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A Vietnamese refugee created and—with the help of God and a few Marines— constructed a concrete sculpture, which he called the “Hand of Hope, ” as a lasting memorial to Camp Pendleton’s Refugee Camp. Somebody put these youngsters in the giant palm, just as somebody put them and their elders in this and similar camps across the country. And all these displaced Asians, like their hosts, tried to make the best of a bad situation.
The demise of the South Vietnamese Government in late April 1975 led to an influx of over 120,000 Vietnamese refugees into the United States. The concurrent collapse of the Cambodian Government produced thousands more. The last attempt to absorb a large number of refugees, the Cubans of the Sixties, had been poorly managed and was still a source of ill feeling. Thus, the United States determined to better control the introduction of the Southeast Asians into its society. Two areas of improvement were decided upon. Where the large majority of the Cubans had never left their original state of entry, Florida, the new refugees were to be dispersed throughout the country. Where the Cubans had been for the most part left to their own devices to build a new life, the Southeast Asians were to have citizens pledged to assist them on an individual basis.
The first home any of the refugees would have in the United States was to be a refugee camp, the running of which would be a military responsibility. Three were initially established, and a fourth came soon after. A camp was established at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, with a maximum capacity of 5,500. The Army opened Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, to 25,000 refugees and later added Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania, with room for 15,000 more. The Marine Corps operated the Camp
Pendleton Refugee Camp in California with a population of 18,000.
The refugees went first to Guam and then, as room became available, were transferred to one of the four camps in the continental United States. Except for cases involving family reunification, the camp a particular refugee went to was a matter of chance.
The camps were home to the refugees for periods ranging from a couple of days to several months. The length of the stay depended on how quickly the refugee could be “sponsored out,” a process which required a security clearance and a sponsor. The sponsor agreed to a moral obligation of insuring that the refugee of refugees had sufficient clothing, food, and shelter until such time as he became financially independent. The security clearance was based on fragmentary records, and it was never made clear at the camp level what would happen if a refugee should fail the criteria.
I was assigned to the Camp Pendleton Refugee Camp from 5 May-15 July 1975. This period began seven days after the official opening of the camp. I will describe some of the problems encountered and the solutions that emerged.
To put my role in perspective, Figure 1 shows the chain of command of the Camp Pendleton Refugee Camp. The camp level, to which I was assigned, was the highest level with direct, continuous contact with the refugees. The camps at Camp Pendleton varied in size, dependent on geographical limitations, from 1,200 to 5,100 residents. I was the commanding officer of Camp 1-2-3, so-called because adjacent areas originally designated as Camp 1, Camp 2, and Camp 3 were under a single command. Camp 1 -2-3’s population varied from day to day, as did that of all the camps, but the average was 3,500 residents.
My mission was never spelled out to me per se, but over a period of time I came to believe it was twofold- The immediate objectives were to ensure that the refugees received all appropriate benefits and that the camp was trouble free. A long-range, and at least equally important, mission was to give these future citizens the best possible first impression of their new country.
40 U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, September 1976
The refugee camp, by its nature, presented some unique problems. The basic goal of the camp was for it to be dissolved as quickly as possible, thus eliminating many motivators or sanctions normally available. This one aspect alone made the refugee camp a challenging test of leadership and managerial skills. The ultimate gift—to allow a deserving refugee to leave the camp— was not in the power of the camp commander. The ultimate punishment—to send a recalcitrant back to South Vietnam—was unthinkable by definition. Even to give material rewards was impractical, both because of the general unavailability of anything for the camp commander to give and because of the possibility of negative publicity generated by those who did not receive gifts. Conventional punishments such as imprisonment or fines were assiduously avoided due to the uncertain legalities and, again, because of the counterproductive publicity that surely would have resulted. Even peculiarly military punishments such as confinement to quarters were too impractical to be implemented.
Another distinguishing feature of the refugee camp, alluded to above, was the press coverage. Because our overall goal was to disperse the refugees as quickly as possible, the program needed to be presented in a favorable light to a sometimes unenthusiastic American public. To aid in keeping the situation in the public eye, correspondents were given free access to the camp. This constituted additional pressure on the camp commanders to ensure that not only was every refugee treated fairly, but that every refugee perceived himself as being treated fairly. An unfavorable story might feed the anti-refugee feeling in the country and cause the loss of potential sponsors. As it turned out, the press coverage of the camps was a major contributing factor to their success.
