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Tactical ASW: Let’s Fight Fire with Fire 99 F-14—Weapon System in Search of Its Engine 103
By Lieutenant Commander A. Van Saun, U. S. Navy By Rear Admiral John S. Christiansen, U. S. Navy (Retired)
USMER: Following the U. S. "Flags” 102 By Commander Richard E. Johe, U. S. Navy
The Soviet Navy, by building a powerful attack submarine force, has developed a relatively inexpensive threat which requires a disproportionate expense in antisubmarine warfare assets to counter it. In an environment of high shipbuilding costs, tight budgets, and reduced numbers of U. S. naval ships, we must examine more effective and less expensive ASW forces.
Three basic scenarios should be considered in evaluating tactical submarine threats: sea control or the protection of independent shipping; convoy protection; and task force protection.
There are several theories for protecting independent shipping against submarines. Some prominent ones include: the deceptive routing of shipping around probable hostile submarine operating areas; ASW patrols by surface and air units in focal areas; and the use of submarine barriers and vectored intercept along aggressor submarine transit routes.
Deceptive routing requires the knowledge of aggressor submarine operating areas. This information is derived through intelligence, or vividly provided by the actual sinking of ships. In any event, deceptive routing must be used in conjunction with all other methods.
ASW patrols by surface ships and aircraft require large numbers of naval units to control even a small area of ocean against one submarine. Such ASW efforts are not practical. With submarine detection and weapon systems capable of intercepts and attacks at ranges greater than surface ships’ effective detection ranges, the advisability of placing several surface ships in a probable hostile submarine operating area is highly questionable.
The effective ASW method is to use ASW submarines to intercept enemy submarines transiting to their stations. In these transits, enemy submarines attempt to proceed as quickly as possible, thus creating conditions that favor passive detection. During these transits ASW submarines provide higher probabilities of enemy submarine detections and kills than any other ASW system employed at any time in enemy submarine deployments. Effective ASW can be achieved by submarine barriers and vectored intercept without providing the aggressor submarine an attractive military target. Therefore, in lieu of producing ASW-configured surface ships, future ASW assets dedicated to meet the sea control submarine threat should include more attack nuclear submarines and modem, quiet hunter-killer diesel submarines.
Some readers will immediately question the rationale of a major power producing diesel submarines in the nuclear age, but diesel propulsion has some very attractive aspects. First, using current technology, diesel submarines could be economically designed, mass produced, and manned for approximately one fourth the cost per unit of the more complex nuclear submarines and for significantly less than surface ships having less offensive capabilities.
Through miniaturization of components and reduction of power requirements, a diesel submarine could be fitted with a sophisticated array of electronic sensors. With advanced battery technology and reduced power requirements diesel submarines could remain on battery power for significantly long periods, measured in days, while quietly engaged in antisubmarine patrols. Modern battery operation endurance would enable the diesel submarine to pick the optimum times to snorkel and charge batteries. By sound-mounting the engines, diesel submarines also could snorkel significantly more quietly than they do today.
The diesel submarine’s lack of a prolonged high-speed capability, when compared with nuclear submarines, would be compensated for in part by the increased ranges of sensors and tactical weapons. These sensors and weapons would serve to nullify the requirement for sustained speed to escape attack by effectively countering attacking enemy surface ships and submarines.
The highly-mobile nuclear submarine provides a great deal of tactical flexibility, but, regardless of speed, she can only be in one place at one time. Four diesel submarines, each with a weapon load equal to a nuclear submarine, would not provide the same individual ship mobil-
ity, but could be in four different places at the same time—a considerable benefit in an age of reduced force levels.
For those individuals who might question the survivability of diesel submarines against modern ASW forces, ASW exercises have proved time and again that diesel submarines designed and built prior to 1957 continue to confound today’s ASW forces. If a modern diesel submarine were designed and produced in the late 1970s, she would be more than a match for ASW forces well into the 2000s. The major advantage of a submarine—stealth—is contingent upon the environment in which she operates, not her type of propulsion.
