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/ he Primary Issue: In the past two years, President Carter has cut in half the five-year Navy shipbuilding plan proposed by the previous administration. In 1977, former President Ford proposed to Congress the construction of 157 new ships; President Carter in 1978 proposed 70.1 In the long term, the U. S. fleet will decline in numbers as ship retirements exceed accessions. Because it is a long-term problem, it has been deferred. This creates the danger that if we do not invest for tomorrow, we cannot expect to maintain superior naval capabilities. Under a doctrine of "first things first”—looking after the strategic nuclear and NATO central front balances—U. S. naval funding has been held to a constant level over the past two fiscal years, while Soviet naval forces continue to improve in capabilities. Despite the differences in funding between Soviet and U. S. maritime-related forces, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown has said the U. S. fleet "is going to grow and become stronger.”2
Given this disparity between resources and confidence, one can conclude that the basic problem with U. S. Navy force planning is that many senior officials believe there isn’t, a problem. We are repeating with naval forces the mistake made a decade ago with our strategic forces: because of ample capabilities today, we are neglecting to build for the future. The reasons for inadequate investment are twofold. First, the total defense budget is severely constrained Fy the fight against inflation, a worsening energy situation, and heavy domestic claims on public funds. Second, within DoD the fiscal priorities discount naval forces. It can be argued that U. S. and NATO navies are too large, because they won’t contribute to the first 30 days of war on the central front >n Europe. Other signs, though, are troublesome. Dr. Brown Fad to fly to northern Norway to reassure the Norwegians that the U. S. Navy would be of sufficient size to operate on NATO’s north flank. Moreover, during 1978, General Alexander Haig, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, frequently Warned against overspecializing U. S. forces for the central front and urged NATO to recognize the importance of events outside Western Europe. However one assesses the vitality of NATO circa 1979, it and our nuclear forces comprise the linchpin °f Western alliance security. Faced with an austere H. S. defense funding level, there simply was not r°om for NATO improvements, nuclear force modernization, and the naval force modernization planned Fy the Ford administration. It’s often claimed, howler, that future U. S. naval forces, without any increase in currently planned funding, can remain superior” if the Navy: ^ “Had its act together” ^ Made its case quantitatively by better analysis rather than military judgment ^ Became more efficient ^ Overcame its own vulnerabilities. Getting the act together: In 1950, Paul Nitze wrote NSC-68, widely acclaimed as the best single strategic analysis of the post World War II era. Despite the plan’s endorsement by the National Security Council, Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson and President Harry Truman went to considerable bureaucratic lengths to ignore it. It cost too much money. Then came the Korean War, and NSC-68 became the blueprint for tripling the defense budget.3 There are other such examples. The point is this: today, even if the navy’s “act” were put together by Alfred Thayer Mahan, Chester Nimitz, and Arleigh Burke, the funding would not change within the administration. There is no perceived clear and pres- | ent danger. The problem is a shortage of money, not of articulate rationale. Better Analysis: It has become fashionable to justify the size of naval forces by the predicted outcomes of theoretical battles. But it’s a delusion to predict precisely how a battle will come out in 1990. We are ignorant of too many basic variables, such as Soviet strategy and weapons performance. Battle analysis gives valuable insights into sensitive interactions; it cannot substitute for judgment in determining how much is enough. The same style analysis and data base can be used by different officials to argue for radically different force sizes. For example, in 1972 presidential candidate George McGovern presented a program whose analysis supported a $60 billion defense budget. The analysis may have been rational and internally consistent; the question was whether one agreed with McGovern’s judgment. Similarly, today if one assumes U. S. battle groups need not be sized and structured to prevail against Soviet opposition, then logical analysis should lead to a cheaper and less capable U. S. Navy. More Efficiencies: While laudable, they won’t overcome the fiscal trend. And the administration so far has not provided the organizational incentives to induce efficiencies. Designs for