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If the Soviets continue to move their troops and weapons, and those of their Cuban surrogates, into strife-torn areas, it may soon become necessary for the United States to take tnore active measures than we have in the past in order to counter the spread of Soviet influence in the Third World.
Since the end of the Vietnam War, the Soviet Union has become more active militarily in the Third World. Soviet shipments of arms and Cuban troops to Africa and Soviet troops in Southwest Asia are being seen on an unprecedented scale. The Soviets have scored important political gains in Angola, South Yemen, Ethiopia, and now Afghanistan. They have also incurred significant losses in Egypt, Sudan, and Somalia, among others. These ambiguous results raise a question about the significance of increased Soviet activity in the Third World for American foreign and defense policy.
Strategists, politicians, and academics are divided as to whether the Soviet Union has offensive or defensive intentions, not only in the Third World but in all realms of political and military activity. Some have interpreted Soviet actions and writings as demonstrating the offensive nature of Soviet motives and the need for a strong U. S. response. Others have argued that Soviet motives are defensive, and thus a lessening of U. S. military activity and an offer of cooperative relations will lead to the Soviets responding in kind.
What is the United States to believe? No one denies that the Soviets are actively attempting to spread their influence in the Third World through participation in conflicts there. The main point of disagreement is whether their attempts have been successful enough to threaten the security of the United
States. Some characterize Soviet activity as bem£ undertaken with the express purpose of gaimn$ hegemony in the Third World to the detriment 0 the United States. Others characterize it as the natu ral, though maladroit, behavior of a great P°wef seeking to enhance its own influence without infrinS ing on anybody else’s. Because we do not have acce*s to the inner councils of the Kremlin, the probkt11 how to read Soviet intentions through their actions' This is not a novel problem of foreign pob^ More than 70 years ago, British foreign pol|C! makers were divided as to how German politlClj. military activity should be interpreted, and sPeC'j ically as to whether this activity should be consider inimical to British interests. In his “Memorand^ on the Present State of British Relations with Frafl and Germany,” Sir Eyre Crowe posed the pr°b e and offered a solution to it:
“. . . Either Germany is definitely aiming at general political hegemony and maritime asC^f dancy, threatening the independence of neighbours and ultimately the existence of F ^ land;
“Or Germany, free from any such clear-cut ^ bition, and thinking for the present merely^ using her legitimate position and influence as of the leading Powers in the council of nation5' ^ seeking to promote her foreign commerce, sPfe* the benefits of German culture, extend the sc of her national energies, and create fresh Get interests all over the world wherever and wbene ^ a peaceful opportunity offers, leaving it to an j certain future to decide whether the occurrence great changes in the world may not some
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sign to Germany a larger share of direct P'
action over regions not now a part of her
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ions, without that violation of the establ** , rights of other countries which would be inv° ^ in any such action under existing political c°n tions.
“In either case Germany would clearly be
^ Soviet AN-12 “Cub” military transport is shadowed over the Indian Ocean by 'Shter aircraft from the USS Midway (CV-41) in February 1980.
t0 build as powerful a navy as she can afford. The above alternatives seem to exhaust the P°ssibilities of explaining the given facts. The cboice offered is a narrow one, nor easy to make 'Vlth any close approach to certainty. It will, howeVer, be seen, on reflection, that there is no actual ^cessity for a British Government to determine ehnitely which of the two theories of German Policy it will accept. . For it is clear that the second scheme (of semi- 'ndependent evolution, not entirely unaided by statecraft) may at any stage merge into the first, or c°oscious-design scheme. Moreover, if ever the Solution scheme should come to be realized, the P°sition thereby accruing to Germany would obvi- °osly constitute as formidable a menace to the rest the world as would be presented by any deliber- conquest of a similar position by 'malice Rethought.”’1 ity hat Was true °F German politico-military activ- tlo^t^len is true of Soviet politico-military activity • Although Soviet action in the Third World ^ n°t at the moment be consciously directed at 0tnotes, please turn to page 62. °Ceedi„-------------- | harming the United States and establishing Soviet hegemony, it may at any time merge into doing so. Hence, the United States has no choice but to regard Soviet activity as directed against U. S. interests. The U. S. Government must not discount the Soviets’ ability to spread their influence merely because they have suffered setbacks in some of their attempts recently. Their continuing activity shows that they have not given up, and we cannot count on their inability to learn how to be effective in the future. Not only do their activities pose a threat; the United States must respond actively if it is going to counter that threat. Recent history shows that this is an exceptionally difficult task. The United States undertook a major effort to halt Communist insurgency in Vietnam between 1964 and 1973- The result was military stalemate, a heavy burden on the national economy, growing domestic unrest, and in the end, victory for the insurgents. Quite understandably, the U. S. Government has sought to avoid a similar situation since then. Yet if Vietnam demonstrated that Soviet- backed insurgents can prevail against strong U. S. opposition, Angola demonstrated what they can do against minimal U. S. opposition. Although Angola may have been less costly in terms of domestic poli- |
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effectively respond to a situation in which a 11. World government, considered legitimate both 1 ternally and externally, is threatened with a Sov*e^ backed insurgency whose success would cause set1 j damage to U. S. influence throughout the world ^ correspondingly increase Soviet influence—and ) where a long-term military involvement might ct domestic unrest within the United States. The anS'\. is simple: instead of directing its military and dipl°,n . forces against the insurgents, the United States should 1° them on the Soviet assistance effort itself.