And, in a hunter-killer role, lying in wait for a transiting nuclear or diesel submarine, battery submarines, which are quieter than any other type submarine, would have a high probability of intercept and kill, especially if approximate target position and track have been determined and transmitted by a third party.
In close-in protection for convoys the surface ships come into their own, but they are not necessarily effective in ASW. In such a scenario surface ships have to provide a ring of electronic/missile defenses, particularly against air, surface, and sub-surface-launched cruise missiles. Such antiair warfare protection dictates that surface warships operate in close quarters with the ships they hope to protect. This does not enhance their ASW capability and makes them more easily intercepted by attacking submarines. The surface problem becomes compounded when one considers that today the surface warships themselves are as attractive targets as the convoyed ships. Hence, surface warships enhance the value of convoys for the attacking submarine.
Airborne ASW has definite potential for close-in convoy support, particularly when working in cooperation with submarines. But, patrol aircraft support is difficult to achieve at long ranges from shore bases or if the convoy encounters a multi-threat environment. Without definite air superiority, however, the only viable option for protecting convoys against close-in submarine attack is the nuclear submarine. Unfortunately, there are not enough nuclear submarines available to meet task force requirements, let alone enough for convoy protection requirements.
An alternate solution, similar to that for protecting independent shipping, is to intercept enemy submarines en route
to their anticonvoy operations. In this regard, a potent mix of third-party sensors and ASW submarines could be employed to great advantage. A large number of relatively inexpensive, quiet diesel submarines could revitalize barrier concepts. The more expensive nuclear submarines would be free then to be employed in the tasks which make optimum use of their higher speeds and lack of dependence on the atmosphere: i.e., the vectored intercept of both enemy submarines and surface warships and direct support for task groups.
When considering task force ASW protection, it is significant that each ship in a task force is an important target whose position in time of war will be known to a major hostile nation. The challenge, therefore, is topreven tan enemy submarine from achieving an attack position on any ship in the task force.
Operating against a task force, the attacking submarine has almost everything her way. A task force usually has low frequency, high-powered active sonars, high cumulative noise levels, and, perhaps, even air warning/surface radar and communication data links, all of which advertise the task force’s location for long distances. This allows the attacking submarines to achieve an attack
position without closing the task force to distances which could jeopardize her survivability. It is somewhat more difficult for the submarine if the task force sonars are operated passively. But, even when considering deception tactics, it is very difficult to hide a task force from a listening submarine which may be aided by satellite fixing of the task force’s position. It is important to remember that the days of the submarine penetrating an escort screen to sink the "heavy” are gone. Instead, armed with accurate high-speed and long-range homing weapons, enemy submarines will take under attack the first warship within weapon range, thereby effectively reducing our order of battle, ship by ship.
It is an inescapable fact that in limited war with a submarine power some losses to task forces will occur due to submarine attack. The best method to counter submarine attack is to prevent enemy submarines from achieving patrol zones where attacks can be conducted. In this respect a combination of submarine barriers and vectored intercept nuclear submarines may be the most effective ASW available.
The solution is offensive ASW. We must not wait to deal with the hostile submarine when she is at her best, on patrol. For limited war scenarios, we should be ready to act aggressively toward hostile submarines and prevent them from achieving positions that will threaten our use of the seas. A method to achieve this goal is to embark on a comprehensive submarine construction program which should include the construction of modern diesel submarines. If we had a very quiet diesel submarine barrier capability, enemy submarines in transit would have to consider reducing their speeds of advance. Speed reductions would force a concomitant reduction in enemy submarine on-station or patrol time and would work to reduce significantly their effectiveness, even if the barrier operation did not result in a high percentage kill rate.