In a utopian society, all members are equal, with the leaders chosen from among the people and deriving their power from the people. At the refugee camp, this was obviously not the case. The American leaders were simply imposed, virtually at random, onto the majority of the society’s population. Their power derived not from the people, but from outside. The leaders had no culture in common with the people, and they were obviously not equal, as was blatantly obvious every time a Marine got into his car and drove out of camp.
Within these unique and narrow confines, a motivation/punishment system to ensure orderly camp life and the accomplishment of the camp commanders objectives depended on subtle shadings of available tools.
I will describe the relative effectiveness of the tools— and many experiences at the camp—in terms of the Maslow Need Hierarchy. This is a theoretical management principle, which states that every human has the same basic needs and will strive to fill these needs in a generally sequential manner. These needs are:
► Physiological
► Safety and security
► Belongingness, social, and love needs
► Autonomy and self-esteem
► Self-actualization
Satisfaction of the first level of need—physiological —was a “lose or break even’’ situation from the camp commander’s viewpoint. The refugees had been promised implicitly and explicitly that they would receive food, clothing, and shelter. The options to use these factors as a carrot or a stick were not open. All refugees were to receive these necessities on as nearly an equal a basis as possible.
It should be realized that the refugees came to this country with a very fundamental understanding of the United States. One basic tenet, fiercely held to, was
jca ° eclual rights. This created difficulties on at cam s^C °CCaS*0n' birring facilities varied between
stanc/ rl am^ ^was fortunate in that there was a facj, ar ’ Permanent military mess hall. Other camp
was th'eS C°ns*ste<^ hastily erected open tents. This Wase cause of many complaints, and at one point it and^h°^0Se^ t^lat t^le Camp 1-2-3 mess hall be closed 1j0(j 1 ^ res*dents of Camp 1-2-3 eat outside like every- should SC ^ ar8ucd that the other camp commanders Unj stress the fact that the disparity in facilities was SOrntentlonah and that it was “the American way”— mar„tlrn,?S some fo^s are luckier than others. This was probl'na ^ accePtable to the other refugees, and the tjp. en? Was ultimately solved by upgrading the facili- « at the other camps.
ful ° 1°.?^ servec^ foe refugees was nutritious, plenti- at Cam a^ fostltutional food, bland. All attempts great]01^ encllcton to cater to cultural preferences were UoJ. aPpreciated, especially the “Mexican Nuc tryin f at resulted from using jalapeno peppers in An imp0 ma^e traditional Vietnamese fish sauce. n tcation of the sensitivity of this factor took place when the food services were assumed by a civilian contractor, replacing the Navy/Marine team. The immediate drop in quantity and quality inspired heated complaints and the closest thing to an organized demonstration seen at the camp. Pressure was immediately brought to bear to correct the problem.
Clothing was provided in two ways. One was through the establishment of sewing centers, and the other was through distribution of Salvation Army-provided clothing. Great care was taken to ensure that all received equal treatment. Two types of shelter were available in Camp 1-2-3. These were general purpose tents which were decided to have a capacity of 16, and quonset huts with a rated capacity of 40. These accommodations held the refugees themselves and all of their worldly possessions. Initial assignment to one type of housing or the other was a matter of chance, although most incoming refugees were assigned to the general purpose tents. The more highly prized quonset huts tended to stay at capacity, with current residents moving in from tents as openings occurred. The quonset huts were warmer and had the additional luxury of concrete floors and, generally, better beds.
The State Department also recognized the primacy of physiological needs by its requirement that a sponsor guarantee a refugee sufficient food, clothing, and shelter.
