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One of the important challenges facing naval officers today is to define, then articulate, why we need a navy and what it should be able to accomplish for the country. The changes in national attitudes and military technology and the relationship of nations today are such that we cannot accept as sacrosanct the traditional rationale for a navy. We must reexamine and be willing to change the well established missions of our Navy. In 1970 the Chief of Naval Operations defined the current missions of the U. S. Navy as being Strategic Deterrence, Sea Control, Projection of Power Ashore, and Naval Presence. By "missions” he meant the outputs or objectives of having a navy. As a starting point, we should examine how these four missions evolved. We can then ask what they specifically mean today and whether they are an adequate rationale for a navy.
The first mission of the earliest navies was being able to move military forces by sea. As time went on, there were many technological milestones, new tactical concepts, and maritime initiatives, but the basic naval mission to ensure the safe movement of ground forces and their supplies across the sea endured for centuries.
By the 18th century, however, sea trade routes were flourishing, exploration was becoming more far ranging, the horizons of imperialism were widening, com
merce was growing, and with it, piracy. As nations began to depend on the seas for their economic well being, they needed security of movement by sea. Control of the sea became the sine qua non of economic growth. The Sea Control mission expanded to include the protection of shipping for the nation’s economy as well. At the end of the 19th century, Alfred Thayer Mahan defined maritime power to include merchant marine and naval forces plus all of the bases and coaling stations needed to support each. He popularized the "control of the seas” concept as a key to expanding national power and prestige. To Mahan the term "control of the seas” meant both denying the enemy use of the seas and asserting one’s own use, both with a battle fleet superior to that of the enemy.
British and German naval strategy in World War I reflected this heritage. Both navies believed that a decisive battle fleet encounter would determine control of the seas. Hence, tactical caution dominated the Battle of Jutland. After that failure to defeat the British battle fleet, the Germans challenged British seapower indirectly, first with surface commerce raiders, and later with unrestricted submarine warfare. The British reacted by attempting to blockade the German U-boats with mines laid across the exits from the North Sea. This failed, and the World War I struggle for control of the Atlantic evolved into a gruelling war of attrition. Large numbers of allied antisubmarine ships and aircraft were pitted against a much smaller number of German submarines. Despite the difference between this kind of warfare and the classic concept that battle fleet engagements would determine control of the seas, few strategists understood how radically the concept of "control of the seas” had been altered by the advent of the submarine. British, German, Japanese, and American preparations for World War II all concentrated on potential battle fleet actions. Only a few voices pointed out that an additional submarine might be more useful than another battleship.
Equally few strategists forecast the dominant role
20 U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, December 1974
that control of the air over a surface fleet would have. However, in March 1941, off Cape Matapan in Greece, the first engagement of major surface forces since Jutland demonstrated that it was the presence of a British aircraft carrier that allowed an otherwise weaker force to prevail. Throughout World War II the primary use of naval carrier-based air power was in the sea control role of defeating enemy carriers and battleships, with a secondary role of providing close air support for amphibious assaults. By the end of World War II the idea of totally denying the seas to one’s enemy while asserting one’s own exclusive use had been overtaken by technology. On the one hand it was nearly impossible to deny an enemy submarine fleet access to the seas; on the other, there were likely to be areas of the sea where enemy air power would make the assertion of one’s presence prohibitively costly. Yet, for the first several decades after the second World War, the U. S. Navy had such a monopoly on seapower that the term "control of the seas” understandably continued to carry its long-established connotation.
The new term "Sea Control” is intended to acknowledge the limitations on control of the oceans brought about by the advent of the airplane and the submarine. It connotes a more realistic concept of control in limited areas and for limited periods of time. It is conceivable for a navy today to temporarily exert air, surface, and subsurface control in a limited area while moving ships into position to project power ashore or to resupply overseas forces. But it is not conceivable, except in the most restricted sense, to totally control the seas for one’s own use, or to totally deny them to an enemy.
This may change with evolving technology and tactics but, in the meantime, we must approach the use of the term "Sea Control,” from two directions: denying an enemy the right to use some seas at some times; and, asserting our own right to use some seas at some times. Any seapower may both assert its own use of the seas and deny that right to the enemy at any given time. Its efforts will usually be divided between the two objectives. For instance, if the United States were attempting in wartime to use the North Atlantic to reinforce Europe, it would put the greater percentage of its effort on asserting sea control. In a situation like the war in Vietnam, where our use of the seas was not challenged, we made a substantial effort to deny the other side any seaborne infiltration into South Vietnam.
