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The future ofU. S. seapower may boil down to a question of whether the Navy will be one of the winners in the ongoing scramble for good people. Potential recruits, such as these Pennsylvania high school students, being wooed during a trip to Norfolk, are entering a workers’ job market. Can the Navy, which doesn’t set its own pay scales, compete for the quality people it will continue to need in good
times and bad?
JL he U. S. Navy in the space age needs space-age people: bright, motivated, resilient, and capable of operating our high-technology systems. Our society, however, is not producing such people in the numbers we need. The trends are clear; before long, the problem will be not how to recruit and retain, but that the people don’t even exist. And now we must recognize a new dimension in the problem—- inflation. Even if good people could miraculously become abundantly available, the pernicious effects of inflation would prevent us from being able to pay them enough to attract and keep them.
The problem has already been publicly recognized by the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, and by the Chief of Naval Personnel, Vice Admiral Robert B. Baldwin. Admiral Hayward, in testimony before Congress, cited the declining population base, combined with increased competition for manpower in the economy, as presenting problems for recruitment in the 1980s.1 Vice Admiral Baldwin stated in an interview that “. . . Inflation is the most serious issue that Navy people face today.”2 When we put all the factors together, we find that we have a problem defying exaggeration. Yet, despite the generous documentation of the trends both in the literature and public media, we don’t seem to be at general quarters, or even thinking about sounding the alarm—rather, we seem to be sitting passively by.
Declining Human Resources, Increasing Demand: The commitment to technological progress has pervaded our economy and our culture. Higher yields, lower overhead, and more efficient operations are essential to success in a competitive economy, and technology is the key to this success.
Among other benefits, technology eases the problem of finding and paying for high-priced human labor. The trouble is that the more automated we get, the more we need that labor to make our systems work—to operate them, to interpret the information they provide, to plan their use wisely, to repair them when they break down. This is true not just in the Navy, but in all the organizations built on the same technological foundation.
As Thomas L. McFadden stated in an analysis of the defense manpower problem, “There is a practical limit to replacing people with technology because the higher the technology, the higher the skill level
'For footnotes, please turn to page 39
required to operate and maintain it.”'! Dr. James K. Johnston recently wrote about the Navy’s problem in Campus, the Navy education and training monthly: "... The Navy faces a dire need to recruit, train and retain people capable of operating and maintaining the sophisticated equipment required to support its mission. To reduce the adverse effect of insufficient numbers of skilled maintenance personnel, Navy officials from the Secretary of the Navy on down have stressed the need for equipment with increased reliability and simplified maintenance requirements. While the resources available for training have decreased, the personnel training requirements have increased in order to meet the demands of ever more complex equipment. . . ,”4 But where are we going to get the people to train? The signs are that our supply of young adults is becoming scarcer as well as less capable. The decline in College Board test scores which began about 1963 is 0r>ly one indication that our educational systems are not turning out the bright-eyed workers of years Past. To aggravate the problem of lower quality, the quantity is dwindling fast as well. Population trends mdicate that the supply of young adults available for military service peaked about 1978 and will decline 25% by 1990. “Supply,” as applied to people, thus becomes a complex variable involving intelligence, | with inflation, it remains subtle and mysterious; none of our economists and politicians seem able to put a hand on the monster. The popular impressions continue that inflation is just one of those unpleasant facts of life, that it is good in small doses because it helps our economy to keep growing, and that it has more or less always been with us. In reality, the current inflationary spiral has not been with us very long—about 20 years, roughly comparable to one human generation. This may be a long time compared to the history of pocket calculators and digital watches, but hardly long enough to qualify as a fine tradition. Rather, the time span has been just long enough and the rises just gradual enough for inflation to cause moderate resentment without setting off the outcry that would really be appropriate. This is partly because the effects of inflation are often insidious. A salary increase may look like a lot of money when seen as a series of numbers on a page, but when one realizes that the real value of those dollars has actually dropped, that same raise doesn’t look like much. The distinction between money and money’s value, though simple, remains elusive as a practical matter. This moving target creates not only confusion but also deceit. Inevitably, we are led to suffer inefficiency, loss of control, and loss of capability—in short, to suffer general weakening. 1 |
