
caliK
gun battery for targets not worth, or suitable t0’^ missile. She would have area and point defense ^ systems, and ASW missiles and torpedoes. She " j
be able to base several sensor aircraft—rotary at first, fixed-winged later if powered lift aircn
_wing
■aftde'
19*1
°Pment goes in that direction. Her magazines sile* ' ^ *ar£e enough t0 carry several hundred mis- ln°tder to be able to engage in air superiority strike warfare operations for several days without ^^rorn‘sing the ship’s AAW and ASW capabilities, 'fa ^ would need facilities appropriate for com- jsn a surface battle group. However this cruiser sUrf°Were<^’ S^e s^ou^ be able to fuel her smaller ^ace combatant consorts.
crui ^art a carr‘er battle group, this “strike” the er Wou^ be able to contribute significantly to a„ . °^ensive mission and also provide a hedge St air wing depletion. As the leader of a surface which ^r°U^ S^e cou^ carry out many missions for resQcarriers must now be sent even though all the TJrces °f their large air wings are not needed, is no^ tlrnetable for building this large missile ship tan a ^arc^ one t0 meet since, except for the long- sign ■ SA^’ most of the development needed to de- hUjijIC ls ‘n progress in connection with other ship- by tLln^. Ptogtams. The SAM system could be ready das C tlfne t*le construction of the CG 47 and DDGX decj . ls completed. It would also coincide with the rje . n tlrne for replacing the current aircraft car- TShm the 1990s.
r0ore 'S re*axec^ timetable could be accelerated if a uPon aCtlVe shipbuilding program were to be decided n' fact, right now, several classes of large ships
are available for conversion should that thought prove attractive. Iowa class battleships, Salem class cruisers, and any of several classes of large, fast commercial cargo ships are examples. Though they lack battle-group speed, even lwo Jima class amphibious assault ships might be considered.
A great deal has been written recently in the Proceedings and elsewhere on the need to provide more offensive power to the U. S. Navy’s surface combatants, as well as on the potential of surface-to-surface missiles and powered-lift aircraft to satisfy that need. The possibilities of long-range surface-to-air missiles as a means of destroying enemy missile-carrying aircraft, and the potential need for that capability, are not so well documented in the open literature. It is important to understand the interrelationships among all three of these incipient surface combatant capabilities since the means for implementing some of them are still under development and much could be gained by coordinating development efforts toward a common operational concept. A range of such unified concepts should be developed and competitively analysed.
‘This ■
^*Ss‘ons '°n ^°rrows heavily from an unpublished report, “Roles and ^trUcture i ^'rcra^c ^arr*ers in the U. S. Navy: Budgetary and Force Srch
Implications,” prepared by the author for the Congressional
Serv:
Mil,
Con
lce in March 1978.
'itary pn®rcss- House. Committee on Armed Services. Hearings on br °stute and H.R. 6495, Department of Defense Authorization i^'ashinpr‘at'°ns for Fiscal Year 1981. 96th Congress, 2nd session 2, P. ft/"”’’ D'C': GPO' ,98°) (60-896 0 80) Part 3 of 6, Book 1 of
^Bo
V’ lntern ^art’ The Vulnerability of the Manned Airborne System, part ^or a c . tl(inal Defense Review, June 1977, pp. 1062-1066.
^al Qut 'Ca^ eva^uat'on °f stealth technology see Edward Teller, “The V ”Stl0n about Stealth: Will it Work?” Wall Street Journal, 18 5,,Var; 8°’ P- 30.
> ar ety of a
l'cbnoi0 v ^lr-Surface Weapons Studied,” Aviation Week and Space taPon
i. Way |
VO - 108' 6 Feb. 1978, pp. 165-169; "Radar Guided
‘nr)
. ^stcm for Stand-off Anti-ship Attack,” Maritime Defense
Vo1' 2’ Nov- 1977, p. 395. A-asr'
In-
stit,
Pfroad ^Sln8> Protecting the Fleet,” in Problems of Seapower As We '* e "1st Century, (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise In-
, Ute
VibrJ5’ I9?7)-
Efface ^XaniP^e. the report of the Defense Science Board, Task Force on c ^ ^u^nerability, in U. S. Congress. House. Committee on
Hearir
Conense Arborization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1981. *°> part ftSS’ 2nd session, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1980) (60-896 0 HmoUr | ^ 8<>°b 1 of 2, Research and Development, p. 1112.
^ Miijt Pitchman, New Technology and Military Power: General Pur
Forces fur the 1980s and Beyond. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview
Press, 1979).
“CNO Report, FY 81. Military Posture and Budget of the Navy Office of the Chief of Information, Navy Dept. (Washington, D.C., 1980) p.55. ‘"CNO Report, FY 81, op. tit., p. 55.
“Seymour S. Deitchman, op. cit.. p. 49.
I2According to the CNO Report, Fiscal Year 1981, development of an OTH targeting capability to support the launch of anti-ship missiles is in progress. CNO Report, op. cit.. p. 55.
1 According to Aviation Week and Space Technology for 6 Oct. 1980, The E-3A AWACS which reportedly has a ceiling of about 35,000 feet, has a radar range of "about 250 naut. mi. for low-level targets."
“See, for example, David C. Hazen, "Nine Prejudices About Future Naval Systems," in U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, vol. 106/7/929, July 1980, pp. 29-30. .
"Ibid. pp. 30-31.
"Ibid. p. 31.
“Anibal A. Tinajero, in Fleet Air Defense: A Naval Problem, Report No. 79-259F, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., 19 Sept. 1979. Page 73 and the appendix show the effect of dispersal on rhe survivability of high value targets.
'"The need ro resurrect the U. S. Navy’s now defunct capability for major caliber gunfire was addressed by Norman Polmar, "The U. S. Navy: Naval Guns," in U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, vol. 105/8/ 918, August 1979, PP- 121-122; Todd Blades, “Needed: Heavy Firepower" in U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, vol. 105/7/917, July 1979, pp. 50-54; and Charles F.. Myers, Jr., "A Sea-Based Interdiction System for Power Projection," in U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, vol. 105/11/921, Nov. 1979, pp. 103-106.
Surf
I have identified three ways now under.disc'1 * * **5 ,
in which surface combatants can be made str j
partners of aircraft carriers as the imPa<\^s: precision-guided munitions on naval warfare tin ^
We can arm them with long-range SAMs, arm ^
with long-range SSMs, and fit them with facil‘tieS