Currently, the United States has less than half as many submarines as the U.S.S.R. Any addition to our attack submarine force will enhance our ASW capability. But, a force of well over 200 attack submarines, half nuclear and half diesel, would provide a good mix of the "ultimate,” but expensive, nuclear submarine capability and the less expensive, but very effective, diesel submarine capability. The nuclear units would be employed in the missions that require high speeds. The new, very quiet diesel submarines would be available for ASW and sea control assignments. Each attack submarine would be capable of operating independently, and, although a target in the sense that each is one of a limited number of ships available, none would be as vulnerable to tracking/ attack and as dependent on mutual support for protection as our present and evolving surface warships. Each submarine, armed with Mk 48 torpedoes and cruise missiles, would be capable of defeating any Soviet surface ship.
A larger, more effective and relatively inexpensive U. S. submarine force would turn the tables on the Soviet submarine force and require the Soviet Navy to devote an inordinate proportion of its assets to ASW in any attempt to deny the United States freedom of the seas.
More than 30 countries operate diesel-powered patrol submarines—most classes built since I960 and many units in each one. The last conventionally- powered U. 5. Naiy attack submarines— three Barbel-rtet units (USS Barbel [55-580] is pictured below, at the bottom right)—were commissioned in 1959.
USMER: Following the U. S. "Flags”
By: Commander Richard E. Johe, U. S. Navy, Office of Maritime Affairs, Department of State
Since World War II, the U. S. Navy has required its ships to report, through regular communications channels, their geographic positions on such occasions as departures from and arrivals in ports and at periodic intervals while at sea. Thus, when a vessel moves from Port A to Port B, she must file a movement report (MovRep), indicating her estimated time of departure from Port A, the proposed navigational track, the approximated time of arrival at indicated geographical locations, and the estimated time of arrival at Port B. If the proposed time schedule varies by more than four hours, the ship must report the appropriate changes to the original MovRep. Failure to follow the reporting procedures of the MovRep system should trigger an inquiry from higher authority as to the vessel’s location. This may be embarrassing to the officer who has forgotten to file a MovRep or an appropriate modification to the original MovRep, but it is a blessing to the vessel in distress.
Because the MovRep system was instituted to fulfill a military requirement, it has never included information on the movements of U. S.-flag merchant ships, except on special occasions and for those ships assigned to the Military Sealift Command (MSC). At least that was the case until 1 November 1975, when the Assistant Secretary for Maritime Affairs (Commerce) and the Chief of Naval Operations agreed to make a U. S.-Flag Merchant Vessel Locator Filing System (USMER)[1] operational. In practice, USMER requires all U. S.-flag merchant vessels of 1,000 gross registered tons and over, engaged in the foreign commerce of the United States, and not operating under control of the MSC, to submit movement reports. It also requires submission of revised at-sea reports if estimated times of arrival differ more than
Figure 1: Sample USMER Message Reports
ROUTINE
DTG
FROM:
TO: AIG 7650 OR 388
BT
UN C LAS USMER USMER SHP/
_(CROSS ONE OUT)
//
SEA/
ARR/
DEP/
DES/
RMK/
ZZZ
BT
(SHIP NAME - 26 CHARACTERS MAX) (CALL SIGN)
_/_________________________ /___________ 1/_______ /_ //
(LAT N/S) (LONG I/W) (MO-DA-HR OF POSIT) (CRS) (SPD)
_____________________________ / ____ /_________ 111
(PORT OF ARRIVAL - 18 CHARACTERS MAX) (PORT OF DEPARTURE - 18 CHARACTERS~MAX)
