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Th,
Voi Ur!Ure °f United States
"'aval p
. 1 t’ower
^°0,niner at^an anc* James K. Oliver. Hs 1070°’ Indiana University
Jl5-°°($13.50)8.PP' Append' Ind-
pevieWed bv r
H°Wers tty ^°mniander Robert C.
* ’ S. Navy
Ar >%olra,
lender p'T °f the Naval Academy, estr°yers. u °WeVS ^as served tours in five
l'n,ant to th“nTmly the mil,tary *fe the c eJense Science Board,
1 he S^tary of Defense.
Nathan
Rented m &nd ®bver have docu- nevv brtt<j0St (he arguments of the ls 'veil c'v*han naval “theorists”
Pol;
‘cies
as
government and Navy °f the
P°ses UI ttle 1970s. Their work String ^Uest‘or>, “Will the naval > p,». .for“ structure of the He jn°Ve 'naPpropriate in the fu- environrvernational and domestic led ;ment?” And
?6d 15 Vaen .
'"at na„.i °ue’ stating approximately
the answer pro-
i - naval
rhe o ^°Wer ls “clearly relevant,” dcterrnjnPtlrriurri force structure is in- e*8o p0j • nt because of an unclear for- U. 5 In a changing world order.
V the Policy is influenced
°r lhe ; 1 ^rnrna of nuclear weapons,” M . nabil'ty to use the threat of
Wean uu“l
S'rategic ]°nS conv‘ncingly at a sub- °1ent 0f eveP With Soviet achieve- H (jnj r'|lcdear weapon parity with Hi as a6 btates, this dilemma is °r Oni • C°nstraint on the use of force *»»,
U. s deterrence).
Ss 0f ,0re‘Sn policy is traced from ^95os 'P°larism and containment daVs0fjP 1960s) to the Kissinger derlyin etente (early 1970s). The un- 5 'he r \ eiT*e *s 'he transformation ,'°Hi one at'°n w'th the Soviet Union •hote rf °f Confrontation to that of a rKXl de and pragmatic attitude ,for , 6 COmmunists” in the 1970s.
h ■ details
g lc«s see th °n order‘ng books and special °°hs 0f | e ®ook Order Service note in the terest department.
reasons (other than
The goal of this foreign policy is stated as that of seeking an international order recognizing Soviet responsibility and restraint, mutual deterrence, and seeking a U. S. globalism without expensive conventional military involvement.
Nathan and Oliver attribute the changing world order to popular themes of increasing nation-state interdependence, the alleged decreasing use of military and naval forces both in battle and suasion roles, strategic nuclear and naval parity between the superpowers, new weapon technologies, and a perceived eventual limitation of hydrospace through law of the sea negotiations. This new world order, public skepticism on the use of military intervention (post Vietnam), and the high cost of new weapons technology restrict the future of the U. S. Navy.
Current and future U. S. foreign policy is undefined because of contradictory views of Soviet restraint versus Soviet actions, the instability of mutual deterrence brought about by nuclear parity, and the U. S. goal of a continuing global presence to less conventional military forces. Nathan and Oliver do not attempt to analyze Soviet foreign policy and its relation to the buildup of Soviet conventional forces in the past decade, which is essential if one is to judge the correctness of U. S. foreign policy.
There are indeed new and valid constraints in which force can be used for both warfighting and political suasion; however, these constraints tend to be overemphasized by academics. For example, with respect to warfighting, Nathan and Oliver make the mistake of attributing mystic powers to precision-guided weapons, without demonstration of any real knowledge of their characteristics and available countermeasures. And theories by Luttwak, Blechman, and Kaplan are set forth which say that the great flexibility of naval forces for political pur-
poses may well respresent weakness, i.e., any force that can be sent but easily withdrawn may not stand up as a credible suasion tool. Nathan and Oliver fail to point out that a record of indecision and withdrawal of any force will create the perception of weakness. Such weakness is a political matter, and does not change the flexibility and utility of naval force. One thing is certain: force becomes very usable if the other side unilaterally rejects its use. Finally, it is unlikely that Third World countries will be successful in the predictable future in limiting “hydrospace” in the face of two superpower navies.
