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The term “Catch-22” came into the language in a novel about World War // Air Force pilots, but now it can be applied as well to the future of Navy sea-based aircraft. Even as new designs for V/STOL ships and planes, such as those at left, are being considered, we ntust look at some even more fundamental questions of policy. While we now have an absolute superiority in both aircraft carriers and planes, the “catch” is that the Soviets will Sain on us no matter what we do.
Introduction: V/STOL (vertical or short takeoff and landing) planes and ships are coming. The Royal Air Force and the U. S. Marines have been operating V/STOL Harriers for several years. Spain has recently obtained some Harriers, being called Matadors, and several other Western countries are looking at the next generation V/STOL planes—either the British Sea Harrier or the American-built AV-8B advanced Harrier. The ships are about to follow the planes. The first of the British Invincible (CAH-l)-class “through-deck cruisers” was launched in May 1977, and the second has been under construction since 1976. Several other countries, including the United States, Spain, Italy, France, and Australia are expected to start building V/STOL carriers within the next few years. And, of course, the most intriguing V/STOL event of the past few years has been the entry into service of the Soviet-built “antisubmarine cruiser” Kiev, complete with a new V/STOL plane, designated the Yak-36 “Forger.”
While there is a good chance that Secretary of Defense Harold Brown might delay or even cancel the marines’ AV-8B program in favor of the F-18 Hornet, there is an even better chance that Congress will override that decision and give the marines at least some AV-8Bs. Or, if the AV-8B is cancelled, there is already some talk of an AV-8C which would be just a slightly improved AV-8A. Regardless of what Secretary Brown or Congress does this year, it will not stop V/STOL programs in other countries. We can expect continuous progress from the United Kingdom, and worse, the Soviet Union.
Background: For the purposes of this discussion, we will consider helicopters as V/STOL aircraft. Helos have been in use by the Navy since the 1940s. Specialized V/STOL-capable ships have been operational since the late 1950s when the United States converted some old carriers to amphibious assault ships (LPHs). They were followed by seven new ships of the Iwo Jima (LPH-2) class. The idea of operating planes from virtually every Navy ship (as the most enthusiastic V/STOL supporters seem to desire) is not really new. Back in 1913, the first head of Navy air recommended that every major U.S. Navy surface combatant should have a plane.1 These were, of course, all seaplanes, and many cruiser-size ships and larger did carry at least one. Actually, most new destroyer-size ships now carry helicopters, which could be considered simply a continuation of the 1913 concept.
Therefore, the idea of carrying planes on all ships is an old one and considering the helicopter, V/STOL planes and ships have been around for at least 30 and 20 years respectively. However, the missions of these planes and ships were mostly limited to antisubmarine work, rescue, logistics, and “vertical envelopment” in which troop-carrying helicopters land behind enemy beaches in a modern version of amphibious warfare. With the possible exception of the AH-1 Sea Cobra, there was little thought of these planes taking on any “attack” role and certainly not of taking on the missions of CTOL (conventional takeoff and landing) planes operating from the large attack carriers.
The real change came with the development of V/STOL planes like the Harrier. Development began as a private venture by Hawker Siddeley back in 1957. This did win official British Ministry of Defence approval, and for a time, there was even a joint effort by the United States, the United Kingdom, and West Germany. The real breakthrough came in 1969 when Harriers entered service in the RAF. That same year, Hawker Siddeley and McDonnell Douglas signed a license agreement for the manufacture of Harriers for the Marine Corps. These entered into Marine Corps service in 1971 as AV-8As. While the marine AV-8As could, and did, operate from ships, the main mission was close air support of troops, not as a replacement for any sea-based aircraft. However, the utility of Harriers operating on board an attack carrier has been demonstrated.2
While V/STOL planes and concepts were definitely developing anyway, in the author’s opinion, three
'For footnotes, please turn to page 29.
factors caused V/STOL to be considered the wave of the future. First was the decision by the British not to replace their attack carriers. HMS Ark Royal, the last of the British carriers designated for the attack role, will be retired in a year or two. Almost concurrent with that decision was the decision to build a “through-deck cruiser” that has essentially evolved into a small V/STOL carrier. While this might have been seen as an economic move by a once-great power trying to maintain some vestige of its former strength at sea, the same cannot be said of the Soviet decision finally to build carriers after years of denigrating their role. Finally, the third factor is that large Nimitz (CVN-68)-class aircraft carriers are now in the $2 billion range.