There are four different tactical approaches for achieving these Sea Control objectives:
Sortie Control. Bottling up an opponent in his ports or his bases is a most economical means of cutting off a nation’s use of the seas or ability to interfere.
Nevertheless, no blockade is 100% successful. Some units may be beyond the blockade when hostilities commence and will remain to haunt opposition forces. Against the enemy’s aircraft there is no static defense. Planes must be bombed at their bases. If we assume an opponent will be in control of the air near his ports, sortie control tactics must primarily depend on submarines and mines. Thus we must conclude that blockades are weapons of attrition requiring time to be effective. But the lesson of history is perhaps the most instructive of all—ingenious man has usually found ways to circumvent blockades.
Chokepoint Control. Sometimes the best place to engage the enemy is in a geographical bottleneck through which he must pass. In so doing, platforms like ASW aircraft that probably could not survive in the area of the enemy’s sortie point can be used.
Open Area Operations. Once enemy ships, submarines, or aircraft are loose in, or above, the open ocean, we have the option of instituting search procedures. Open area search is a third form of attrition operations. In short, these operations are not part of defending specific merchant or naval shipping. They are intended to seek out the enemy and reduce the threat before it makes contact with forces to be protected.
Local Defense. In contrast to searching out a large area with the intent of locating, tracking and possibly prosecuting and destroying enemy forces, in local defense we assert our use of the seas. If our attrition forces have not been 100% successful, the enemy may be able to close our forces to within range of attack. If so we must defend ourselves by (1) engaging his attack platforms directly, (2) defeating his attack weapons by direct kill, or (3) decoying or deceiving his weapons. This objective may include contributions, as a preliminary, of sortie control, choke point control and open area operations. Depending upon our purpose in asserting use of the seas we may select (1) to try to evade and deceive, (2) to close in and attack, and (3) to attack enemy forces when they close to within their weapon range, and to defend actively or passively against these weapons.
In executing Sea Control, our relative emphasis on these four tactics will vary with the particular circumstance, especially the enemy threat and our own objectives. For instance, if our objective is to ensure an early flow of supplies to some theater of war, attrition type tactics may not be adequate. Or, if in the early days of a conflict, the enemy has dense defenses near his ports and bases, sortie control may be difficult.
Additionally, in executing Sea Control tactics, two passive techniques deserve particular mention:
Deception. Assertive Sea Control objectives do not necessarily demand destruction of the enemy’s force.
If the enemy can be sufficiently deceived to frustrate his ability to press an attack, we will have achieved our Sea Control objective. Force routing, deceptive/ imitative devices, and other anti-search techniques can be employed, often in combination with other tactics.
Intimidation. The perceptions of other nations of our Sea Control capability relative to that of other major powers can influence military decisions. What a nation says about its capabilities can influence the challenges that are offered or accepted. A Sea Control force that is recognized by the enemy may inhibit the enemy’s willingness to commit his sea denial forces.
By the early 19th century, another important naval mission had evolved—the projection of ground forces from the sea onto the land. Modern amphibious warfare began during the wars of the French Revolution. A new dimension in tactics was given to commanders in the Projection of Power Ashore through amphibious assault. During World War I the first major amphibious assault of the 20th century was attempted at Gallipoli. The failure of the assault as a result of poor execution nearly killed the amphibious assault concept. In World War II, however, amphibious assault played a major role in both theaters, and the Inchon assault in Korea in 1950 constituted a stunning tactical maneuver.
Amphibious assault tactics are largely a function of the size of the operation. Figure 1 applies.
The war in Korea and later the war in Vietnam brought into play two new ways of projecting power ashore: naval bombardment and naval tactical air. Naval bombardment was undoubtedly used on occasions as far back as the 18th century to interfere with enemy coastal communications and installations. But, by 1950, it was employed primarily as a part of amphibious assault. Both Korea and Vietnam have long, exposed coastlines with significant road and rail lines.
Here naval bombardment came into its own as an independent way of projecting power ashore.
Naval bombardment is presently available from naval guns in destroyers utilizing two tactics: direct fire and indirect fire. If the target is visually observable from the firing ship, direct fire is the simplest and most accurate method. If it is not, fire directed by a spotter on the beach, from an aircraft or by pre-arrangement based on geographical coordinates, must be employed.