The high cost of weapons technology and the Carter Administration’s policies that are reducing conventional force levels are the most serious constraints to the future of the U. S. Navy discussed by Nathan and Oliver. The inflation rate in the United States, coupled with the need to compete with the Soviets at a high technology level, has caused the defense dollar to shrink drastically at a time when Soviet defense spending exceeds our own and is increasing. President Carter has continued to espouse a global, forward-deployed U. S. strategy, but has implemented three policies detrimental to the Navy force structure that can support such a strategy. First, an item not well covered in this book is that available defense dollars have shrunk by the pursuit of a balanced budget and the high level of welfare programs. Second, President Carter has adopted a “continental” strategy based on beefing up the NATO Central Front at the expense of building up the Navy in offensive operations against Soviet forces, and sought to build a defensive force structure for the protection of the sea lines of communication.
Specific force structure alternatives are not presented, other than a discussion of the various carrier alternatives (CVN, CV, CVV, VSS, etc.). Rather
66dln
force structure is discussed in general terms, such as the popular argument that since the actual use of force is no longer credible, an inexpensive navy can be designed specifically for political suasion. The U. S. Navy, on the other hand, has maintained that warfighting missions of sea control and power projection are essential to having credibility in political suasion and presence. Modern circumstances require increased flexibility and distributed offensive power in a navy.
The authors say that “neutralizing Soviet influence will likely involve a great deal more than naval power.” This is very true, and it is unfortunate that Nathan and Oliver do not pursue this theme further. For the future of the U. S. Navy as a means of preserving the security of the nation is inextricably interwoven with other forms of suasion: violent and nonviolent, political, and economic.
The primary strength of this work is the assembly into one short, readable volume, of some very important foreign policy and domestic and bureaucratic factors that shape the environment in which naval strategists must function.
Conspiracy of Silence: The Attack on the USS Liberty
Anthony Pearson. New York: Quartet Books, 1978. 179 pp. Illus. $9-95.
[J] Assault on the Liberty:
The True Story of the Israeli Attack on an American Intelligence Ship
James M. Ennes, Jr. New York: Random House, 1980. 229 pp. Illus. Map. Append. Ind. $12.95 ($10.35).*
Reviewed by Donald Blalock
Mr. Blalock was employed in the U. S. intelligence community for ten years, including six years as a civilian in the Department of Defense. He holds a bachelor of arts from the University of Maryland with emphasis in Middle Eastern studies. Mrs. Blalock, who served in the Department of Defense as a uriter and editor for eight years, collaborated with her husband on this review.
At approximately 1435, 8 June 1967, I turned to Chief Melvin D.
Smith, master-at-arms on board the USS Liberty (AGTR-5) and wearer of a standard military-issue helmet, and said, “Smitty, I wish that there was room in that helmet for both of us.” A split second later, an Israeli torpedo penetrated the ship’s hull and exploded in our compartment, killing 25 of the approximately 30 men there—including Smitty.
In the almost 13 years since that day, I have waited for some enterprising writer to tell the true story of one of the most obvious international cover-ups in recent history. Finally, not one but two efforts have been made to expose what actually happened and to offer some explanations to the tantalizing questions of why our supposed ally Israel would attack an unarmed and clearly identified U. S. ship in international waters, and why our government would not only accept Israel’s lame and obviously false excuse but then would actively covet up the truth, going so far as to edit official reports and control crew members’ contacts with the press.
A speculative approach to the incident is taken by British journalist Anthony Pearson in Conspiracy of Silence. Pearson, an investigative reporter, draws on second- or third-hand sources and his contacts in British Intelligence to develop a theory of why it happened. This theory involves a widespread conspiracy involving the United States, the Soviet Union, and Israel.
Unfortunately, Pearson’s research seems sloppy. Even some of the most easily researched facts are incorrect. Some are minor (e.g., Allen Blue was not a major); yet other facts betray a basic lack of understanding of the whole operation (e.g., the Liberty was off the coast of Sicily when Israel attacked the Arabs and was nowhere near the Sinai; Pearson’s “Big Ear” super-spy antenna was actually a sophisticated communication apparatus used to establish direct contact with the United States). These errors cast suspicions on the rest of his story. Pearson seems to fill in the gaps where his sources do not provide sufficient concrete information, and always in a manner designed to heighten the terror, excitement, and readibility.