(COUNTRY (MO-DA-HR OF ARRIVAL) CODE)
_/____ /_________ V/
(COUNTRY IMO-DA-HR OF DEPARTURE)
(DESTINATION - 18 CHARACTERS MAX)
CODE)
_/ /
(COUNTRY (ETA - MO-DA-HR) CODE)
111
(INCLUDE REMARKS AS REQUIRED - 65 CHARACTERS MAX PER LINE
(IF NEEDED)
(DOUBLE SLASH // DENOTES END OF LINE ITEM)
//
NOTE: FILL IN AND TRANSMIT ONLY THOSE LINES APPLICABLE TO THE TYPE OF REPORT BEING
SENT, REQUIRED MESSAGE TEXT LINES ARE:
CD
ARRIVAL REPORT USMER USMER SHP ARR
RMK (OPTIONAL) ZZZ
(2)
DEPARTURE REPORT USMER USMER SHP DEP DES
RMK (OPTIONAL) ZZZ
(3)
AT SEA REPORT USMER USMER SHP SEA
DES (IF DES CHANGES OR ETA CHANGES BY MORE THAN 24 HRS) RMK.(OPTIONAL)
ZZZ
COMBINATION REPORT
SEE EXAMPLES (4) AND (5) BELOW
(1)
U)
SAMPLE DEPARTURE REPORT ROUTINE DTG FROM:
TO:
BT
UNCLAS
USMER
USMER
SHP/THETIS/KMJH// DEP/HAMBURG/GE/111013Z// DES/CAPET0WN/SF/112508Z// ZZZ BT
SAMPLE ARRIVAL REPORT ROUTINE DTG
FROM: SS THETIS
TO: AIG __
BT
UNCLAS USMER USMER
SHP/THETIS/KMJH// ARR/HAMBURG/GE/110710Z//
RMK/ETD 10 NOV//
ZZZ BT
(4)
SAMPLE COMBINED ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE REPORT (VESSEL ARRIVING AND DEPARTING SAME PORT WITHIN A 24 HOUR PERIOD)
ROUTINE DTG FROM:
TO:
BT
UNCLAS
USMER
USMER
SHP/DOCTOR LYKES/KHNB// ARR/ROTTERDAM/NE/051614Z// DEP/R0TTERDAM/NE/051617Z// DES/LONDON/UK/051701Z//
ZZZ
BT
SS DOCTOR LYKES AIG
SS THETIS AIG
(3)
SAMPLE AT SEA POSITION REPORT ROUTINE DTG
FROM: SS THETIS
TO: AIG
BT
UNCLAS USMER USMER
SHP/THETIS/KMJH// SEA/1430N/01815W/111811Z/170/17// RMK/ (OPTIONAL)
111
BT
(5)
SAMPLE COMBINED DEPARTURE AND ARRIVAL REPORT (VESSEL DEPARTING ONE PORT AND ARRIVING AT ANOTHER PORT WITHIN A 24
HOURPERIOD) ____
ROUTINE
DTG
FROM:
TO:_______________________
BT
UNCLAS
USMER
USMER
SHP/AFRICAN MERCURY/KCOJ//
ARR/NEW YORK/US/100512Z//
DEP/NEWPORT NEWS/US/100501Z//
RMK/ETD 8 OCT//
ZZZ
BT (NOTE: DESTINATION LINE (DES) IS TO BE OMITTED IN THIS CASE
SS AFRICAN MERCURY AIG
24 hours with actual times or if destinations change.
The Maritime Administration (MarAd) had conducted a test program in late 1974 wherein 19 U. S.-flag merchant vessels, operating in various areas of the world, reported their port departures and arrivals and their positions every 48 hours while at sea. The messages were sent to U. S. Coast Guard and U. S. Navy communications stations, which in turn relayed the messages to the Naval Ocean Surveillance Center (NOSTC), the U. S. government agency which maintains the data bank on U. S. merchant ship locations. The test proved that accurate merchant ship position information could be maintained at a minimum cost.
The statutory authority for the establishment of USMER is contained in Section 212(A) of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936:
"The operator of a vessel in waterborne foreign commerce of the United States shall file at such times and in such manner as the Secretary of Commerce may prescribe by regulations, such report, account, record, * or memorandum relating to the utilization and performance of such vessel in commerce of the United States, as the Secretary may determine to be necessary or desirable in order to carry out the purposes and provisions of this Act, as amended. Such report, account, record, or memorandum shall be signed and verified in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Secretary. An operator who does not file the report, account, record, or memorandum as required by this section and the regulations issued hereunder, shall be liable to the United States in a penalty of $50 for each day of such violation. The amount of any penalty imposed for any violation of this section upon the operator of any vessel involved in the violation and such vessel, may be libeled therefor in the district court of the United States for the district in which it may be found. The Secretary of Commerce may, in his discretion, remit or mitigate any penalty imposed under this section on such terms as he may deem proper.”
