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Anyone in the Navy who doesn’t realize that retention of ox enlisted personnel is a problem just hasn’t been paying att group of individuals who have been paying particular atte commanding officers of ships. Retention statistics seem replacing inspection results and material condition as the ■ threats to the CO’s future well-being.
nat pn i t > •
c • * believe that many policymakers are coming Perceive people programs (retention, recruit-
ho]
ns
com
command success. In fact, reporting seniors n°w address this area in officer fitness reports.
bu:
Ue« his
career, to improve his statistics in these
:as
' Ideally, he will get more involved, improve his
tj0rirnanh climate, facilitate the flow of communica- a0d ’ rev'tabze his command retention team efforts, whatever else might work. If he is an effective
Nav'--)st among the objectives of the Chief of thu$a Opiums is retention of personnel. It has "bo ecome an instinctive reaction for those of us pemake or implement policy in the Navy to “put Jail 6 ^rst' We must weigh the impact of each Ver \ ^ec's‘on upon people, lest retention be ad- bit ^ a^ected. Unfortunately, we may be going a fQr[>°Ver^0ard in this direction and, in the process, •p, tln8 why we maintain a Navy, of e Purpose of the Navy is to assist in the defense in(j- nati°n. Navy people, however precious and to that objective, still are a means to
,n8 to
s,8htetc->> 35 ends in themselves. We may be losing
aPpoi °Ur P1'01^'65 as we react urgently to dis-
teetuiting and retention statistics, un-
Ur>a Tably high attrition (including desertion and
p]e °ri2ed absence), and the accompanying dis-
^Ure from on high which these data invoke.
rfcr 6 ^ Clear,y at a crisis stage in the general areas of
^ retention, and attrition. Those in command
whjchWeicome suggested solutions to the problem
lettels dearly defined for them in personal messages,
senjorS’ ancl memoranda from genuinely concerned
s0Ufcrs- here is an area in which rudder orders from any
Un . ^uuld be welcome. One part of the message is
pecakably clear, however—improvement is ex-
keteor some commanding officers will not prosper.
■ '°n and attrition appear to be displacing inspec-
and material condition as the leading threats to a
beij niancling officer’s career health. It is reasonable, I
hk.e.Ve’ t0 examine the validity of this degree of em- *dSls.
the|j'litary an<J naval personnel were recruited into basecjreSy)ect*ve services or procured as officer trainees ljttjeuP°n certain aptitudes and potential having skill t0 w'cb salesmanship. Yet, that particular ti0n *S rapidly becoming a major factor in the evaluate! a commanding officer’s performance. Staffs ttte re.b0rt'ng seniors place great weight on personnel tots „°n and attrition statistics and trends as indica- ‘st 'Jh
f'cer Kw°rd, of course, is out. The commanding of- per *s ln deep trouble if his reenlistment rate or his siStta§e °f personnel not eligible to reenlist is con- ^ worse than fleet averages. His response is v^^le. He will do whatever is necessary, if he
are; co salesman or charismatic leader, he may be rewarded by improved statistics. Of course, every other rational commanding officer is trying, too. If, as a result, the averages improve fleet and force-wide, the pressure on each individual skipper increases. The result, almost inevitably, will be a lowering of standards in a frantic attempt to stay close to or rise above the averages.
I submit that lowering standards for retention and recruitment will not contribute to the defense of the United States, however comforting the ensuing statistics may be to those who chart them. It will quickly be pointed out, just as supporters of Admiral Zumwalt’s initiatives of the early 1970s pointed out, that if we don’t do something about poor retention and attrition there won’t be enough people left to man a Navy at all. But let’s consider the fruits of such efforts. It can be argued that many of the Zumwalt people-oriented initiatives did much to increase the quality of Navy life. That result is commendable, to be sure. These efforts also raised, significantly, the expectations among military personnel to a degree that made them difficult to satisfy. Ironically, the changes didn’t do much to aid retention. Neither has all the recent emphasis on improving retention performance. What this emphasis has accomplished, however, is to create a perception on the waterfront that the commanding officer is once again the heavy. If his retention rate is below average or his “not eligible to reenlist” percentage too high, then he must be doing something wrong.