c|usion
Pearson does support the co ^ ^s. that the attack was no acci en ^ take on Israel’s part but rat e^|s 0f scious decision at the highest ^ ^ the Israeli Government, an<- the detail the in-depth cover-up ^orTI United States which exten the the White House down thro ih jsjavy State Department and to t ,^tj0n Department. But his 'rn‘!^ jns to seems to take flight as he e)i-
include the likes of the KGB jCj. plores the possibility of Soviet pation in the whole affair- (jni[e^ His conclusion that the^ ^Ijr States participated so fully in
in the near total whitewas 0 jjabora' cident because of the close c tion between U. S. and Israe ^ gence services in their desire determine the outcome o c jaUsi- East situation, while CerThv the eV ble, is not fully supporte ^tajnly »s dence he presents. And it c not the only possible reason • ^ jn
One interesting aspect r,yj S- both books was the presence 0 the submarine near the Liberty 1
attack. In fact, this is the e preshad heard of the sub story- ^)US in ence of a submarine seems c light of the shallowness o c ^poP yet the evidence appears to that contention. (During and while we were load g ^ v,-eft material into weighted ^id be eaS' concerned that the bags c „rresil0t) ily retrieved.) Pearsons su^sg toi that the sub was there in r4jsP th-11 U. S. declaration to the °v ^£fe to we would punish Israel i 1 use nuclear weapons against t seems rather farfetched. . 's
The strength of Pearson s^ j(Sel that it goes beyond the eV 0
and attempts to explain it ,n j stfjt' international politics and g ® egy. It is provocative in t a ^ ^ 5. some important questions a th4-’
foreign policy, particular y Middle East, and what we ar to sacrifice to protect ^
A better book is Assault n ^ v/H5 erty by James M. Ennes, Jr- ^ £ the electronics officer o H
Liberty at the time of the a n£LvaI spent the remaining years o ^\c
career in positions where e^eC^ oUc to compile information, c
^°tUnlentWeh- His facts are well ^rings th 6 ’ an4 his clarity of writing fash;6111 t0Sether in a totally reader "'hat °n "^1e rea<^er gets a feeling (his shit-j ^ WaS actual*y hke on board n°rrrial ja *r0rn c^e dull activities of a Y to the unsuSpecting obser- reconnaissance
di
Vtip V’ dy'n« room. As I read his all to0fhe memories came back SlitgeVlv'dly—of that torpedo; the /‘0-fOot "'ater rushing in through the * had t„ °^e’ c^e momentary panic as
to
0^^
“P>nionS) ,
, a Senerally increase his terrifyinC^e attack. His book is a tl>tire ® y accurate recounting of the ^rom a f0Urne^ taking the reader COast of At1'116 cru‘se the western i°itied the f'ta t0 ^ota’ Spa‘n (where I trn crew) and on into the east- ^0rnev>^-^erranean' Ennes has done his
r|,6hts of the Israeli lhe utterr Seven hours on the 8th to shells u terror and confusion as the
tack js , teatrnent of the actual at- toulcJ ,'Ves°tne. It is something that Soit>eoneaVe keen written only by ^tokeri K V'^1° ^as witnessed not just vvho^'eS ^Ut bodies being bro- napalm ° ^as seen the carnage of Ng and ^ antipersonnel rockets rip- C°rdite . tfar'ng> who has smelled the lr*si(jeche gasoline fumes trapped Jr>d ijst.a utt0ned-up, blacked-out, l^e betr ^ ship, and who has spent sPacfc tu^r l1art of 18 hours in a mess °PeratinV<"rted to serve as a combined ^()r 'tuiny r°0rn’ recovery room, and
PUH my foot out of my shoe to free ;t. the yell at the tool it and we’ll all get out” as they started to scramble up the side of the damaged ladder; the order to “prepare to abandon ship” as a life jacket was thrust at me; the effect of shock which prevented my being able to put the jacket on; and finally, the seeing of the living and the mental exercise of trying to figure out who was missing.