On a political and strategic level, this means
tics than Vietnam, both Vietnam and Angola caused similar foreign policy losses to the United States.
The United States seems to fear that the spread of Soviet influence is inevitable, no matter how much or how little we do to counter it. Why this situation has arisen deserves examination. The American public can be counted upon to support U. S. action wherever the Soviet Union directly threatens U. S. interests with its forces. The American public has also shown that it is willing to defend areas that it considers vital, such as Western Europe, Japan, and Korea. However, Americans are not willing to undertake a protracted war in areas they do not consider vital or against enemies who do not pose a direct threat. The American experience in Vietnam proved that this is a basic factor in domestic politics which U. S. strategy must take into account in dealing with Third World conflicts.
How can the United States avoid the Scylla and Charybdis of over- and under-involvement in countering the Soviets’ attempts to spread their influence in the Third World? The Soviet Union does not act alone in the Third World, but rather seeks to enhance its influence through supporting groups with legitimate grievances. When such grievances are widespread and deep-rooted among the populace, and when the government blatantly acts for the benefit of a minority group or class to the detriment of the majority, leading one to suspect that it would eventually collapse because of internal forces alone, the United States has no interest in committing its forces and prestige on behalf of such an unworthy government simply because the Soviet Union is supporting the insurgents. For example, we would be ill advised to support the white minority regime in South Africa if it faced guerrilla movements supplied by the U.S.S.R. American support of governments that will eventually fall anyway only enhances Soviet influence and hinders our own.
What the United States should do is outmaneuver the Soviets by providing more effective assistance to the insurgents. These groups, despite their nominally socialist ideology, are highly opportunistic in reality. Their motivations arise from local political conditions, not from the worldwide East-West struggle. They will accept support from wherever they can get it, and if more than one source is available, so much the better, because they have no desire to be dominated by any one power. The United States, then, must examine local political conditions with extreme care in order to discover how best to counter the growth of Soviet influence in each particular case. Though cases such as these may be rare, we must take special pains to be aware of them, for they are the situations most easily exploited by the U.S.S.R.
Another political factor that the United States must
consider is the degree to which U. S. military action support of a government (or insurgent group) woul command the support of America’s allies and of Thif World states in general, no matter how bright the prospects for successful military action. In the strugg^ for influence, the United States would not want to ri^ the possibility of winning a battle only to lose a can1 paign, if not the entire war. This is especially true when considering the support of an offensive action, such a5 the Somali attempt to capture the Ogaden. Although3 Somali success would be a blow to Soviet prestige after the latter’s vigorous support of Ethiopia, America1^ support of Somalia would be opposed by almost other African states which have a commitment to sanctity of borders established by colonial power5' However Soviet actions may be characterized *n Ethiopia, they cannot be said to be disruptive of 1 status quo as far as the border issue is concerned, t"-11 American support of Somalia in this effort would Hence, American support here might have the effect actually enhancing Soviet influence in Africa and 50 should be avoided. If the Soviet-backed Ethiop1^ forces threatened to invade Somalia proper, this, course, would present an entirely different situati0^ But since America’s actions affect the perceptions ^ nations have of the United States as well as they doc immediate parties involved, we should interve militarily only when this would enhance our influe globally, and we should not do so if intervention 'v°u damage our influence.