motivation, and emotional stability as well as simple numbers. “Demand” can be defined as a measure of °nr requirements for people in sufficient numbers and capabilities to maintain the status quo. As for the Navy, the future of American seapower "nay boil down to a basic question: Will the Navy be °ne of the winners in the scramble for good people? Unless we recognize the severity of the challenge, the °dds are very long against us. Even if we do, we have n° guarantee of success. McFadden wrote that because of “. . . American social policies which seri- °usly affect the long-term military personnel supply • • • an adequate, ready peacetime military force capable of using the military technology to which the Nation is already committed may be unattainable at any price.”5 This reference to price is a reminder that che people crunch is also a workers’ job market, which means that employers are forced to pay higher salaries. Of course, the Navy doesn’t have the charter to set its own pay scales; this is a matter which regains in the hands of our government. Sneaking Inflation: For all our intimate contact | The Navy's Stake: It would be comforting to assume that the Navy will continue to be strong and effective while the rest of the country suffers and struggles, but such an assumption will never be realistic. When the country feels squeezed, the Navy will feel pressure. When economic confusion, anxiety, and personal self-protection instincts whittle away at our “net national product,” when the Congress is forced to make the big budget cuts, a battle will be at hand. The Navy will have to prove its case for a proportionately higher share of the wealth, or be forced to retreat with the overall economy. Unfortunately, the fleet has already faced the prospect of becoming one of the first and most battered victims of inflation. It is a matter of where the Navy stands in the ranking of national priorities as perceived by the government. The record of the last decade contains unfavorable signs of what the future may hold. What began as a brief “belt-tightening” and post-Vietnam drawdown has turned out to be a steady, disheartening squeeze in physical assets anti fiscal constraints. Many of today’s veterans remember when it was unheard of to extend people in their |
^roceedinu-K / Ofitoher 1979 | 37 |
duty assignments because of permanent change of station fund shortages; when military fringe benefits were widely regarded as something special; when pay raises were matched not just to inflation, but to higher real wages enjoyed by workers at large.
Social Security, food stamps, and other social programs are going to be tough competitors for available funds. If the choice comes down to bailing out Social Security for another year or building a new ship, how much chance will the ship have? Of course, the answer depends on war’s degree of imminence. But in the continuing cold war, the Navy is going to have to do some fighting to keep up its capital assets and operating budgets.
Although the material losses may be painful, they will be petty compared to the loss in personnel. The 5.5% limit on salary hikes is unlikely to go away soon. As the struggle among employers to attract capable people approaches all-out war, this simple fact threatens to debilitate the world’s proudest navy. Regardless of any regulations the government may impose to try to hold down wage increases, private industries will find a way to pay as much as necessary. They won’t have any choice. Until the day comes when an organization can get along without constantly renewing its people, the competition for personnel will not diminish. And the surviving organizations will be the ones which manage—by
The USS Fife (DD-991) and Fletcher (DD-992), christened this past July, are the last of the Spruance class.
And everybody knows we need more. But with the Navy competing against social and welfare programs for the same funds, it is not hard to guess which peacetime priorities will prevail.
whatever means—to remain competitive. Where will that leave the Navy?
Within the Navy, as in the other military services, professionalism and a sense of duty continue to be held high. But to some extent, the military has evolved toward an “occupational model” which, says Lieutenant Colonel S. C. Sarkesian, USA (Retired), can “. . . expose the profession to political manipulation, creating dangers not only for the profession but for the entire political system.”8 Such a posture also tends to turn military people into rational economic creatures: we may work more for less pay—■ but not forever. The 5.5% limit on pay increases may bring on the breaking point. With this 5.5% limit, even assuming only a 12% inflation rate, a commander with 20 years of service earning $31,681 in 1979 would be down to $23,494 in 1979 dollars by 1984. The retirement pay of a 20-years commander in 1984 might be as low as $9,000 in 1979 dollars. If that sounds unlikely, we should observe that the trend is already well established, based on pay losses between October 1973 and October 1978. The monthly base pay for a chief petty officer with 10 years’ service fell from $686.70 to $601.18 in 1973 dollars (the figure was $883.50 in 1978 dollars). The pay loss was 12.5%.
We are clearly pointed downhill. The day is not far off when people will become so preoccupied with financial problems that they will be ineffective in their work, triggering a host of other problems. (The recent gasoline shortages have given us a glimpse of what can happen. Workers in some cases used their annual leave time to wait in long gas station lines. Even on the job, many used up company time talking about the gasoline problem.) Reenlistment rates would plummet and resignation rates would soar. A
general freeze on resignations would not be far behind.