I believe that Ennes wrote this book for a number of reasons, not the least being a desire to expose and, in a way, right the grave disservice done to the brave ship and her valient crew by the Israelis and the U. S. Government. He writes of the cover-up from the vantage point of one who was made part of the cover-up and explores the hows and whys extensively and thoughtfully. He carefully discusses the pressures exerted by the U. S. Navy on the survivors to say nothing, the editing of facts and statements from the court of inquiry findings, and the obvious distortions of truth by the Israelis that went unchallenged by our government. He offers conclusive evidence that a cover-up did occur and, according to the acknowledgement in the book, is being perpetuated to this day by our State Department.
Ennes’ explanation as to why the Israelis attacked—to prevent the United States from having prior knowledge of a planned Israeli assault on Syria, the knowledge of which might have resulted in U. S. pressure to call off the operation—is not only reasonable but is virtually the only military explanation. The question Ennes does not explore fully is why the U. S. Government would accept Israel’s excuse and then perpetuate a cover-up. This is perhaps the only disappointment in the book. Ennes offers the explanation (drawn trom a White House staffer) that President Johnson was anxious to end the war before the Soviet Union stepped in, and that L.B.J. could not afford a confrontation with Israel. Besides, the internal investigation by Clark Clifford did not indicate a deliberate, premeditated attack. Still, this ine begs the question of why, when evidence to the contrary was turned up, it was suppressed. But Ennes set out to deal in facts and not conjectures. And he succeeds admirably.
To understand what really happened on board the Liberty, Assault on the Liberty is the book to read. Ennes clearly and graphically tells the story without embellishment and with a minimum of speculation.
Manning the New Navy: The Development of a Modern Naval Enlisted Force, 1899-1940
Frederick S. Harrod. Westport, CT.: Greenwood Press, 1978. 367 pp. Ulus. Append. Bib. Ind. $18.95 ($17.06).*
Reviewed by Vice Admiral William P. Mack, U. S. Navy (Retired)
A 1937 graduate of the Natal Academy, ■Vice Admiral Mack retired from active duty in 1975. Among his personnel assignments were two tours in the Officer Distribution Section of the Bureau of Naval Personnel, a tour as Superintendent of the Naval Academy, and three years as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs.
The book’s title is a story in itself. The average reader will wonder why a book published in 1978 and purporting to talk about the “New Navy” basically completes its account in 1940. The author tells us that the development of the “New Navy” was indeed completed essentially in 1940 and that there have been no significant changes since. Admiral E. R. Zum- walt’s supporters will find that the changes he made in the social area are considered relatively insignificant when compared with the radical and all-encompassing changes made by Secretary of the Navy Josephus
Daniels from 1913 to 1921.
Josephus Daniels is best known as the Navy Secretary who banned alcoholic beverages from ships. Some well-informed historians will also know him as the authority who banned the issuance of contraceptives and veneral disease exposure treatment kits to members of liberty parties because “such issue might be interpreted as condoning immoral conduct.” However, the significant fact which emerges from this book is that Secretary Daniels is really the father of the modern Navy as far as enlisted men are concerned. His term of office was eight years long and spanned World War I and the period of transition to peace after that war.
The Navy prior to 1900 was small, with ships and their equipment being almost archaic, and was manned mainly with personnel recruited from seaports and overseas.
In the early 1900s, the Navy began to expand and to broaden its recruiting to include those “with the brawn of Montana, the fire of the South, and the daring of the Pacific Slope.” This and other personnel policy changes, the author asserts, developed from “the demands of the services rather than from the thrust of assertive leadership.” The author gives little credit to uniformed personnel experts, and the record, unfortunately, bears him out. In the areas of morale improvement, racial discrimination, training, education, and promotion, the Navy remained stagnant until the advent of Secretary Daniels in 1913.