As in many other phases of the eternal conflict between staff direction and ship and squadron realities, the commanding officer is at a disadvantage, for not all of the ingredients essential to a solution lie within his control. There is, to be sure, much that the enlightened commanding officer can do to bring about improvement in the command retention climate. Most successful techniques do not, in my estimation, involve salesmanship. Rather, they involve leadership, example, and communication. The latter can be enhanced through training, but the other qualities are tough to teach. In my own command experience, I learned several techniques from talking with commanding officers of ships which consistently posted retention statistics significantly above fleet averages. Most of these techniques involved communications skills. I found such exchanges with these commanding officers far more valuable than guidance from staffs on the subject. I commend the idea of periodic retention seminars among commanding officers to exchange techniques and lessons learned. A frank exchange of lessons learned would probably be facilitated by the exclusion of staff per-
Stlfl
seen
the penalties. It is commonly believed tha punishments will not deter deserters. 1 ^ be
evidence which confirms this popular view- of
true that severe punishments do not deter aCt, impulse, but desertion is a deliberate, ealeu ^ and the deserter generally has at least 30 adjuSt template it. It is often a result of his inability to constraints on his personal freedom. JrheV knowledge that he would be caught and th jo
likely face a period of lengthy incarceration all probability, constitute a very effective ^ g0t But punishments currently being awar vjSioOs effective deterrent. Under t^iel^j1jSshif
constitute an
sonnel, because there may be a natural reluctance to discuss command weaknesses in front of staffers.
The Human Resources Availability (HRAV) is another valuable tool in the self-assessment of a unit’s command climate and retention efforts. These one- week workshops coordinated by the fleet-managed Human Resources Management Centers (HRMCs) provide for frank exchange of views among personnel at all levels of responsibility within a command. They are preceded by weeks of preparation by several key members of the command, assisted by HRMC personnel. They also provide attitudinal surveys of command personnel by various age, ethnic, and rank groupings which form a basis for workshop discussions and provide a valuable insight regarding command climate and the flow of communications. It follows that they can give a commanding officer a number of indications why his retention program may be falling apart.
In the early part of my last ship command tour, I experienced consistent 100% career retention and very healthy second-term retention, but only average first-term retention. We underwent our HRAV midway during the time I was in command, and the results were illuminating to all of us. It was obvious that the flow of communication between middle grade and senior petty officers and the ship’s officers was effective and that these shipboard leaders and technicians knew where we were going. It became apparent also that during periods of high operational tempo, work load, and stress, the communications down to the junior enlisted men tended to be less effective. It is one of the ironies of shipboard life that at the very time when the men have the greatest need to know just what the command is trying to accomplish and what it takes to do it, shipboard leaders are likely to perceive themselves as too busy to put the word out.
Current efforts to reduce attrition fail, in my judgment, to pay adequate attention to the several profiles of typical deserters. Some are clearly misfits who will desert at the first encounter with adversity, whether on or off the ship. Many of them arrive at the decision to run away before they finish recruit training. They may not even execute the orders to report to their first commands, but they will, nevertheless, be charged against those commands as deserters. Others apparently cannot survive the cultural shock of their first exposure to shipboard life and run away at the first opportunity, without ever giving the command a chance to win them over. While an effective shipboard indoctrination program can have a tremendous effect on easing this shock, it is disturbing to shipboard leaders to receive so many products of recruit training who seem utterly ^u ^ pared for shipboard living and unwilling even . ^uS it a chance. Valuable shipboard training tirnf en ac- expended on something that should have jef complished ashore. Other deserters, perhaps ^ the stress of their first shipboard assignments, emotional problems, patterns of immaturity, ^ behavior toward authority, or a wide variety ^ lems, ranging from bedwetting to drug ^ePetl -lCe. which do not portend much promise of useful ser ^ While there is, to be sure, much that the reSP ^ ^ shipboard leader can do, it is clear that many ^ ^ individuals with a propensity to desert just ^ easily salvageable. It is, of course, a matter of Prl° a(1J Before the recent emphasis on reducing deseijjpely t0 unauthorized absence, a command would be 1 gi\ breathe a collective sigh of relief when a P ^ problem child was declared a deserter on the eftjon of his unauthorized absence. Now, with his ej0f statistics under intensive scrutiny at the higheS^^ the Navy, the commanding officer who, f°r son, has experienced consecutive periods o ptto than-average desertion rates for his class of snip jaj|ors move heaven and earth to prevent a few margin or perhaps even misfits from running away- [t$~ It is frequently a misplaced effort. It is a ^ efjt. tion of management attention on a very sma Y f0{i age of the crew. The attention might better be s^griler the sailor who is trying but needs help- The g{ argument tells us that what we see in rJ?e jS an personnel is what we will continue to get. accurate forecast of future recruiting quality, t|ie had better be prepared for little improvement^ ^f. desertion and unauthorized absence ratCS Jfro Sti^en rently experiencing, unless we are prepare „ sti^
no of NAVOP 125/77, a deserter must be returned tc' if his absence does not exceed 180 days. His c° ing officer will, for most lengthy or^g “suS' desertions, award a special court-martial- pect” is likely to plead guilty in return for a ma^ confinement of perhaps two months and an o
shi ?fa^e discharge. He will not be returned to the 0ard environment he found so intolerable and, COrij.have achieved his original objective. His l0aj ltl0ns will be accepted because of the legal case anc^ rhe expense of a trial, including the transpor- j°n ^witnesses.
