From the first application of the steam engine for the purpose of propelling vessels, the risk of boiler explosions had been recognized. And the recognized risk was not without its sad satisfaction over the loss of the riverboat Moselle and about 200 passengers and crew members. Her boiler explosion on the Ohio River in April 1838 was only one of a long series of major steamboat disasters. Only a few days earlier, the steamer Oronoko suffered a similar fate on the Mississippi River from a boiler explosion which cost the lives of 100 persons.
The steamboat problem was, indeed, very real and evoked considerable national concern. The search for possible solutions divided into two general schools of thought:
- Enact and enforce laws which would establish minimal standards for the design, construction, and maintenance of boilers—thereby preventing loss of life.
- Rely on the economic motivations of the vessel owners to institute their own preventive standards to protect their investment, and thus preserve the lives of the people exposed on board their vessels.
Various municipal governments agreed with the first school of thought and, as a result, initiated investigations and passed ordinances in the area of steamboat explosion risk. During the 1830s, a number of states had passed laws providing for the periodic inspection of steamboat machinery and testing of boilers. These noteworthy attempts failed, primarily because of the interstate nature of the waterborne commerce. The problem was beyond the scope of effective state action.
Why, then, didn’t the federal government act? Part of the reason lay with the Congress, which was somewhat reluctant to impose restrictions upon the development of an emerging industry just at the point when it was so vital to the nation’s progress.
In 1825, Secretary of the Treasury Richard Rush reflected the views of the laissez-faire school of thought: ". . . legislative enactments are calculated to do mischief, rather than prevent it, except such as subject the owners and masters of those boats to suitable penalties in case of disasters . . .” He also referred to the ". . . evident reluctance to legislate on subjects relating to the arts and occupations of particular professions, such interference being generally considered ungenial to the character of our institutions, and contrary to sound policy . . .” The matter, he declared ". . . must be left to the intelligence of the age, and to the operation of motives which are more powerfully felt by the owners and managers of steamboats than any which legislative authority can impose.”
The secretary was not the only person of this persuasion. An editorial in a major western-rivers port newspaper stated in no uncertain terms:
"It is a notorious fact when a steamboat meets with a serious accident, the loss to the owners is intense, and often seals their ruin, more than any legislative body would think of imposing . . . the business is much safer in the hands of those having money invested and understanding all its bearings, than in the hands of politicians, having neither interest or experience.”
While we now attach negative, self-interest labels to those who vigorously oppose legislative enactments on safety, the philosophical differences between the two schools of thought still persist. And this is, perhaps, a healthy difference of opinion that best serves the interests of taxpayers by inhibiting both the excesses of costly bureaucratic over-regulation and abusive corporate profit taking at the expense of the individual’s safety and well-being.
On 14 June 1838, the steamboat Pulaski exploded in North Carolina with the loss of approximately 100 lives. Combining these deaths with those of the Moselle and the Oronoko, Congress received still more impetus to pass remedial legislation. An act was passed 7 July 1838 "for the better security of the lives of passengers.” It was directed at a number of causes of disasters and was not limited to explosions alone. Other steamboat disasters, involving fires and collisions, had also resulted in heavy loss of life. The new law required all steamboats to undergo periodic hull and boiler inspection and to install certain lifesaving and fire fighting equipment. Owners of steam vessels were required to employ skillful and experienced engineers. The law, however, did not provide for a cadre of inspectors or centralized supervision. It merely said that district judges would appoint, from time-to-time, skillful and competent persons to make inspections. Obviously some of these "time-to-time” inspectors could be very friendly or very harsh, depending upon whom they were dealing with. Nor did the law provide for the licensing of a vessel’s officers on the basis of competency or for the revocation of their licenses in cases of negligence. Penalties were provided, but violations required prosecution in federal court. There were no specific standards promulgated concerning the hydrostatic testing of boilers, establishment of maximum steam pressures, or in other areas of bona fide preventive safety.
Subsequent amendments to the 1838 law included a requirement for non-flammable steering apparatus (iron rods or chains instead of rope) and limits to the number of passengers which could be carried on both domestic and foreign voyages. Because of its limitations, the 1838 law was not one of our better pieces of safety legislation, but it was a start, and in view of the philosophical opposition, it was significant.
Despite the law, steamboat disasters continued to occur. Predictably, these were attended by renewed demands for corrective legislation. Between 1847 and 1852, there were a number of major steamboat fatalities resulting from explosions, fires, and collisions. During the eight months prior to August 1852, seven major disasters cost nearly 700 lives. It was time for new and more exacting legislation, and again Congress reacted.
