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^ st year, retired Vice Admirals Robert th ^a^Zer and Frank W. Vannoy accepted ^ Proceedings’ invitation to discuss the davy s amphibious forces, now much ePleted from World War II levels. Each ^ fe> unaware of the contents of the I ef 5 paper. Vice Admiral Salzer’s
“The Navy’s Clouded Amphibious *ssion, ” appeared on these pages last JL..' The views of these distinguished jJ.Cers are occasionally as far apart as cii - ^ and $an Diego, the great port
ei from which each commanded a fleet Phibious force.
perceptions of the future of amphibious warfare in the U.S. Navy are not based on an operational analysis but rather on an amphibious background spanning the period between the invasion of Tarawa in 1943 and my retirement from command of the Amphibious Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet in 1974. While I shall attempt to remain truly objective, a degree of bias is likely to appear on the side of the gator navy, for I am proud to be counted as one of that breed.
I take as a fact that an amphibious warfare capability has been of great importance to the United States. I also take as a fact that we enjoy significant amphibious capabilities not shared by the Soviets at this time (although their capabilities are improving). Our three active Marine Corps division/wing teams are superb fighting organizations. Our amphibious warfare ships are relatively new and are capable; they are being supplemented by major new ships now under construction, and others are programmed for later construction. In short, we now have an amphibious warfare capability which is time-tested and an important component of our military structure. Logic would dictate the continuation of this capability into the future.
Basics: The content of this section runs the risk of insulting the intelligence of those readers who understand amphibious warfare. Unfortunately, altogether too many naval officers do not have that understanding. While this is a condition which will be corrected to a degree by the relatively recent practice of splitting tours at the department head level between cruiser/destroyer types and amphibious/logistic types, the transfusion is not yet complete.
It needs to be recognized that amphibious warfare ships and some (but not all) of their problems arc- different from those of the rest of the surface navy. When most other Navy ships are commissioned, manned, shaken down, and provisioned they arc- ready to carry out their assigned combat missions. The main battery is an integral part of the ship. While amphibious warfare ships are able to train in seamanship and at-sea operations using ship’s company, they cannot train in or carry out the primary functions for which they were designed without the presence of their “main batteries”—embarked marines. The combat troops, helicopters, and am-
phibious vehicles permit amphibious readiness to be achieved and assaults to be conducted. And, since our marines—whatever their many fine qualities— have little capability for walking on water, they are irrevocably tied to our seaborne amphibious forces. “The Navy-Marine Amphibious Team” is not a catch phrase, but rather a statement of fact. Neither part of the team can get along without the other. A case can be argued that this situation is little different from that of the aircraft carrier, which is impotent without her air wing on board. The point has merit. However, the carrier and air wing are controlled by a single type command. This is not the case with our amphibious warfare ships, which are a part of the Atlantic and Pacific Fleet Naval Surface Forces, and the Marine Corps elements, which are a part of the respective Fleet Marine Forces. Other than the names involved (the substitution of the Surface Forces for the now-disbanded Amphibious Forces), this situation is nothing new and is cited only as evidence that the amphibious warfare ships are truly without parallel within the Navy.
The amphibious force commander has always been a parallel commander to the landing force commander during planning for an assault. The former has always been responsible for the conduct of the assault, and the latter has always been responsible for operations ashore. The command arrangements and interactions are admittedly complex and poorly understood by many. For instance, many naval officers may not know that a naval officer always commands the amphibious task force and is responsible for all operations in the amphibious objective area until responsibility is passed to the landing force commander after the assault is completed. Others, who understand the foregoing, may feel that the amphibious task force commander can or should direct the landing force in matters relating to its job ashore. This would be a major mistake. Since the Navy and Marine Corps components have coordinate planning roles, the landing force commander will determine the landing area and the landing sequence which are optimum from his viewpoint. The amphibious force commander will judge his ability to support the optimum landing force plan from within his resources. Adjustments will be made as necessary to work out a mutually acceptable solution. If agreement cannot be reached, the problem will be passed to the common
The large mouth-like bow ramp of the USS Peoria (LST-1183) swallows up the marines who comprise her ‘‘main battery.”
senior for resolution. These principles apply at all levels of amphibious warfare and validate the j Navy-Marine Corps team concept.
