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"An Absence of Accountability”
(See R. L. Beavers, pp. 18-23, January 1976
Proceedings)
WilliamJ. Gundersdorf—lht commander states that, "America, in the abstract, and too many individual Americans in their private lives, never really made a commitment on behalf of the Vietnam effort.” While true, how could the public enthusiastically support the war when it never understood the need for the war? Many theories and statements (national security, domino theory, etc.) were forthcoming, but, unfortunately, they sounded as hollow and empty as they turned out to be.
As for our radio and television networks being "all strangely unsympathetic to America’s efforts and all bringing daily into virtually every American home the gory details of a no-holds- barred guerrilla war,” I only say, thank God for the news brought to us by our radio and TV networks. If the public hadn’t seen what this war was like, we might still have the foolish idea that war was like a John Wayne movie and that nobody really got hurt. Many times the public asked why, but we heard no real answers which would have stimulated a full commitment, only lies and military mumbo-jumbo (Vietnamization, gradualism, and "peace with honor”).
I don’t believe that the radio and television networks failed us, or that we’ve "become a nation of buck-passers.” The problem of the Southeast Asian war was one of national morals, and no amount of military might can make a morally wrong war right.
I question how Commander Beavers can separate the issues of our Southeast Asian involvement without first asking, should we have been there, and why were we really there? Until we have definite answers to these questions everything else is speculation. Let us face these questions before it is too late.
Captain Jack Caldwell, U. S. Navy {Retired)— Commander Beavers has hit the nail precisely on the head.
► Our defeat in Vietnam was not inevitable.
► We did lack a national commitment to that war.
► A concerted effort by the news media did manage to thwart the desire of a majority of Americans to win the war.
► We have become a nation of buck- passers.
It is too late to do anything about the first two points, but we can do something about the last two—the quicker, the better.
It is imperative that Congress enact legislation to control news media excesses during wartime. A law similar to the British National Secrets Act, which provides that the elected representatives of the people, not news editors, shall decide which information affects national security, would seem to have real merit. If we continue to permit arrogant news media to expose every secret detail of our national policy, troop movements, tactical plans, unit morale, weapon capabilities, etc. as we did during the Vietnam experience, we shall never again win a war.
I have long believed that, as a last resort, military leaders should resign in protest to political decisions or orders by seniors which they believe to be wrong. I often wonder why, in over 32 years of naval service, I never witnessed a protest resignation.
Could the answer be that most American military leaders are locked into the system of "going along to get along” due to financial considerations? Very few military people seem to enjoy the security of inherited wealth. Resignation, prior to 20 years service, would mean financial hardship for most officers and for their families.
The English author Nevil Shute, in his autobiography Slide Rule, made an interesting comment on the effect inherited wealth had on naval officers. He wrote:
"When I was in the navy I served in an office staffed by over a hundred temporary officers of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve. As civilians in uniform we found in many instances that the only way to get things done quickly was to short-circuit the system by getting verbal decisions and
letting the paper work tag along later. This required senior officers of the regular navy to give verbal decisions involving the expenditure of thousands of pounds without any paper cover. These officers were as brave as lions and would have risked their lives in a destroyer torpedo attack without a second thought, but they balked at risking their jobs on a verbal decision. Now and again we would find some cheerful young commander or captain who did not hesitate, who was as brave in the office as he was at sea. Commenting on such a regular officer and on his way of doing business we would say, 'He’s a good one. I bet he’s got private means.’ Invariably investigation proved that we were right. The officers who were brave in the Admiralty were the officers who had an independent income, who could afford to resign from the navy if necessary without bringing financial disaster to their wives and children. It started as a joke with us to say that brave officers in the office probably had private means, and then it got beyond a joke and turned into an axiom.”
Buck-passing has become endemic to America. No one is responsible for anything. The U. S. military services naturally reflect this national character trait. The individual naval officer who acts in opposition to it will get little support from the upper echelons of naval leadership. Also, he will get very little guidance by example. The examples set by our naval leadership in recent years are poor. Naval morale and fighting effectiveness were severely damaged by a recent CNO who, by forcing through changes decreed by an ill-informed Secretary of the Navy, gained national recognition to further his political aspirations.
ENTER THE FORUM
Regular and Associate Members are invited to write brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also to write brief discussions on any topic of naval interest for possible publication in these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Navy can be exchanged. The U. S. Naval Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion published in the Proceedings.
Until the prevailing climate in the Navy changes, the officer who stops the buck at his desk and courageously speaks his mind would do well to have private means.