cheaper ships are imperative if force levels are to be increased. The administration and Congress must stop creating incentives for the most expensive ships, as they do when they imply one-for-one replacement. During the fiscal year 1979 shipbuilding debate, Dr. Brown implied the substitution of a midi-carrier (CVV) and five frigates for a nuclear carrier (CVN). The five FFGs turned out to be cloud formations. Given the choice between a CVN or a CVV, the organization will seek the very best “one.” The Navy must perceive an incentive for designing units less costly and less capable than the LSD-41 amphibious warfare ship and the SSN-688 and Trident submarines. This incentive has to be a larger number of ships authorized and, most likely, an increased budget. Defense Secretary James Schlesinger did this with the Air Force in 1974. He approved 26 wings instead of 21 after the Air Force agreed to fill those wings with A- 10s and F-l6s rather than F-15s. He and General Creighton Abrams, the Army Chief of Staff, agreed to expand the Army from 13 to 16 divisions. The Army would man the units by transfers from headquarters and staffs, while Schlesinger would increase the Army budget to provide the equipment for the divisions. There must be an organizational reward, not punishment, for increased efficiencies. Too Vulnerable: Perhaps what hurts the Navy most is the widespread perception that the surface fleet is |
Proceedino*«; / Or*t.nhfir 1979 | 27 |
27
too vulnerable to be worth its costs. Ironically, given phased array radar, improved electronic warfare, antisubmarine warfare narrow-band processing, and the Phoenix antiair warfare system, there is substantial evidence that with 3% real growth the surface fleet would in the future be more survivable than today. On the other hand, if the fleet is underfunded, then its vulnerability becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.
In sum, the long-term trends point to fewer naval forces, very austere funding, and scant recognition, at least within the administration, that the trends are a serious problem. This leads to the question: where is the Navy going and why?
In his fiscal year 1980 posture statement, Secretary Brown linked naval forces with a series of missions in support of national security objectives.4 These roles are shown in Table 1, together with a guess about the future size of associated U. S. naval forces.
Mission 1. Forward Deployments: Naval personnel and ships are stretched taut now, with no relief in sight. While in 1979 there are afloat three marine amphibious units, each of about battalion size, my guess is this will change. The demands for an increased presence in the Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean will lead to a V/STOL (vertical or short takeoff and landing) task force organized around an LHA (amphibious assault ship [general purpose]).
Such worldwide U. S. naval presence is required for geopolitical reasons. Our security rests on a forward defense strategy which inextricably links our fate with that of a set of nations around the rimland of both Europe and Asia. Until recently, the United States has enjoyed unchallenged supremacy in maintaining these links. There is now, however, a growing perception of Soviet naval superiority, and it is unacceptable to American interests. Though such perceptions may or may not be justified, nations, like people, act upon perceptions. Unfortunately, perceptions of the trend in overall power, both here and abroad, favor the Soviet Union.
In regard to U. S. naval forces, Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, the Chief of Naval Operations, has said we currently hold “a slim edge of superiority.”5 The main trouble in the naval balance lies downstream, as the steady procurement pace of the Soviets is contrasted to our program’s fits, stops, and starts. Be-
Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, seen here with Saudi Crown Prince Fahd in March 1979, maintains that he has postponed—not reduced—naval force goals.
cause naval warfare is so complex, how military professionals perceive the balance is the major barometer watched by the press and the public. Based on conversations with senior U. S. naval officers, a composite judgment about a conventional NATO or worldwide war indicates:
► At most, nine or ten U. S. carrier task groups would be available at the onset of hostilities.
► Four to five carrier task groups is the prudent minimum force in any of the four possible major theaters (the Norwegian Sea, Mediterranean, Northwest Indian Ocean, and Western Pacific) where Soviet Naval Aviation and submarines would be met.
► At most, only two of the four theaters—plus the Atlantic sea lines of communication—could be engaged simultaneously.
► The carrier battles to reinforce allies would be largely determined by electronic warfare and tactical skill, with the outcome too close to call in advance.