The Steamboat Act of 1852, approved on 30 August of that year, established an agency which became the foundation for the present-day federal program of merchant marine safety. To some unenlightened individuals, that program remains an anachronism from the 19th century. The new law provided necessary elements not in the 1838 law: regional administration of the inspection laws, licensing of engineers and pilots, desperately needed additional fire fighting and life-saving equipment, a special license for ships to carry certain dangerous or inflammable articles, hydrostatic testing of boilers, establishment of maximum allowable steam pressures, the promulgation of rules for vessels passing in order to prevent collisions, factory testing of boiler plate, segregation of inflammable vessel structure from heated metals in and about the boilers, and adequate means of escape to the upper deck for passengers in the event of an accident. Presumably, in the latter case, the vessel would rest on the bottom before the upper deck would submerge. By virtue of its administrative organization, the agency was given the capacity for development and improvement.
The 1852 law failed in one respect; it applied only to steamboats carrying passengers. Other steam vessels such as tugboats, towboats, freight vessels, canal boats, and ferries, were exempted from its provisions, although not from those of the 1838 law. While it took a period of time for the provisions of the steamboat act to take effect, a noticeable reduction in the number of fatalities was realized. The morale of the inspectors was good, they were well paid by the government, they were productive, and their leaders were energetic. During the middle 1850s, it seemed as if the day of major steamboat disasters was over. But the spell was broken by three steamboat explosions on the lower Mississippi in the years 1858 and 1859; they claimed a total of 175 lives. By then, however, the nation was occupied with other problems.
During the course of the Civil War, the number of steamboat fatalities was of little consequence when compared with the carnage of battle. The war was scarcely over when one of the worst single vessel disasters in history occurred. On 27 April 1865, the steamboat Sultana embarked 2,000 Union veterans, most of whom had been prisoners of war. They were in addition to almost all of the 3 76 regular passengers allowed on the vessel's certificate of inspection. The Sultana's enterprising master had decided he would conveniently apply the relaxed standards of wartime practice to postwar vessel operations. Early in the morning of the 27th, the vessel departed Memphis en route to Cairo, Illinois. About 0200, a boiler exploded, and the vessel caught fire. The entire vessel was soon in flames, and fire spread rapidly through her dry wooden superstructure. In a short time, the Sultana had burned to the waterline, and those lucky enough to survive the flames found themselves in total darkness in the icy spring runoff of the Mississippi. More than 1,500 of the approximately 2,300 persons on board perished as a result of suffocation, drowning, or exposure on the flooded banks of the river. The Steamboat Act was not the culprit; blame for the enormous loss of life was rightfully placed on the action of the master in overloading the vessel. He would properly have been tried for murder except that he died in the Sultana disaster.
The explosion was blamed upon an unauthorized repair made by the Sultana’s engineer in Memphis after the vessel had been inspected in St. Louis. A section of bulged boiler plate was removed, and a patch of less thickness than the parent plate was riveted in its place. Shortly after the disaster, the district supervising inspector located a senior engineer from the Sultana and revoked his license on general principles to cover the period which would include the time of the ensuing investigation. The engineer predictably went into hiding, emerging just long enough to have his license reinstated by the local inspector of hulls at St. Louis. That inspector, as a result of this act and some other improper behavior, became involved in a dispute with the Board of Supervising Inspectors; he was subsequently called upon to relinquish his position. There was reason to believe that the Sultana’s allowable working steam pressure was exceeded in an attempt to stem the spring river current, and this too, was a contributing factor in the explosion of the already weakened boiler.
The result of the Sultana disaster was the development of "locked” safety valves which could not be tampered with unnoticed. A statute was also enacted prohibiting the employment of any steamboat inspector "who is directly, or indirectly, pecuniarily interested in any steam vessel,” or "who is a member of any association of owners, masters, engineers, or pilots of steamboats.”
Preceding the Sultana’s demise, the collision threat of non-passenger steamboats with passenger steamers was used as an argument to extend the provisions of the 1852 law to cover the previously exempt tugboats, towboats, ferries, and canal boats. The effect of the not-too-effective 1838 law was finally terminated by the enactment of that provision.
While the 1852 Steamboat Act provided a foundation for administering regional responsibilities under the indirect authority of the Secretary of the Treasury—and for the growth and development of the inspection system - it did not establish a central executive head of the steamboat inspection service. In 1869-70, the agency was administered for the Secretary of the Treasury by his Chief of Divisions, including the Revenue Marine, Life-Saving Stations, Steamboat Inspection, and Marine Hospitals Divisions. The Chief of Divisions, N. Broughton Devereaux had this to say about steamboat inspection in the 1869 Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury:
"Steamboat inspection-another branch of duty committed to this office-is one uniting so many interests, as well as being associated with such a multitude of issues pertaining to the safety an preservation of life and property, chat the undersigned feels he cannot, in the limits of this report, properly present all the suggestions which occur to his mind as bearing upon the subject and essential to the framing of proper enactments regarding it. The whole matter of steamboat inspection and the laws connected with it need a radical revision. The spirit of the laws with reference to it is to protect the lives and property of our people by interposing legal enactments as checks and restraints to the too common lawlessness, carelessness, and wanton neglect of steamboat men, and the recklessness which is so frequently causing frightful disasters on our waters.
