This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
W-
ith its 200th anniversary just past, the Marine Corps faces a series of important challenges to its present capacity to provide the United States with strategically mobile and decisive ground combat power. To meet these challenges during the next decade, the Corps will have to make major changes in its structure, equipment, and tactical doctrine to successfully adapt to a rapidly changing battlefield environment. Implicit in the current structure and doctrine is the idea that the primary mission of the Corps is that of carrying out brigade- or division-size assaults against a heavily defended beach. The need for such a requirement is not clear. The Corps has not been used in the fashion it is best suited for since the opposed amphibious operation at Inchon in 1950. Since that time, Marine forces have been used as line units in prolonged ground campaigns in Korea and Vietnam. In the future, it is likely that
the Corps will be called to supplement the Army as a multipurpose ground force. This requirement to operate as a rapid reaction force is likely to remain very high on the U. S. political/military leadership’s list since the Corps now represents nearly 20% of the ready ground forces. Therefore, it is a central concern of the Corps to maintain an amphibious capability while meeting an expanded set of requirements for ground combat operations.
In general terms, there are three elements involved in projecting ground forces ashore:
► Moving forces long distances in a timely manner
► Moving forces ashore
► Operating air and ground forces once ashore
Changes in the military environment affect the Navy-Marine Corps team’s capacity to manage these
three elements. Two of the most important changes °f this coming decade are the development and deployment of battlefield guided weapons (BGWs) and the Worldwide spread of other high-quality nonnuclear military hardware. For example, Syria and Egypt have been supplied by the Soviet Union with thousands of BGWs such as AT-3 Sagger antitank missiles which were used with considerable effect during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. In turn, the United States has sold targe numbers of the TOW (tube-launched, optically- tracked, wire-command) antitank missile to many foreign countries. Aside from BGWs, the Soviets and rhe major military industrial states of the West have been selling or transferring first-line nonnuclear equipment to a large global market. The Soviets have sold such advanced weapons as the T-62 battle tank, and the Scud-B surface-to-surface missiles to such states as Syria and Egypt. In turn, large sales have been made by the West. As an example, Great Britain recently agreed to sell Iran 1,600 Chieftain battle tanks. This represents nearly four times the planned tank inventory of the Marine Corps. All of this points to a much more severe military environment in which the Corps will be required to fight and prevail.
It is instructive to describe briefly the current structure and doctrine of the Marine Corps in order to note lts current vulnerabilities to these changes in the military environment. In general terms, the four (three active and one reserve) Marine divisions are organized as light infantry units with a very high ratio of aviation Support per maneuver battalion. Nominally, a division consists of nine infantry battalions with organic support from three light artillery battalions. Further support is provided by the "force troops” attached to each division which maintain one battalion of medium fanks (M-60A3), one battalion of landing vehicles backed (LVTs), two battalions of medium artillery, and 0r>e battalion of heavy artillery. The firepower and aerial Maneuver potential of the division units are increased substantially by the attached air wing, consisting of aPproximately 175 helicopters and 175 attack aircraft. One of the current selling points of the Corps is the successful tight integration of its air and ground assets into a powerful combined arms team. This air/ground team is directly threatened by the appearance of battlefield guided weapons.1
These BGWs present a two-fold threat to close air support operations. First, they inhibit the use of airborne sensors to acquire and designate targets to an attack aircraft. Second, they force attack aircraft to rely on standoff weapons or expensive bomb computer systems to deliver ordnance outside of the envelope of the battlefield air defenses. Furthermore, as demonstrated in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, heavy battlefield air defenses severely restrict the offensive use of helicopters. Since it is unlikely that cheap and reliable countermeasures can be developed to negate the large menu of guidance systems available for current and future BGWs, the Marine Corps will have to rely less on aviation to enhance its combat power.