► The Soviet “Badger” bomber will be killed; the sprint speed of the “Backfire” bomber makes it tough for the U. S. F-14 and very tough for the F-18.
► Area antiair warfare against more than a few antiship missiles is poor; the Aegis air defense system is needed.
► Electronic warfare deserves more attention and practice.
► The Atlantic sea-lanes are well guarded at the eastern end by patrol aircraft and U. S. attack submarines lying in ambush on barriers.
► These planes and submarines hold a distinct acoustic advantage over Soviet submarines.
► But those Soviet submarines which did reach the major sea-lanes would take a heavy toll of shipping
| Table 1 Naval Missions and Forces | 1985 | 1995 |
U. S. National Objective | Naval Role |
| Forces |
Maintain Stability | Force Deployment | 2 MAUs 4 CVs | 1 MAU 4 CVs |
|
| 1 VSS | 1 VSS |
Contain Crises | Superiority at Sea Force Over the beach | 13 CV 1.2 MAF | 13 CV 1.0 MAF |
Deter World War III | Seven SLOC Convoys | 106 DD 24 VP | 115 FF 24 VP |
|
| SOSUS | SOSUS |
| Pressure Soviets —Blockade | 83 SSNs | 63 SSNs |
| —Threaten with |
|
|
| land-based air (or CVs) |
|
|
| Reinforce Allies | 10 BG | 10 BG |
|
| 110 Escorts | 94 Escorts |
|
| 2 Aegis | 10 Aegis |
| Control Ocean Sequentially |
|
|
| Hedge Vs. Uncertainty |
| 5 Theaters/2 Fleets |
| Keep Superiority | 490 Ships | 425 Ships |
| Deterrence nuclear war | 36 SSBN | 30 SSBN |
MAU-Marine amphibious unit; CV-aircrafc carrier; VSS-V/STOL Support Ship; DD-des,royer; FF-frigate; VP-land-based patrol planes; SOSUS-underwarer antisubmarine listening device; SSN-nuclear-powered arrack submarine; BG-barrle group; Aeg.s-anruur warfare sh.p; SSBN—ballistic missile submarine; SLOC—sea lines of communication; MAF Marine amphibious force
because we are short on escorts and rely too much on SOSUS (underwater listening system) remaining intact.
► Our marines would be overcommitted, given the competing demands of the Commander in Chief Atlantic and the Supreme Allied Commander Europe.
Many naval commanders are sincerely pessimistic about the downward trend, because they believe U. S. naval forces eventually will fall below the threshold necessary to limit incoming missile damage and to succeed in battle.
Mission 2. Superiority at Sea in a Crisis: In crises during which both sides must use the sea, we’ve had two things going for us: the Soviets’ lack of confidence and their lack of capabilities. They are trying to correct both. Currently, they have about eight potential anti-carrier groups and are building and organizing more. If we stay with just 13 carriers and °nly the Harpoon as a surface-to-surface missile, we naay be forced into matchups in which we’re outgunned. For example, how would a U. S. LHA/VSTOL group look against a Kiev!"Kara” group? We do not know, because we have not worked out the tactics.
But it is only a matter of time before we deploy either V/STOL task forces or surface action groups with long-range surface-to-surface missiles.
Mission 3■ Force Over the Beach: Much of the utility of amphibious warfare ships relative to their costs rests in the crisis management role. Their numbers are dropping because the dominant DoD criterion for force sizing is a 30-day European war preceded by two weeks’ warning. The amphibious warfare ship (none of which is in the current five-year plan) emerges as too slow, too vulnerable, and too irrelevant.
Mission 4. Sea-lane Defense in World War III: There is solid support for this mission. It is NATO-related, buys frigates and patrol planes, doesn’t threaten the Soviets, requires at most eight carriers, and supposedly reassures our European allies. Projected shipping losses to Soviet submarines have decreased as narrowband sound processing has improved. Also, the number of frigates for convoy escort is increasing. But this optimism has been tempered by the possibility of “Backfire” air-to-surface missile attacks against the convoys.