Changing Concept: While even the most optimistic supporters would not consider a V/STOL plane equal to a CTOL plane, these three factors have led to the concept of V/STOL planes as a “replacement” for CTOL planes. It would be a serious mistake to consider V/STOL aircraft interchangeable with CTOL aircraft- The Marine Corps is considering becoming an all- V/STOL force for ground support, but considering V/STOL as a replacement for an F-14 fighter or even an S-3 antisubmarine plane is something else.
This concept could be seen developing in some of the British seapower literature. What started out as a series of almost isolated events—the decision to retire attack carriers, the decision to proceed with Harriers, and the decision to build what was originally termed a “command cruiser”—has now taken on the air of V/STOL planes and ships as “replacements” for the old British attack carriers. Even the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral James L. Holloway III, has added his authority to this “replacement” concept. In a recent article, Admiral Holloway recommended building one more attack carrier but then added that eight conventional attack carriers will be “replaced” with V/STOL carriers.3
Future of V/STOL: This “replacement” concept figures heavily in what is officially the future of V/STOL aircraft. Included are the so-called Type A, Type B, and Type C V/STOL concepts. (These are not to be confused with the AV-8A, AV-8B, and AV-8C designations which are just model changes of the original Harriers.) The Type A is to be a multipurpose subsonic plane to “replace” present S-3 carrier planes for antisubmarine warfare (ASW), E-2 airborne early warning (AEW), and carrier on-board delivery (COD). Type B is to be a small supersonic fighter which would “replace” the F-14s and F-18s (which have yet to join the fleet) around the mid-1990s. Finally,
Type C is in the conceptual stage as a replacement for the helicopters, specifically the light airborne Multipurpose system (LAMPS III) helicopters which also have yet to join the fleet.4
It seems to be a foregone conclusion that V/STOL planes will replace all our CTOL planes shortly after the beginning of the 21st century, and the same, seems to be true of ships. As previously mentioned, the British will retire their attack carriers and replace them with at least two Invincible-class through-deck cruisers. Spain plans to begin building a V/STOL carrier, the Canarias, in the near future, and Italy plans to build a new V/STOL carrier, the Giuseppe Garibaldi. France plans to build a nuclear-powered carrier. Originally designated PH-75 for “porte helicopt'eres,” this has recently been changed to PA-75 for porte aeronefs” to signify her V/STOL capability. The United States is currently looking at three different
class carriers of the U.S. Navy.
The Catch 22s: So, ready or not, the V/STOLs are coming. Even opponents of V/STOL ships and carriers seem to have accepted this development as virtually inevitable. While there have been literally hundreds of articles and news items about the technical aspects of V/STOL programs, there has been little published discussion of the long-range implications of V/STOL planes and ships.5
If one looks into the future, especially at the “best possible case” for V/STOL, there are some “dilemmas” that might better be called “Catch 22s.” The term has become a part of our vocabulary since Joseph
V/STOL options. The CVV would be a medium-size (50,000-ton) carrier capable of operating both CTOL and V/STOL planes; the VSS (V/STOL support ship) would displace approximately 22,000 tons; and finally, a DD-963 (AC) would be an air-capable ship built on the Spruance-class hull to carry helicopters and/or V/STOL planes. Finally, the Soviet Navy is planning at least two more Kiev-class V/STOL carriers in addition to the two already built. These Soviet ships are about the same size as the old Essex (CV-9)-
Heller’s famous novel by that name was published in 1961. But this is really nothing more than the old “damned if you do, and damned if you don’t” sort of “no win” situation.6
Catch-22 Number 1—The big winner in the VlSTOL race is likely to be the Soviet Union. The better VlSTOL turns out to be, the greater the relative advantage which will accrue to the Soviet Navy.