The Marine division faces a simultaneous threat from ground forces which are likely to be heavily mechanized and have substantial organic tube and rocket artillery support. For example, according to The Military Balance: 1975-76, the standard TO&E of a Soviet motorized division contains one tank regiment and three mechanized regiments—a strength of approximately 200 battle tanks and 300 armored personnel carriers. The average division comprises 17,000 men. Many third world countries are acquiring first-line armored equipment from the Soviet Union and the West and are deploying armored fighting vehicles in similar ratios of armor to manpower. In comparison, the current Marine division slice of 40,000 men has only one tank
'Steven Canby, 'The Alliance and Europe: Part IV, Military Doctrine and Technology”, Adelphi Paper No. 109, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Winter, 1975. Peter A. Wilson, "Battlefield Guided Weapons: The Big Equalizer,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, February 1975, pp. 18-25.
battalion containing between 54 and 85 medium tanks, and one LVT battalion containing approximately 150 LVTP-7S. These forces provide the division with a weak capacity to carry out mechanized operations. In particular, the LVTP-7 is a mediocre armored personnel carrier since it was designed as an amphibious assault vehicle to operate in ocean surf. Thus, the vehicle has a high silhouette and light armor. The lack of organic APCs is all the more serious since the role of the helicopter will be circumscribed by the presence of BGWs. Furthermore, the Corps has been reluctant to supply its infantry battalions with a high density of antitank weapons. For example, the Marines plan to deploy only one reinforced TOW antitank missile company with each force troop tank battalion. The smaller Dragon missile will be deployed in small numbers with each infantry battalion. In contrast, the Army plans to deploy a TOW company with each infantry battalion and have the Dragon organic with each infantry company.
This lack of orientation toward combating armor is explainable in light of the history of the Corps with its extensive combat experience against Asian opponents such as the Japanese and North Vietnamese whose armies were primarily light infantry forces. Thus, an orientation developed toward preparing for combat against opponents who were unlikely to employ much mechanized equipment.
Aside from the assumptions made about the nature of future ground combat, the Corps has tried to keep the weight of its support forces to a minimum. This posture is designed to reduce the burden on current techniques of moving heavy equipment ashore. Heavy lift amphibious technology has remained relatively unchanged for 30 years. That technology is singularly inadequate as a means of supplying heavy equipment ashore in a timely manner or against a well-defended shoreline. In particular, the current displacement vessels are slow, dependent on weather and beach conditions, and they force the amphibious lift ships to remain close to shore for prolonged periods of time. Fortunately, the technology of the air cushion vehicle (ACV) is sufficiently advanced so that a high-speed assault vehicle can be built which will be capable of carrying the weight of the current and future generation battle tank or self-propelled gun/howitzer.2 The widespread introduction of an ACV, such as those being developed by Bell and Aerojet-General for the JEFF boat competition is one of the major improvements which will be available to the Corps by the early 1980s. The ACV is less dependent on weather, can operate over a wide range of beach conditions, and has a ship-to-shore transit speed in excess of 50 knots.
During the next decade, the Marine Corps has three basic alternative responses to the current challenges. The first response is maintaining the status quo. The second is to move to an ultralight posture, eliminating all mechanized equipment, heavy artillery, and engineering support. The third is increased mechanization, though the precise ratio of armored personnel carriers (APCs) to battle tanks in a mechanized regiment is subject to debate.
More of the same is a dangerous response to current changes in the military environment. The status quo is dangerous for three reasons. The current posture is dependent upon the intensive and successful use of aviation to supply firepower to ground units, the current maneuver battalions are light in organic firepower, and they are tied to a ponderous logistic train. In essence, the current posture has most of the disadvantages of a light and heavy ground unit; the current posture provides for a weak capacity for the ground units to maneuver in combat beyond the beach.