During World War II, naval tactical air began moving into the projection of power role. Tactical air projection evolved fully as a mission in the post-World War II period. The marriage of the jet aircraft and improved, lesser drag munitions gave the aircraft carrier a capability of extending its reach far past the shoreline. During the Korean War, naval tactical air came to play a major role in support of the land campaign: air attacks on enemy networks; transportation; air superiority over the battlefield; and close air support of ground forces.
The four basic tactical air tactics are: deep interdiction; battlefield interdiction; close air support; and counter-air/anti-air warfare.
Figure 1 Comparison of Amphibious Task Organizations
| MAF* | MAB* | MAU* | Raid |
Troops | To 33,000 | 8,000-12,000 | 1,800-4,000 | 50-250 |
Ships | 43-52 | 15-17 | 4-6 | 1-2 |
Helos | 250-300 | 75-120 | 30-36 | 10-14 |
Attack Aircraft | 50-60 | 18-20 | 6-8** | 2-4** |
Boats | 320-350 | 80-100 | 30-40 | 2-10 |
Gunfire Support | 8-10 8" 22-30 5"/54 | 12-14 5"/54 | 2-4 5"/54 | 0-3 5"/54 |
*MAF—Marine Amphibious MAB—Marine Amphibious MAU—Marine Amphibious ** VTOL | Force Brigade Unit |
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Missions of the U. S. Navy 21
Deep Interdiction is usually more strategic than tactical. That is, the impact on the ground campaign is more remote and less immediately felt than in the other tactical air tactics. Attacks can be either directed at the enemy’s war making potential, that is against civilian morale, economy, or command structure; or they can be militarily disruptive, that is against military bases, logistics sources, depots, or supply routes. Generally these are fixed targets that are pre-planned. Thus such attacks may include advance preparations of target lists, strike group tactics, approach profiles, defense suppression techniques, and planned staging of attacks. For instance, attack aircraft if threatened by enemy fighters,
22
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, December 1974
have three options: continue to target, jettison ordnance and attempt to escape or, in some circumstances, jettison and attempt to engage the fighters. The actual choice will depend on the type of aircraft and the nature of the mission flown. One or another of these tactics may be preferred, but it generally will be determined in advance.
In addition to the primary attack aircraft, a typical operation may also involve special EW, anti-ground defense, or air-to-air configured fighters (see counter-air tactic below), which may be preceded by photo electronic reconnaissance missions. Because deep interdiction operations are remote from the fluid conditions in battle areas, enemy air defenses generally tend to be well integrated. Reasonable radar warning, good air control facilities, airborne patrol or ground alert fighters, and both surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and antiaircraft fire (AAA) can be anticipated.
Battlefield Interdiction is generally carried out in the enemy’s division to corps area, about 5 to 50 kilometers into enemy-held territory from the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA). It is directed primarily against military targets, both static, such as bridges, gun emplacements, and bunkers, and fleeting, such as troop concentrations or vehicular traffic. The measure of effectiveness of this tactic may not be so much in targets destroyed as in the denial to the enemy of ground force mobility behind the front lines or of increased difficulty in resupplying key items such as POL and ammunition.
Flights and areas of coverage are usually pre-planned but include targets of opportunity with target acquisition being the mission-limiting feature, especially in bad weather, at night, or in jungle terrain. Real-time intelligence may be provided by various types of sensors. In most circumstances, attacking aircraft will penetrate enemy-held territory over short distances only. Because of this, they may well operate at low levels with or without fighter cover. Mobile SAMs, although perhaps not well netted and with only short radar warning time available, plus AAA, can be anticipated. There must be good air space control and coordination because of the close proximity to front line close air support operations.
Close Air Support operations are "call fire” in response to direct requests from ground units or through Forward Air Controllers (FACs). As these same sources may be calling simultaneously for artillery, good liaison procedures between the controllers and the close support aircraft are essential. Aircraft, capable of heavy ordnance loads and low level operations, must be able to scramble quickly from nearby bases or be able to loiter in the area on call. The zone of operations tends to be no deeper than five kilometers from friendly
forces, hence accuracy of weapon delivery is extremely important. While large, mobile SAMs are possible in this zone, they are less a threat than AAA and hand held, short-range SAMs. Fighter escort is usually not assigned, though there may be general front coverage against raiding aircraft.