It is probably safe to say that the United States and the Soviet Union are both approximately equal now in the V/STOL race. The Harrier might be a little better than the “Forger,” although some reports indicate the latter is slightly supersonic. That would put the Yak-36 in the Type B V/STOL category—a category the West is not expected to reach until the 1990s. On the other hand, the “Forger” is really only a vertical takeoff plane and thus cannot take advantage of the Kiev class’s 600-foot-long flight deck. Assuming that the next generation of Soviet planes will be truly capable of V/STOL operations, we might anticipate some very sophisticated aircraft. Many observers are stating that the “Forger” is really only an interim “experimental” plane and that we might not see the best the Soviets can produce until the 1980s—just when American AV-8B and the British Sea Harrier will be entering service.
The West’s greatest advantage in military aviation has long been quality. The Navy’s F-14 Tomcat may well be the finest fighter plane in the world today with its extremely sophisticated electronic and weapon systems that can take on six targets at the same time. The F-14, however, is an extremely large plane, almost the size of the Navy’s old A-3 Skywar- rior strategic bomber. In other words, to have a “quality plane” it is often necessary to have a large plane. But, as most readers know, the thrust-to- weight ratio problem requires that a V/STOL plane be as small as possible. As indicated in the following table, the F-14 is more than three times as heavy as the AV-8A. Admittedly, there will be some improvements, perhaps dramatic ones, but no one expects that a V/STOL plane would ever be as good as an F-14. As a result, the United States will lose its qualitative edge. Under the present state of the art, most observers feel that the West has an advantage on such techniques as miniaturization, and that would probably help maintain some advantage for a Western V/STOL plane. But the almost absolute advantage that the F-14 has over a “Forger” will be lost when both countries go to V/STOL because of the size limitations that will be placed on sea-based V/STOL planes.
Turning to the V/STOL ship situation, there is an equally pessimistic view and even the distinct possibility of an advantage for the Soviet Union in the future. Before the advent of the Kiev, the United States had an absolute superiority in aircraft carriers. The Kiev alone has changed the ratio to from one of absolute superiority to pne of 1:13. If one counts the amphibious assault ships (LPHs and LHAs), the ratio is 1:22. In the 1980s, when the LHAs and four of the Kiev class are completed, the ratio will change to 4:25—a worse one as far as the United States is concerned. And even if the United States outbuilds the
Soviet Union by two to one (which is highly unlikely) the relative advantage will still change in the Soviet Union’s favor. These are, of course, “gross comparisons, for the author is certainly not suggesting that a Kiev equals a Nimitz (CVN-68). But this “gross” comparison might be justified in the future when both sides are building only V/STOL carriers.
In fact, when you look into the future, the advantage for the Soviet Union might be greater. While it is now unfair to compare a Kiev with a Nimitz, in the future it might be just as unfair to compare a 40,000-ton Kiev with a 22,000-ton VSS. Finally, a look at shipbuilding rates provides even more cause for concern. As Vice Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Plans, Policy and Operations) stated at a recent conference, “In the twelve year period following the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Soviet Union has built a total of 1,323 ships of all classes compared with 302 for the United States.” This is not to say that the Soviet Union will have, at least in gross figures, more “carriers” than the United States by the turn of the century. It does show that if the V/STOL plane develops according to schedule and the Soviet Union feels the relative advantage is changing in planes, it does have the capacity and the will to outproduce us in warships.
