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The n earer of the Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal went where he was ordered. The holder of the Medal of Honor, Navy Cross, or Silver Star did something extraordinary when he got there. There is, however, ample evidence that the initiation fee one pays to join the fraternity of heroes is higher for the enlisted man than for the officer.
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X erhaps one of the most emotional subjects within the Navy is the awarding of decorations. The suggestions of favoritism which surface repeatedly regarding the manner in which decorations are awarded were of serious enough concern to prompt the Chief of Naval Operations to issue a letter on 17 September 1976 to all flag officers, commanding officers, and officers in charge. The letter’s purpose was to expand the guidance in the current Secretary of the Navy instruction on awards and to provide the CNO’s personal policy on the subject.
In his letter, the CNO addressed three specific criticisms of the award system:
► Not enough awards are made.
► Awards are given to the wrong people.
► Too many awards are given to senior personnel. The CNO conceded the possible validity of the first two complaints but indicated they tend to be subjective and are customarily raised by those who don’t get the awards. The remedy, he wrote, was strict adherence to existing regulations and policies. Then he added:
“The third criticism, too many awards going to senior personnel, often has a basis for validity. However, there is also clear justification for a higher percentage of sustained performance awards migrating to senior personnel because achievement decorations are usually earned on the basis of outstanding performance in a position of responsibility and it is the more senior of our officers and petty officers who are assigned to positions of higher responsibility.”1
The author has long felt that the award system as presently implemented within the Navy has inherent failings. These failings are not ones of mechanics but of philosophy. This feeling has grown during the author’s naval service and has been crystallized by personal experiences in attempting to obtain awards for enlisted personnel, numerous observations, and the research which forms the basis for this article. The sum of these experiences has brought me to the conclusion that the central problem with the award system is that the initiating, reviewing, and awarding officers have a level of expectation of what is “extraordinary” for an enlisted man or junior officer based primarily on what they consider “extraordinary” for themselves or their contemporaries. In order to research this idea, the author undertook a study of the awarding of decorations to naval personnel during this century.
The four most significant periods of military ac- 'For footnotes, please turn to page 48.
tion during this century differed materially in the level of naval participation, hence the opportunities for presenting awards. Only during the two World Wars did the Navy face a significant threat at sea. The Korean and Vietnam wars involved primarily shore bombardment and air support roles. Since it can be argued that the manner in which awards are made in wartime forms the philosophical basis for awards in peacetime, the author first looked into the awards which were presented for services in the World Wars.
The awarding of medals in the naval service for service in World War I was one of the more controversial episodes in the Navy in this century. Before it was all over, there was a direct confrontation between Rear Admiral William S. Sims, the Commander of U. S. Naval Forces in European Waters during the war, and Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels. In addition, a congressional hearing was held to look into the manner in which the awards were handled.
There were no awards made during the hostilities because none had been authorized by the Congress. Only the Medal of Honor had been authorized up to that point. To correct this situation, Congress passed an act on 4 February 1919 which established the following awards for naval personnel: the Medal of Honor to be awarded to “. . . any person who, while in the naval service of the United States, shall, in action involving actual conflict with the enemy, distinguish himself conspicuously by gallantry and in- trepedity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty and without detriment to the mission of the command . . the Distinguished Service Medal to be awarded to “. . . any person who, . . . , has distinguished, or who hereafter shall distinguish, himself by exceptionally meritorious service to the Government in a duty of great responsibility.”; and the Navy Cross to be awarded to “. . . any person who, . . . has distinguished . . . himself by extraordinary heroism or distinguished service not being sufficient to justify the award of a medal of honor or a distinguished service medal.”2
On 6 March 1919, in order to comply with the desires of Congress, the Secretary of the Navy appointed a Board of Awards, under Rear Admiral Austin M. Knight, to consolidate recommendations for awards for naval personnel involved in the war. The board received the recommendations for awards from the various fleet commanders, chiefs of the bureaus in Washington, D.C., and other senior naval officers. They considered these recommendations, deleted some, downgraded others, and forwarded their findings to the Secretary of the Navy for approval. Mr. Daniels did not rubber-stamp the recommendations of the board; in fact, he made major changes himself. He deleted and downgraded many awards and upgraded others which had been submitted by senior fleet commanders, most notably Rear Admiral Sims. He directed the reconsideration of certain groups of individuals he thought had not gotten sufficient recognition by the fleet commanders. These were principally the naval gun crews which had served in merchant ships and enlisted men in general. Having done this, he published a list of proposed awards. The furor was immediate and volatile. Newspapers and magazines carried letters and articles written by senior naval officers protesting the “injustice to distinguished officers” that the awards had done. Admiral Sims’s main complaint was “not erick Hale, set the purpose of the inquiry in his opening remarks.
in the number of awards made but in the fact that the awards as issued to officers in a number of instances are not in accord with the relative merit of the services performed by them as indicated by my recommendations.” The result of the furor was a congressional hearing conducted by the Subcommittee on Naval Affairs of the Senate. It began on 16 January 1920.