The purpose of USMER, like that of the MovRep system, is to keep any interested national agency, including military authorities, informed of U. S.-flag merchant vessels arrivals, departures, and at-sea locations. To date, USMER information has been provided to the Maritime Administration, Department of State, Federal Communications
Commission, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Military Sealift Command, and the U. S. Coast Guard. Such information may be helpful when the need arises to warn a merchant vessel(s) of a danger at sea. Moreover, in an age of international terrorism, of which the Mayaguez seizure is but one example, USMER assures any merchant vessel captain that his ship’s immediate location is available to those who are in a position to possibly warn him of impending dangers or to dispatch assistance should it be required. Like any reporting system, the results will depend largely on the spirit of participants.
The first year of merchant ship reporting under USMER is encouraging. Within this short period of time, Maritime Administration officials indicate that on an average 90% of (260 of 286) U. S.-flag merchant vessels engaged in U. S.-foreign commerce are reporting on a regular basis. If the initial results are indicative of the overall effectiveness of the system, USMER seems to be getting "launched” on the right foot.
Additional instructions on how to use USMER are found in the U. S. Department of Commerce (Maritime Administration) pamphlet entitled "U. S.- Flag Merchant Vessel Locator Filing System (USMER)” issued with MarAd Advisory No. 75-7 of 19 August 1975. In addition, the Defense Mapping Agency, Hydrographic Center, published information about USMER in Notice to Mariners number 41/75.
F-l 4—Weapon System in Search of Its Engine
By Rear Admiral John S. Christiansen,
U. S. Navy (Retired), former Director of Plans and Programs and Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Air Warfare; now with Grumman Aerospace Corp.
In 1968, when it became apparent that the F-111B (the Navy version of the TFX development program) would never become the air-superiority fighter and fleet air defense interceptor the Navy needed, the program was terminated and a new solution sought. The solution was the F-i4 Tomcat.
The approach taken by the Navy and the aircraft manufacturer, Grumman
Aerospace Corporation, was to design the fighter for a high-thrust advanced technology engine which, when matched to the F-i4’s advanced swingwing airframe, would provide clear margins of air combat superiority over any aerial threats anticipated through the 1980s and beyond. The F-111B program consumed valuable time, however, and caused the Navy’s need for an air-superiority replacement for its aging F-4 Phantom fighter to be undeniably urgent. As a result, the decision was made to acquire the needed capability in a "phased-development” program.
Under this approach, the F-14 was to be procured in three phases: -A, -B, and -C. The F-14A would use the proven engine and weapon system technology already developed for the F-111B, thereby reducing the two traditionally highest- risk and longest-lead-time items in an advanced fighter development program.
The F-14B would incorporate the advanced technology engine (primarily to strengthen the Tomcat’s dogfighting capabilities against future new-technol- ogy fighters) as soon as it became available, without having to wait for concurrent development of the swing-wing airframe and weapon system.
In the third phase, the F-14C would be developed as the full-growth version of the new fighter, incorporating an advanced avionics suit and thereby maintaining the fighter’s weapon system superiority through the 1980s and beyond against all projected threats.
The Navy’s plan in 1969 called for putting TF-30-P-412 engines (the same power plant designed for the F-111B) in the first 36 F-i4 aircraft (F-i4As), with advanced technology engines to be installed in No. 37 and subsequent production models. Building a minimum number of F-14AS would allow early development of the new swing-wing airframe in time to be mated with the new engine.
An open competition for the new advanced technology engine was held early in 1970. The engine selected was the Pratt & Whitney F4oi, an advanced power plant designed from scratch to meet the demanding requirements of the Navy fighter mission environment. It was anticipated that the F4oi would provide about 30-40% more thrust and weigh about one-fourth less than the TF-30.
Complicating the picture at that time was the fact that the Air Force also initiated development of an advanced- design Pratt & Whitney engine, the Fioo, for its F-15 fighter. Since there was considerable commonality between the F4oi and Fioo—they share a common gas generator, which is the "heart of the engine”—logic argued that both be developed in a joint Air Force/Navy program.