'"The Knox-Class Frigate—
A Reassessment”
{See T. B. Buell, pp. 93-96,
November 1975 Proceedings)
Raymond J. Schneider, Jr., former MAD Project Engineer on the LAMPS Mk III program—I enjoyed Commander Buell’s article on the Knox-class frigate, but I must correct him when he says ". . • the magnetic anomaly detection (MAD) towed body can be deployed at water level to extend its detection depth and range.”
The MAD towed body contains the magnetic detecting head, an extremely sensitive and quite expensive device. Flying the towed body near the water level produces serious risk of wave strike damage or even loss of the towed body. Such risk might be acceptable if improved performance were the result. However, wave and swell induced ionic currents in sea water produce a phenomena usually called "wave noise.” Near the ocean surface the wave noise increases more quickly than signal strength, thus very low altitude operation actually can, and usually does, degrade system performance. Other unattractive features of such low-level flight are increased crew fatigue, noise induced by increased buffet, and reduced safety of flight.
When it arrives I trust Commander Buell will find that the LAMPS Mk III is indeed a ". . . dramatic increase in ASW improvements for the frigates . . . .”
Captain L. J. Brown, U. S. Navy, Commander Destroyer Squadron Thirty-One— Commander Buell’s treatment of the capabilities and limitations of the Knox- class is perceptive and comprehensive. The Knox frigate has an impressive combat systems capability, especially with a LAMPS embarked, Harpoon missiles, and an additional passive sonar capability, for a ship of her size. However, I would add emphasis to the serious limitation of her main propulsion engineering. While agreeing that two-boiler operation provides little if any additional safety or
A SH-2F LAMPS helicopter, equipped with magnetic anomaly detection gear, surface search radar, and sonohuoys, gives a Knox frigate an impressive ASW capability when it is properly employed.
KAMAN AEROSPACE CORP
reliability over one boiler, one wonders how this flaw in the system’s basic design escaped notice during the early stages of design approval.
Similarly, the vulnerability of the Knox frigates to battle damage and their inability to remain at sea for protracted periods in the face of adversity are critical to the usefulness of these ships in war. Being prepared to "stop and fix her” is small consolation while lying dead in the water during heavy weather or with an enemy in striking distance.
Moreover, the fragility of these ships erodes the confidence that is required to achieve and maintain the offensive tactical orientation of their COs and officers which the weapons suits permit, and the surface warfare community demands.
Doubtless there is little that can be done in the way of major redesign and alteration to help this situation, but a concerted, well managed effort and dedication of resources to improve spare parts support, adequate manning (skill and numbers), and correction of design deficiencies when practicable will do much to make these ships truly useful men-of-war for the years to come of which Commander Buell speaks.
"USS Constellation Flare-up:
Was it Mutiny?”
(See P. B. Ryan, pp. 46-53, January 1976
Proceedings)
Rear Admiral George van Deurs, U. S. Navy (Retired)— The buck-passing and administrative temporizing, as reported by Captain Ryan, which followed the Constellation flare-up make a striking contrast with the procedure in the case of the frigate Congress. In both occurrences some three percent of the vessels’ crews were involved.
On 12 January 1800, the recently commissioned United States Frigate Congress was six days out of Newport bound for Batavia when a gale completely dismasted her. Forty-three days later she made the Virginia Capes under jury rig. Her "officers were at variance with the captain,” and the crew was disorderly. Soon after she made Norfolk her Captain, James Sever, jailed eight men and a midshipman, charged them with mutiny, and wrote Secretary of the Navy
Benjamin Stoddert for a court to try them.
Stoddert passed that buck right back to Norfolk. He wrote Captain Thomas Truxton of the USF Constellation:
"Captain Sever has reported to me, the mutinous conduct of some of the crew of the Frigate Congress. — As Commander of the Squadron, you might have ordered a Court Martial at once, without appealing to me, & I am sorry you did not do it. I do not like this method of appealing to the head of the Department, by officers, who are themselves competent to the object of appeal—I have now directed Captain Sever to apply to you for a Court Martial, which be pleased to order.”
Truxton promptly appointed a court to meet on 3 May, with a civilian lawyer (who was also a member of the Virginia legislature) as Judge Advocate. The trial apparently took some eight days.
On 15 May the court aquitted one man and sentenced four to "receive seventy two lashes [each] of the Cat of nine tails aboard the Frigate Congress." The court regretted that the law required them to sentence two ringleaders to be hanged from the Congress' yardarm and recommended clemency for these two. (The midshipman and the eighth man were not tried.)