The chairman of the subcommittee, Senator Fred
“The purpose and intent of the statute was to award medals to officers and men of the Navy for heroism in action and for distinguished service, and for such purpose alone. In order that merit and merit alone should prevail, the statute provided that no medal or cross should be given unless a specific statement or report distinctly setting forth the act of distinguished service on the part of the officer or man, and suggesting or recommending official recognition thereof, shall have been made by his naval superiors through official channels. It was clearly intended that the awards should be beyond the reach of patronage or of
political or private influence of any kind.
"No medals as yet have been given out. The Secretary however, in his report for the year 1919, published a list of proposed awards. Following the publishing of this list, many protests were made about the awards, and a feeling has arisen in the country that the purpose of the act has not been followed out and that political and private influence and patronage have crept in.”'!
To understand the cause of the discontent among senior naval officers over the proposed awards, we must examine the criticisms which the secretary had of the proposed awards which were submitted to him by the board of awards. He had four specific complaints:
► The large number of officers recommended who had either served on ships which had remained in home waters throughout the war or who had been on shore duty in the United States throughout the war
► The small number of enlisted men who had been recommended
^ The small number of Naval Reservists recommended
► The small number of awards for the armed guard service on board merchant ships.
His testimony before the subcommittee reflected his concerns. He indicated that of 140 officers recommended for the Distinguished Service Medal, 68% had been stationed in the United States or its adjacent waters, 45% on U. S. shore duty, and only 22% on sea duty in the war zone. Said Daniels, "I did not approve of this disparity between honors to men ashore and afloat, and reduced or eliminated a number of the awards for shore service.”4
The Secretary of the Navy said he was ”... astonished to find that only 119 enlisted men out of the 500,000 in the Navy during the war were recommended for any high honor. . . . The country had applauded them and rejoiced in what they had done. But in awards they were largely overlooked.’”’ As for the naval armed guards, Daniels studied the reports of their deeds and added 32 names to the list of those to receive Navy Crosses. Only six had been recommended. Another group that the secretary thought had been overlooked was the Mine Force. He described to the subcommittee how he added 92 names to the list as a result of his investigations of this group during the war.
The most celebrated critic of the secretary to appear before the subcommittee was Admiral Sims. His complaints regarding the secretary’s actions on the proposed decorations:
► There is no one better qualified to assign the relative merit of actions among officers than a fleet commander.
► Awards were recommended for every commanding officer who lost a ship or had one damaged in enemy action.
► He had not had an opportunity to review the proposed awards for all the officers and men who were nominated for actions which occurred in areas under his command during the war.
► The arbitrary elimination of staff officers from high awards because they were in home waters or home shore stations does not take into account the value of their services to the war effort.