Counter-air/Anti-air. There are two distinct air superiority operations:
► Counter-air to neutralize an enemy’s anti-air capabilities sufficiently to minimize attrition to our attacking forces.
► Anti-air operations to deny an enemy the capability of operating attack aircraft in our areas of interest and control.
Escorting fighter aircraft provide counter-air defense against enemy fighters; armed suppression fighters or attack aircraft are directed against ground defenses such as SAMs and their control facilities; and a variety of EW aircraft techniques defend against SAMs and AAA. Escort fighter aircraft tactics can be divided into:
► Long range intercept utilizing sophisticated radar and fire control techniques and air-to-air missiles.
► Dog-fight maneuvering and close in missiles or guns.
In the long range case, positive identification is a critical problem. In either case, air intercept control can be valuable.
For anti-air operations, airborne CAP, ground alert fighters, SAMs, AAA and deceptive electronic measures can be employed.
This type of mission tactic categorization can be valuable in assessing own and enemy capabilities, whereas the usefulness of a simple summary of weapon/aircraft performance characteristics is limited. When we thereupon superimpose weapons and aircraft, we can then better evaluate our capabilities for achieving some part of the tactical air projection mission. By superimposing enemy defensive capabilities, we can move into a dynamic evaluation of our systems in combat. By superimposing enemy offensive weapons and aircraft and our defensive systems we can estimate our vulnerabilities.
Beyond this, we can also use this categorization to identify the weapons and aircraft characteristics that we need for each tactic. Figure 2 does this with some of the principal aircraft and weapon characteristics.
There will be specific scenarios where some of the judgmental evaluations in Figure 2 will be incorrect. It would be desirable to be infinitely flexible and have maximum characteristics in all aircraft and weapons. Unfortunately, the laws of both physics and economics prevent that. Hence, some evaluation of probable use and likely need can be valuable.
Only a fine distinction separates some aspects of the
Sea Control and Projection of Power Ashore missions. Many weapons and platforms are used in both missions. Amphibious assaults on choke points or tactical air strikes on enemy air bases can be employed as a part of the Sea Control mission. Sea-based tactical aircraft are used in Sea Control missions for anti-air warfare and against enemy surface combatants. The distinction in these cases is not in the type of forces nor the tactics which are employed, but in the purpose of the operation. Is the objective to ensure/prevent use of the seas or is it to directly support the land campaign? For instance, much of the layman’s confusion over aircraft carriers stems from the impression that they are employed exclusively in the Projection of Power Ashore role. Actually, from the Battle of Cape Matapan through World War II, aircraft carriers were used almost exclusively to establish control of the ocean’s surface. Today they clearly have a vital role to play in both the Sea Control and Projection of Power missions.
Both Sea Control and Projection of Power Ashore can be termed "war fighting” missions. We buy forces capable of executing these missions in combat. The Navy’s two other missions are "deterrent.” We buy forces to ensure against having to engage in combat.
During the 19th century, the term "gunboat diplo
macy” came into the naval vocabulary. In the quest for colonies, powerful nations paraded their naval forces to intimidate and serve warning. In time, the range of this activity extended from warnings and coercion to demonstrations of good will and humanitarian assistance. Today, the Naval Presence mission is the use of naval forces, short of war, to achieve political objectives.
We attempt to accomplish these objectives with two tactics: preventive deployments and reactive deployments. A preventive deployment is a show of presence in peacetime whereas a reactive deployment is a response to a crisis. In a preventive deployment, force capabilities should be relevant to the problem, clearly not inferior to some other naval force in the neighborhood, and in capability we should have a reasonable hope that reinforcements can be made available if necessary. On the other hand, a reactive deployment may or may not actually involve a movement or deployment of forces. There will be instances when the threat of doing so, perhaps communicated through an alert or mobilization order, will produce a desired reaction in itself. When a force is deployed, however, it needs to possess an immediately credible threat and be prepared for any contingency. A comparison with other naval forces in the area will be inevitable.