absls ev‘dent that many deserters and unauthorized ir,., es are manipulating the system at a stagger-
itig
th,
>en:
Slty to run away. A substantial portion of
c°st in man-hours and administrative effort on v0teJart °f ships and naval stations. The effort de- tive| f° ^eadng with this troublesome but still rela- itjjjc^iSrnad percentage of our naval population is in- t0 readiness, detracts from time available to vast °n rhe productive sailors who constitute the tj0rnai°rity of our people, and is far out of propor- th;„ t0 t^le potential aggregate value to the service of Sh^a 11 group.
,\fav P^oard desertions are an embarrassment to the levej an<^ r‘ghtfully a cause for concern at every We0Ur efforts to correct the problem, however, t>henrriUSt attack the right dragon. The absentee freej rtlenon is a product of the permissive and It is°rn~k)'dng society whence our volunteers came. Mannot necessarily the fault of weak leadership. deSg us who grew up in a Navy in which a tfack Cr WaS c^e lowest form of life—a fugitive to be sh0te<^ ^°wn by the FBI and local police and then daysat Sunrise—find it hard to comprehend that totes y°uth does not fully share his elders’ views on ability and restrictions on personal freedom. f0r j^es bttle morally wrong with absenting himself On” 0xvever long it takes to “get his head screwed thgs^H^ bis problems solved. Nor do lawyers view free f °ffenses with much gravity when a civilian is q Walk off a job without penalty. devej11 <^eserti°n rates will persist unless we can hopg0!3 Elective methods for identifying (and, we (>r0 ’ Prevent from enlisting) the person with a
Most of our young people have never in their lives been asked to forfeit as much privacy and persotial freedom as they are asked to surrender in a warship.
deserters and chronic absentees can be characterized by the failure syndrome—failure to succeed in high school, in jobs, or in marriages. Having gotten into the failure habit, it is likely that they will consider running away again when the going gets tough. Isn’t it better not to enlist them in the first place?
The migration of skilled petty officers out of the Navy is a cause for grave concern—graver concern by far than that which we appear to be bestowing on a small minority of deserters. We cannot afford to dilute our efforts to retain the best by catering to some marginal performers with a propensity to desert. To do so creates, in my opinion, a reenlistment disincentive among true professionals. In selecting a career, a motivated professional wants to associate with quality professionals. The constant preoccupation of his superiors with chronic misbehavers and low achievers provides little incentive for him to reenlist. It may be socially commendable to lavish a great deal of attention on the small percentage of sailors with a propensity to desert, but it contributes little to readiness. The armed services can no longer provide a source of inexpensive rehabilitative services for the problem juveniles of a permissive society. Other institutions must do this. The cost of military manpower today consumes such a high percentage of the defense dollar that we cannot squander leadership talent on low-payoff counseling of chronic disciplinary cases.
%
There is a tendency among those at the shipboard level to blame factors beyond their control such as a difficult overhaul, high operating tempo, extended deployment, pay caps, and so forth, for poor retention and high attrition. Recognizing our limited ability to do much about these factors, there is a corresponding tendency on the part of the staffs to blame poor leadership and ineffective shipboard management of retention programs. In truth, retention and attrition data are capricious and sometimes defy intelligent analysis. Causes for fluctuating performance are not always apparent, and most explanations are pure speculation. Good performance, on the other hand, is inevitably credited to strong leadership. It is universally accepted in the Navy that strong leadership can overcome any adversity. Therefore, there is a natural inclination on the part of seniors to suspect, at least deep inside, that weak leadership at the command level is the real culprit. Staff actions tend
tain’s call session with individual divisions and the division officer should be there as a me
rnber
meat'
o(
challenges, and highlights of the coming
dearth
to be governed accordingly.