Daniels established the recruiting system which remains virtually unchanged today. By various general orders, he set up a service school system, a training center system for recruits, and a Navy training course institution, all of which remain today. He made it possible for enlisted men to enter the Naval Academy via the Naval Academy Preparatory School, and superintended the entrance of women into the Navy in World War I. The unsatisfactory discharge was another of his ideas as was the conversion of Navy prisons from holding in- r reStOf'
stitutions to organizations 0
ing men to duty. ^jof
It is significant that all . Option changes were made at the 10 ^jeC. of a civilian leader and over t ^ t[,e tion of the uniformed *ea ^ aCtions services. The wisdom of t e* ute, is attested to by their lasting ^ stateS In his conclusion, the aut ^ that today’s Navy is able to^
within the personnel structu three quarters of a century ag ^ the
its basic requirements filled
same—the maintenance ° ,va0ced force for a large, technically fleet. ■ sUpP,e'
The text of the boo ' sarnpleS mented by appendices, g>vin£ aUthof of the data from which t ^tn0teS worked, and very complete and references. . feSted 10
Readers particularly ,n ^ hi5'
naval personnel and genera ^ Je-
tory will find this source o -^res1' tailed information extreme ^,{0 ing. Its forthright style ma ^ sUhJivi'
read, and its organization a^jeCts-
sions permit easy access to
Written with authority by the former gunnery officer of the cruiser Prinz Eugen, this is an absorbing testimonial to the courage and tenacity, as well as the chivalry, of the commanders and men of the auxiliary cruisers that served as the feared German raiders of two world wars. It includes detailed descriptions of battles as well as of the ships, their armament, aircraft, auxiliary torpedo launches, radio equipment, and methods of deception. For the serious naval historian or enthusiast, here is a vast amount of hitherto unpublished facts and figures, together with more than 200 illustrations.
19801144 pageslillustraited A Naval Institute Press Book
List price: $15.95 Member’s price: $12.75
GERMAN RAIDERS
A History of Auxiliary ^ujSfg45 of the German Navy 1890-
/|
By Paul Schmalenback
Books of Interest
Compiled by Professor Jack Sweetman, Associate Editor
fwAL affa,ks
Hattle n,
USSu, ma8e Report No. 1: x" Una CL 50
i pr- ,
nnapolis atlc^ ^°bert F. Sumrall.
^ Pp. Ii|lle . '■ Reward Publications, 1979.
^art, ;u :95.Pap- 'vel].es,ab|. lcations, publishers of thi *raphs, ^ ls^ea Ship’s Data” mono Rattjg Undertaken a new series o:
'S exam3"138" Reports.” The first o “ss of th .'nes.t*le technical aspects of tl ^uta Gulf C;UlScr Helena at the Battle • 6 Julv 1043
!h"
P*t>lo £
5 July 1943
?°'vnian u ,
J^hting McCalla:
S E, r °r
|.r'‘versity p^tta' Washington, D.C.:
Us- Maps "S of America, 1979. 210 pp R"- ' lb' Ind- $10.25 ($9.23) pap'
°wman u , --------
nfnciry McCalla (1844-19 i a I . . .
S n°t in n ' - v *“ ■ • ■
Cfr- Nearl a,.resPects a model naval i Hing ^ ‘smissed from the Navy s*o.j . n tmruly enlisted man with
Lr^t- i . .
0rd. he I
■ l V i 1: 116 tat)
C'Vi||*n rn„ - >-* an aiguiuciii
rtl°Unt‘^°KtfaCt0r ^is ^lsts
er settled an argument
;int> k w,tn ms tists.
> • ot^ crises, he went on to :
’ ■ nctl°n in the Spanish-Ame:
» p, . ” 111 tne spamsn-Ame
,ioKet j> , d‘Ppine Insurrection, am asM tjlee bon- Professor Coletta ?ar*cter ■ 'rSt biography of this lshe,j j ^'n Part r\r» ollo^c
■ter jn ~........
Part on McCalla’s - ’ 'Page autobiography.
Ch-
11 As'an W/na Stat'°n: The U. S.
Sn £Wat«s 1800-1898
Rotate p. d°hnson. Annapolis, MD.: :k' tad : Is’ 1979. 308 pp. Ulus. Ma \rll8-50($14.80)PP
(|lSt ,ndiaCMmplete history of the jat tarCe p ater’ Asiatic) Squadron ''■'tash.^ r°m *ts precursors throu,
h
^erican War.
masterly study of American aircraft carriers covers escort carriers and auxiliary vessels. It is illustrated by 21 diagrams and 238 photographs. The first volume was reviewed in the August 1979 Proceedings.
Kriegsmarine: A Pictorial History of the German Navy 1935-1945 Robert C. Stern. Carrollton, TX.: Squadron/Signal Publications, 1979- 80 pp. Ulus. $7.95 ($7.16) paper.
Heavy surface units hold the limelight in a pictorial review of the German side of the war in the Atlantic.
