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Until his recent assumption of command of the Atlantic Fleet, the author regularly briefed Secretary of the Navy J. William Middendorf II on the harsh realities confronting the Naval Material Command.
One such problem: it takes three to seven years to build most of today’s complex ships, and shipbuilding costs are increasing from 15 to 22% annually. Were the increase only 10%, a warship requiring four years to build would increase in cost at least 40% without any change, modification, or problem.
The purpose of the Naval Material Command (atl the rest of the shore establishment as well) is to supp°rl the fleet. Let us then consider the readiness of ^cCl equipment today. The following statistics demonstfatC progress made to date. The Navy’s current reliabibb objective is to have all fleet equipment fully operatic11 at least 75% of the time for 60 straight days at se*'
without direct support from the beach. This is fl
uitf
a task, because just the ships in five deployed camet task forces have more than 83,500 pieces of machine and equipment that could fail. .
Over the past three years, the fleet has averaged °n ’ 600 inoperative pieces of shipboard gear daily than seven-tenths of one percent! The record aircraft components is even better. This sort of fr formance represents a significant achievement and lS tribute to the hard work of a great number of hign' dedicated members of the military-industrial team f supports and maintains the fleet. Perhaps this contfl tion is best summed up in a Navy Times editorial 'A'tl concluded:
"Nothing ... is intended to belittle iC<f[0 plishments of fighting men. There is no nee repeat . . . what has been said so often; that wit*1 the man, the best weapon is nothing. But there need—pressing need—to remind some of the efl11 truth; that since the industrial revolution—
weapons, the best men are nothing.”
One of my primary reasons for writing this at11 ^ is to draw on my recent experience as head of the Material Command in order to point out the crl ^ significance of providing material support for a m°^ navy. A fair share of the Navy’s best is require , this effort. Duty in the logistic arm of any m* service provides a unique opportunity to c°n ute—particularly in peacetime—not only t0f. service, but to our entire nation. Moreover, this °PP ,
&
tunity exceeds that of any other peacetime
J
deal
In a command the size of NMC, there is a great
■t&[
exercise in futility. In NMC, various staff specif travel constantly through the command asking
.lists
Of5
tions. Most importantly, they also relay the questr they receive back to others who can help provide 3,1 swers. This elementary management practice is n directed to technical problems exclusively. On the trary, people problems get as much attention as hardware hangups. Morale is a vital concern in command, particularly one this size.
assignment! This may sound strange to operators, but I now believe it. Those who work on the hardware- producing and equipment-maintaining side of the house will have far more to do with determining the real future of our service in peacetime than anyone else.
Frankly, the Naval Material Command’s (NMC) charter is a bit awesome. It has complete responsibility for research, development, procurement, and logistic support for everything the Navy needs—beans, bullets, black oil, clothing, weapon systems, or communication satellites . . . everything, that is, except people. That’s where the Bureau of Naval Personnel, the Navy Recruiting Command, and the Office of Civilian Manpower Management fit into the Navy’s scheme.
To provide all the material support the Navy needs takes almost a third of a million people—most of them civilian employees—in duty stations from Washington, D.C. to Bremerton, Washington and the oceans beyond. The NMC’s civilian and military people work in five systems commands and eight laboratories or research and development centers. Subordinate field activities include aircraft rework facilities, ammunition depots, supply centers and depots, electronic engineering divisions, construction battalions, public works centers, shipyards, experiment and test stations, inventory control points, and weapons stations.
The Naval Material Command employs one-third as many people as the entire aerospace industry, and its eight shipyards alone employ almost half as many people as all U. S. private shipyards put together. And this is merely the "in-house” portion of the team. Additionally, there are countless private business organizations—large and small—that devote all or a significant portion of their effort to research, development, testing, production, repair, or support of naval vehicles and systems. This Navy-industrial base is a long-standing American tradition. Perhaps President Calvin Coolidge explained it best in his Navy Day proclamation for 1924. His words are equally valid today:
"Our American Navy has always been much more than an arm of wartime defense. All the money that has ever been spent on the Navy has been returned to the community several times over in direct stimulus to industrial development. We may be very sure that in the future, as in the past, the Navy’s services to industry and the arts of peace and science will continue completely to justify its maintenance in the highest efficiency.”