This is really not surprising, because researchers into retention and attrition have few comfortable correlations to work with. The overhaul environment, frequently blamed for poor statistics, does not deter some ships. Neither do extended deployments. Indeed, many ships “get well” in the retention and attrition area during distant deployments. In fact, there does not appear to be any statistical correlation between retention on the one hand and attrition (desertion, unauthorized absence, and high “not eligible to reenlist” category) on the other. Some of our best performers in retention are high also in attrition. Nor does high first-term retention necessarily go hand in hand with high second-term and career retention. Nor, finally, is a strong operational performer necessarily a high retainer.
Another substantial impediment to objective analysis is the elusive aspect of what constitutes an effective retention program in the first place. The only real constants recurring in effective retention programs are good results. What works for one command simply may not work for another. Hence, we are practically forced to judge ships in this area on statistics alone. This contributes to a growing feeling on the part of commanding officers that their professional fitness is being judged increasingly by statistical analysis. Expressions of concern regarding a month’s or a quarter’s worth of statistics contribute little to anything except the unfortunate commanding officer’s anxiety level. He will experience, moreover, a great temptation to lower his standards in order to survive the crisis.
We should concentrate on the positive things we can do. Good internal communication may not ensure high retention and low attrition, but it is an important ingredient in most successes. In my view, the most critical components of an effective shipboard internal communication program are these:
► A vigorous sponsor and welcoming program for incoming personnel. This program should include his family. A personal letter from the commanding officer to a sailor fresh from boot camp may be the first welcome anyone ever extended in his entire life.
► A well-managed and meaningful indoctrination and orientation program for newly arrived personnel starting the moment he or she sets foot in the area. The initial period upon reporting to his or her first ship represents the biggest adjustment for most young sailors since birth. It is essential that it be handled right. Most of our young people have never in their lives been asked to forfeit as much privacy and personal freedom as in a warship. Many have extreme difficulty coping. They need help or they may
the f,rSt
make an early resolution to run away at ^ chance. The commanding officer and executive^^ cer must be prominently involved in the I 1&n program; it is simply too important to be le ,t available junior. Of course, it’s time consuming' who ever said commanding ships was easy. ^st ► An aggressive captain’s call program. This be a continuing program, not an occasional, sp reflex when time permits or something san in between events which preclude an active ‘ Closed-circuit television is better than nothing’ best results come from an eyeball-to-eyeDan ^ ^ at which the questions cannot be sanitized or t^ ^ swers delivered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.
of the division, not as a spokesman for manage The master or senior chief petty officer of t e^£[e mand should also be there and no one fast
should be three parts to the captain’s call- j0ing part should be informative with the captam^^ is the talking to get the momentum started. ca[) an abundance of useful information in captai*^ (
packets put out for this purpose. The secon o
should involve the review of scheduling m „ ut. with the captain again doing the talking a [S, ting out the straight dope,” defining the e, of
_i_ 11____ __ j i___ : i i : t_
months. By this time, there will be no c ^ a(1. questions for the third part, the questions ^ j,e swers. It goes without saying that answers feC(ly candid and that “I don’t know” can be a Pe valid answer. Getting the opinion of the con^onI)el master/senior chief or the senior division Per also helps. ^ 0f-
► Frequent and effective use by the comman
ficer of the general announcing system an . at'S circuit television. Letting the crew know ^ going on is critical to creating unit there is no more welcome source than the 0 ^ p00r himself. While a TV screen image may ^e^^ for substitute for a “live” captain’s call, ir is exc r a briefing the crew on a forthcoming evolu ^ a liberty port. If the captain’s voice on the ^ t0 familiar sound, the crew will invariably feel c the command structure. c.o&'
► Frequent tours of the work centers by r ^get manding officer. Commanding officers can n° yorrna' run their ships from their bridges, combat i l(] tion centers, and cabins exclusively. Pape e(tfrg port cannot suffice as an excuse for nor around the ship and talking to crew mem e ^ealls As elementary as this may seem, it *s 0 uniformly practiced or even believed.