The testimony of all the principal witnesses in the hearing dealt almost exclusively with the awards to officers and who was most capable to judge the merits of their services. No comment will be made on this part of the hearings, but the recommendation of the subcommittee will be included. The list of proposed awards submitted to the subcommittee does show two significant features: the preponderance of commanding officers of ships which had served in the war and the large number of staff officers from flag staffs that were recommended. Some of the most heated exchanges involved the awarding of medals to COs who lost their ships in action. Rear Admiral Sims summed it up by saying:
“In the case of destroyers or other vessels that were successfully attacked by German submarines, no special distinctions were recommended in my reports. These are typical examples not only of unsuccessful action, but of failing to injure the enemy. The victors in these actions were the German submarines. By reason of the peculiar nature of the submarine warfare, no blame necessarily attaches to the commanding officers of these vessels for their failures, but on no account should they receive a special award for this lack of success.”6 The subcommittee’s report to the Senate generally supported the concept that the Secretary of the Navy is the proper official to interpret the intent of Congress for awards, but it criticized him for not making his policies known to the fleet commanders prior to award submissions. The subcommittee agreed with Admiral Sims that fleet commanders are the best judges of the relative merit of the officers under their command but implied that there must be consistency between all ships and shore stations on what actions deserve recognition. On the matter of awarding medals to commanding officers of ships sunk or damaged, the subcommittee wrote that it could not:
. . . too strongly condemn the practice of giving awards to commanding officers in the Navy who lost their ships unless in such cases they shall have shown such marked heroism in spite of the loss of their ships. The subcommittee does not believe that because of the loss of their ships the commanding officers are necessarily ineligible for reward, but it does believe that in each such case these officers are on the defensive, and instead of the loss of their ships being taken as an opportunity where an award may be given, it is an obstacle, though not necessarily an insurmountable obstacle, in the way of an award.”7
After the end of hostilities in World War II, controversies again arose over the manner in which awards were made during that conflict. The Secretary of the Navy appointed a Board of Review for Decorations and Medals which was convened on 22 December 1945 “. . . to review the recommendations for Awards and Decorations and Medals made during World War II and to recommend improvements in the present system.” The senior member of the board was Admiral F. J. Horne.
The board first looked into the history of awards in the naval service and outlined the problems after World War I. It concluded that, “Let it be said, however, for those members of the Board of Review who have reviewed approximately 28,000 cases, that it all has a very familiar ring and could have been written today.”8 Next, the board examined the criticisms which were of awards made during World War II. The major ones:
► Inconsistency among the various delegated authorities in awarding medals
► A disproportionate number of awards to regular Navy officers
► Not enough awards to enlisted men
► The depreciation of higher awards
► Questionable practices in awarding automatic awards
In considering these concerns, the board agreed with the first criticism without much comment other than “. . . it is apparent to this Board that considerable inequities resulted in the awards made by the various delegated authorities.”9 In the matter of awards to regular versus reserve officers, the board found that awards were properly made to those in command of large units, and these senior commanders were almost certainly regular officers. The board then concluded:
“After considering all factors involved some of which cannot be reduced to a mathematical figure, the Board is of the opinion that there was no apparent discrimination against Reserve officers.”10 The findings with regard to awards to enlisted men were qualified by the comment that, “Enlisted
men were not frequently in a position of responsibility nor were their courageous and heroic acts always witnessed by someone who could make a recommendation.”11 It is interesting to note, however, that the report went on to comment on the opportunities for winning awards which were given enlisted men:
“Only in serious emergencies, catastrophes or battle action do such opportunities occur for them and then it is often difficult to “distinguish” one’s self. Heroism is commonplace, i.e., there is too much competition.”12
The board then concluded that as a percentage of the total awards given, enlisted personnel received 45% of all awards. The number of enlisted personnel as a percentage of the total awards given is shown in Table I and a comparison of the percentages for World War I and II is shown in Table II. A fact which is mentioned in passing, but which is ger-
Table I World War II Awards to Enlisted Men by Percentages
Medal of Honor 40%
Navy Cross 22%
Silver Star Medal 51%
Legion of Merit 2.2%
Distinguished Flying Cross 36%
Navy and Marine Corps Medal 76%
Bronze Star Medal 55%
Air Medal 45%
Commendation Medal 42%
Overall 45%
Source: Report of a Board of Review for Decorations and Medals, Serial 105B of 7 April 1947, p. 5-6.
Table II Enlisted Awards as Percentages of All Awards
World War I World War 11
Medal of Honor | 33% | 40% |
Distinguished Service Medal | 1.5% | None |
Navy Cross | 39% | 22% |
Silver Star | None | 51% |
Legion of Merit | None | 2.2% |
Distinguished Flying Cross | None | 36% |
Navy and Marine Corps Medal | None | 76% |
Bronze Star | None | 55% |
Air Medal | None | 45% |
Commendation Medal | 42% | 20% * |
Overall | 25% | 45% |
•(Letters of Commendation)
Source: Report of a Board of Review for Decorations and Medals, Serial 105B of 7 April 1947, p. 6.