With these political caveats in mind, it is necess to address the question of how the United States j
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whenever the Soviet Union threatens to intr° . arms or Cuban troops to gain influence in a 1 World country, the United States must be PreP to prevent such an action. Diplomatically’ t United States must inform the Soviet Union such hostile activity would have grave conseqLien^. for our entire bilateral relationship. If the then persist in supplying weapons and soldiers t0 ^ insurgency, then we must follow through with diplomatic warnings. Militarily, we must be P
cally
^ ls a convenient medium not only for preventing Vlet weapons and Cuban troops from debarking in C?ciflc dvil war-ridden country, but also for Co^ing their arrival in a neighboring Soviet allied , ntfy and their subsequent transport over land to
q ls obvious, though, that Soviet weapons and tan rroops need not arrive by sea, but can also be nsP°rted by air—thus circumventing a sea-based
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• Navy appears to be in the best position to do tjQS' The presence of American sea-based naval avia- j. n al°ne might dissuade the Soviets from undertak- (|^ Ur>acceptable actions. Should they persist in ^erTl> however, it may prove necessary for U. S. tt Aghters to shoot down one or more Soviet 0rjnsP°rts loaded either with weapons or Cubans in 5bl?r t0 Prove t0 rhe Russians that they will not be ct0 get away with interfering in Third World 0v '«s. Sea-based aircraft would have an advantage Und-based aircraft in that they may be carried ^ ^ °n k°ard Navy vessels in the area when not in ' ^ may be politically unacceptable, domestically
Pared to intercept and cut off the Soviet assistance to tae insurgency. The battle with the insurgents, though) should be left to the Third World govern- tnent we are trying to support. Without Soviet as- Slstance, the insurgency should be readily defeatable, °[1] at least containable. If this is not the case, then e United States should not try to support such a 'Veak government at all and may even be better ad- v‘sed to support the insurgents. Indeed, in cases such as Afghanistan, in which the Soviets actually invaded another country and set up a puppet regime, supporting the insurgents may have been essential to Eventing the consolidation of Soviet power there.
^ What, however, does this strategy mean for the . Navy, operationally and tactically? Indeed, in ^letnam and other insurgencies in which we have een involved, the Navy’s role has been mainly sup- P°rtive, while the Army, Air Force, and Marine . urPs attempted to directly engage and defeat the ^Urgents. In this interception strategy, however, ^ e Navy would play the most prominent role. The ^viets ship most men and materiel to the Third 0rld by sea. U. S. naval forces are the only ones aPable of interrupting the Soviet supply effort in the °st flexible manner possible. In some instances, the $QSence of U. S. Navy vessels alone might deter the Vl«s, which would be a political use of force in its rest form.2 Should this not prove sufficient, a rsii blockade could be organized that might physi- f prevent the Soviets from passing through. The °ckade, albeit at a high cost to the Soviets. How- 1j ; even Soviet air supply could be cut off, and the
and internationally, to maintain an Air Force base in the war-torn country, especially if our justification for preventing Soviet supply of any one faction is that we believe the combatants should either fight or make peace without outside interference. In addition, an Air Force base in the country at war might lead to domestic fears of escalating U. S. military involvement as in Vietnam, and such fears may have adverse consequences for the interception strategy if they are widespread. Finally, if the neighboring countries are unwilling to allow land-based aircraft to operate from their territory, there would be no choice but to use sea-based aircraft, because it would be too costly to keep the former in the air continuously and too difficult to operate them from long distances.
In order for this strategy to succeed, the sea-based aircraft involved must be long-range, multipurpose Navy fighters capable of intercepting Soviet air transports on any avenue of approach into both the insurgent- or invader-controlled territory of the country involved and of any neighboring country allied to the U.S.S.R. which might allow ground transport of men and materiel after landing. The limited range and capability of V/STOL (verrical/short take off and landing) aircraft would make them inappropriate for this mission. Furthermore, no less a ship than an aircraft carrier would be necessary to service and house the type of aircraft needed for this mission and the large numbers of them that would be required.
Many will undoubtedly feel that a strategy calling for U. S. Navy fighters to shoot down Soviet military aircraft would be too extreme and provocative a measure. However, as Robert P. Berman pointed out in his recent study Soviet Air Power in Transition, this is a tactic that the Soviets employ themselves. He records that from the late 1940s through the 1960s, the Soviets shot down more than 40 aircraft over their own territory and beyond.3 It was not long ago that the Soviets found it necessary to shoot down an unarmed Korean Airlines jet that had strayed over their territory. More significantly, since the Soviets obviously use this tactic to halt air activity that they consider inimical to their interests, they would be more likely to understand that the United States considered their involvement in Third World conflicts as inimical to our interests if we employed the same tactic against them.