Following the initiation of that joint engine development program in March 1970, perhaps predictably, production emphasis shifted to the Fioo. While the Air Force had its engine qualified by October 1973 and proceeded to procure it in quantity for the F-15, the F-14B engine development had slipped to the point that the Navy felt it could no longer afford the qualification of the F-14B F4oi engine. The reason for the delay in bringing the F4oi along, I believe, was partly due to governmental bureaucracy and the insistence by the offices of the Secretary of Defense and Management and Budget and the Congress on a "joint development” program. In this case there were several built-in inequities: First, the Fioo engine was given higher priority because it was the only engine designated for the F-15 fighter; whereas the F-14 already was being procured with the interim TF-30 engine. Also, it is probably safe to assume that the Air Force, because it was a much larger potential customer than the Navy, was able to capture more of the engine manufacturer’s attention—talent and money—for the Fioo engine development.
The Navy, not getting a productive program for its money, suspended the development of the F4oi engine due to "durability and performance problems and a lack of funds to complete qualifications.” Then, in April 1974, the Navy also terminated flight tests of the YF401 engines in the prototype F-14B airplane. Before the program funding was exhausted, these tests produced data showing that the F4oi had achieved significant gains in intermediate thrust, but that the engine needed further work to overcome its stability problems. In the final Navy report, the evaluation team concluded that the F401 engine provided the F-i4 fighter with a better than 25% improvement in combat potential and called for continued development of the advanced engine so that it could be installed in all deployable F-i4s as early as possible.
Without its intended F-14B engine, the Navy proceeded to meet its fleet operational commitments with the F-i4A. As a result, Grumman has continued to turn out the "A” model at rates varying from three to six per month. Production aircraft No. 36, planned to be the last to use the TF-30 engine, has long since gone out the door. In fact, more than 200 TF-30-powered aircraft have accumulated more than 80,000 flight hours, and deliveries are continuing.
After more than 30,000 problem-free hours had been logged on more than 100 Tomcats, the first of four F-14 losses and two major incidents, possibly caused by TF-30 failures, came as a complete surprise. Today, two-and-a-half years since the first loss, critical engine problems have been isolated to stress corrosion in first stage fan blades, excessive vibration in second to third stage fan air seal, and insufficient fan case strength to contain internal failures. Beginning next July, all Tomcats produced will incorporate healthy modified engines and fire suppression systems. This should eliminate any recurrence of the problems described above and, at least, ensure a safe F-i4 engine and airframe.
Despite these problems, all aircraft carrier deployments of F-14 squadrons have been very successful, and the Tomcat is a prime contender to meet "next-generation” interceptor requirements for a number of nations. Also, despite its recent problems, the engine
The F-14B prototype flight tests its YF401 engines.
has performed beyond original expectations, and as a result the Navy has found it difficult to maintain support for procuring the advanced engine that would clearly establish the Tomcat’s superiority over the new hotrod fighters of the future. And, since the F-14 has not been permitted to progress through the normal growth cycle of a new airplane into the usual improved "B” model, many state-of-the-art improvements affecting the plane’s performance, reliability, and maintainability have been designed but not incorporated.
In fact, during its fiscal 1975 budgetary hearings, the Congress, looking for opportunities to cut "fat” in the Defense Department’s funding requests, found the stalled F4oi engine development program a ready target. It elected to suspend the F4oi engine development until the Navy could adequately justify a requirement for it. The Navy, however, has consistently made known its interest in re-engining the F-14 to maintain the airplane’s critical role as the fleet’s most effective counter to the so-called "high- threat, air-to-air scenarios of the 1980s.” To appreciate the essential role played by the power plant in this most advanced of air-superiority weapon systems, it is necessary to understand how the F-i4 addresses that threat.
The F-i4 was built to meet any airborne threat anywhere in the world and defeat it, regardless of the time of day, weather conditions, or the type of adversary. And, of course, the airplane had to be able to fit into the carrier environment.