Truxton approved the proceedings the same day. He "mitigated” the death sentences to "one hundred lashes on their bare backs with the Cat of nine tails and that they then be cashiered of all wages now due them from the United States and further that they be discharged as unworthy of ever serving in the future aboard any ship belonging to the United States.” He directed the sentences to be carried out six days later. They had been carried out by the time the papers reached the Navy Department.
Who produced the more effective Navy, Stoddert or Chafee?
"Shipboard Drug Abuse”
(See R. E. Helms, pp. 41-45, December 1975; G. T. Dunn and R. G. Porter, p. 114, March 1976 Proceedings)
Captain J. V. Cricchi, U. S. Navy, Commanding Officer, Naval Investigative Service Office, Charleston—Captain Helms’ useful article on shipboard drug abuse, while drawing an accurate and perceptive picture of some of the problems and remedies of this insidious situation, may have overdrawn the role of the executive officer in the matter of developing drug informants and handling and protecting sources. The XO’s participation is of course natural and vital, but, trying to penetrate and neutralize a drug network without professional investigative support all along the way is risky business. Protecting informants, interviewing sources confidentially, and building a solid, prosecutable case are some of the reasons why SecNavInst 5520.3 reserves the initiation of criminal intelligence operations to the Director, Naval Investigative Service.
Special agents of the Naval Investigative Service (NIS) are trained and equipped to carry out such operations. They have a depth of experience plus all kinds of investigative aids and techniques to safely and effectively do the job. Equally important, they are in a position to be aware of any interface with other ongoing operations. As Captain Helms points out, drug networks may cut across several command lines and inquiries need careful coordination.
A typical hard-pressed and overworked executive officer needs all the help he can get, so when it comes to fighting a shipboard drug problem he need only contact the nearest NIS Resident Agency for some help.
"Military Cover and Deception vs. Freedom of Information”
(W. D. Toole, pp. 18-23, December 1975; J. G. Sobieski, G. W. Healy, and P. M. Regan, pp. 116-120, March 1976 Proceedings)
James T. O’Reilly—Pick a court, Admiral Gorshkov—your navy’s strength has been invoked in the December Proceedings as evidence against the laws which mandate open disclosure of most documents by agencies of the U. S. Government. As an alien, admiral, you may choose the U. S. Navy plans, programs, or policies which you wish to see, you may write to the Navy formally requesting copies of those documents, and upon denial you can sue the Navy in any federal district court for access to those documents. If the court, after receiving the documents from the Navy and reviewing them, feels that they are not classified properly in accordance
with existing Executive Orders on classification, the court can deliver the documents to you and award you the costs of the suit and attorneys’ fees.
Admiral Toole’s article strongly criticizes the Freedom of Information (FOI) Act, upon which the above scenario is based. I sympathize in principle with Admiral Toole, but his point is made too late, his article fails to ascribe part of the blame to the Navy, and his solution is pegged to an approach which no current Congress could or would adopt.
Ten years before the article appeared, the House of Representatives voted 307 to 0 to make openness of all federal agencies the law of the land. In November 1974, with much the same sentiment again fueled in Congress by exposure of specious "national security” claims, the Congress toughened the Freedom of Information Act’s exemption for defense materials and produced the conditions upon which a potential opponent of the Navy could legally obtain access to Navy files. Had the Toole article appeared in December 1965, the Secretary’s Notes comments might well have called it "one of the most significant and timely articles ever published in the Proceedings." Today, it is too little, too late.
At the time that freedom of information was moving from concept into statutory form, the Navy’s abuses of existing public information law were cited as examples of bureaucratic misuse of the Administrative Procedure Act. Under the terms of that 1947 act, which encouraged public disclosure but did not mandate it, the Navy refused to make public its telephone directory, claiming confidentiality, and refused to make available to the press a guest list for a private party which had been held on a Navy yacht. The press, frustrated by obstructionism within many bureaucratic organizations, successfully pressed for an across-the-board public disclosure law. Though Defense Department representatives objected and claimed that the whole system would be unworkably burdensome, massive congressional sup port swept the legislative proposals into law in 1966.
It is easy to construct an argument that sinister forces created a situation so uncomfortable and unaccustomed that the Navy cannot endure this "forced openness.” It is harder, on the legal and historical record, to accept the Navy’s share of responsibility for the climate in which a mandatory disclosure law was needed. Under the revised statute, effective in February 1975, defense secret information can only be held confidential if a federal court finds it "specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and ... in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order.” Perhaps, if the Navy’s congressional efforts had been better, or the Pentagon’s track record for credibility conformed to congressional expectations, the language of this exemption might have been made more favorable to the Navy.