This might be considered a “best possible case” for V/STOL. But even if you take a “worst possible case’ for V/STOL, the outlook is still not that sanguine. We will see some improvements in Soviet planes, and the minimum we can expect is that future versions will have a short-takeoff capability. These planes would have greater range and/or weapon-carrying capacity, and the Kiev's 600-foot flight deck could be used to
Aircraft Characteristics
Plane | Weight Empty | Normal Takeoff Weight | Maximum Takeoff Weight | Combat Radius |
AV-8A | 12,200 | 17,930 (vertical takeoff) | 21,150 (short takeoff) | 260-400 |
F-4 | 28,000 | 46,000 | 54,600 | 900 |
F-14 | 37,500 | 55,000 | 72,000 | 1,000-plus |
A-3 | 39,500 | 56,000 | 82,000 | 1,050 |
Weight indicated in pounds, radius in miles. Combat radius equals one-half of range. Figures in the categories shown can vary, depending on aircraft loading, speed, and mission.
full advantage. We Americans should not forget the 1942 Battle of Midway in which an outnumbered U.S. Navy force and a lot of luck were able to turn fhe tide of battle to victory. In the future, because of limited mission requirements, the Soviets would have the luxury of concentrating two or three of their Kievs against one or two American full-size carriers. A Soviet Kiev with advanced “Forgers” or some other rype of V/STOL aircraft would also be of great use in Third World nations. In short, whether you take a best possible case or a worst possible case for V/STOL, the absolute American advantage in sea-based air power has ended.
Catch-22 Number 2—The better V/STOL is, the better lhe case for CTOL aircraft and large attack carriers.
While many see V/STOL as the wave of the future—replacing CTOL planes and large attack aircraft carriers—even the most optimistic supporter Would not suggest that a V/STOL plane will equal a CTOL plane for many, many years to come, if ever.
The limitations of the V/STOL plane are readily seen in the current debate over whether to build the AV-8B. Enthusiasts of the AV-8B state that it will have “double” the range or payload of the AV-8A. This sounds very impressive until you realize that a fully loaded AV-8A that takes off vertically has a range of only 53 miles, and “double” that is only 106 miles. Granted, this is the worst case. Range will be longer with a lighter load or rolling takeoff. Even so, a range of 106 miles that might be sufficient for a close ground support plane that is supposed to operate near the front is certainly not adequate for a sea-based airplane with missions that require both long range and lots of firepower. There should also be great doubt over development of the Type A V/STOL which is supposed to replace ASW and AEW planes, both of which need long range and holding time on station. In short, V/STOL planes simply cannot replace CTOL craft as we now know them, let alone replace their mission requirements.
Thus, since U. S. and U.S.S.R. V/STOL planes will be relatively equal, as discussed in the last section, the United States will need conventional aircraft in order to maintain its qualitative edge. Also, since the Soviet Union might, and probably will, outproduce the United States in ships, again, the United States will need attack aircraft carriers and qualitatively superior CTOL aircraft in order to counter the possible Soviet V/STOL quantitative advantage.
Catch-22 Number 3 —While CTOL planes will always be better than V/STOL planes, we must still continue V/STOL development since a U.S.S.R.-U.S. V/STOL “gap” could be dangerous and even disastrous for the country.
While CTOL planes are, will be in the immediate
future, and probably always will be superior to V/STOL planes, it would be wrong to conclude that CTOL planes and large attack carriers are the only way to proceed. V/STOL will improve. The only real question is how much. Again, even if one looks at the “worst possible case” for V/STOL, it is easy to envision a Midway-type battle, especially with a “Forger” armed with “smart”-type guided weapons. Nor can we simply dismiss the role of a Soviet advanced “Forger” in a Third World situation. And, of course, under “best possible case” situations for V/STOL, many adverse possibilities come to mind.
Therefore, and unfortunately, the West must proceed with current V/STOL programs and especially with research and development for the future. To do otherwise would be simply a head-in-the-sand decision that could have dangerous, even disastrous conclusions. If the Soviet Union proceeds with V/STOL research and development—which it is bound to do for at least the next few years—and succeeds with a long-range supersonic fighter for the 1980s or even 1990s, we could anticipate that fantail V/STOL platforms would be installed on virtually all Soviet destroyers and cruisers. This would have an absolutely devastating effect, completely upsetting the now delicate naval balance. A V/STOL “gap” in the Soviet Union’s favor simply could not be tolerated.