The factor that represents the greatest challenge for most naval officers assigned to procurement or logistic duties is the dominant civilian makeup of the work force. The importance of these civilian workers cannot be overstated. They do most of the work, and they provide continuity. Naval personnel come and go witf> comparative rapidity. (This is something NMC has ber" trying to slow down. There has been some success, although I suspect it may be due more to auscerit) than for the right reasons.) Consequently, the dedicate career civilian personnel are particularly important i11 a field such as weapon system acquisition and supp0'1 where the life-cycle of a given project is often as lon£ as 20 years—30 years or more with ships.
Whether one deals with Navy civilians (either whitC or blue collar) or those who work for defense c°fl' tractors, it is imperative to understand the basic difft1' ence between command and management. Naval cers realize that with command you can issue orderSl But you can’t "command” an A-7 aircraft to grow fr0"1 a I960 "gleam in the eye” of some unknown design engineer into a successful combat deployment with'1’ seven or eight years! Much of the uncertainty involvC, in these undertakings is subject only to the laws 0 nature and not the commands of men. Only effect*'C management can make that occur.
of management on a great many organizational kv^S' Projects are managed, as are laboratories, shipyards,3,1 rework facilities, and branch activities. General m3*1 agement of policy or direction is handled at the headquarters or systems command level. There is a g1 tendency, however, for management at the top to sume too much. The mere issuance of a directive not necessarily solve a problem. An officer of the R°r Navy some 400 years ago expressed a basic managetne!l1 principle when he wrote that "a ship without frequ£|1' and thorough inspections soon becomes a thing of31 and license.” This also applies to the operation of3"' organization. Without follow-up to see that orders carried out properly, many efforts become merely 30
an!
tli3t
the products it turns out can be used by the avef3^ sailor. Unfortunately, things are still a great deal m complicated than they need be. Too often, the goes to great—and very expensive—lengths to sec every iota of that last 5 or 10% of potential in a sPeCl^ system. But getting that last ounce of capability^ £ it speed in a missile, altitude in an aircraft, or ran? on a radar—often requires a good deal more m°
During the slightly more than four years it took to build the guided-missile cruiser South Carolina (CGN-37), shown here being launched in 1972, shipbuilding costs increased by more than 50%.
'Down gear” reduces readiness, and frustrated _rs don’t stay in the Navy very long, ch i bviously> the major and continuing management enge facing all our national leaders dealing with j nse *s providing greater national security from re- o resources. For a great many valid reasons, there thi1 ^ 1S not enou§h money to go around. For one
Us b'
y water. The requirement for keeping these
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NEWPORT NEWS SHIPBUILDING AND DRY DOCK CO.
,n a great deal more complexity. It is thus more cult than ever to "sailor-proof” modern systems and 0rms. This problem can produce both too much own gear” and too many frustrated young blue-
wkets.
sailo:
Jpiyis o , o ............................................................................. ....
s0rt^’ a^°ut ^ cents of each defense dollar pays for k . e form of personnel resource. Another essential T ls that the United States is really an island nation. U nty-five years ago, we had virtually everything we ^ r*ght here at home. Now many of the raw erials we need must be imported. Air freight is so t(p nsive that most of what we import must come ls§1Stic lifelines open under any and all circumstances Th^al m'ss*on °f the U. S. Navy.
e Navy’s modern procurement cycle also has a c,erent tempo and life-span. The U. S. Air Force has i ate<^ chat f°r its last four bombers, last four fight- thg aSt three transport planes, and last three ICBMs, 51 average total development cycle averaged nine-and- f. years- And this is merely the technical span. reltlQnal non-technical factors such as changes in prj rernents, contractual problems, changing national gra°rit‘es) and the like served to compress a few pros and stretch out others even more.
I’ve already indicated that Navy platforms have longer lives, 20 to 30 years. We not only keep things longer but also take longer to build them because they are so complex—three to seven years for most ships. The Navy also requires more hardware. Currently, the Navy has over 240 programs. Among them are some 53 major acquisition programs totaling $91 billion. This is almost the combined total of the other two services. Our procurement budget is usually about three times the Army’s and at least one-and-a-half times the size of the Air Force’s. Thus, we are particularly subject to inflationary pressures. Shipbuilding costs, for instance, have been increasing from 15 to 22% annually. Even allowing only 10% increase a year, a ship requiring four years to build has increased in cost at least 40%—without any change, modification, or problem.