Figure 2 Aircraft and Weapon Characteristics for Tactical Air Projection Missions
| Deep Interdiction | Battlefield Support | Close Air Support | Counterair |
AIRCRAFT |
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Speed | H | M | L | H |
Maneuverability | H | M | H | H |
Range | H | M | L | M |
Endurance | M | M | H | M |
All Weather | H | M | L | M |
Sophisticated Weapons |
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Delivery System | H | M | M | — |
ECM Capability | H | M | L | H |
Weapons Payload | H | M | M | — |
WEAPONS |
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Long Range | H | M | L | M |
Large Warhead | H | M | L | L |
Antipersonnel | L | M | H | — |
Antimaterial | H | H | H | — |
Sophisticated (Smart) | H | M | L | H |
H—Highly sophisticated M—Medium L | -Low-simple, basic |
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Missions of the U. S. Navy 23
In deciding to insert a presence force, the size and
24 U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, December 1974
composition of force must be appropriate to the situation. There are five basic actions which a Naval Presence force can threaten: amphibious assault, air attack, bombardment, blockade, and exposure through reconnaissance.
Almost any size and type of presence force can also imply that the United States is concerned with the situation and may decide to bring other military forces or non-military pressures to bear. All too often, especially in reactive deployments, we tend to send the largest and most powerful force that can mo ye to the scene rapidly. The image created may not be appropriate to the specific problem.
When selecting a Naval Presence force, we must also take into account how the countries that we want to influence will perceive the situation. There are three distinctly different categories of national perceivers:
The Soviet Union. When contemplating a U. S. presence force, the Soviets must assess their comparative naval strength available over time, and the expected degree of U. S. resolve. As the United States is not likely to threaten the U.S.S.R. directly, except in a world-wide crisis of the most serious proportions, the principal strength comparison would probably be on which country could actually exercise sea control in the area in question.
Nations Allied to the Soviets. Nations with close ties to the Soviets must assess relative U. S.-U.S.S.R. capabilities. These powers will ask, "Can the United States project its assembled power onto my shores?” and "Can the U.S.S.R. deny them that capability?” Thus, third nation appraisal of relative sea control strengths may be the most critical factor and their assessment may not correspond to either U. S. or Soviet assessments of identical military factors.
Unaligned Third Nations. There will be cases where a nation is not able to invoke major power support in a dispute with the United States. The perceptions of such a country would likely focus on U.S. capability and will to project its power ashore to influence events in that country itself.
Thus, the Naval Presence mission is sophisticated and sensitive and, because of the subtleties involved, probably the least understood of all Navy missions. A well orchestrated Naval Presence can be enormously useful in complementing diplomatic actions. Applied deftly but firmly, in precisely the proper force, Naval Presence can be a persuasive deterrent to war. Used ineptly, it could be disastrous. In determining presence objectives, scaling forces, and appraising perceptions, the human intellect must take precedence over ships and weapons systems.
The second naval deterrent mission came with the introduction of Strategic Deterrence as a national mili
tary requirement. Again, the combination of improved aircraft performance and smaller packaging of nuclear weapons made the aircraft carrier capable of contributing to this new mission. With the Navy struggling to readjust its missions to peacetime needs and with the U. S. Air Force at that time establishing its own place in the military family, it is understandable that there was a sense of competition for this new role. However, by the mid-1960s the development of the Polaris submarine eliminated any question of appropriateness of this mission for the Navy.
Our Strategic Deterrence objectives are:
► to deter all-out attack on the United States or its allies;
► to face any potential aggressor contemplating less than all-out attack with unacceptable costs; and to maintain a stable political environment within which the threat of aggression or coercion against the United States or its allies is minimized.
In support of these national objectives, we have three principal military "tactics” or force preparedness objectives. The first is to maintain an assured second strike capability in the hope of deterring an all-out strategic nuclear attack on the United States. Today that means dissuading the Soviets from starting a nuclear war. We hope to achieve this by maintaining a strategic attack force capable of inflicting unacceptable damage on any enemy even after he has attacked us. The Navy’s Po- laris/Poseidon/Trident forces are fundamental to this deterrence because of their high nuclear survival probability.
A second tactic is to design our forces to ensure that the United States is not placed in an unacceptable position by a partial nuclear attack. If the Soviets attacked only a portion of our strategic forces, would it then make sense for the United States to retaliate by striking Soviet cities, knowing that the Soviets still possessed adequate forces to strike our cities? This means making our strategic strike forces quickly responsive to change in targeting and capable of accurate delivery. SSBN forces can be well tailored to these requirements.
A third objective is to deter third powers from attacking the United States with nuclear weapons. Because of the great disparity between any third country’s nuclear arsenal and ours, the same forces deterring the Soviet Union should deter others.