For most of the refugees, the second level of need—
4 2 U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, September 1976
Mrs. Irene Dunham, right, was commended by the Marine Corps for starting the sewing centers which, together with the libraries, served as meeting places for young people. The meetings occasionally resulted in marriages such as this double wedding ceremony between two Catholic couples in Camp Five.
safety and security—provided the motivation for leaving their homeland and for choosing America as a destination. When asked why she had come, Tran Thi Nam, a 108-year-old lady spoke for many when she answered, “Because they [the Communists] would not have let me live.” She had fled North Vietnam in 1954 and felt that the Communists would punish her for that earlier betrayal. All refugees assumed themselves to be free of physical danger in America. They were further convinced of the American interest in their physical well-being by the extensive medical treatment available, including routine examinations to rapidly identify any problems.
For those who had been practicing capitalists, the prospects of financial security under the incoming government had been intolerably low. Some lucky few brought economic security with them in the form of gold. For the vast majority, however, their capital assets were near zero. Only a handful of secretaries had the opportunity to earn money while living in the camp.
Attendance to the need of financial security centered on providing an index of skills acquired in Vietnam to prospective employers. While in camp, English classes, survival classes on how to visit a doctor, shop in a market, etc., and libraries were available. All were enthusiastically received. These improved the refugees’ facility with the language, a major step, but did nothing to sharpen old skills or teach new ones which would improve their opportunities in the American job market.
Belongingness, love, and social needs—the third level of needs—were recognized and addressed in the welcome speech I gave to each planeload of new residents assigned to Camp 1-2-3. I stressed my personal pleasure that the refugees had chosen to come to America and ended my speech with, “. . . welcome to our country, for America is now our country.”
Another occasion for speaking to large groups of the refugees came at the periodic meetings I held with spokesmen from each tent and quonset hut. While the elected spokesmen were specifically invited, an open invitation was proffered to all residents. After the routine announcements such as, “Please remind the children not to play with snakes,” I would field any questions they might have. I realize now, in light of the sequential nature of the basic needs, why the questions
concerning food, clothing, and shelter steadily decreased and questions concerning the future increased- One poignant question encompassing level three and level four needs was, “Why would anyone want t° sponsor one of us?”
The refugees’ need to be loved was displayed on two levels—the need to be accepted by the Americans and the need for the personal love of close friends and relatives. Volunteers were especially helpful in demonstrating that Americans other than those assigned to the camp cared about the refugees’ welfare. A great deal of my time was devoted to the coordination and orchestration of the efforts of these groups and individuals.
One special volunteer at Camp 1-2-3 was a U. S- Navy hospital corpsman. He took annual leave and drove to the camp on the day it opened because ho thought that his knowledge of the Vietnamese language might be useful. He was a large man, complete with a red beard and a perpetually full bag of candy for the children. He was instantly and universally loved and trusted by the Vietnamese due to his obvious love for them and his knowledge of their language and customs- During the first weeks of the camp, he continually walked from tent to tent answering questions and locating people in need. I got his leave status changed to temporary duty and used him as an unofficial twoway communication link to the refugees. As the bond of mutual trust and respect between the refugees and
the official camp managers grew, the corpsman’s
11 tty declined. After two months, he returned to his home unit.
a M n0t^fr *nstance °f individual effort was provided by arine s wife who constructed a series of displays on var*ous regions of the United States. By rotating esc on the bulletin board near the mess hall, it was 0SS1 e to give the refugees an idea of the vastness and Var^y of their new land.
Y 1 e most entertainment was arranged through the oung Men s Christian Association, I set up the first • °r cntertainment event at the camp. I invited a
t club dance band to perform and also invited 30 ac^rican high school students. The American kids of K ^ C3talysts ^or the dancing and soon had a couple Undred refugees dancing on the parking lot black- P^w ile 4,000 others watched and cheered. re. , other area in which I was able to achieve good frts Was *n assembling a library. By soliciting books - anY°ne who asked, “What can I do to help?” we k ° j ,a<^ a library of over 1,000 books, supplemented with 31 ^ ncwsPaPers- The librarians were Vietnamese
V | Prevjous experience. Combining the efforts of
teers led to some symbiotic relationships. For ce’ a Jewish youth organization came to work cent a ^°ut^ern Baptist group in running a day care tapUeif center enabled the mothers to take advan- ^ the language classes, sewing centers, and library, s with many other projects, the library and the sew- ^8 center satisfied multiple needs. They served as also 'n^ ^aces ^or People with similar interests. They by ^onmbuted to self-esteem needs: the sewing center ancf r°VlC^n^ t^le means f°r a higher standard of dress cb aPPc‘arance and the library by giving the refugees a ce to gainfully employ their time by adding to
their personal knowledge. The sewing centers came about through the efforts of a 72-year-old lady whose energy and ability to get results were astounding. She spent many nights on a folding cot in Camp 1-2-3’s sewing center so she wouldn’t have to “waste time’’ making the drive to and from her home. The chairwoman of Church Women United of San Diego County, she established sewing centers in five camps, coordinating donations of machines, material, and personnel. Additionally, she scrounged enough white gowns and tuxedos to set up a no-charge wedding boutique.