But matters need not reach this extreme. Although the Soviets now have the capability of extending their air and sea power far beyond their own borders, their capability of maintaining them in a hostile environment is extremely limited. Despite their gains in recent years, the Soviets’ ability to support
military efforts extensively and securely from bases in the Third World does not match that of the United States. While the Soviet Navy has increased its ability to remain at sea, the necessity for its most important vessels (including nuclear submarines and aircraft carriers) to spend more time in port than at sea is indicative of its weakness compared to the U. S. Navy. Thus, the deployment of naval forces capable of interrupting Soviet supplies of men and materiel to a conflict may by its presence alone prove sufficient to deter the Soviets from undertaking such an action without the United States having to open fire at all. There are, of course, limits on the Navy’s role in intercepting a Soviet military effort. Naval power would not be sufficient in halting a Soviet invasion of a bordering country, such as Afghanistan. Although the U.S.S.R. suffers from vulnerable logistics links in its transoceanic military operations, it can move forces across its own frontiers with relative ease. Now that the Soviet Union has invaded Afghanistan, both Pakistan (a U. S. ally) and Iran (a large supplier of oil to Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD] nations) are under increasing military threat from the U.S.S.R. The interception strategy alone would not be sufficient to halt Soviet aggression here. Furthermore, if the Soviets made a rapid invasion of Pakistan, it would be unlikely that the neighboring countries of Iran or India would provide the United States with military facilities. Thus, the Navy would have to play an important role in projecting American forces into Pakistan and in ensuring secure supply lines for them. Similarly, if the U.S.S.R. invaded Iran, the Navy would be essential in sending forces into the oil field regions and in preventing the Soviet Navy from dominating the Persian Gulf and the Straits of Hormuz. An objection may be raised to this strategy on the grounds that hostile action directed toward the Soviet Union might escalate into a third world war. The proper implementation of this strategy, however, should prevent such a catastrophe. First of all, the interception strategy is not at all similar to the strategy of massive retaliation, which states that if the Soviets pursue an unacceptable action, the United States has only the choices of launching allout war or doing nothing, neither of which would be desirable. The strategy of interception, on the other hand, can be kept on a local level. Since World War III would be as disastrous to the U.S.S.R. as to the | United States, the Soviet Union may also be counte on to keep any conflict in the Third World limke there. In addition, if the United States moved nava and other forces into the area to make the interceF tion strategy credible, a prudent Soviet leadersluP would realize that the costs involved in threatening American interests are too high and thus should °° longer be undertaken. Finally, and most importantly, if the cost of e* panding its politico-military influence is not ma high now, the Soviet Union may very well achieve a position which may allow it to threaten America0 interests much more easily from its acquired baseS later. The Soviets may develop a greater confident about their ability to expand; the United State* would be faced with a much more difficult (a° necessary) task of halting the spread of Soviet influ ence; and World War III may become all the &0*e probable. If the United States could convince 1 U.S.S.R. now of the inadvisability of expansion^111 while we are still in a relatively strong position the Third World and not on the defensive—and 1 fore the U.S.S.R. has grown overconfident throu? too easily gained success—the chances for mainta1^ ing international peace and American interests W°U.() be rather good compared to doing so in a situation^ which Soviet politico-military influence was expa° ing. As the events of the late 1930s show, an arn.jy tious state that is allowed to gain victories too ea cannot be appeased. Instead, it is likely to PufS further victories with the conviction that its adv saries are weak willed. Above all, the United must not allow the Soviet Union to doubt Amefl determination to oppose its expansionism. Mr. Katz received a B.A. in international f ^ tions from the University of California (R>ver^i[]S ^-A in 1976 and an M.A. from the Johns H°P ^ / •*•! School of Advanced International StudieS 1978. He is currently a Ph.D. candidate in P0^ K ical science at MIT, where he is doing re for a dissertation on Soviet military thin about conflict in the Third World during the Brezhnev era... vel^‘°°S ‘Sir Eyre Crowe, “Memorandum on the Present State of Britisn ^ ^ with France and Germany, January 1, 1907,” in G. P. Gooch *^^4, Temperley, eds., British Documents on the Origins of the War, vol. Ill (London: HMSO, 1928), pp.402-420. j jj. 2For an excellent discussion of this entire subject, see Ed^af ^ Luttwak, The Political Uses for Sea Power (Baltimore: The Johns M0? University Press, 1974). p C - 3Robert P. Berman, Soviet Air Power in Transition (Washington* The Brookings Institution, 1978), pp. 58-66. |
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