Let’s look at a few specific examples. The first destroyer in which I served in 1940—a World War I four piper, incidentally—cost the taxpayers of that day $1.5 million. That was the cost of everything—propellers, guns, masts (they didn’t have radar). The second destroyer I served in (built in 1942) cost $5.5 million. Again, this was the cost of everything. (She had no radar either; electronics hadn’t really come of age yet.) But the destroyer that we buy today, while admittedly larger and carrying more sophisticated and capable equipment, has virtually the same basic mission as the earlier two classes although against much tougher adversaries. Yet she will cost somewhere between $60 and $90 million. Now that’s cost escalation. I’ll admit there have been advances in technology, but such cost growth remains largely a matter of inflation. Look at aircraft a moment. My older aviation friends tell me that these days a modern aircraft can fly faster straight up than their old biplanes could fly diving straight down. That is certainly increasing capability, but this increasing sophistication is also leading to our staggering costs.
Training is also more expensive. For example, a destroyer produced in I960 carried equipment that required 95 technically trained men for hardware operation and maintenance. Contrast this with the destroyer being built today that needs 161 such technically trained sailors. This represents an increase of 64%, and the demands are even more jarring when total training is considered. Actual training requirements have increased from only 810 weeks for 95 youngsters, to 3,367
estimates. Two random, eerie examples from ano[
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400% and the Erie Canal, which cost 12,000% 111.
technical problems, inexperienced or politically
.o'1'
vated estimates, mismanagement, inflation, and a<
weeks needed now to bring the 161 bluejackets up to snuff. That’s a 416% increase in costs within a decade and a half.
Not only hardware, personnel, and training costs increase the challenge to modern material managers, however. The various necessary safeguards built into our procurement system require careful analysis and vigilant monitoring. The rules governing procurement were laid out in the Armed Services Procurement Act, a ten or 11-page document. The regulation (DoD’s implementation) today embodies 26 sections in five
majority of contracts are completed well within^ fact, often far below—the ceiling price. ^
In examining the technological history of the it is a fact that virtually all projects involving technical breakthroughs have cost more than inltl,
century are the Erie Railroad, which had an overrun than anticipated. There are many reasons projects ^ crease in ultimate cost: lack of technology, unfofeS
.ddi
new requirements to a program long after a firm P has been set.
A major challenge on NMC’s priority list is to futt ^ improve the reliability and maintainability of m° weapon systems and platforms. The Navy spends ^ tirely too much time in trying first to diagnose,
I
^en fix, equipment which is breaking down too often. e can and will do better to extend mean times between Ures- Although this costs more money initially, the
jctum (along the lines of 10 to 1) is very substantial, nefo: ' and
the
c0tn
achieved
. °Ve all, the Navy must be intellectually honest ar)jtS approach to obtaining a "good” design during— j as the key point—the design activity of the
abo 1°^rnent phase. Industry knows how to bring
Q^esign which not only place an unnecessary burden a|| r^c development time budget but also are not at
pcchensive quality control measures to sustain reliability.
, a good initial design, without undue testing and design ' ' ■ -
the
^^^fifective. There are, of course, many reasons why
have been directed to enforce these require- *°n> or terminating contracts if necessary. R&M
ucti
Navy "user-supplier” relationship presupposes ,Per balance between OpNav, whose role is to set euients, and the supplier (NMC) which is tasked Uce or acquire the means to meet those require-
re leaving NMC, I added to the staff a Reliability Maintainability (R&M) Director who was formerly NASA Apollo program’s director for reliability and His organization has been given broad respon- ch *ltles and commensurate authority to produce ^anges as may be necessary to modernize our approach acquiring reliable weapon systems. He has issued a itber of detailed R&M requirements in all acquisi- requiring NMC approval. Management reporting control requirements delegated to the systems ajj ^nd r&m directors assure the same attention to other acquisitions and provide the means for imple- Hting and monitoring the effectiveness of new R&M j ,1Cles and procedures. His R&M policy requirements ls( not only on realistic, enforceable specification ^. lrements, but as in Apollo, extremely disciplined Slgn practices, rigid qualification testing to expected fo env*ronments> analysis of and corrective action r failures in both pre-production and early deploy- t until requirements are met or exceeded, and
pr 'avy has not insisted upon good initial design, dj ably the chief reason stems from an inadequate f0lbutt°n of the development phase time budgeted esign as compared with testing and the production ch SC ^ttent*°n is therefore being directed to the iti n/’es necessary to cause good designs to emerge early f0rC acquisition process. NMC is requiring firm, en- jUstR&M requirements such as the ones I have \Vf escrtbed in all contracts, tailored to each specific c°n-f°n system- The R&M director and the systems through withholding acceptance, stopping pro-
Na^r°Vement *s so v'tal and complex that it merits the Vy s best efforts to achieve.