Mission 5. Reinforce Allies in World War III: Many of our allies, such as Norway, Turkey, South Korea, and Japan, are on the flanks of the Soviet Union. Reinforcing them would be much more difficult than the Atlantic sea-lane protection because allied naval forces could encounter heavy Soviet attack.
Mission 6. Control Oceans Sequentially in World War III: Massing our battle groups for optimum effect would limit us to one campaign at a time in the Atlantic and one in the Pacific. So we are going to have to shift forces among theaters, as will the Soviets. Both Admiral Hayward and Dr. Brown caution that allied naval campaigns must be conducted prudently. Admiral Hayward favors an offensive naval capability for “. . . taking the war to the enemy s naval forces. . . . The prompt destruction of opposing naval forces is the most economical and effective means to assure control of [the seas].”6
Mission 7. Pressure Soviets in World War 111: Attack submarines on the offensive or in blockade positions are accepted in concept. They are also trump cards in deadly serious crises (such as Cuba, 1962), but we are funding construction of only one attack submarine a year.
Many, in the Navy and elsewhere, also doubt the feasibility of offensive strikes by carrier aircraft. They reason that a surface fleet could not survive within 400 miles of the Soviet Union. Yet, if carriers are to operate in, say, the Norwegian Sea, as Dr. Brown has said, then their attack aircraft are within striking distance of Soviet bases. It is the fact of geography/ distance that places at risk the Soviet bombers which are attacking the allied naval forces.
Long-range naval cruise missiles would complicate Soviet planning for three reasons. First, as Admiral Hayward has pointed out, they allow for U. S. task- organized non-carrier surface action groups which can outfight Soviet surface groups. This is important in worldwide cases in which surge deployments occur simultaneously in different regions, as the Soviets did in the summer of 1968. Second, cruise missiles complement tactical air strikes in conventional war. Third, they allow nuclear attack from a mix of platforms.
Mission 8. Hedge Against Uncertainty: We are planning forces which will still be in the fleet in 2020. So it behooves us to keep a balanced force, even when just one force element seems to solve a problem. In studies, for instance, land-based antisubmarine aircraft kill a large percentage of the Soviet submarines on the Atlantic sea-lanes. So our investment in submarines and frigates may seem too large. But by changing certain study assumptions, the planes’ effectiveness drops markedly. Similarly, the amphibious assault in a one-month VCorld VCar III receives low credibility. But by the year 2000 the Soviets are likely to have acquired one or more overseas bases. If they have, then marine assault becomes a credible possibility. The real problem is this: one cannot explain or size a multipurpose force on the basis of just one or two missions or roles.
The Overall Capabilities Trend. Until 1985, the trend looks fair to good because the systems are already authorized.
After that, the naval trend looks shaky to adverse. Block obsolescence begins to hit classes of ships, and we’re not funding to prevent it. Soviet capabilities are projected to improve steadily. In general terms, it appears:
► Guided missile frigates are overprotected in the shipbuilding debates.
► Land-based antisubmarine planes are safe.
► The amphibious forces and Marine Corps tactical aircraft face rough sledding.
► Nuclear-powered attack submarines are not understood, but if a cheaper submarine is proposed, it will be built.
► Many inside and outside the Navy think it’s nutty for carrier battle groups to get near the Soviet Union, yet they think we must control the sea approaches to Norway, Turkey, Japan, South Korea, and other countries.
► With the numbers of task forces now planned, one misstep early in World War III could put us out of the naval war and leave the Soviet Naval Aviation free to stop military convoys.
This assessment assumes an American frame of reference: concern for containing crises and deterring a NATO war while ignoring the nuclear monster lurking in the closet. Because the national command authority does not take nuclear warfighting seriously, the services aren’t going to spend money for it.