No commissioned officer before or since Smedley Darlington Butler has ever been awarded two Medals of Honor for two separate acts. And, had he been eligible, “Old Gimlet Eye” would have won a third at Tientsin in 1900. He and a brother officer and four enlisted men carried a wounded marine seven miles without a stretcher while under continual pursuit and fire. The four enlisted men received Medals of Honor, but officers were not eligible for their country’s highest decoration at that time. While many military men, officer and enlisted, have lusted after the Medal of Honor, Butler tried unsuccessfully to return one he felt he had not earned. In a letter to the Secretary of the Navy, routed via the Commandant, Major Butler respectfully requested the Secretary to “reconsider his action" in awarding him the medal for his part in the 1914 Vera Cruz operation.
mane, is that the group from which enlisted awards were drawn was at least ten times larger in both cases than that of the officers. The board explained the higher number of officer awards in the following manner:
“Becoming an officer does not increase a man s heroism in this respect but does broaden his scope. He is then in a better position to make plans and decisions whereby he voluntarily brings his unit (himself) into situations of great hazard for the purpose of closing and fighting the enemy in ‘mortal combat.’ It is probable that this ‘voluntary acceptance’ factor operates in the leader’s favor in the awards system, it being natural to give him more credit than to individuals in lower echelons who are acquainted only with the immediate and obvious factors, and much of whose combat is performed as a matter of necessity, of personal salvation, and perhaps with no other alternative.”1'3 In the author’s opinion, this logic is ripe for serious criticism, but this will be addressed later.
On the matter of depreciation of the higher value awards, i.e., the Distinguished Service Medal and the Navy Cross, the board once again found merit in the argument that too many had been given. As regards the DSM, the board said: “The Board considers that too many awards of the Distinguished Service Medal were repeatedly made to those in high command. In this connection, it is noted that sixteen Distinguished Service Medals went to four officers.”14 The awarding of the Navy Cross came under strong criticism, particularly in the aviation community. In many cases, it said, the Distinguished Flying Cross or Air Medal would have been the appropriate award.
Finally, the board considered the matter of automatic awards. Much discussion was made of the fact that the criteria for the awarding of the Air Medal and the Distinguished Flying Cross were lacking until late in the war, and this caused a great deal of dissension. The board recommended that Air Medals be given on a strike/flight basis only when actual combat was involved and that the Distinguished Flying Cross should not be an automatic award. The matter of automatic awards to commanding officers of submarines for tonnage of ships sunk caused the board problems. Although the board thought the system “worked well” it found that:
“. . . the standards were such that several Commanding Officers won as many ns four (4) Navy Crosses. This appears to be excessive. The rules were set up requiring a certain number of ships sunk, a certain type of ship sunk or a certain tonnage sunk. Under this system a Commanding Officer could qualify for a Navy Cross without ever exhibiting the “extraordinary heroism” required. On the other hand, a Commanding Officer might display the greatest heroism in making attacks but still not qualify for a Navy Cross under the automatic rules."15
Before discussing the effects the precedents of two World Wars have had on the awarding of decorations in today’s Navy, a brief discussion of the awarding of the Medal of Honor to personnel in World Wars I and II is in order since the award is supposed to be for extreme bravery in combat “above and beyond the call of duty.” Of interest concerning World War I are several facts. The award went to:
► More enlisted men than officers
► Four staff officers (all serving with the marines in France in a medical capacity)
► Only one commanding officer
► No senior officers
A study of the awarding of the medal in World War II discloses:
► An exceptionally high number of commanding officers as recipients
► The early years of the war produced a large number of Medals of Honor, particularly Pearl Harbor and the night battle off Guadalcanal in November 1942 (Pearl Harbor resulted in 15 and the Battle of Guadalcanal five)
► All awards in the submarine service were to commanding officers
► No fleet sailor awarded the medal survived the action in which he won it
► When corpsmen and Pearl Harbor awards are subtracted from the total of enlisted awards, only six Medals of Honor were awarded to fleet personnel during the war
A brief look into the awards made during the Korean and Vietnam wars discloses what would be expected in award presentations as a result of the nature of the naval involvement. There was a greater percentage of awards to the aviation community because of the air support/strike involvement of naval air and a larger number of awards to the hospital corpsmen because of their participation in ground combat with the marines. The fleet awards were for gunfire support and operations in support of the carrier task forces. Since there was no naval threat to speak of, opportunities for “combat” awards for fleet personnel were limited. As in previous wars, however, senior officers, staff officers, and commanding officers of ships received a substantial proportion of the awards. One controversial aspect of the Vietnam War award policy was the policy for awards for “in country” personnel, i.e., those serving in Vietnam, whose awards were processed through Commander U. S. Naval Forces Vietnam. It became generally common knowledge that there was a fairly rigid policy regarding end-of-tour awards. Most officers and senior enlisted personnel were recommended for awards at the end of their 12-month tours in Vietnam. The policy was that lieutenants and below could receive the Navy Commendation Medal or the Navy Achievement Medal for their end-of-tour awards; lieutenant commanders and commanders, the Bronze Star Medal; and captains and above, the Legion of Merit or higher. There were exceptions, of course, but generally the rank criteria were adhered to. This brought about complaints that there was little justice in awarding a Bronze Star to a lieutenant commander on a staff in Saigon who never left the city for the “combat” zones and a lieutenant (junior grade) who received a Navy Commendation Medal for 12 months duty out in the hinterlands with much more danger. Additionally, many of the general complaints of previous wars were raised again, i.e., not enough awards for enlisted personnel, too many awards for senior officers, etc.