^ Th *
pr . ^re must be an incentive and award system that the CS ^recluent feedback and recognition. Some of hav^°Un8 products of our all-volunteer environment tin > never been recognized for anything except get- atk 'nt0 trouble- An expression of appreciation or (]rs^°^e^gement of some minor success may be the ula . ln8 an individual has ever won in his life, and he \ p|Ust follow you forever!
peefUt a muzzle on the short-timers. The effect of
-eultPreSSUre uPon y°un8 men and women ‘s dif-
tareet0 <)verc<)me. It can have awesome effects upon n,User decisions and other behavior. They simply is ^ e convinced that what they do with their lives rrjat0° important to be influenced by some ship- e who may be disgruntled.
'J'l
stjn6 ^oregoing is by no means a cookbook to in- teteSUccess. There are many elusive factors affecting lea<jntl0n and attrition that cannot be overcome by at ^ersb'p ar>d example alone. But these things will 3te aS^.‘mProve a command environment, and they C levable bv any officer who is screened for
^mand.
retentii
ft
the rtlan<^' f believe they will improve his chances in i^^Hbon and attrition derby.
e|Ucj 1 e the formula for certain success clearly dian(j. 0ur grasp, it is equally clear that some comely n§ officers do well at everything, retention in- % ' it s certainly possible that luck and talented
mates play a major role for some, but then ats life.
th;_
Sh°ujdute- Whatever the methods, these superstars retained in command beyond two years 0ffjCerseVVarded , not by princely positions in the front C°rr»na °^Sen’or ^ag officers, but by repeated tours in
S°nneia f'na^ P0*nt’ our efforts to survive in the per- s(i0 . area until the draft mercifully is restored tfg .not be hampered by clinging to certain myths the f retention and attrition. Among these are i St°rllowing:
• f0rig leadership can overcome poor retention and ^ A °n Perf°rmance- Not necessarily so. vvjji vvell-structured command retention program ana^bieve good retention and attrition perform-
re- Nc~ - ■ - —■ • •
c0ti
But certainly not better educated in verbal and mathematical skills and certainly less disposed to give up personal leisure and freedoms. Our efforts to retain these young men and women must be tempered by these realities.
► Money is not an effective incentive in retention. Not true. Several studies on the West Coast have indicated that pay, coupled with the high cost of living in fleet home-port areas, is a major cause of poor Navy retention in an all-volunteer environment. Increased remuneration may be the least expensive way to improve personnel readiness if it decreases turnover and retraining costs.
One and a half years of missed recruiting quotas have taken a heavy toll on personnel readiness. There is little promise of near-term improvement—barring massive unemployment, of course. Combined with less than adequate retention, it poses a severe threat to our readiness posture. Retaining marginal performers or lowering recruiting standards will not enhance our readiness; nor will focusing our attention on an embarrassing but still relatively small number of deserters and potential deserters whose value or potential for useful service is not promising.
It appears to me that we are fast running out of options. Accordingly, it may now be time to do one or more of the following:
► Expand the assignment of women to ships
► Extend civilian manning of ships to all mobile logistic support ships
► Reinstitute selective service.
Meanwhile, let’s worry a little less about deserters and potential deserters and worry a little more about what we can do to make things better for those who want to stay.
urtie ^0t necessar‘ly so either. The best results may ft°m a healthy and positive shipboard e<w nrnent which may not even have a “structured” t > ancl retention program at all.
day s young men and women are smarter and by r located than ever. Wrong. More conditioned
telev
'Sion certainly and less inhibited perhaps.
Captain Kelly, a graduate of Southern Connecticut State College, was commissioned in 1953. He has served in the USS Hawkins (DD-873), USS Tarawa (CVS-40), USS Westchester County (LST-1167), USS GriJley (DLG-21), and commanded the USS Parsons (DDG-33) and USS Fox (CG-33). Captain Kelly holds an M. S. in management from the Naval Postgraduate School and also attended the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration. Since 1978, he has been assistant chief of staff (personnel and administration) for Commander Naval Surface Force, Pacific Fleet. His article "Command Authority and Professionalism" was published in the August 1978 Proceedings and "Women in Warships: A Right to Serve” in October 1978. Captain Kelly was the 1979 winner of the Naval Institute’s award of merit to an author.
lnes / April 1980
45