The aPr0 reSuir<
Ptod
ments. Obviously, research and development play a vital role in meeting this requirement, and the eight Naval Material Command laboratories are the instruments for the generation and use of technical ideas and knowledge in support of major weapons programs.
A particular strength of the NMC laboratories has been their organization along major functions, warfare, or platform lines. This has allowed the laboratories to interact with the fleet with superior knowledge of working systems, to accept more responsible functions in technical direction during the acquisition of major systems, and to act as the common factor in dealing with more than one systems command when the technical job requires such joint attention. In short, this organization has been of significant value in coupling these technical organizations to the practical purposes of the Navy. In concert with the value of the organizational structure has been the existence of a central reporting point in NMC that could set and implement general laboratory policy and, in principle, could control program balance in the laboratories from a Navywide point of view.
Approximately one-quarter of the Navy’s research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) funds are spent in or by Navy laboratories. These in-house laboratories are not analogs of industrial laboratories which develop new products for their parent organizations to market. The new technology adapted or created by the Navy laboratories normally finds its way to the fleet only after it has been given to the industrial producer. They must be capable of fresh technical approaches to practical problems. They are the Navy’s most important single source of technical input to consideration of new requirements for equipment that will enhance our operational capability. They offer a blend of theoretical and practical experience and serve as a massive reservoir of the latest scientific and technological knowledge for the solution of fleet-related problems. As our fleet commanders can testify, the laboratories indeed have been active in direct support of the fleet. They have provided our operating forces with a body of continuous experience with Navy problems that is the foundation of our technical ability to respond immediately to operating problems in crisis situations. In this connection, the recently completed Navy/Marine Corps Acquisition Review Committee (NMARC) study concluded that the "running contact of the Navy laboratories with actual operations is thought to be superior to that of laboratories of the other services and allows the Navy’s organization to develop the corporate technical memory that is one of their prime assets.”
Related to this RDT&E function is another approach to problem solving which has been both exciting and
16 November 1973, the Naval Reserve training USS Johnston (DD-821) operated for 24 hours on
ijli
cost
- jjfd
analysis of gas turbines versus nuclear power (stan Navy and lightweight reactors) is next on the ageI1( Anyone who has ideas that will assist the develop01^ of a more credible Navy is invited to use the Corf1 Systems Advisory Group as a sounding board.
of
,vC
innovative at NMC. Early on, we became aware of the wealth of smart young technical talent available within the command for addressing the problems and anticipating the hardware needs of the fleet. About two years ago the Combat Systems Advisory Group (CSAG) was formed, and the results have been gratifying.
This small team (usually six) of highly-qualified junior officers from the various systems commands directly supports the Chief of Naval Material. Brainstorming "new ideas” that address the Navy’s material requirements is the group product, and, in that respect CSAG serves as an important sounding board for new ideas from the fleet and from the Navy as a whole. Since all of these officers are young, bright, and have relatively less invested in past practice, they are more apt to apply creative thinking where solutions to future problems may require the innovative application of new technology and concepts. CSAG develops contacts throughout the Navy, the national industrial complex, and various foreign defense establishments in order to surface and research new ideas that may solve or define existing and future problems.