Admiral Toole’s article suggests a confidential oversight panel, but his proposal has two fatal flaws. The constitutionality of delegating a legislative branch power, that of oversight of Executive departments, to a quasi-executive agency, is doubtful. But constitutional questions are merely academic, since no present or foreseeable future Congress is going to abdicate authority for enforcing the accountability of the Executive Branch to the type of panel suggested. Accountability is the key word behind freedom of information and behind the openness theory; had the Navy in the past been more accountable, as in the two cases used to bolster arguments for a Freedom of Information Act, it might not face its present dilemma.
Instead of the Toole panel, the Navy should concentrate internally on three realistic and timely measures:
► Begin with the law’s requirement that an Executive Order exist which is applicable to the classification of the documents. Have an outside contract consultant, or an officer appointed from within as a "devil’s advocate,” to review important classified documents. If these were not specifically authorized to be kept secret by Executive Order, then the Navy should seek, through the Defense Department, a new or supplementary Executive Order. If the first test is met for the class of documents but they were not properly classified in fact, i.e. objectively in light of written Executive Order standards, reclassify them before a request is received. Remember that this process cannot begin after a request is received. (If a document is unclassified at the time a request is received, it cannot be classified legally and withheld thereafter.) Perhaps the devil’s advocate approach would improve the Navy’s winning percentage when disclosure cases are litigated.
► Loss of the recent Kriendler cases demonstrates the Navy’s need for better legal representation before the courts. At a time when more suits are being filed and lost, the Defense Department is trying to force disclosure of sensitive employment data of its contractors in the Westinghouse case. Instead of devoting its energies in favor of more disclosure, the Defense Department might prepare itself for successful defense of Navy documents by increasing the resources and staff devoted to that mission of defending FOI Act cases. Training and careful preparation for many expected future cases, along with thoughtful policy decisions on which documents deserve strongest protection, will benefit the Navy in the long term. The American Civil Liberties Union has published a booklet explaining the means of making requests for specific State and Defense department information and has supported a number of cases financially.
By contrast, the Navy’s legal defense is often left to a local U. S. Attorney whose other cases may not afford the same time and resources available to the parties demanding disclosure. For each case lost by the government, a precedent against future confidentiality is established. Legally, the Navy needs help.
► Navy personnel should understand that embarrassing and undesirable publicity will result from some of the disclosures which the FOI Act requires. The documents must be released, whether or not there is resistance to disclosure, if they lack exempted status under certain narrowly-limited exemptions. The Navy should educate its people not to resist disclosure unless a probability of success on these narrow legal grounds exists. Had the Secretary of the Navy accepted the embarrassment of revealing the guest list or the inconvenience of disclosing the phone directory, proponents of openness would not have had ammunition for attacks on confidentiality within the military side of the bureaucracy. Recognize that openness is the law of the land—and not a passing trend; changes in attitude should be made in accord with this philosophy in all but the most significant cases.
"The Naval Officer:
Manager or Leader?”
(See R. T. E. and D. R. Bowler, pp. 64-67, December 1975 Proceedings)
Midshipman 1 /c John R. Allen, U. S. Naval Academy—The Bowlers’ article discusses a potential crisis in the minds of young naval officers who might genuinely pose the question, "Am I a manager or leader first?”
The Navy, in its officer procurement and career planning programs, has had no difficulty in placing this relationship in comfortable perspective. A handy document, the Navy Officer Careers Handbook published by the Navy Recruiting Command, describes qualifications for today’s officer. It acknowledges that, although the wide variety of officer occupations requires particular combinations of specific qualifications,
. . each of the officers performing such varied duties is alike in many respects. Each, from the time he first dons his ensign stripe, is a manager, responsible for getting things done through the people—the enlisted and civilian personnel—he leads. As a leader, he is responsible not only for the direction of human effort in his organization, but also for property and human lives. As he is promoted up the career ladder, he must be a planner and an able executive, with full responsibility for thousands of individuals and millions of dollars worth of material, ships, and facilities. ...”
The Lieutenants Bowler conclude, finally, that the young naval officer can recognize that the relationship between management and leadership is not incompatible.
It is not enough to simply recognize that the relationship is not incompatible when one considers the heavy reliance the Navy places on its officers to provide requisite leadership at every level of Navy operations and management. Although my experience in the fleet has been limited to summer cruises, I have observed that the younger officers perform their operations-related duties reasonably well and with enthusiasm. These are duties which identify with traditional roles of leadership—the giving of commands, orders, directions, etc., attended by instant obedience by subordinates. It is in the performance of the more mundane "management” functions, such as division work assignments, training, housekeeping, administration, etc., that neglect is apparent.