The most radical reorganization is one in which the Corps configures itself entirely to an ultralight posture. This means that the Corps would become the primary source of light mobile forces available for rapid intervention. All medium tanks, heavy artillery, and heavy engineering equipment would be given up. The infantry units would carry organically a large number of BGWs to substitute for conventional fire support systems. Aside from operating BGWs, the light units could carry sensors and target designators (such as the laser) to direct long-range guided munitions. These muni-
2The planned follow-on to the M-60A3, the XM-1, is a 50-plus ton class vehicle. It is possible but not likely that a much lighter battle tank could be available by the mid-Eighties. The M-551 Sheridan light tank is a possible option. Unfortunately, it has been plagued with some serious technical problems.
Several problems are contained in such a solution. b'rst, the problem of maneuvering on the battlefield stlH remains. A problem with all current air-transportable units is their lack of ground mobility once deployed. This lack of combat mobility can be partially alleviated by the deployment of small all-terrain vehi- des (ATVs). The Mechanical Mule and the West German Kraka weapons carrier represent current designs
Clons could be delivered by aircraft or from ships offshore. Infantry so equipped could provide formidable defensive barriers to an opponent heavily equipped with •Mechanized forces, especially in that type of terrain which gives the mechanized forces little room to •Maneuver, and use mass shock tactics to break through.
One can safely surmise that the defensive power of •nfantry against mechanized forces will be greatly increased by the wide use of BGWs. It is not clear how •he presence of BGWs will influence the nature of •nfantry-versus-infantry combat. In theory, the assault potential of an infantry force should increase since it will have an organic capability to destroy fortified positions. On the other hand, the ability of a force t0 maneuver to an assault position will be restricted by the fact that the defender will be able to deliver high explosives accurately at a range out to several kilometers. The current generation of BGWs is deigned to destroy armored vehicles or aircraft. Later systems may be employed with very effective antipersonnel warheads. This trend implies that the primary r°le of infantrymen of the future will be that of a long- tange grenadier. In most cases, the automatic rifle will be used as a support weapon.
The idea of large-scale amphibious operations would be given up with this posture. Much of the amphibious hft associated with heavy equipment could be demobilized. Those amphibious forces remaining would be designed around small commando-type operations. Any shortage of amphibious lift capability would be met airlifting reinforcements which would be facilitated f’y the light posture. The Marine Corps would thus ec°me a competitor to the Army’s airborne and Ranger units.
The Marine Corps in 1985 35
to provide infantry with a transporter which requires limited logistic support. Several of the light units could have such vehicles to provide organic lift. This would give the normally foot-mobile infantry, and their heavier weapons such as mortars and BGWs, increased mobility. This would allow an infantry unit an enhanced capacity to maneuver behind the forward edge of the battlefield. On the other hand, ATVs do not increase the combat assault capability of the infantry. After all, these vehicles are vulnerable to the entire array of infantry weapons.
This lack of rapid assault and maneuver capability could be a serious problem in terrain which facilitates the use of mechanized forces. Second, the ultralight units would be dependent upon the successful use of battlefield guided weapons. The degree to which BGWs can replace conventional organic weapons is likely to remain uncertain during the course of the coming decade. It seems likely that tactics and countermeasures will continue to degrade the effectiveness of all BGWs. The degree of their degradation is uncertain but points to the likely need for a portion of the Marine force to be mechanized and armed with unguided weapons. The Israelis found that tanks in close cooperation with armored personnel carriers and indirect fire support from artillery and mortars could operate in a battlefield full of BGWs. In light of the Israeli experience, the armored personnel carrier appears to be an important means of conducting infantry offensive operations. In that terrain which allows combat vehicles room to maneuver, mechanized units consisting of armor, artillery, and personnel carriers are likely to be the most effective units to carry out offensive operations against an opponent well equipped with BGWs. The armored infantry carrier can successfully take advantage of BGWs subjected to suppressive fires and countermeasures such as chemical smoke. This need for mechanized forces leads to the third alternative posture, a mixture of light infantry and mechanized forces.