So much for the basics; let us look now at future tasks.
Tasks: It seems unlikely that future amphibious tasks will differ in significant degree from those existing today. They will include requirements to:
► Provide a forward-deployed amphibious presence to add stability and to provide reassurance to an ally in an area of importance to the United States.
These amphibious forces are generally known as amphibious ready groups. They are usually quite small, consisting of perhaps five ships of varying types and a marine amphibious unit built around a reinforced battalion landing team and a mixed helicopter/Harrier aviation element. The advent of the 40,000-ton LHA—which is saddled with the impossible name of amphibious assault ship (general purpose)—will probably result in a lesser number of amphibious warfare ships in the “presence” group-
These groups will continue to be deployed in the Mediterranean and Western Pacific and occasionally ln the Caribbean. They are the only amphibious resources always immediately available for employment, and they have been frequently called upon.
^ Provide a cover force for evacuation of U.S. and Perhaps allied citizens or, alternatively. conduct or assist ln (be evacuation.
The forward-deployed amphibious ready group w°uld normally be used in this case, augmented as required and as time permits by other amphibious Un‘ts. Since such operations would take place in a cnsis environment, supporting aircraft and surface antisubmarine and antiair forces would be provided. Such contingencies would be unlikely to develop Without some warning, thereby permitting enhanced readiness to be achieved. Vietnam and Cambodia evacuation operations involved participation by amphibious units.
^ Provide initial security of a logistic entry point (port or atrhead) required for support of a friendly government threatened from within.
This presupposes a request for assistance from the riendly government under circumstances in which lts °wn forces are committed elsewhere. The comments under the preceeding task apply here as well.
^ Conduct assault landing to restore or support a friendly &°vernment requesting assistance.
This case would involve considerable preplanning and assembly of forces beyond those normally avail- ah*<-‘ in the forward-deployed amphibious ready Sfoups. It aiso connotes a continuing commitment beyond that of the previous cases. The likelihood of Slgnificant opposition would also be higher than in ^he preceding instances.
Conduct assault landings in support of alliances.
This case is the upper limit of potential tasking. It ^°uld involve extensive preplanning and assembly of °rces. The assault would have to be conducted in a more severe threat environment than that existing in 0ther cases and would involve a heavy continuing
c°mmitment.
The foregoing tasks are ordered in general from th(-‘ least to the most demanding as far as resources are concerned, although there is little to differentiate ctween the requirements likely to be necessary to Carry out the second and third tasks. While the amphibious raid could be considered as a special task, it as been considered here as a subset of other tasks. Ile forces assigned to a specific task, and between ^Pccific tasks, will vary widely with circumstances, here is a common thread. Every organization con- ucting an amphibious warfare task has a naval offiCer acting as commander, amphibious task force
(group/unit) and a Marine Corps officer acting as commander, landing force (group/unit).1
Threat: Looking to the future, it appears very likely that the already severe maritime threat environment will worsen as more and better “smart” weapons come into the inventory. Of these weapons, the cruise missile, with its capability for air, surface, and subsurface launch will continue to pose the most severe threat. Particularly in areas such as the Eastern Mediterranean and the Norwegian Sea—and to a lesser degree in other areas contiguous to the Eurasian landmass—the Soviets will increase their potential for multimedium attack against naval forces. Also, there is no reason to expect termination of a long-standing Soviet policy to provide relatively sophisticated weapons to client states. These states have, on occasion, displayed proficiency in the employment of such weapons. Although the threat will be less in waters contiguous to third countries than in waters contiguous to the U.S.S.R., it will still be significant. We cannot expect the benign maritime environment of Korea, Cuba, and Vietnam to continue in future crises.