Table 2 is a guess about side-by-side comparison of U. S. and Soviet naval force inventories in 1995, as contrasted to today. These inventories are arbitrarily allocated among five warfighting categories. The table neglects completely our allies and land-based forces. Still, it shows a disturbing trend.
President Carter has said that the military balance will remain at least as favorable as it was in 1977. The trend does appear favorable for the category of sea-lane protection/antisubmarine barrier operations. I do not believe, however, that the other categories of platform comparisons shown in the table support his contention. Table 2, however, is only a guess. No one can accurately predict inventories for 1995. But the trends certainly point in the direction shown.
Reasons for the Trend: Most of the reasons for the long-range trend were stated earlier. Many people disagree that there is a problem with the trend in Table 2 because:
► It’s long-term, so less pressing than immediate deficiencies.
► Many citizens are disenchanted with American power and believe military capabilities are not that relevant to modern international affairs. Consequently the trend is not a reason for concern. We can cooperate as well as compete with the Soviet Union. Nuclear weapons make a war between the superpowers unthinkable. One agile U. S. ballistic missile submarine can destroy all major Soviet cities. Vietnam was not ours to lose. Iran was not ours to lose. We have reassured the Saudis we will not lose them. The Mexicans have reassured us they are not ours to lose. And so forth.
^ Table 2 includes only part of the relevant factors. There are much better analytical tools available to decision-makers. They require classified, complicated data which are difficult to explain. The naval force trend toward 1995 is sensitive to nitty-gritty assumptions, including Soviet systems not deployed or not observed. So using these uncertainties, reasonable analysts can and do deny the shape of the trend, and hence the risk to be incurred.
| Table 2 Naval Force Comparison in Five Warfighting Categories |
| |
IJ S. Nave | Soviet Navy |
| |
1979 | 1995 | 1995 | 1979 |
|
| I. Battle Group War |
|
13 CV | 13 CV | 8 VSS | 2 VSS |
24 SSN | 24 SSGN | 52 SSGN 36 SSN | 42 SSG/SSGN 18 SSN |
0 Aegis | 10 Aegis | 80 SURF (SSM) | 40 SURF (SSM) |
95 CRU/DES | 95 CRU/DES 300 “Backfire” (1.5 Mach) | 400 “Bdgr”/“Blndr” (0.7 Mach) | |
|
| II. U. S. SSNs on Offense |
|
20 SSN | 10 SSGN | 30 SSN 260 ASW A/C | 18 SSN 170 ASW A/C |
|
| III. SLOC & Barrier |
|
31 SSN | 29 SSGN | 16 SSN | 0 SSN |
24 VP | 24 VP | 52 SS | 156 SS |
70_ff | 115 FF |
|
|
|
| IV. Amphibious |
|
N2_MAF | 1.0 MAF | .6 MAF | .3 MAF |
|
| V. SSBN |
|
41 SSBN | 30 SSBN | 60 SSBN | 55 SSB/SSBN |
^ aircraft carrier; VSS- warfare ship; SURF(SSM)— Carrying antiship missiles; | -V/STOL support ship; SSN-nuclear-poweted attack submarine; SSG/SSGN-crmse missile submarine; Aeg.s-antiair -surface ship with sutface-to-surface missile; CRU/DES-cruiser/destroyer; ■■Backfire," ■'Bdgr"/"Blndr"-bombers capable of ASW A/C-antisubmarine aircraft; VP-land-based antisubmarine aircraft; SS-d,esel-powered attack submarine; FF— | ||
r‘gate; MAF—marine amphibious force; SSB/SSBN— | -ballistic missile submarine. |
|
Conclusions: Because martial power deeply influences non-military events and because the competition cannot be ignored, our military might must be sufficient to maintain a global power balance. Strategic stability is one element. A European regional balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact nations is another element. U. S. naval superiority to reinforce our allies around the periphery of the Soviet Union—from Norway to Turkey across the Persian Gulf to Japan and South Korea—is another element, according to Dr. Brown. U. S. naval force projections were the most severely affected by the administration’s fiscal restraint. The 1979 Maritime Balance Study, conducted by a Navy study group in conjunction with the Defense Science Board, concluded that
Carrier Task Group 77.4. led by the USS Midway (CV-41) conducts exercises in the Indian Ocean, one of many potential areas of confrontation with the Soviets.