Here the instant "command-obey” relationship must be replaced with a continuous, close-contact, hard-working, "leader-follower” relationship based on mutual understanding and respect. Lack of leadership in such management areas is interpreted by subordinates as a lack of interest in their welfare and the welfare of the ship. If officers will not lead, men will not follow. Morale suffers, and the discipline needed for combat will be all but non-existent.
Is it this same disenchantment with management responsibilities that has caused young officers to ask, "Am I a manager or leader first?”
The answer, of course, is that management and leadership are inseparable, just as operations and leadership are inseparable.
"Oklahoma: Up from the Mud at Pearl Harbor”
(See Pictorial, pp. 46-59, December 1975
Proceedings')
Captain Joseph W. Koenig, U. S. Navy (Retired)—As an old Oklahoma hand, I wish to compliment the Proceedings and the compiler (unidentified) of the Oklahoma pictorial story. The layout is great; the quotations particularly apt; and the
span of years covered gives the story tremendous impact. It is a suitable tribute to a great old ship.
Editor’s Note: We have received numerous favorable comments on the Oklahoma pictorial. The ",unidentified compiled’ of the feature is Paul Stillwell, Proceedings’ Managing Editor, who also developed the USS Spruance (DD-963) pictorial which appeared in the February 1976 issue.
The USS Oklahoma (BB-37) prepares to depart from Philadelphia Navy Yard in 1929 after a two-year, $7 million modernization.
"Fleet Observations,
From the Fleet”
(See J. M. Lang, pp. 75-76, January 1976
Proceedings)
Commander A. A. Balunek, U. S. Naval Reserve—Commander Lang’s comments on the Naval Reserve and reservists are correct, and his opinion that the transportation funds could be better utilized is valid; although the participating reservists welcome shipboard training and escape from the sterile drill halls, flying of reservists to ships is costly and impractical. Government air will not do it: the Navy does not have the transport assets; and the Air Force/Air Guard has better things to do. Yet, to this day, some Naval Reserve managers are pushing the idea.
Commander Lang identified the heart of the problem when he said the "program” might not be as effective and as reliable as it could be. Being a USNR-R commander, I welcome and appreciate any attention given the Naval Reserve by USN officers, especially "younger” officers; and I am writing this in the hope that Commander Lang and his shipboard operating brothers might further discuss the Naval Reserve and someday improve it. For, in the past, our seniors, both USN and USNR, have been ineffective, considering the present confusion and havoc we’re witnessing.
I would imagine a regular commanding officer, because of his busy schedule, would not concern himself about the Naval Reserve, and rightly so. But, unless active duty officers learn otherwise, as Commander Lang did, they would rightfully assume that somewhere, somehow, the Naval Reserve is being trained and is ready to go—but that is not so. Excepting the Naval Reserve Force (NRF) destroyers and other small reserve ships/craft, the surface reserve sailor gets little practical shipboard-type training.
The solution to the problem plaguing the program lies with the Secretary of the Navy and the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. Whether the Navy wants a reserve, or whether a surface reserve in these modern times is good or bad, I do not know. Yet, the fact remains that law established the Naval Reserve, and the program and adminis-
tration of that law is charged to the Navy. But, what has happened?
► As late as 1973, surface naval reserve mobilization was premised on World War II and Korean War models.
► That since 1970, DoD requested, and later demanded, total force scenarios from the Navy.
► That, despite DoD’s demand and accusations by some DoD spokesmen that Navy was "remiss,” it wasn’t until October, 1974, that the Navy announced its definition of Total Force.
While the Navy was footdragging, DoD took the initiative and convened its own studies, completing them before the Navy’s; and the result now is that the Navy and the Naval Reserve have been on the defensive, trying to justify their numbers, ever since. It is incomprehensible that the Navy could not relate its reserve in a timely manner to three of its four missions.
It wasn’t until the pressure was on that the Navy finally looked at the Naval Reserve problem in the office where reserve planning should have been considered years ago—OP-06 (Strategic Plans Policy and Nuclear System, National Security Council Affairs Division).
So where are we today with the surface Naval Reserve? We haven’t made much progress in the surface Naval Reserve from a combat-training viewpoint. The Navy has only now identified reserve manpower missions. If it took five years to rediscover the wheel, how long will it take to make it when DoD will not provide the spokes?