Our amphibious warfare ships now have little to no capability for self-defense against submarine, surface, or air threats. The basic point defense missile system is now installed in some of the large ships, and there are plans for future installation of close-in weapon systems in all ships. These systems will provide some antiair and antimissile capability, as will upgraded passive defense systems; however, selfdefense levels will remain low and continue to require support from other sources. It has been suggested that embarked marine aviation resources could be used in antisubmarine warfare (ASW) and antiair warfare (AAW) roles, but the complexities of ASW helicopter operations would effectively negate the use of marine helicopters for anything other than visual detection. Also, the utility of marine V/STOL (vertical and short takeoff and landing) aircraft for AAW is marginal.
Thus, our amphibious ready groups are sitting ducks for a surprise attack until they have been reinforced. In crisis situations, this would occur. Antisubmarine and antiaircraft ships and dedicated air support would be provided. Whether such action would suffice would depend largely upon the area of operations involved. The fact that our Navy now has significant deficiencies in AAW and ASW is not en- 'There is no reason that an Army officer could not be the landing force commander in an amphibious assault. This was frequently the case in World War II; however, Army forces do not now train for this role.
couraging (although ASW is showing progress). Even less encouraging is the current requirement to operate amphibious warfare ships close inshore, thus precluding effective use of those defensive systems which they do possess and the defensive systems of their supporting forces. In the projected threat environment, even the outmoded weapons of the superpowers would constitute an increasing threat in the hands of client states, for they would be more capable than the even older ones the clients now hold.
The foregoing is a reasonably bleak picture if taken in the context of a superpower confrontation, but much less so in other circumstances, which fortunately are also more likely. The first four amphibious tasks considered for the future would neither necessarily nor normally involve superpower confrontation.[1] The fifth, the conduct of an amphibious assault in support of an alliance, might involve such confrontation and certainly would do so in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) area. There is no question that severe problems will be encountered now and in the future in attempting amphibious assaults in areas in which multimedium major power forces can be brought to bear. Indeed, until such forces have been reduced to manageable proportions through attrition, an assault should not be attempted. There will normally be time for attrition to be accomplished during the time required to assemble, load, and transit the amphibious forces required for task five. Carrier task forces and attack submarines will have to implement the attrition task, which will be a difficult and potentially costly one. Success on the part of the carrier forces is likely to depend to a critical degree on significant improvement to existing capabilities to cope with the antiship missile.
At just what point the threat will have been reduced to manageable proportions for an amphibious assault is a judgment call which will be tempered by circumstances. Timing could be so critical that a higher-than-prudent threat level would be accepted. An excellent example of this was the Guadalcanal operation of World War II, which took place with major elements of the Japanese fleet in the area. That gamble paid off, although it was touch and go for a time. In any case, it would be naive to assume that any future amphibious assault would go unopposed afloat or ashore. It is therefore important that existing or anticipated problem areas be identified and remedied.
Resource Limitations: Perhaps the most critical problem area is one of resources. It is nearly impossible for anyone who did not participate in the campaigns in the Pacific late in World War II to appreciate the sheer magnitude of the total effort. When Vice Admiral Harry Hill, for whom I worked, took over from Admiral Kelly Turner at Okinawa in the latter part of that campaign, he assumed responsibility for more than 1,000 U.S. combatant and merchant ships of all kinds in the Okinawa area. Even that many ships did not constitute the major portion of the amphibious warfare resources available in the Pacific at that time. In the Pacific command, there were then six active marine divisions, together with marine fighter and attack aviation. There were three amphibious force commands, about 15 amphibious group staffs, and lesser staffs and commands too numerous to mention. The strength of the Amphibious Force Pacific then was larger than the total Navy is today. The point to all this is that neither the Navy nor Marine Corps was then resource limited (although on occasion we thought so). There were all sorts of gunfire and air support resources available, and many specialized ships and units were oriented solely to the amphibious missions. Good use was made of all these resources, and our naval warfare publications were written with all this abundance in mind. Now we continue to talk about multi- division/wing team amphibious operations at a time when Navy resources are not available to do the job- In short, we haven’t changed our pattern to accommodate the shrinkage of the Navy cloth. We need to stop deluding ourselves in this regard and develop I procedures commensurate with our real capabilities.