if the current fiscal and “business-as-usual” trends continue, things will get worse as the competition improves.7 The study recommended the Navy should either receive more money or cut forward deployments/readiness today in order to invest in forces for tomorrow. It is not reasonable to expect the administration to accept less readiness or fewer deployments. As a result, the long-term trend for U. S. naval forces is not promising.
But those who argue for the current resource level offer two justifications: if the U. S. Navy is superior, there is no need to worry; if it will become vulnerable to the Soviets, then it is not worth throwing good money after bad.
I suggest the following:
► To offset the vulnerability perception, we need better technical explanations of the complicated, modern- day Navy. This assumes that naval leaders can agree on an optimum mixture of ships and that they agree that the ships can operate successfully in high-threat areas (they don’t agree today).
► To offset the perception that the total defense budget is adequate, there must be persistent emphasis, from the Joint Chiefs of Staff on down, that the Soviets lead in procurement and that we must buy today to prevail tomorrow. At some point, the mathematics of resources will make it a fiction for the United States to claim to be the world’s most powerful nation.
► Concerning the bottom line—inadequate naval funding—there is not much the the Navy can do directly. The administration is locked into its game plan. The president is trying to balance the budget, control inflation, and check those in his own political party who are demanding increased federal spending for various domestic programs. To the president, the Navy probably looks like just another special interest lobbying group. What could help considerably is an external catalyst which influences the administration’s fiscal priorities. For instance, Senator Sam Nunn and Dr. Henry Kissinger have linked ratification of SALT II to an increase in the defense budget.
► Congress will make some naval changes to the president’s budget. Congress could benefit from comprehensive technical explanations of the Navy by the Navy. The modern Navy is so complicated that relatively few outside the Navy understand it. Through its professional expertise, the uniformed Navy could clarify which ideas advanced by outsiders
had merit and which did not. Most particularly, the uniformed Navy would have a view on what the naval force structure should look like in the 1990s.
► Crisis Confrontation: The Soviets have persisted in building forces which a decade ago our defense leadership considered a waste of resources. Those efforts are now paying dividends. The Soviets can calculate net outcomes at each level of escalation and threaten escalation where it favors them. We’d better have a response for that.
We have lost the strategic nuclear edge which underlay our posture in previous crises. We’re going to have to be shrewd in our dispositon of forces in future crises. As a rule of thumb, if a crisis occurs where the Soviets can reinforce directly across their borders, we stand an excellent chance of being outmatched. On the other hand, if the Soviets must use an ocean, then leverage without escalation to World War III shifts in our favor. Two suggestions follow. First, the Navy must carefully think through U. S. move and Soviet countermove when deploying naval forces to hot spots like the Indian Ocean. If U. S. moves are contemplated in a crisis which would require Soviet recognition and active compliance, such as a cordon sanitaire, these moves may be signalled through a peacetime exercise. Second, the inferiority complex of the Soviet Navy should be encouraged. For instance, the fact that in March 1979 the Soviets had to tow a cruiser home from the Mediterranean should not pass without comment. The image of a Soviet worldwide Okean exercise in 1980 should not be left just to the Soviets. Independent of Okean, we may want to coordinate the timing of our exercises in different oceans and display our capabilities.
► To explain a navy, the threat must be assessed. There are two approaches here. On the one hand, the threat can be accentuated. On the other hand, there is what the CNO is doing: emphasizing U. S. superiority today and expressing concern about the
future. The sailors at sea must think and act like winners. The problem with this approach is that Dr. Brown and others may not worry while we’re still ahead. Many oppose the present method as regards defense forces, arguing that a solid threat is the only way to go in dealing with a Congress which faces a thousand competing claims on a budget. If the Navy chooses the superiority/concern option, it may want to demonstrate by exercises what it believes its capabilities and strategy to be. This would also be a means of reinforcing strategic doctrine in the fleet.