The purpose of this hybrid posture is to increase the mechanization and firepower organic to the four Marine divisions. As a combat-ready force, the Marines have an asset not readily available to the light air-transportable units in the Army. This is the Navy’s large inventory of amphibious heavy lift ships. As indicated earlier, the air cushion vehicle represents a significant potential means of dramatically reducing the difficulties of moving heavy equipment ashore. One can go so far as to say that the ACV represents as great a potential to mechanized forces in amphibious warfare as did the helicopter to infantry 20 years ago. With the widespread introduction of a heavy lift ACV, one of the main arguments against the further mechanization of the Corps is eliminated.
Between now and the year 1985, the four Marine divisions could be organized into heavy and light regiments. The precise mixture is subject to debate. Furthermore, one might well configure one or both of the Pacific divisions differently from the Atlantic division. This posture would allow for some interesting' deployment options. The heavy regiments could be forward deployed at sea or ashore near a potential area of conflict. These units would be among the first to go ashore, and they could be reinforced by light units
which could be airlifted from the United States. Once deployed, the heavy and light units complement each other. The light units could provide defensive screens behind which the heavy units could maneuver to carry out offensive operations. Again, the precise mixture of heavy and light units could be matched to the character of the terrain and the configuration of the potential opponent. For example, a Marine force operating in Norway would use far fewer mechanized units than one deployed in North Africa.
In essence, the Marine Corps would provide the United States with a strategic mobile force having much greater organic combat power than the current air-transportable units. Naturally, the Corps would train extensively with the light Army units which could provide further rapid reinforcements. The heavy /light posture does not provide the Marine Corps the means to meet all opponents in all circumstances. In particular, it seems unwise to consider using Marine units in the central theater of Europe. In a NATO central front conflict, it would be more effective to send Army units which have been configured to fight in a massive mechanized engagement. Furthermore, it is extremely unlikely that one could operate amphibious forces of any size in the North Sea during such a conflict. They would be in range of a vast array of tactical fighter- bombers which could overwhelm any conceivable combination of air defenses.
The key to this posture is a dramatic improvement in the Corps’ capacity to get armor and artillery ashore rapidly and with the first assault echelons. As indicated, the ACV appears to provide that new capability. If a 50-ton payload ACV is used, then a new generation of amphibious ships will be needed to replace the aging Thomaston-chss (LSD-28-35) dock landing ships. None of the current amphibious ships is capable of handling large ACVs. Unfortunately, the well deck of the new Tarawa-class (LHA-1-5) amphibious assault ships is not designed to handle large ACVs. One possible design is the lighter on board ship (LASH). This is a high-speed cargo ship designed to carry her own shallow-draft barges. The ACVs could replace the barges.
A successful amphibious assault of the Eighties will have to use speed, surprise, and deception. The days of a prolonged naval gunfire and aerial bombardment to suppress beach defenses are over. An opponent well endowed with BGWs and mechanized units can widely disperse its forces. This will greatly reduce the effectiveness of suppressive preparatory fires. In essence, the Corps will have to replace firepower with finesse to seize a hostile coastline. This emphasis on speed and deception points to the extensive use of ACVs, long- range heavy-lift helicopters (e.g., the CH-53E) and V/STOL aircraft. Transport ships will operate over the
horizon from the planned assault points. This will allow the surface forces a better chance to defend against coastal defense cruise missile positions. Further, it will induce uncertainty in an opponent as to the precise location of the planned attack. Operations will have to be conducted at night under the cover of heavy electronic and optical countermeasures.3 For example, one of the important missions for naval and Marine aviation assault phase will be that of laying down heavy
3If BGW guidance systems can be designed which are nearly immune to countermeasures, then an assault by any vehicle is in grave doubt.
weapons will be far greater than that of armor or aircraft.