"If the steamboat inspection is worth anything at all as an instrumentality for congressional interposition in behalf of humanity, assuredly it is of the first importance that those who are delegated to execute its laws, should perform their duties without fear, and inexorably exact the penalties for every violation of those laws. In this way only can we be led to expect more care and attention in the management of steamboats, and to hope that men will in due time learn that one of the best safeguards is good management."
The act of 28 February 1871 reorganized the stream boat inspection service. Except for the punishment provisions of the 1852 law applicable to steamboat inspectors for receiving graft, the act of 1871 repealed or superseded all existing legislation concerning inspections, licensing of officers, and the transportation of passengers and merchandise on vessels propelled in whole or in part by steam. There were three major thrusts to the new law, apart from the specifics and the refinement of material inspection standards:
- License examinations were extended from engineer and pilot to include master and chief mate.
- The administration of the service was centralized in a Supervising Inspector-General.
- The avowed objective of the service was broadened beyond that of preventing the death of passengers; it now generously included all persons on board steamboats, including the crew.
The Steamboat Inspection Service continued within the Treasury Department until 1903, at which time it was transferred to the Department of Commerce and Labor. During those years prior to 1903, a number of pieces of legislation were enacted which improved the efficiency and the scope of the service. Most of these laws came about only after repeated recommendations by the Secretary of the Treasury and the Supervising Inspector-General. For example, in 1897, motor vessels over 15 gross tons carrying freight or passengers for hire became subject to the inspection and licensing laws. In 1898, sailing vessels of over 700 tons, and all other vessels, or barges over 100 tons carrying passengers for hire became subject to the inspection and licensing laws. By 1896, the employees of the Steamboat Inspection Service, except for the Supervising Inspector-General, were placed in the classified Civil Service.
On 15 June 1904, a little over a year after the transfer of the service to the Department of Commerce and Labor (and to the probable relief of the Secretary of the Treasury), the excursion steamer General Slocum burned in the East River in New York. As a result, 957 persons, mostly women and children, lost their lives. An investigation by a commission appointed by President Theodore Roosevelt filed a report which placed most of the blame on the officers of the Steamboat Inspection Service. The reasons for the apparent failure of the officers of that agency were fourfold (this author’s editorial remarks in parentheses):
- An "inadequate” corps of inspectors at the port of New York (quotes supplied)
- Opposition from the public to delays for purposes of reinspection, causing personal inconvenience (There’s nothing quite so inconvenient as a death in the family!)
- The reluctance of the owners of vessels to maintain lifesaving and fire fighting equipment in proper condition (Besides, it costs money.)
- Inadequate supervision exercised by the supervising and local inspectors over the assistant inspectors who performed the actual work of inspection.
The President approved the report and ordered the dismissal of all the officers of the service who were concerned. While no mass exodus ensued, the worst offenders were "canned.” Congress, by now convinced of the importance of legislative action, acted on many of the recommendations for improvement which had been placed before it a year earlier. The bulk of these improvements were in the area of necessary administrative changes relating to appeals, the promulgation of regulations, chain-of-command, salaries, and technological flexibility.
Additional laws broadened the scope of the service to include setting vessel manning standards and the inspection of seagoing barges. In 1910, Congress passed the first of a number of motorboat acts which were applied to small vessels less than 65 feet in length. In 1913, the Department of Labor was created, and the Steamboat Inspection Service was placed in the new Department of Commerce. The Department of Commerce Seal, depicting a steamboat and a lighthouse, was thus highly appropriate. Later, both the Steamboat Inspection and Lighthouse Service functions would be transferred, but the seal would remain intact.
The Titanic disaster of 1912 caused the United States to adopt certain provisions of the International Convention of Safety of Life at Sea (1914) with respect to lifesaving devices. These provisions formed a part of the Seamen’s Act of 4 March 1915 and related to the number and character of lifesaving devices carried on board vessels, as well as to certificates of service to "able seamen” and certificates to persons qualified as "life- boatmen.” The fact that the safety of vessels is affected by their freeboard generated the requirement for loadlines on certain American vessels engaged in foreign trade as contained in the act of 2 March 1929. The requirements of the first International Load Line Convention were incorporated into the existing Load Line Regulations of 20 September 1930, although the convention was not ratified by the United States until 10 June 1931, becoming effective 1 January 1933. A trend for the future was set.