Discussion: For discussion purposes, it is important to separate the two issues of the V/STOL plane and the V/STOL ships. The United States and the West must proceed with a V/STOL plane development program for at least the next few years. The Marine Corps should be allowed to purchase the AV-8B for the ground support role and, also, for operational testing for the other services. In fact, the Navy should also purchase a couple of squadrons for operational experience and evaluation. Even the Air Force should purchase a couple of squadrons for the same purpose, especially for the European theater.
Also, the West must continue research, for at least a few more years, on the three V/STOL concepts. In particular, the Type B V/STOL project for a supersonic plane should be pursued. Research and development could involve billions of dollars, so this could perhaps be pursued with our British allies who have already taken quite a lead in this area. Since both West Germany and Japan have expressed interest in this project at various times, and since they are our only allies that can truly afford large defense budgets, they might be asked to contribute to any international consortium. But this V/STOL research simply must be continued at least as long as the Soviet Union pursues the concept. This, in other
words, is the classic dilemma of any arms race.
In the author’s opinion, the problem is not development of the plane, but the building of new V/STOL ships. It takes a long time to build a ship, but after all, it does not take that long. The next generation of V/STOL planes, the American AV-8B, the British Sea Harrier and probably an advanced “Forger” will not appear until the middle 1980s, while the time frame for the V/STOL Types A and B is the middle 1990s (which probably means after the turn of the century)- With a completely new ship type, the design and construction process might take ten years. Since our attack carriers will be operational into the 1990s, at least with the current plans for the service life exten- tion program, the earliest there would be a serious problem would be around 1995. That means we probably have until 1985 to make a definite decision. By then, the AV-8B would have been operational for a few years, and more research and development would have been completed on the Type A and Type B concepts to see if they really will be operationally feasible. Finally, by the mid-1980s period, we should know if the Soviet Union plans to go beyond building more than the proposed four or so Kievs, and we should also know if there will be an improved Soviet V/STOL plane. And, since the V/STOL ship decision does not have to be made until the mid-1980s, there will be time to build one more large aircraft carrier. As discussed above under the various Catch-22s, she will be needed regardless of the outcome of V/STOL development.
If we do decide to build V/STOL carriers in the interim, three alternatives should be considered, one for the short term and two for the long term. For the short term, consideration should be given to converting one of the Exrex-class carriers that we now have in mothballs into a sea control V/STOL ship. Converting an old ship to a new role would not only save money, it would be in keeping with the tradition of recycling old ships before building new classes. The U.S. Navy’s first three aircraft carriers included a converted collier and two converted battle cruiser hulls. The first LPHs were converted aircraft carriers. Taking an old carrier, doing a mini-service life extension and using her only for the V/STOL role would actually make this a larger V/STOL carrier than now envisioned by most American and Western designers, yet she would still be less expensive.
Those who want to build a completely new V/STOL ship before we have a truly operational plane should go back and take a look at the old DASH program. DASH, which stands for “drone antisubmarine helicopter” was a very ambitious Navy program in the early 1960s. Before this concept was fully tested,
some 120-odd destroyers were converted to take these drones under the FRAM programs. In essence under FRAM (fleet rehabilitation and modernization) the after gun mounts were removed from World War II destroyers, and the area was converted to a flight deck complete with a small hangar large enough to accommodate two drones. The program never worked, and most of the hangars wound up being used for storage or as crew’s lounges. This was only a mini” disaster because older ships were converted and besides adding the hangars, the FRAM programs did complete other modernization items needed. But the point is that ships were changed before the drones were fully developed, and the concept never
worked.