Where to from here? Basically, the position of Secretary Brown is that he has postponed — not reduced—naval force goals. His public statements endorse a 500-550-ship active Navy, although the budget points to 400-500 ships. However, a 500- ship concept can be supported by extending service life beyond planned retirements. Thus, some defense analysts argue that U. S. naval capabilities will remain about constant through the year 2000. After that, the bottom falls out as block obsolescence hits. By this rationale, substantial shipbuilding authorization can be deferred through fiscal year 1985. The problem of the future will then belong to the next administration.
Will this be permitted to happen? Who knows? If there is a serious international crisis, shipbuilding funds will probably be doubled. If not, this administration is locked in. It’s too late in the administration to change its basic fiscal game plan.
The challenge facing the Navy and Marine Corps
to take a future-year ship procurement plan whose funds were reduced by 40% and ensure that the fleet numbers and overall capability of the original plan ate not reduced. It requires procuring more ships at less cost per ship with an aggregate capability sufficient to retain superiority over an increasing threat. Because current Soviet naval force spending roughly equals ours, American technology must be superior to that of the Soviet Union. We must also achieve significant (some would say extraordinary) economies °f scale through the guarantee to industry of longterm production runs. Secretary of the Navy Graham Claytor is trying to develop cheaper cost options for °ur submarines. Beyond that, there are only two other large-ticket items in the current five-year shipbuilding plan: ten DDG-47 Aegis ships and one carrier.
The shortage in U. S. military resources is projected to widen. Soviet military spending is increasing in real terms by 4-5% a year, compared with about 2% in the United States.8 If this trend continues for the next decade as it has for the past decade, then in the 1990s the Soviets will be outspend- ing us in research and development by 90%, in procurement by 90%, and in personnel by 45%.
What do such trends in resource figures mean? Dr. Fred Ikle, the former Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, wrote recently:
“All the needed steps [to ensure a stable power balance] will falter unless the American people share a sense of purpose sufficient to sustain a burdensome effort for many years. Such dedication requires a durable consensus, free of comforting illusions. It would be forcing the facts to assert that there is any such consensus today. But there is every reason to believe that the American people are in for some shocks in the years ahead, as the new reality about our military weakness sinks in—and every reason to believe that when it does sink in the people will demand some rapid changes.”9
A graduate of Georgetown University in 1961, Mr. West served as a marine platoon commander from 1962 to 1965. He received his M.A. degree from the Wilson School of Public and International Affairs of Princeton University. He has been to Vietnam on active duty as a tactical and pacification analyst, as a civilian corre- ■ A m spondent, and was Special Assistant to Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger. He is currently a professor of management and director of strategic research at the Naval War College. His most recent Proceedings article was "Marines for the Future” in February 1978.
’Comparison of new ship construction in the February 1977 Five Year Defense Plan (FY78-82) with that of the March 1978 Plan (FY79-83). Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, Address to the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, Chicago, Illinois, 6 June 1978, p. 8.
3Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971), pp- 161-162.
4Harold Brown, Fiscal Year 1980 Department of Defense Annual Report (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 25 January 1979), p- 159.
5Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, USN, Address to the Current Strategy Forum, Naval War College, Newport, 16 May 1979.
6Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, USN, CNO Report on the Fiscal Year 1980 Budget of the U. S. Navy (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1979), p. 15.
7Defense Science Board, Maritime Balance Study, Department of Defense unclassified study, Washington, D.C., 1979, p. 116.
8National- Foreign Assessment Center, Estimated Soviet Defense Spending: Trends and Prospects (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, June 1978), p. iii.
9Fred C. Ikle, "What It Means to be Number Two,” Fortune, 20 November 1978, p. 84.