I offer two suggestions for the employment of the surface Naval Reserve: (1) The surface Naval Reserve should be outfitted with ships to the extent required by some foreseeable national emergency. The ships provided would not be mere training platforms but assets which the Navy would need. The ships would be manned 20%/80% regu- lar/reserve in a stand-down or cadre condition. These Naval Reserve ship operations would be limited in interest of economy—reservists would be mainly caretakers and custodians of the ships. (2) Serious thought should be given by naval planners as to what type of ships would be desirable for national defense and would be suitable for the Naval Reserve. As an example, with the advent of the LHAs and the changing role of the Marine Corps, will we need all of the Newport-zlass LSTs in active service? When that decision is made, do we mothball them, give them to our allies, or place them with the Naval Reserve? The Naval Reserve crews would be, at least, marginally competent to move the ships from Point A to Point B.
THE SHIPS & AIRCRAFT OF THE U. S. FLEET 10th Edition
This is a comprehensive and detailed description of all the ships and aircraft of the U. S. Navy and the U. S. Coast Guard. The missiles and conventional ordnance carried by the ships and aircraft are also discussed. All elements of the U. S. Fleet are portrayed in tables, text, and photographs. There are 500 photographs of nearly every class of ship, type of aircraft, and missile in U. S. naval service. The index lists ships by both name and number. A comprehensive list of abbreviations makes the technical details easily understood. This volume is the standard in its field and belongs in every library with books about ships.
1975. 296 pages. Illustrated. Glossary. Index.
List price: $14.50 Member’s price: $11.60 A Naval Institute Press Book
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I am aware that in 1975 three LKA/LPAs were designated for the Naval Reserve, and that the Navy is experimenting with regular/reserve manning mixes; but it has been a long time in coming. Perhaps my thinking is outdated, and the environment of modern naval warfare has so changed that there is no need for a surface Naval Reserve; if so, then where is the senior officer with the knowledge and fortitude to take a stand and make such a declaration?
"Another Problem in Resource Allocation—The Radio Frequency Spectrum Shortage”
{See J. L. Boycs and F. L. Frisbie, pp. 94-95, December 1975 Proceedings)
Commander H. L. Holthaus, U. S. Navy, Office of Telecommunications Policy, Executive Office of the President—This article provides an insight into the management of a unique natural resource that interestingly enough does not deplete with use, only mismanagement. This vital resource is used in support of national policies and the achievement of national goals with the primary objectives being to:
► Enhance the conduct of foreign affairs
► Serve the national security and defense
► Safeguard life and property on land, at sea, and in the air
► Support crime prevention and law enforcement
► Support the national and international transportation systems
► Foster conservation of natural resources
► Provide for the national and international dissemination of educational, general, and public interest information and entertainment
► Make available rapid, efficient, nationwide and worldwide radiocommunication services
► Promote scientific research, develop ment, and exploration
Overall, the Federal Government has close to $50 billion invested in spectrum- dependent, communications-electronics equipment. The key to protecting this investment, which underwrites the above indicated objectives, is competent spectrum management.
The Office of Telecommunications Policy (OTP), Executive Office of the President, motivated in part by a September 1974 General Accounting Office (GAO) report on management and use of the radio spectrum, but with the added incentive of preparing for the 1979 International Telecommunication Union General World Administrative Conference, had the Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee (IRAC) undertake a study of the frequency management manpower situation. The IRAC manpower study indicated that 20 of the 35 senior government frequency managers, as will 40% of the middle grade (GS 13-14) frequency personnel, are expected to retire by January 1979. Clearly, most of the current managers and their normal replacements will be gone by 1979- The military departments are the most affected by this manpower crisis. For example, the Navy position has been vacant since fall 1975 due to Mr. Fris- bie’s departure. Vacancies on current rosters are indicative of a lack of concerted intent by the military departments to enhance the image and career growth patterns of the frequency management community. An October 1975 GAO report indicated, inter alia, that within the Defense Department there had been no specific commitment to strengthen frequency management personnel resources. Therefore, to use a phrase coined by our former Ambassador to the United Nations, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, we are letting a vital national resource slip away by "benign neglect.”
By Vice Admiral Sir Arthur Hezlet.
In this companion volume to his successful works, The Submarine and Sea Power and Aircraft and Sea Power, Admiral Hezlet now deals with the electric and electronic revolution that has so affected naval warfare in the twentieth century.