MARITIME AFFAIRS
Saved! The Story of the Andrea Doria—the Greatest Sea Rescue in History
William Hoffer. New York: Summit Books, 1979. 249 pp. Illus. Maps. Ind. $11.95 ($10.76).
At 11:06 PM on 25 July 1956, the Italian luxury liner Andrea Doria was rammed by the Swedish liner Stockholm in heavy fog off Nantucket Island. The story of the disaster is related minute by minute.
MILITARY AFFAIRS Battles of World History
Walter Markov and Heinz Helmert. New York: Hippocrene Books, 1979. 438 pp. Illus. Maps. Append. Bib. Ind. $35.00 ($31.50).
Sixty great battles, from Kadesh (c. 1292-1285 B.C.) to Berlin (1945), are surveyed in a lavish pictorial. Emphasis is placed on the general historical context and relevance rather than the tactical details of the actions. Originally published in East Germany, the work reflects an obvious but not overpowering Marxist- Leninist perspective. The quality of the illustrations, many in color, is superb.
cities remains one of the most controversial subjects of World War II. The strategic and moral dimensions of the campaign, as well as its operational character, are investigated in an important new history.
How Wars begin
A. J. P. Taylor. New York: Atheneum, 1979. 180 pp. Illus. Ind. $10.95 ($9.86).
A. J. P. Taylor is certainly among the most distinguished and perhaps the most independent-minded of British historians. In his latest work, he examines the origins of eight major wars since the Napoleonic era.
FICTION
To the Honor of the Fleet
Robert H. Pilpel. New York: Atheneum,
1979. 463 pp. $12.95 ($11.66).
Two American naval officers, attached to the British Grand Fleet as observers, are the main characters in an historical novel of Machiavellian policy, espionage, and naval action in World War I. The author’s research into the men and events of the era make his absorbing story very plausible.
--------------------------
SAVE
,—
o.
?
Mail-order from Germany %
Ip7 Rer der U. S. Navy/
Varr'ers of e|eitflugzeugtrager (A
H 2. of the U. S. Navy/
l97QaSC^'tSC^‘ Munich: Bernar
\T°x- $2^: IIlus‘ Append‘1
^ and concluding volume
Bomber Command: The Myths and Reality of the Strategic Bombing Offensive 1939*45
Max Hastings. New York: Dial Press/James Wade, 1979. 399 pp. Illus. Maps. Append. Bib. Ind. $12.95 ($11.66).
The effects of the R.A.F. Bomber Command’s saturation bombing of German
r 1:1250 Ships, over 1500 models to select. Also • i the new 1:2400 models. We have NAVIS, J ? NEPTUN, HANSA, VIKING, MERCATOR, J 3 DELPHIN, ATLANTIC, SANTOS, FLEET- 5 i LINE, SEXTANT, FRAMBURG, EAGLE, k
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REPRINTS
Armageddon: 1918
Cyril Falls. Annapolis, MD.: The Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company of America, 19.79. 200 pp. Maps. Bib. Ind. $14.95 ($13.46).
The only major cavalry campaign of World War I, in which British and Dominion forces under General Edmund Allenby destroyed the Turkish armies in Palestine and the Levant, is described in an appropriately fast-moving account by a noted military historian. The volume is one of the “Great War Stories” series recently launched by the publisher.
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Fix Bayonets! and other Stories
Col. John W. Thomason, USMC. Washington, D.C.: Marine Corps Association, 1978. 523 pp. Illus. $8.95 ($8.06).
A professional Marine officer and combat veteran of World War I, Colonel John W. Thomason (1883-1944) was also a gifted illustrator and stirring story-teller. His books and stories, such as those collected here, made him the poet laureate of the Old Corps.
The Reminiscences of a Marine
Maj. Gen. John A. Lejeune, USMC (Ret.). Quantico, VA.: The Marine Corps Association, 1979. 488 pp. Illus. Maps. $8.95 ($8.06).
Thirteenth Commandant of the Marine Corps (1920-1928), General John Archer Lejeune probably contributed more to the traditional image of the Marines than any holder of that post. His plainspoken autobiography, long out of print, has been reissued by the Marine Corps Association Heritage Library Series.
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Ray Bonds, Editor. New York: Crown, 1979. $17.95 ($14.35). Last order date: 15 May 1980.
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In Praise Of Sailors yor|c
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