After analyzing the manner in which the Navy has presented awards during this century, three conclusions seem inescapable to the author:
► Defending larger proportions of awards to officers seemed to be a primary concern of the naval establishment in any situation.
► The predominant theory with regard to enlisted personnel was as expressed in the Horne Report, i.e. ”... it being natural to give him [the officer] more credit than to individuals in lower echelons . . . much of whose combat is performed as a matter of necessity ...”
► There is a profound belief that the commanding officer is deserving of recognition as a matter of course when awards are being considered for any action.
I do not believe that these ideas are in consonance with good leadership principles. The basic purpose of any award is to recognize an individual for actions which he has taken beyond what is normally expected of an individual of his rank/experience/posi- tion. The argument that a greater portion of awards should go to senior personnel does not stack up well with the idea that as one is promoted to increased rank, he is expected to do more and that he has a greater duty to fulfill. If one accepts the idea that with increased rank there is a higher expectation of performance, then the number of awards should diminish as the pay grade increases instead of the opposite. By the time an officer has reached the grade of captain or rear admiral and an enlisted man has reached the grade of chief petty officer, the expectation of his performance should be very substantial. If the author can paraphrase a portion of the Horne Report which was used in describing the problems with making awards to enlisted men in wartime, i.e. “Heroism is commonplace,” “Outstanding meritorious service is commonplace for senior officers and enlisted personnel.” Senior personnel are expected to perform in an outstanding fashion. If they do not, they are quite likely to be relieved.
Several factors have been brought up as mitigating circumstances in favor of the high percentage of awards to senior officers. The Horne Report stated: “Awards are properly made to senior officers in command of large units, . . . not only as a reward for their personal responsibility, leadership and gallantry, but in recognition of the gallantry of all hands. Briefly, it is inferred that awards made to Commanding Officers are shared by the crew. It is probable that some Commanding Officers did so instruct their men while others took it as a personal and private distinction.”16 Clearly, it is the intent of a unit award to recognize the gallantry of a unit. A personal award to a commanding officer is just that, a personal award.
Additionally, consider the logic that was quoted earlier from the Horne Report regarding the rationale for awards to leaders: “It is probable that this ‘voluntary acceptance’ factor operates in the leader’s favor in the awards system, ...” This connotes the idea of a commanding officer cruising the seas or flying above it, deciding independently to attack or not, as it strikes him. This is hardly the case. A submarine 'CNO letter serial Set 00/500881 of 17 Sep 1976
2Awarding of Medals in the Naval Service Hearing Before a Subcommittee on Naval Affairs, United States Senate, Sixty-Sixth Congress, Second Session, on S. Res. 285 published by G.P.O. 1920, p. 5.
'‘Ibid.. p. 4.
*Ibid.. p. 445.
:'lbid.. pp. 494-95.
Hbid.. p. 246.
‘Ibid., p. 670.
8Report of a Board of Review for Decorations and Medals. Serial 105B of 7 April 1947, p. 3.
''Ibid., p. 4.
'"Ibid., p. 4.
"Ibid., p. 4.
"ibid.. pp. 4-5.
1 Albid.. p. 5.
"Ibid., p. 7.
"Ibid., p. 10.
"Ibid., p. 4.
1 ‘Navy Regulations. 197 5, p. 13.