We are already operating by crisis management and brinksmanship. Most of us will recall the flurry °f messages and the special arrangements that the services had to make when we nearly missed payday in October 1978—only two years after Congress had shifted the fiscal year from July to October to allow 'T'ote time to work on the budget. More recently, in April 1979, Congress again waited until the eleventh hour to approve a new national debt ceiling. Savings bond sales and treasury bill interest accrual came w*thin a day of grinding to a stop.
In times of recession or prolonged economic decline, the worker supply could temporarily exceed che job openings, and the Navy might be able to attract its fair share of people. Unfortunately, economic declines also mean reduced industrial capabil- lcy; just when we find that we can get enough People, we can’t get enough hardware. In any case, these “employers’ markets” appear bound to be
short-lived.
Bad times come and go, as always. But the current Problem is bigger than a temporarily adverse attitude 0r casual decision. To say that America will not allow its fleet to become second rate and that the trend will change soon may be very similar to what Englishmen a century ago were saying as Britannia began to falter following the Crimean War. Will Vietnam, and the inflation triggered there, turn out to be America’s Crimea?
Conclusion: The Navy must face up to socioeconomic trends as the most serious threat to its future effectiveness. The days are long gone when all we ^ad to do was to receive our orders and get on with °Ur military duties, whether the mission was Peacetime drilling or full-scale conflict. We have before us a tremendous challenge, but the situation is fot from hopeless. For the moment we are still on t0P, nationally as well as nautically, and we have not 7ei: lost contact with the great traditions and qual- •ties which helped build our country as well as our Navy. The place to begin, as in solving any problem, ls first to recognize that a problem exists. From that Point we can proceed with a number of actions:
^ Encourage active campaigning by service people t0 show that we understand the nature of inflation, that we refuse to accept the confusing and misleading language which ignores inflation, and that we are tfocply concerned about the possible results. As sug- 8ested by Sarkesian, we should try to become “some- fo'og more than unconditional servants of the state. This would necessitate the profession to acquire political understanding and expertise" with “[t]he institutionalization of healthy skepticism, reasonable inquiry and legitimate dissent. . . .”7 Letters to Congress and to the White House would be a place to start.
y Renew our determination to improve efficiency and conservation efforts. For once, we are in a position to be able to see the finiteness of our resources. When further sacrifices in the national budget become necessary, the Navy will have to be able to account for every penny it wants. y Reconsider with a cautious attitude the advantages of newer and more technology. Fancy black boxes and mighty machines won’t do us much good if the nation’s parents and schools don’t produce enough talent to make the gadgets work. The ships may be tougher than ever and the radars more efficient, but our structure stands on a foundation of human beings. Within the Navy, as much as in society at large, we need to rediscover basics: the effectiveness of our organizations, procedures, and standing orders, and the value of our traditions.
Distasteful as it may be, we need to establish a real awareness that the Navy of 1989 may be a small fraction of its present size. We need to learn to look farther into the future. If we can learn to accept future hardships as a genuine possibility, we will be in a better position to make the best of what we have remaining. The alternative is to put our heads into the sand, leaving what sticks up to become a tattered remnant.
After receiving his B. S. degree with the U. S. Naval
t Academy Class of 1965, Lieutenant Commander Gonzalez was commissioned as an unrestricted line officer. He served in destroyers and studied at the Scripps Institution of Oceanography, receiving a master's degree in oceanography in 1967. In 1969 he was designated as a special duty officer (geophysics), and has since served in a variety of geophysics billets, including computer systems officer at Fleet Weather Central, Pearl Harbor, and meteorology officer on board the USS Enterprise (CVN-65). In 1976 he received an M. S. degree in computer systems management from the U. S. Naval Postgraduate School. He is currently assigned as plans and programs officer, Fleet Numerical Weather Central, in Monterey, California.
‘“Admiral Hayward Optimistic About the State of Navy," All Hands, May 1979, p. 27. .
2Paul Smith and Jim Parker, “Promotion Chances Bright for 1980, Baldwin Predicts,” Navy Times, 21 May 1979, p. 1.
3Thomas L. McFadden, "Availability of Defense Manpower," National Defense, March-April 1978, p. 463.
4James K. Johnston, “Apprenticeship: a Solution to the Navy's Training Problems,” Campus, April 1977, p. 26.
5McFadden, p. 469.
6Sam C. Sarkesian, "An Empirical Reassessment of Military Professionalism,” Military Review, August 1977, p. 19.
7Ibid.