The act of 30 June 1932 brought about the consolidation of the Steamboat Inspection Service and the Bureau of Navigation. The consolidated agency was unimaginatively known as the "Bureau of Navigation and Steamboat Inspection."
On 8 September 1934, the passenger ship Morro Castle burned at sea, resulting in the deaths of 124 persons. On 24 January 1935, the passenger vessel Mohawk collided with the Norwegian motorship Talisman; 45 persons on board the Mohawk perished. The reaction to these disasters was the enactment of more legislation, particularly in the area of structural fire protection and subdivision and stability. During 1936 and 1937, more marine legislation was passed than during the previous 20 years, and that's saying something. It fell within three general areas:
- Structure, equipment and material used on board vessels
- Officers and crew necessary to operate the vessel efficiently
- Federal supervision over the merchant marine
Included in the focus on vessels was the logical extension of the inspection and licensing laws to include motor-propelled, oceangoing vessels, 300 gross tons and over and the authorization for promulgating regulations for tank vessels carrying dangerous liquid cargoes in bulk Personnel legislation centered upon the certification of crew members and designated given percentages requiring U. S. citizenship.
The federal supervision statutes provided for the economic development of the merchant marine, the creation of a Maritime Commission, and the reorganization of the Bureau of Navigation and Steamboat Inspection into the Bureau of Marine Inspection and Navigation (BMIN). A final result of the 1936-1937 statutes was the requirement, for the first time, that marine casualties involving regulated vessels be reported and investigated in order to prevent recurrences.
The need for the economic promotion of the U. S. Merchant Marine was recognized, and an agency to meet that need was created and logically positioned within the Department of Commerce. At the same time, however, an interesting point of conflict arose. Could the BMIN effectively promote development and enforcement of safety standards within the same department that was dedicated to the economic development of a private sector of industry? Would there be inevitable conflict between the cost of non-flammable construction, emanating from safety considerations, for example, versus the added cost factors of that non-flammable construction? Can economic gain be facilitated by the same government body that is responsible for safeguarding the lives and limbs of the citizenry? Experience will reveal that economic considerations frequently win out over safety when the decision is intra-organizational.
On 28 February 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt under the Warpowers Act, transferred the BMIN to the U. S. Coast Guard for the duration of the war by Executive Order No 9083. The transfer was made permanent in 1946 through Reorganization Plan No. 3. With the transfer of this vital safety function to the Coast Guard, the federal government had successfully consolidated all its preventive and corrective safety programs in one logical place, or at least the Coast Guard and the Congress thought so. The existing Coast Guard marine accident reporting procedures, which affected virtually all U. S. vessels, were merged with the BMIN casualty investigation process. An information-gathering system on the occurrence of accidents was thus created in order to provide a single arm of the government the wherewithal to evaluate risk of life, limb, and property-irrespective of whether or not the vessel was subject to the inspection laws. This information concerning risk has made it possible to seek preventive legislation in anticipation of, rather than in reaction to, marine disasters.
Some will still echo the chorus of those opposed to safety legislation. Indeed, the track line of the course of safety laws and regulation has periodically wobbled from side-to-side of reasonableness, either "too-little” or "too-much.” But we must admit that usually it has tracked the "too-little” side, typified by the Moselle's ignorance or the Sultana's recklessness. If the risk to the citizenry is to be weighed, it must be done by persons with no axe to grind. It should not be charged to persons of the ilk of the Sultana's captain or by politically appointed entrepreneurs of departmental stature, anxious to promote the economic success of their sector of the marine world to the expediency of safety considerations. Nor should it be done to justify an agency’s expansion and hence, the enhancement of personal power and wealth of the guiding and employed bureaucracy at a cost both to the taxpayer and to the specific clientele upon which the unjustified effort will come to rest.
After 138 years, history will bare the mischief of the steamboat inspectors as being calculated for a benevolence of a most special and practical nature, that of preserving life, limb, and property with a minimum of visible activity. The record of steamboat inspection is not flawless. If it has erred, it has been on the side of restraint. But its activity has been immeasurably successful and has prevented tens of thousands of deaths at a small monetary cost. And it has not ruined the industry it regulates through overzealous enforcement. The officer-inspectors of the Coast Guard are practical, marine-oriented men of seagoing experience whose only concern is that of preventing marine accidents. In 2114—138 years from now—historians will certainly have cause to remark upon the efforts of these men and the successes they realized towards that marine safety goal. "Calculated mischief" indeed!