"Ibid., p. 20.
skipper may have this choice occasionally, but fleet units generally operate on specific orders as to where they operate and what they can expect to engage. To quote again from the Horne Report describing why fewer awards went to enlisted “. . . much of whose combat is performed as a matter of necessity, of personal salvation, and perhaps with no other alternative.” This could be used to describe the actions fought by many ships, airplanes, and submarines. The commanding officers were placed in a position in which they had to take action even though the odds were not good. The expectations of a ship’s captain are extremely high. Navy regulations state: “The responsibility of the commanding officer for his command is absolute . . .”17 Additionally, with regard to action with the enemy, it states: “The commanding officer shall . . . engage the enemy to the best of his ability.”18
The author realizes that this may appear to be an attack on awarding medals to commanding officers and senior officers, but that is not the intent. The intent is to show that during this century, this group of personnel has received many awards for successfully completing their assigned duties (and in some cases not successfully completing them as in the case of World War I skippers who lost their ships and received medals), while at the same time, enlisted personnel were expected to show action significantly above what was normally expected in order to qualify. This amounts to a philosophical discrimination against the lower ranking officers and enlisted personnel. Awards are appropriate for outstanding performance above that normally expected, but in the case of a commanding officer, a flag officer, or a senior enlisted man, a great deal is expected as a matter of course. As a result, there should be fewer awards to them.
Why is all this relevant to today’s Navy? Each generation of junior officers and enlisted personnel in this century has been exposed to the fact that junior personnel, as a rule, do not receive awards and senior personnel and enlisted do receive them. They then have looked forward to the time that they are senior enough to receive their share of awards. When they reach this point, they are likely to feel that since they received little as a junior officer or enlisted man, that is the way it should be. The philosophy then perpetuates itself. In today’s environment of an allvolunteer force, lack of recognition of achievements of junior personnel is a key factor in resignations, non-reenlistments, and desertions. Individuals will put up with long hours of hard work if they perceive that what they do is recognized for its importance.
This does not mean that every individual who works long hours should receive an award. The whole unit may be working long hours; however, there are those individuals who, by virtue of their abilities, are assigned to tasks in excess of what they would normally be expected to do. This is significant because the expectations of seaman, third class petty officer, ensign, or lieutenant are small in comparison with those of a chief or a captain. Therefore, outstanding work in excess of that which is expected should be more easily identifiable. The division officer/chief and the department head should know who these individuals are. Their contemporaries most certainly do. When they are rewarded by a decoration, incentive and motivation are established. Pride in wearing a decoration that is perceived by one’s peers as having been earned can overcome much adversity. All Navy personnel must be able to have the expectation that, if they sufficiently exceed what is expected of their position/rank, they will be recognized for what they have done, be they seamen, admirals, or anything in between.
B Lieutenant Commander Shelton graduated from the U. S. Military Academy in 1967. Subsequently, he had two tours in South Vietnam, with Naval Mobile Construction Battalion Nine as security officer/plans and training officer/communication officer in 1967-1968 and as an advisor to the Vietnamese Navy with the Naval Advisory Detachment Danang in 1970-1971. These tours were split by graduate study at the University of Illinois which led to a master of science in civil engineering. From 1971 to 1975, he was assistant public works officer and then public works officer Naval Activities United Kingdom. He then reported as operations officer of Naval Mobile Construction Battalion Four, where he directed the construction of the Vietnamese Refugee Camp on Guam. He reported as aide/administrative assistant to Deputy Chief Naval Operations (Logistics) in 1976 and is now at the Bureau of Naval Personnel as Enlisted Rating Coordinator for the Seabees. He has a master of science in management from the University of Arkansas and is a registered professional engineer. Lieutenant Commander Shelton was chosen as one of the outstanding young men in America by the Jaycees in 1977.
rhip __________________________________________________
When Rear Admiral G. Steve Morrison retired from the Navy he decided to take some courses at San Diego State University. One morning, after getting caught in a traffic jam, he walked into class late. The professor, who had been distracted by late arrivals several times, decided to make an example of him. "Mr. Morrison, you used to be in the Navy. What did the people in your office say when you came in late?”
Replied Morrison, “Usually, they said, ‘Good morning Admiral.’ ”
Anne A. Armstrong
One Was Expendable
While on shore patrol duty with the Navy, we sometimes received calls from harried barkeeps to, “Come quick.” The chief on duty would almost always select the biggest patrolman he could find to accompany him. One veteran chief however, always chose the smallest man on duty as his assistant. 1 asked him why?
“Well,” he replied, “suppose you were in a fighting mood and you saw two shore patrolmen coming at you—one big and one little. Which one would you go for?”
George Nelson
(The Naval Institute will pay $25.00 for each anecdote published in the Proceedings.)