CSAG circulates the opinions and ideas produced by its efforts through its personal contacts and through conferences with and briefings directly with the Chief of Naval Material, the Naval Material Command General Board (composed of systems commander, deputy CNMs and selected representatives from the command), parent systems commands, laboratories, and other appropriate activities and contractors. Since its inception, CSAG’s young "tigers” have inspired a series of potentially useful ideas covering a broad spectrum. NMC is in the process of exploring the ideas and in many cases implementing them. For example, CSAG’s efforts were partially responsible for the joint fleet/laboratories effort in the shipboard manning and automation program, which already has looked at reducing bridge manning on 17 ships and is evaluating the concept of a new ship controlman rating. CSAG initiated the design for the prototype automation of an FF-1052 (ex-DE- i052)-class engineering plant. This effort is expected to at least halve the number of people necessary for the effective operation of the engineering plant, and will be managed through the shipboard manning and automation program.
Another project being addressed by the group is an attempt to use an aviation weapon system development as the core of a surface weapon system. This effort was generated by a review of lightweight high performance fire control systems designed for minimum operating personnel. It indicated that aircraft volume and weight restrictions have forced innovation. Specifically, CSAG is pursuing the use of the F-14 fire control system as a surface missile/gun fire control system. An innovative ship designer is under contract with the Naval Ship Engineering Center and CSAG to produce a concept113 design for an AAW ship using that system.
The most ambitious group project is the SEAM0® (Sea Systems Modification and Modernization by ularity and Intermodality) concept. This concept won permit the Navy to design for rapid change and fleX‘ bility by designing ship payloads in standard module that can be installed in existing platforms. SEAM0® is comparable to the modular aircraft weapons conceP being pursued by DoD.
CSAG suggests that SEAMOD will provide four nasi01 benefits to the fleet: improved effectiveness, reduced cycle costs, more efficient personnel utilization, 311 accelerated innovation. Since SEAMOD module containers will be compatible with all transportati°|j modes and port/terminal handling equipment, a rap^ and continual renovation of the fleet is anticipate This capability promises to meet the changing threaCj mission, and deployment burdens placed on individ hulls/platforms. ^
The most recent project undertaken by CSAG d with the apparent dichotomy of designing fossil- ships (30-year life-span) and the continuing cofl£ over energy supplies. The initial phase of this pr°J has verified the use of a coal-derived fuel as an ene^ source for gas turbine/steam-powered ships. On 15 ^
Stf*' tained runs from 30% to 108% full power on Sea<T a liquified coal product. A comparative life-cycle
The many challenges in the management material functions will continue. To develop impr^ methods and procedures, the Navy must set tea j and reasonable goals as management objectives then strive to meet them through improved leader This task requires enticing some of our most cap*^ naval leaders into the field of material support and 1 ^ training them so they will be able to perform difficult management tasks to which they will signed. . Ja
It has always been difficult to acquire and rna1 ^ new defense platforms and weapon systems, but bj early 1970s things had become more difficult than ^ It seemed that program after program was not ^ in financial trouble, but behind schedule. Mr- ^ Packard, then Deputy Secretary of Defense, foun ^ problem extended throughout DoD. He latn£
b>oD
and its four military services. It now offers a
and a system for matching officer with billet
has
sele.
Case after case of just plain poor management by the argest departments of the government and by well- n°wn and large firms in the industry.”
Obviously, this situation was not satisfactory. After considerable reflection, Mr. Packard concluded that ^putting better managers in charge would do more to ring about improvement than anything else.” Among other actions, he directed establishment of the Defense fystems Management School (DSMS) at Fort Belvoir, bginia—just outside of Washington, D.C. This ^hool has become "the Academy of Management” for ^0-week program management course and a three-week executive refresher course for project management per-
Additional actions have followed. After three years effort, the Navy established a weapon systems acqui- ^ti°n management (WSAM) career program in 1972. ls provided a career pattern for both line and staff cers from the grades of lieutenant commander k r°ugh captain. More than 1,000 officers have already een designated for the WSAM code by the process of r cial selection boards. In addition, very thorough has been given to all Navy billets related to
been adopted. The third round of WSAM board ctions conducted in February 1975 used these re- j ’ more valid outputs.
n 1974, work was begun on a similar project man® ment program for Navy civilian employees. Vital gram elements to be included were performance Ration, a ranked pool of talent, career counseling, mty for development, and career and productivity s'derations. This program is expected to be fully ^rational by the end of 1976. To support these dual r programs, considerable effort has been given to par^CCt rnanaSement training. In addition to the Navy cj tlc'pation in the DSMS (where both officers and toll lans~-from government and industry—are en- the NMC sponsors several short courses at the
U. S. NAVY
Navy Logistics Management School in Anacostia, D.C., and the Navy has added an 18-month curriculum in systems acquisition management at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. Successful completion of this program, now in its third year, results in a master of science in management degree. About 25% of these students enroll in a three-year integrated program resulting in dual master’s degrees in both engineering and systems acquisition management.