Admiral Hezlet begins with warships and electricity in the nineteenth century, preparing us for the effects of the invention of the wireless and other developments prior to 1914. Then in three chapters, he gives us World War I, with particular emphasis on the Battle of Jutland. He follows with the developments between the wars, 1919-1939, and then three chapters on the spectacular changes during World War II. A
Electronics
„Sea
Power
last chapter brings his subject up to date, leaving the reader once again in Admiral Hezlet’s debt for his great ability to render technical matters in language that is both clear and pleasurable. Few writers on naval warfare have contributed as much as Admiral Hezlet, in this and the preceding two volumes, to our understanding of the sea power that has played such an important role in the preservation of the United States and Britain.
1975. 318 pages. Illustrated. Index.
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A Naval Institute Book Selection
In an effort to counter part of this
situation, the Office of Telecommunications Policy, in August 1975 with the concurrence of both the Civil Service Commission and the Office of Management and Budget, issued OTP Circular No. 14 which established a career development program in spectrum management. Subsequently, OTP has followed up with a letter to the heads of departments and agencies of the Federal Government requesting their current and projected professional manpower levels of frequency management personnel for fiscal years 1977 through 1979.
As the subject article indicated, "radio frequency management is done by experts who meld years of experience with a curious blend of electronics, politics, and not a little bit of larceny.” A strengthened Civil Service framework in the frequency management community is necessary to provide a long-term management team. However, who can best make the political, subjective, and often judgment decisions in national and international forums but those who have operated in the environment both as a military professional and quasi-diplomat? Well trained, experienced, and promotable naval officers are needed to fill this bill. These individuals offer a blend of education, operational experience, and broadened vision on current and projected Navy requirements and trends.
A well trained and competent frequency manager must deal with a wide range of applications, such as review of competing government and non-government systems, electromagnetic compatibility, cost-benefit trade offs, interservice, inter-agency, and international agreements, and tactical requirements. Therefore, his background and expertise become increasingly valuable as he progresses through a career path that sees him performing first at the unit and station level and then progressing to area, fleet, joint, national, and international positions of authority and responsibility. Again, quoting from the article, "They justify requirements, horse-trade, coerce, bluff, and gamble with an intuition that cannot be taught other than by long experience.” All too often senior officers without adequate training and background are assigned to demanding national and international frequency management billets and are simply not the best to represent our Government or Navy interests.
The Navy has a significant responsibility to safeguard national maritime and space allocations. Without these allocations our multi-billion dollar com- munications-electronics investment, including satellite and weapon programs, is vulnerable to degradation through mismanagement. The radar bands are a specific portion of the spectrum that is invaluable to both our Government and national defense interests, but, at present, they are generally mismanaged. By 1979, developing countries and other nations which have finally "arrived” in the space age will be exerting a significant force that will require this country to be on solid ground in order to defend its right to retain current allocations. If the current lack of expertise continues, military departments will be playing catch-up ball in 1979 and entrusting less user-oriented players on the national team with the responsibility "to hang on to what we have, if you can.”
Clearly the solution to upgrading our officer ranks in this vital resource management area is to identify promising officers early in their careers (preferably in the 0-3 grade), properly prepare them by assignment to progressively more demanding roles, and ensure that they are promotable by maintaining proper sea/shore rotation patterns. Currently, the Navy frequency manager stigma of being frozen in that area, and thereby limiting, if not permanently terminating, opportunity for future promotion has the effect of frightening potentially capable young officers from the frequency management field. It should be recognized that an officer who early-on begins to master both the engineering and management aspects of spectrum utilization is, by the very nature of frequency management, dealing with a fundamental factor of any system and in order to exercise judgment must in turn develop a fundamental appreciation of every equipment or system he deals with. He is therefore engaged in a career that will include detailed involvement in tactical and strategic operations, command and control planning, communi- cations-electronics radar and weapon systems review for electromagnetic and joint service compatibility, national and international negotiations, and the continued study of advanced technologies and public policy. This background, supplemented with regular sea rotation to acquire and maintain basic professional expertise and perspective, would allow a disciplined practitioner of basic engineering, operational, and management skills to acquire a broad overview of the Navy’s mission, tasks, and functions as related to both national defense and public policy. Thus, an officer who is a qualified spectrum manager is in fact a broad-based systems engineer, an experienced negotiator, and an individual with a working knowledge of how to operate in the national and international arenas where economics and politics dominate. It is submitted that this is the blend of talents required of flag officers and accordingly sought in officers at each selection milestone. Why then is the stigma still with us?
Articles and comments such as these will sound the alarm, but proof of serious national intent is a healthy, trained, and creditable frequency management community.