Nationally organized volunteer organizations also played a major part in camp life. The Salvation Army provided free clothing. The Red Cross, by actively seeking out those in need, was another manifestation of Americans caring about Vietnamese. These organizations also provided me with special materials on occasion. For instance, they provided a warm, pretty sleeping bag for the 108-year-old lady in Camp 1-2-3. They were reluctant at first, for fear of starting a run on sleeping bags, but I told them that everyone would be made aware of the rules. If your age went into three digits, then and only then would a sleeping bag be provided instead of the standard blankets.
Entertainment provided through the YMCA ranged from an accordian class playing polka music to Herb Alpert and the Tijuana Brass, from marching bands to church-sponsored choral groups, and from puppet shows toBarnum & Bailey. Because of the boredom that is inevitable at a refugee camp, all forms of volunteer entertainment were gratefully booked.
The need for familial love was constantly underscored by the refugees’ efforts to locate relatives. The Red Cross devoted considerable assets to the “Family ReUnification Program.’’ All possible efforts were made to expeditiously unite families that had become separated during the exodus from South Vietnam.
Many romances, several leading to marriages, bloomed at the camp. On the other hand, several marriages were seriously endangered by the camp experience. I found myself functioning as a marriage counselor, a real trick since I don’t speak Vietnamese. I had mixed success. One patch-up was beautifully successful, one common-law couple eventually made up, and the wife-beater/husband-beater couple was still at odds when I left.
Self-esteem—the fourth need—of the majority of the refugees was at a low ebb when they arrived at the camp. Refugees are, by and large, tough mentally. They are survivors above all. Yet it is impossible to be indifferent to being forced out of your homeland, knowing you can never return. It is not possible in a refugee camp to offer each refugee an opportunity to demonstrate his worth to himself and others. Many had
to regain some measure of self-esteem vicariously. ^ they saw other Vietnamese holding responsible posi' tions, obviously being treated as important, kno^l' edgeable people, they could say to themselves, ‘‘See. we Vietnamese people are capable. If there were more jobs open, I too would do as good a job.”
It was partially with this in mind that the Vietnamese leadership structure was established. Each tent °r quonset hut elected a leader, and then these spokesmen elected camp committee chairmen. Staff jobs were created as needed and filled with volunteers. The camp managers worked with and through these committee5 as much as possible.
An example of the use of the committees for both motivation and punishment concerned assignment t° the quonset huts. The huts were the preferred quarters- Whenever a family from a quonset hut left the camP’ there were always others waiting to move into the vacated beds. The refugees could not be allowed t0 change residence freely as it would completely negate any locator system. A form was devised for requesting to move into a quonset hut. The important signature5 to obtain were those of the hut leader and the commit' tee chairman. I made it clear that, ‘‘If they approve it, 1 will.” This enhanced the position of the Vietnamese leaders, helped the self-esteem of all refugees, and gave an illusion of autonomy. Autonomy, of course, was no[ possible in any absolute sense. Given autonomy, thc refugees would simply leave.
n the other hand, when some refugees decided not t0 0 *ow tke procedure and simply moved in, the camp theCUt*VC • °^CCr an<^ t^C ^etnamese leaders evicted em. This had to be done only once because the result-
the °SS ^aCC Was a Powerful deterrent. The next day, evicted family, submitting the standard form, was
mi^ltte^’ hereby reinforcing the position of the com-
liari°S'n£> face is the term used to describe the pecu- ar y Asian sensitivity to any degree of perceived public Se]S£faCe' ^ represents a violation of both social and ^ esteem needs. Since the Vietnamese, like all lans, have this as part of their psychological make- and U a^or^e^ me my only real tool for punishment fa K*16 stron8est tools for motivation. Gaining
te y being paid special attention to or having his ref^10n and advice sought was important to all of the gees. As with losing face, the more public the act, e m°re powerful.