Additional training which NMC has helped develop is in the area of business and financial management. Included are a semiannual six-week course for midlevel project management personnel at the Naval Postgraduate School, a two-week course for project managers and their deputies at DSMS, and an excellent American Management Association correspondence course on this subject. Obtaining and training better project managers is a high priority item within DoD today. As the current Deputy Secretary of Defense, Mr. William P. Clements, Jr., told a recent project management class at DSMS:
"I am impressed by the Project Manager’s task; with the need to have top officials in each Service recognize the importance of the Project Manager; with the need to fully and effectively implement our policies; and with the necessity to shorten the decision-making procedures associated with the acquisition process.”
Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger is of a like mind. Dr. Schlesinger desires that we make the task of doing business with DoD less of a chore. He desires steady reduction in layering and needless administration. And he has requested emphasis on four aspects of defense procurement:
"First, the Defense Department will continue to be interested in and support advanced technology developments particularly when they promise the same kinds of payoffs that precision guided munition, for example, have provided.
If the Navy resumes construction of its own ships, the likeliest builder would be the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard where the USS Jouett (CG-29), left, and USS Sterett (CG-31), right, were built in the early 1960s.
"Second, there remain many forms of combat where numbers count and where the best may become the enemy of good; weapon systems required in those areas will necessitate incremental development rather than great leaps forward, relatively low costs, and long production runs.
port personnel, more guidelines for smaller projectS' longer training tours and required advanced train*n$ for project managers, early use of design-to-cost pt'nC1 pies, multi-year authorizations for major projects, m°'! stringent source selection, stronger local contract * ministration, greater use of business managers on pr0 ject management staffs, and a general reduction of layefS of review and requirements for periodic reports.
All these new ideas—along with more than other recommendations—will be reviewed and stud' with great care by those responsible within both f Department of the Navy and the DoD. Already sevJ useful improvements have been agreed upon, and u ther progress is anticipated in the months to corn£
DoP
ad *
"Third, while we will encourage reasonable profits for capable firms, we do not propose to subsidize sluggishness and inefficiency.
"Fourth, we will not let our inventories of weapons systems get out of balance with our ability to operate and maintain them; nor will we arbitrarily reduce our procurement of consumables in order to buy more hardware, no matter how pressed to do so.”
Admirable as these statements of philosophy may be, we can never be content to rest upon past accomplishments. Naval material matters are under constant examination and analysis leading toward future improvements. In the past year or so, three such examinations have provided some solid stimulation that will undoubtedly result in additional changes and improvements in the future. I refer to the 1974 shipbuilding hearings before the Seapower Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, the wide-ranging initiatives developed by the Manpower Action Council of NMC and the recently concluded Navy and Marine Corps Acquisition Review Committee (NMARC) which studied the acquisition of weapon systems for the Department of the Navy.
The shipbuilding hearings, which included testimony by leading members of the shipbuilding industry as well as Navy officials, received considerable publicity at the time. The important issues discussed are expected to serve as the basis for additional legislation deemed necessary by the Congress.
The NMC Manpower Action Council (MAC) is a staff management group that endeavors to stay abreast of all the many activities within the command. Thus far, this advisory group has visited more than 25 headquarters and field commands and talked directly with more than 6,500 NMC civilians at the "grass roots” level. New initiatives stemming directly from MAC recommendations include a new performance appraisal system for blue collar employees, easing of regulations for transfer from blue to white collar posts, several new employee communication channels, considerable expansion in equal employment opportunity efforts, liaison with the Air Force Logistics Command to exchange ideas on employee motivation, improved and increased training opportunities, and the establishment of middle management councils within all NMC headquarters commands.