Today, there are three active Marine Corps division/wing teams, two in the Pacific, one in the Atlantic, and a fourth team in the reserve component. The Navy has something over 60 amphibious warfare ships, split approximately evenly between the Atlantic and Pacific fleets. Each fleet keeps an amphibious ready group continually deployed; this is the “presence” unit of task one. The total capacity of all our amphibious warfare ships could embark the assault elements of about one and one-third marine division/wing teams. However, given ship overhauls and other considerations, the maximum Marine Corps unit which can be lifted in amphibious warfare shipping in either ocean without stripping the other ocean approximates the assault elements of one-half a division/wing team. This is an acceptable level for the first three amphibious tasks and perhaps for the assault elements required in the fourth task. The fifth task, however, will require more muscle. If amphibious lift is concentrated in one ocean, and if
ships in overhaul or repair are buttoned up and used as practicable, something slightly in excess of the as- ^ault elements of one division/wing team can be •rted—a force that can make a very important imPact even in a conflict situation involving major Powers. However, the time to accomplish the assem- y °f forces and loading of ships would be measured lri weeks, not days. Also, no provision is made for other two active, highly trained, and ready c Wision/wing teams. Because of existing and projected Navy force levels, there is no possibility that t*le Navy will or should support any significant increase in dedicated amphibious lift capability. There- 0re> both to enhance more timely large-scale amphibious response and to permit effective early amphibious employment of something beyond one-third °f the Marine Corps active force, merchant marine ^sources must be exploited. Containerships are ting examined for this purpose and show' promise, he idea of using merchant ships to supplement amphibious shipping is not new. For many years the j^n-assault elements of the division/wing team have een planned for merchant lift. This has been prac- tlctd several times on a small scale—and on a rela- ^lvely large scale on at least one occasion. Water- <>rne craft from amphibious warfare shipping were Usc‘d for unloading. Containerization was not employed. What is new here is the idea of using merC ar>t ships to lift a significant part of the assault c ornents of the landing force and to do so in contain- Crs- There are major operational problems associated "■'th this approach which can be worked out only by posting. Three obvious ones:
* What equipment can be placed in containers 'V,thout destroying the integrity of the landing plan?
The amphibious warfare forces of the 1970s are far more sophisticated than those of World War II, hut they don't begin to compare in size to those commanded by the likes of, left to right, Lieutenant General Holland Al. Smith, Vice Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, and Rear Admiral Harry W. Hill.
► How can the containers be handled so as to make equipment available at the proper time and place?
► Recognizing that merchant ships have personnel accommodations for crew only, how are personnel associated with the containerized equipment to be provided for?
Also, it seems likely that some degree of container prepackaging will be necessary. If so, duplicate equipment will have to be procured for use in training. There is ample precedent for this in the case of Army and Air Force elements earmarked for NATO, and the cost should be modest.
Elsewhere in the resource problem area is the matter of gunfire and air support. These resources are not available in the quantities that have been considered essential in the past. There are now no major-caliber guns in the active fleet, except for one lightweight 8-inch gun under evaluation in the USS Hull (DD-945). A number of these guns are planned for installation in the fleet after evaluation is completed, mostly in Spruance (DD-963)-class destroyers. The Navy is also proceeding with a 5-inch and 8-inch guided-projectile program. Our best gunfire ships now come with only one or two guns, and many ships coming into the fleet have gun installations w'hich cannot contribute effectively to amphibious gunfire support. Our aircraft assets have also been
Moving onto a launching pontoon is the amphibious assault ship (general purpose) Nassau (LHA-4) which was christened 28 January and is due for commissioning in 1979.
greatly reduced. It is obvious that alternatives to massive air and gunfire support must be developed around the improved conventional weapons which will be coming into our inventory. Also, the entire subject of preliminary air and naval gunfire preparation of the amphibious objective area needs to be reexamined in the context of tactical surprise considerations, which are discussed under the succeeding section.