When a refugee had broken a rule, I tried to let the ation be handled at a lower level, trying to conserve the USa^C my only “weapon.” If the Vietnamese aemselves, or the camp executive officer could clear up th*111?01 *n^rach°n’ all the better. One type of trouble Fi ,'1^Ways handled myself was a fight.
3 snn tS Can exPected in any situation in which pv People are packed in together with little to do. m^ry°ne intuitively realized, and I stressed at the har ln^S’ t^le necessity f°r mutual cooperation and out^W' Every so often, however, a fight would break rnee ”C f’art*aPants would be brought to me. I would en^t ^em outside my office, thus insuring an audi- l°udl ^fSt ?art t^ie Proceedings consisted of me tho ^ ^ernanding to know what the problem was and Was °d^y rePr'manding the culprits. The fact that this . °ne through an interpreter did not seem to thi|rUniS^ cffectiveness or the amount of face lost. At point, I would “notice” the gathering crowd and w PLRe t^lem' ^ long quiet talk with the participants D , mllow, hammering out a solution to the original em and ending with personal promises to me that e would be no continuation of the fight. I never
ha^a repeater.
thelnterestmg indication of the sequential nature of tneeds involved the issuing of coats. Camp Pendle- Coln ^ate spring can be quite cold, especially when jn Pafed to Saigon. When the camp first opened, all : , ming refugees were issued standard military field in CtS ^ese jackets were uniformly unattractive and ^ atiably oversized. Yet, they were happily accepted. ci ...ln two months, the Red Cross began issuing ja U1^ iackets t0 new refugees and trading the new ets for the field jackets. These new jackets came in al sizes and colors. There was considerable haggling involved during the trade-in process. Refugees were quite choosy about size and color, an attitude which surprised and dismayed most of the American staff. This apparent change of attitude on the part of the refugees appears reasonable in light of Maslow’s Need Hierarchy. When first arriving, the refugees were eager to fulfill their level one needs, including clothing. This was the attitude with which the field jackets were viewed. Several weeks later, confident of their ability to satisfy level one and two needs, the refugees viewed the offered jackets in light of level three and four needs. An attractive, well-fitting jacket filled social and self-esteem needs.
The fifth need, that of self-actualization, is the most difficult to fill in any society. Not surprisingly, it was even more difficult at the refugee camp. Those who approached it were a fortunate few, and can easily be enumerated. They were:
The artist who constructed a mammoth “Hand of Hope,” a concrete sculpture, as a lasting memorial to the camp; the photographer who put together a portfolio to permanently record the camp life, using film provided by the Marines; the committee heads, including a number of women, who were probably more important than they had ever been before.
In all of this, I’ve only discussed one aspect of the assignment: the meeting and satisfying of needs that exhibited themselves in remarkable textbook fashion. In total, the personal relations with the refugees, volunteers, State Department personnel, and Marines were tremendously satisfying. Imagine the pleasure involved in having a military assignment in which there were immediate, obvious results to nearly everything you did, one in which you affected the future lives and attitudes of thousands of new citizens, and one in which the people you were trying to help frequently said, “Thank you.”
Major Townsend received a bachelor of science degree in mathematics and a commission in 1963 through the NROTC program at Marquette University. He earned a master’s degree in computer science from the Naval Postgraduate School in 1971. He has served two tours in the Far East, one in Okinawa and a second in Vietnam’s Northern I Corps, which included seven months as commanding officer of the 1st 8-inch Howitzer Battery. Stateside tours included two years as an artillery gunnery instructor at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and four years with the Marine Tactical Command and Control Systems (MTACCS) Test Bed, Camp Pendleton. While waiting for duty at the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, he volunteered for the Camp Pendleton Refugee Camp Complex. He is now attached to the 3rd Marine Division in Okinawa.