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"Missions and Concept of the Federal German Navy”
(See K. H. Reichert and F. D. Braun, pp. 96-99, December 1975 Proceedings)
Vice Admiral Friedrich Ruge, Federal German Navy (Retired), Chief of Naval Operations of the Federal German Navy (19561961)— The concept actually goes back to 1950 when Chancellor Adenauer approached the Allies on defense problems. In view of the Soviet treatment of Czechoslovakia and the Berlin Blockade, he considered the situation of the Federal German Republic as very insecure and offered a German contribution to Western defense. The first plans for German Armed Forces were drawn up for him by experts at Himmerod, near Bonn, in October 1950. The starting point for the naval contribution was identified by the importance of the Danish Narrows as the number one strategic position in northwestern Europe. This area had to be defended through the close cooperation of the three services, primarily of Denmark and the Federal Republic. The naval contribution was tailored to this task. We had learned from history; all ideas of a large navy or a "High Seas Fleet” were rejected. Incidentally, the Himmerod plans were followed almost completely.
The main tasks of the new navy were threefold. First and foremost it had to contribute decisively to the defense of the Narrows proper; then it had to make the approach through the North Sea safe for supplies arriving from the West; and finally it had to make the Baltic unsafe as a transport road for the other side. Negotiations took longer than expected, but the Federal Republic was admitted to NATO in 1954-1955, and the first volunteers took their oaths on 12 November 1955. It took almost a decade to set up a navy which could fulfill these missions. Training officers and men had first priority, as did identifying our place in the Alliance. We had to use material which was quickly available. As aptly described in the article, the second decade was used to modernize material and methods, and this will continue in the third decade, as also shown by the two authors. The steady growth of the Soviet Navy makes it imperative. Scrapping the Federal Navy and concentrating on the army and air force, as suggested by specialists with a purely continental outlook, would be a bad mistake. The naval tasks around the Danish Narrows exist, and they are fulfilled best—and also cheapest—by those who live there and know this decisive area best.
Editor’s Note: The map on the first page (p. 96) of the referenced article has done away with the Danish Narrows. This change would alter the situation somewhat if it were valid—however, it was our error.
Special Marine Corps Issue
(See November 1975 Proceedings)
Captain J. V. Cricchi, U. S. Navy— Congratulations on your fine November issue highlighting the Marine Corps. Count me as a well-wisher who hopes the Marines are around at least another 200 years. Despite the Nixon Doctrine, they undoubtedly will continue to play a crucial role in maintaining stability on this weary old globe. I get "bad vibes” from the fact they are not in Beirut at this very moment, but, on the other hand, it is comforting to know that the Marines are prepared to react to some totally unexpected incident like the Mayaguez affair.
As a blue-suiter I hold what may be a minority view among naval officers concerning Marines: I love ’em! Having served alongside many Marines in peace and war, I have the greatest respect and admiration for their high ideals, "take- the-high-ground” spirit, and uncompromising professionalism. While they can be occasionally intractable, intolerable, and infuriating, they are incomparable. Actually, a Marine, like a martini, just takes getting used to.
There’s also a little bit of Eliza Doolittle ("Don’t speak of love, show me!”) in every Marine, so as tangible evidence of my high regard I would like to point out that I had a hand in adding the Marine globe and anchor as a prominent feature in the insignia of a Navy ship, the USS Spiegel Grove (LSD-32).
Shortly after reporting on board the Spiegel Grove as executive officer in 1968,
I convinced the skipper that the ship’s insignia needed revising. We held a contest, but none of the entries seemed suitable so we scuttled that approach. (This caused some unexpected dissatisfaction and suggests that one should stifle the natural urge to stage a contest in matters of this sort.)
My next mistake was to undertake the project almost single-handedly. After finding out that it is patently dumb for an XO to do nearly anything single-handedly, I turned the job over to a small ad hoc committee.
As for the design itself, I wanted to get away from the usual "alligator” theme that is so common in the amphibious Navy. Instead, we concentrated on the idea of the Navy-Marine Corps team which, of course, reaches its highest expression in amphibious warfare. This idea was, I think, fittingly carried out by placing the naval officer emblem and Marine Corps emblem side-by-side. The rest of the insignia shows the ship in silhouette against four white pillars which represent the dominant architectural feature of the Rutherford B. Hayes memorial located at the former President’s home, Spiegel Grove, near Fremont, Ohio.
I had a slightly uneasy feeling that our new insignia might be hard to sell with the Marine Corps emblem so boldly displayed. But we floated the design up the chain-of-command, and it gained rapid approval.
I’d like to think that the Marine Corps emblem as a feature of a U. S. Navy ship insignia is unique.