Assault Procedures: For the purposes of this article, assault procedures encompass both those for preparation of the objective area and the ones spelled out in the ship-to-shore movement plan. This is the plan which takes the marines from the amphibious warfare ships in which they are embarked and delivers them to the spot desired by the landing force commander at the time he desires. The plan provides for both the heliborne troop elements which assault objectives behind the beach and the waterborne elements which assault beach objectives. The problem here is that the over-the-horizon capability of the heliborne forces— and their transit speed of more than 100 knots—is in no way matched by that of the waterborne elements. The waterborne landing force elements are led by amphibious tractors which have a water speed slightly greater than a tortoise going downhill and are not compatible with extended waterborne troop occupancy. This means that the ships carrying the tractors and their troops have to get close inshore to launch them. This is not a comforting thing to do if you have the prospect of heavy warhead missiles coming your way from the land. A true over-the-horizon launch capability for all elements of the assault force is badly needed, both to ease the problem of force defense against land-based weapons and to enhance the possibility of tactical surprise. This need has long been recognized and is being addressed. The Navy has under development an amphibious assault landing craft (AALC)—a high-speed air-cushion vehicle capable of across-the-beach movement—and a waterborne landing craft w'ith improved propulsion and speeds in the 25-knot range. The Marine Corps is working on a new amphibious personnel carrier which it hopes will be capable of water speed significantly greater than 25 knots and can be launched much farther offshore than is now the case. The AALC is farther along in development than the other programs, but no procurement has yet been authorized.
There are many unresolved problems in regard to over-the-horizon launch other than the current lack of high-speed craft. Included are the location of our own ships and their objectives (i.e., how do helicopters and landing craft launched from over the horizon get guidance to their landing area?). And, although not limited to over-the-horizon launch, how do you do the job without setting yourself up as a target for an antiradiation missile? There obviously are others, not the least of which are peacetime safety limitations on extended-range, fully-loaded, over-water helicopter flights without extensive search-and-rescue provisions. The navigational problems have been with us for years; technology is at hand to solve them and at reasonably low cost. Funding should be provided to get this job done.
A true over-the-horizon capability should permit tactical surprise as to the point of attack, but, ir would impose serious limitations on preliminary preparation of the objective area if that tactical surprise is to be exploited. This factor, taken in conjunction with the reduced air and naval gunfire assets cited earlier, leads to a dilemma. How can preparatory measures be compressed without jeopardizing the success of the operation? An optimum solution is to avoid enemy defenses altogether in selecting objectives, and certainly this will be attempted in over- the-horizon assaults. However, defense systems are increasingly mobile, and it would be unwise to assume a totally undefended objective. This leads to the conclusion that an intense but short pre-landing preparation is needed, which leads to the further conclusion that high-shock conventional weapons should be applied to the objective area immediately prior to landing. We read of high-shock munitions being used against terrorists. Perhaps a much expanded version should be developed for amphibious applications.
Amphibious operations are notable for the number of radio frequencies employed and the nearly continuous nature of their employment. Since the amphibious operation is the most complex of all military operations, this is understandable. However, in the missile age, radiation is a target. There remains a requirement for the commander to be informed and t0 be able to command. If possible, it would be highly desirable to manage these requirements by means not associated with radiating ship systems. There have been tests of silent landings, but these have always been on a small scale. The problem needs further exploration.