For the long term, especially if V/STOL does live up to expectations, another solution should be considered. The idea of building V/STOL carriers with °ur allies has been suggested.7 As discussed earlier, if the Soviet Union decides to produce V/STOL ships as *t has produced other ships, we can anticipate a large Program that the United States probably cannot tuatch if present shipbuilding trends are any guide. Therefore, while American attack carriers will continue to take care of the quality problem for at least the next 30 years, the quantity problem must be addressed. It can probably be solved only by a concerted effort with our allies. Finally, analysts should take a closer look at the CVV, a proposed medium- size carrier designed to take both CTOL and V/STOL Planes. The CVV has met with only lukewarm enthusiasm as not being enough for the CTOL supporters and being too much, and too expensive, for the V/STOL enthusiasts. However, if there is any validity for the Catch 22s outlined in this essay, a CVV could Possibly be the answer for the future.
Conclusion: The United States now has only a "slim tUargin of superiority” over the Soviet Union in naval strength. “Slim margin of superiority” is the phrase that is used by senior U.S. Navy officials when discussing the American-Soviet naval balance. And, what is that slim margin of superiority? It consists of the large attack aircraft carriers and their embarked CTOL airplanes. The Soviet Navy has more major combatants than the United States in every category except aircraft carriers, and the overall American tonnage advantage of 30% comes only from those same carriers. Yet, in almost a cavalier manner, tnany seem to agree that those very same aircraft cartiers are “dinosaurs” which will be replaced by
V/STOL planes and carriers. Does that mean that the idea of “superiority,” slim or not, is a dinosaur? If you complete the syllogism, that could be the answer, but one that few would endorse. The point is, the current V/STOL debate is not just a simple debate over which is better, V/STOL or CTOL, or should we build another Nimitz or start building VSSs for the future. Rather, the debate could be over the whole question of who commands and controls the seas.
Finally, anyone who is looking for a simple answer is not going to find it in the current V/STOL debate. There are many “dilemmas,” “Catch-22s,” and a few “ironies” thrown in, but the stakes are extremely high. Since they are so high, they should be very carefully studied and considered, which, unfortunately, does not seem to be the case at this point.
1William D. Houser, “Aviation in the Modern Navy,” Strategic Review, Fall 1976, p. 65.
2John T. Tyler and Andrew H. Boquet, “V/STOL and the CV," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, October 1977, pp. 94-99.
3James L. Holloway III, “The Transition to V/STOL," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, September 1977, pp. 18-24.
4John Rhea, “Marine Aviation,” Sea Power, November 1976, pp. 9-13. 5One exception is David C. Hazen, “V/STOL and the Naval Planner’s Dilemma,” Astronautics & Aeronautics, June 1977, pp. 20-29.
6In Heller’s satirical antiwar novel, “Catch-22” symbolized the unwritten loophole in an agreement, allowing an organization to work its will on an individual. In the story, Air Force pilots were supposed to be able to go home at the end of a certain number of missions, but the number kept increasing. The rationale was that a pilot could get out of combat duty by being certified as crazy. But the “catch” was that “Anyone who wants to get out of combat duty isn’t really crazy. ..."
7James L. George, “Maintaining a Western Carrier Capability,” Proceedings, October 1977, pp. 30-41.
Lieutenant George graduated from the Naval Academy in 1961. He served two years in the USS Soley (DD- 707) with cruises in the Mediterranean Sea and the Red Sea-Persian Gulf area. He then served as operations officer in the USS Suffolk County (LST-1173) and then executive officer in the USS Pulaski County (LST-1088). While en route to Vietnam, he contracted cancer and was retired. He had been selected for command for his next duty. Following his retirement in 1967, he obtained his M.A. and Ph.D. from the University of Maryland in international relations in 1969 and 1972. After graduation, he was awarded a public affairs fellowship from the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace and spent seven months at the Hoover Institution, three months at the American Enterprise Institute, and one year in the office of Senator Bill Brock. From 1974 through 1976, he was a professional staff member on the Senate Government Operations Committee and is now a professional staff member for national security affairs on the House Government Operations Committee. Lieutenant George is editor of a book titled Problems of Sea- power as We Approach the 21st Century, to be published later this year by the American Enterprise Institute.