Finally, we maintain sufficient strategic forces so that we do not appear to be at a disadvantage to the Soviet Union or any other power. If we were to allow the opinion to develop that the Soviet strategic position is markedly superior to ours we would find that political decisions were being adversely influenced. Thus we
Missions of the U. S. Navy 25
must always keep in mind the balance of power image that our forces portray to the non-Soviet world. In part, this image affects what and how much we buy for strategic deterrence. In part, it affects how we talk about our comparative strength and how we criticize ourselves.
In summary, the Strategic Deterrence mission is divided into four tactics: Assured Second Strike, Controlled Response, Deterrence of Third Powers, and Balance of Power Image.
There is very little overlap between Strategic Deterrence and other Navy mission areas at present. However, significant improvements in enemy ASW technology could reduce the ability of SSBNs to survive without assistance from friendly Sea Control forces. With this exception and the fact that aircraft carriers still possess the potential for nuclear strikes, that mission is performed almost exclusively by forces designed specifically for it.
There is a good deal of overlap in the overall field of deterrence. There is no doubt that our strategic deterrent forces inhibit at least ourselves and the Soviet Union from engaging in non-strategic or conventional warfare. It is also true that the very existence of our Sea Control and Projection of Power Ashore forces deter conventional warfare, over and above whether we consciously employ them in the Naval Presence role. There is very likely even some interplay between our conventional force capability and the way in which our strategic deterrent forces are perceived, e.g., a Sea Control capability is essential to the security of our sea- based strategic deterrent forces. Thus, the boundary lines between the four naval mission areas cannot be precise. More than anything, they each express a somewhat different purpose. Despite these inevitable overlaps and interdependence, we can understand the Navy far better if we carefully examine each mission individually. We must know what each mission’s objectives are so that we do not overlook some useful new tactic or weapon and so that we can strike the proper balance whenever these missions compete for resources.
Additionally, we must be careful not to view as
rigidly fixed these mission areas and their relative importance. We swung from a primary emphasis on Sea Control with a secondary interest in amphibious assault before and during World War II, to a primary emphasis on strategic deterrence and tactical air projection for the 20 to 25 years following that war. In about the mid-1960s, the dramatic and determined growth of Soviet naval capabilities forced renewed attention to Sea Control. The even more recent national disinclination to engage ground forces in support of allies should perhaps today place more attention on the conventional deterrent mission of Naval Presence. The dynamic nature of world conditions will demand a continuing reassessment of the relation of one mission to another and the comparative emphasis on their individual tactics.
Perhaps this constant flow and counter flow of mission emphasis and tactical adaptation is even more accentuated today than in the past. On the one hand, the pace of technological innovation is forcing this. On the other, the changing nature of world political relationships and domestic attitudes demands a continual updating of naval capabilities to support national policy. Naval officers, as professionals, must understand the Navy’s missions, continually question their rationale, and provide the intellectual basis for keeping them relevant and responsive to the nation’s needs. Unless we do, we will be left behind, attempting to use yesterday’s tools to achieve today’s objectives.
Vice Admiral Turner entered Amherst College in 1941 and two years later transferred to the U. S. Naval Academy at Annapolis. After graduation he served a year at sea before entering Oxford University where his studies as a Rhodes Scholar led to a Master’s Degree. After Oxford, he held a variety of sea assignments, including command of a minesweeper, a destroyer and a guided missile frigate which he placed in commission. His shore duties included the Politico-Military Policy Division in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis, the Advanced Management Program at the Harvard Business School and Executive Assistant and Naval Aide to the Secretary of the Navy. In 1970 he assumed command of a Carrier Task Group of the Sixth Fleet. In 1971 he served as Director of the Systems Analysis Division of the Office of the CNO and after that as President of the Naval War College. He is presently Commander, Second Fleet.
___________________ Condition Noted
Captain "Howdy” Gray, one of the top flight surgeons from the famous Mayo Clinic, served with me on board the hospital ship Solace. His wide assortment of parlor stories included one about the young ensign who, while in port, made this entry: "The captain came aboard drunk”. He was severely reprimanded, so the next day, attempting to right his wrongs, he wrote in the log: "The captain came aboard sober”.
Captain Leo L. Stanley, MC, USNR (Retired)
(The Naval Institute will pay $25.00 for each anecdote published in the Proceedings.)