Dedication: The Marine Corps exists to conduct amphibious operations—and other important but somewhat incidental operations. The Navy exists to %ht wars at sea—and other important but somewhat incidental operations. The Marine Corps, nearly 200,000 strong, is dedicated to amphibious warfare. The Navy has no such dedication, at least in Peacetime. The relatively modern amphibious war- fere ships we now have are more an inheritance from the Robert S. McNamara regime as Secretary of Defense than the result of Navy initiatives. The Amphibious Force command has ceased to exist at the ffeet level, and the amphibious warfare organization ln the office of the CNO is made up of four officers, huried within a subordinate office to the Deputy CNO (Surface Warfare). Numerous excursions have ^een attempted over the years to establish an amphibious warfare flag billet in the office of the CNO; all have failed. The marines have had to pick up the afi on amphibious warfare, and they have done it Wefi. However, the situation does little to encourage a naval officer to seek assignments in amphibious Warfare. This is too bad, for the planning and opera- t*onal challeng es associated with assignment as an amphibious squadron commander are unmatched in che 1110 surface warfare community and thus constitute superb training for flag responsibilities. Until and unless the 1110 community brings amphibious c°mmanders into the top surface warfare command feVel, a bias against amphibious assignments by top Performing captains will persist.
The Navy V/STOL Initiative: The reader may wonder how this subject becomes an amphibious warfare Problem area. It is a potential future problem, tied t0 resource limitations. The amphibious assault ship (LpH) and the amphibious assault ship (general pur- P°Se) (LHA), have large flight decks and excellent av- •ation support facilities; the amphibious transport ^°ck (LPD) has lesser but still significant capabilities.
will be experienced in V/STOL operations with the Marine Harrier aircraft by the time Navy V/STOL is °ff the drawing board. There will be a great incense for the Navy to use these tested ships for Navy v/STol operations, with a consequent reduction in amphibious lift availability, and this will particularly be the case if the small carrier now planned is not available. There is also the likelihood that air-capable amphibious warfare ships would be used in a sea control role in early stages of a major conflict, and there is certainly nothing wrong with this concept. However, it would be well for the Navy and Marine Corps to sit down before the event to work out jointly agreed policies and procedures within the Navy family.
Conclusions: From the foregoing, there are no insuperable problems in carrying out the first three of the stated future amphibious tasks. The first two have demonstrated continuing utility over the years, and there is no evidence of reduction in importance. The last two require correction of some problem areas which will also make the first three tasks easier. There will be those who hold that the last two tasks are not realistic, that we will never become involved in “another Vietnam,” and that a major war would end so quickly that amphibious capability would not be relevant. I do not agree that the future is subject to such precise definition. I participated in a meeting in Los Alamos shortly after the Soviets detonated their first nuclear weapon. Many of our most prominent nuclear physicists were there, and all were of the opinion that future amphibious operations would not be possible. Two weeks later came the Inchon operation. Many others followed in Vietnam. Even the best crystal ball becomes clouded when we look down the road to the next century. However, I remain convinced that an amphibious capability will be viable in the future and that it will continue to make a significant contribution to our security.
A 1939 graduate of the Naval Academy, Admiral Van- noy had three years of battleship duty and one year as a njAa8 beutenant before becoming assistant operations of- fleer, Amphibious Group Two in 1943. He later held the same billet in the Fifth Amphibious Force. In these assignments, he planned and participated in most of the Central Pacific amphibious assaults of World War II. After the war ended, he went to the staff of Commander Amphibious Forces Pacific until late 1948. Subsequent sea tours included serving as operations officer of the USS Des Moines (CA-134) and command of the USS Watts (DD-567), Mine Squadron Eight, the USS Vermilion (AKA-107), Amphibious Squadron Ten, Amphibious Groups One and Three, and the Amphibious Force Seventh Fleet. Duty ashore comprised tours at the Special Weapons Project, Sandia Base, the Naval War College as student and staff member, the Strategic Plans Division of OpNav, Commander Amphibious Training Command Atlantic Fleet, Policy and Plans Directorate of the Joint Staff, Assistant DCNO Plans and Policy, DCNO Plans and Policy, and Commander Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet. Since his retirement from active duty in the autumn of 1974, Admiral Vannoy has engaged in consulting work. He lives in McLean, Virginia.
[1]The Eastern Mediterranean littoral is a special case. Any amphibious task other than the maintenance of a ready group risks confrontation in that area since superpower naval forces are continuously present there.