It takes an unusual airplane to meet those requirements, and the F-i4 Tomcat is that kind of airplane. With its AWG-9 Phoenix missile fire-control system, it can engage an enemy at very long range (over 100 miles) at far less risk and with very little expenditure of precious combat fuel, destroy up to six aircraft, and still engage in dogfighting with Sidewinders and a rapid-firing 20-mm. gun. A single F-i4 can simultaneously engage several targets, ranging from a low-flying antiship cruise missile at 50 feet off the water to a supersonic high-flyer at well over 80,000 feet. For intermediate-range threats, it can dispense radar-guided Sparrows at multiple targets.
All ingredients of a remarkable weapon system are there and could remain in force into the 1990s if the advanced engines so badly needed—particularly for close-in work—were procured. The F-i4, fitted with the advanced-technology engine for which it was designed, would have the same clear margin of superiority in the dogfight that it is currently demonstrating in the other areas of the high-threat scenario. In fact with the 25-to-40% better thrust-to- weight provided by the advanced F-14B engine, the Tomcat fighter would have ample margins of superiority against all classes of aerial threats it might encounter. Fully aware that the severity of these threats has increased since they were originally projected in the F-14 design requirements in 1968, the Navy has continued to push for a replacement for the TF-30 engine.
Since the fiscal year 1975 congressional directive to suspend the F4oi engine development, the Navy has conducted an extensive analysis of all available engine candidates, including such alternatives as uprating the existing TF-30 engine and developing derivatives of the engines used in the F-15 and F-16 fighters and the B-i supersonic bomber.
Pratt & Whitney (P & W) is proposing that it be permitted to complete the development of its F-401-571 advanced technology engine, which probably would have the most compatibility with the F-i4 airframe. Certainly this approach must be one of the least expensive ways of re-engining the F-14 because of the previous work that has been done. Also, it would be hard to deny the inherent benefits of adopting an engine which shares a common, well-developed core with the F100 unit that powers the Air Force’s F-15 and F-16 fighters. For example, the technical risk associated with the F-401 engine has been minimized. To help bring the cost of the F-401 down even further, P & w has proposed to develop, in a parallel program, a nonafterburning version of the F-4oi for use
in the Navy’s A-7E attack plane.
Perhaps the most convincing point in the F-401’s favor is that it was originally designed for the F-14, and vice versa. As a result, the airframe should readily accept the more powerful engine, whereas it was overdesigned in some respects for the TF-30. For example: the present inlet airflow capacity is 8% more than is needed for the TF-30; the inlet control system is designed to handle a higher airflow; the plane’s fuel capacity is designed to accommodate the F-4oi’s 30% higher flow rates; and the engine nacelles are sized precisely to accept the new engine.
During the many months that the F-14B engine program has been stalled, other engine manufacturers have entered competing candidates for the advanced technology engine. One of these is the General Electric F-101X, which is said to be about 10% better than the original F-401-571. Pratt & Whitney has responded with the F-401-26C, a new engine design based on the F-401 but with performance equivalent to G.E.’s F-101X.
Each of the proposed new engine developments is said to involve an expenditure of upwards of $1.5 billion, covering development, production, and aircraft installation. This seems like a great deal of money until one recognizes that the F-14B will meet the threat spectrum for the next 20 years.
The specific advanced engine procured for the Tomcat matters little. The concern is only that one be procured, and the sooner the better. The F-14 is a magnificent fighter weapon system which deserves to have the power plant for which it was originally designed, so that the plane and the fleet can obtain the full measure of performance. Reengining would provide, for the first time in history, a single aircraft that covered the entire fighter spectrum— from long-range interceptor through hotrod dogfighter.
[1] USMER is basically a locator system and should not be confused with the U. S. Coast Guard Automated Mutual-assistance Vessel Rescue System (AMVER). AMVER is an international program designed to assist in providing for the safety of merchant vessels on the high seas. (For a complete discussion of AMVER see W. McDougall, pp. 106-108, March 1976 Proceedings.)