As indicated, the role of attack aviation is likely to diminish considerably during the coming decade. Those attack aircraft and armed helicopters needed are likely to be used as aerial platforms for standoff missiles. This will allow aircraft to operate outside of an opponent’s SAM envelope while being able to attack point targets. The AV-8A Harrier armed with the laser-guided Bulldog and the AH-iJ Sea Cobra helicopter armed with the TOW missile point to this trend. In fact, an evolutionary development of one or both platforms seems the most useful attack aviation system for the Marine Corps. Both can operate out of primitive airfields. By being deployed near the battlefield, they can be made responsive to the requirement of on-call close air support. Furthermore, their V/STOL capability allows them to operate off of the decks of a wide range of ships. One of the main missions of the LHA will be to support these V/STOL attack vehicles. Since both will use guided munitions as their primary ordnance, the relatively modest payload capability will not be a serious handicap. Unlike the A-io attack plane, the Harrier and the Cobra are not designed to deliver large quantities of unguided ordnance at low altitudes. In theory, the heavy armor of the A-io will allow it to survive a dense air defense environment. That assumption can certainly be cast into doubt if the Soviets upgrade their mobile antiaircraft guns such as the ZSU-4-23 (a radar-directed 23-mm. quadruple barrel rapid-fire gun system mounted on a tracked vehicle). One possibility is to use armorpiercing munitions similar to that of the 30-mm. gun designed for the A-io.
Other aircraft systems are likely to be very much less useful to the Corps. These are the big multipurpose fighter aircraft such as the F-14 Tomcat. Such aircraft should be procured only by the Navy. The Corps’ recent decision not to buy the F-i4 will doubtless result in an enormous saving in capital and skilled personnel. Therefore, Marine aviation may have to accept a more modest set of missions. It is unlikely to be able to sustain a quasi-independent air arm containing the large array of aircraft of naval aviation. To do so would jeopardize any meaningful modernization of the ground component of the Corps. As an example, the initial investment cost of a squadron of 12 F-i4s is, at current prices, approximately $200 million. That sum can buy 400 M-60A3 tanks or 1,600 LVTPVs.[1] This cost comparison between advanced aircraft and modern ground equipment should act as a stimulus to those who set the Marine Corps budgetary priorities for the next decade. In an era of tight military budgets, the Marine aviation community may have to expect more modest budgets to finance their ground-based colleagues who will need substantial resources to meet the requirements of the 1980s.
There are a host of lesser issues which will influence the course of the Marines’ evolution over the next decade. For example, a technological and tactical question remains as to whether remote sensors and unmanned airborne vehicles can successfully replace the air or ground-based observer as the primary means of target acquisition. There are other such issues, but it is the main thesis of this article that the central questions for the Corps for this coming decade are the following:
► What types of conflicts should the Corps be prepared to fight? In particular, should the Corps be prepared to engage an opponent well endowed with mechanized forces?
V What is the future of attack and tactical transport aviation in an era of battlefield guided weapons?
► Can countermeasure technology sufficiently degrade guided weapon technology to allow for opposed landings?
The time in which to answer these questions is short. The inertia of current decisions will carry into the early Eighties. It is imperative that the Corps scrutinize these issues immediately. An incorrect answer to any of these questions will put the Marine Corps at great risk on some future battlefield or in the halls of Congress. It is unlikely that budgetary support can be sustained if the Marines appear to decline in effectiveness and to outlive their usefulness. Fortunately, the Corps has shown ingenuity in the face of past changes in the military environment. This is a hopeful sign that the Marine Corps can respond to the changes which, by its 210th anniversary, are likely to profoundly alter the nature of land warfare.
t*j Peter Wilson earned a B.A. degree from Princeton in
[ 1966 and an M.A. from the University of Chicago in 1970, both in political science. He has taught at DePaul University and at the University of Chicago on U. S. national security policy and on arms control. He worked as a consultant to the Rand Corporation, the Ford Foundation, and the Center for Naval Analyses prior to accepting, in 1973, a full-time professional staff position with CNA in its operational evaluations group. In 1975, Mr. Wilson resigned from CNA and became a consultant to the Air Force Chief of Staff.
[1]The recent decision by the Marines to acquire the cheaper F-18 instead of the F-14 does not significantly solve the dilemma cited by example above. After all, the estimated unit cost of the F-18 will be $8-10 million.