The NMARC group—made up of key industrial executives with broad military procurement backgrounds—has developed a wide-ranging series of specific observations designed to reduce claims, strengthen combat effectiveness, and increase the attractiveness of doing business with the Navy. Specific actions called for include a comprehensive acquisition plan for each major project, colocation of project managers and sup
Many of the improvements sought will require L and/or congressional approval. The Navy is act'v seeking approval where appropriate. Included are cut rent actions listed below.
Congress will be requested to:
\\6
► Authorize a five-year shipbuilding program rat
than a year-by-year program. 1
► Remove personnel ceiling restraints from industry ■ funded naval shipyards and staffing for the f°!Ci$ military sales program.
► Review the serious funding deficiency for shipbul
ing caused by double-digit inflation. ■
► Permit the Navy greater flexibility in assigning s j
repair, conversion, and alteration between private naval shipyards based on current workload reflu merits. 0(
► Authorize specific federal funds for subsidization shipyard apprentice programs in private yards an expansion of such programs in naval yards.
The Department of Defense has agreed to:
► Sponsor, in conjunction with the Navy an
Commerce Department, joint planning of ne^ construction over a five-year period. Such joint P ^ ning would provide the basis for the poD shipbuilding program. , £d
► Review material allocation priorities estab1 ^ under the Defense Production Act of 195° [£(J amended) to determine if priorities should be all° ^ for commercial shipbuilding in offler to foster a production base for shipbuilding in the United St3
Additionally, the Navy is currently cxaminW# ^ potential and value of implementing strengthening changes as:
► Assigning additional contracting personnel reS°U to acquisition project managers.
► Strengthening the offices of the supervisors o ^ building with the assignment of project officers foPjjp major acquisition program, and removing respof5
adeq_ ► Ult: °n
:^uate competition.)
■mately, assigning some new construction work,
1& oj-» 1 ® ®
^ 'a expect our efforts to pay off in the very near
cutei
reviewing claims from field contract administration offices.
Encouraging the availability of at least three ship- miders with the capability for nuclear submarine conduction and at least two in nuclear surface ship conduction. (Although current planning indicates that e existing capacity of the two shipyards, Newport ^ews Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co., and Electric 0at Division of General Dynamics Corporation, en- j>aged in nuclear shipbuilding will be sufficient to meet tUre requirements, there is proper concern that the c°ncentration of our shipbuilding capability in only tW° shipyards leaves the nation vulnerable to dangers disadvantages of disaster, sabotage, and lack of
du cont'nuing basis, to naval shipyards. This proce- ro will relieve industrial capacity problems in private s and also maintain a cadre of skills at naval ship- ar s for emergencies.
^summary, the Navy has a reasonably sound system ajd 1S)tion process and project management system ^eady. it can stanq improvement of course. In areas \vefe tke Navy can be compared with other services, e have done well. A large percentage of free world f lca aircraft and air-launched weapons emanated ^ 111 cbe U. S. Navy. Included are the F-4, A-4, and w, aircraft, the Sparrow, Sidewinder, Shrike, and q eye guided weapons, and the Mk 80 series bombs, ati/ S^Uffo°ard air defense systems are used worldwide, Of <uUr Navy kas ^een se<fo)nd to none in development sub maranes> nuclear propulsion, aircraft carriers, and ^rine-launched strategic missiles. We are currently ffip ,’n8 accurate indicators regarding our contract-
Th
tv, Cre are sta^ significant problems in material pro- rtlent. Many of these problems stem from contract- va^Procedures imposed during the 1960s and aggra- 'Nn ^ ec°nomic changes in recent years. Of course, 0f y °f the problems are a result of less than the best bj , anaScment. The quality of management closely e s the ability of the manager. NMC is working ciajt0 develop better managers, industrial and Ananiy! as well as to improve their tools by better organ- ste *?n’ dearer lines of authority, and insistence on ^ ast accountability.
a§etn ^1S a^S° makinS Progress in upgrading project mailer Cnt> both of the military manager and his civilian th"terPart- This is being done in the short term by agetu'n8 ^est PeoPfo f°r Inaportant project man- 10^ ent jobs and by demonstrating to those that fol- is ^ tkat this is a viable career path to the top. This est done by the promotion system. The project
manager and other project people in the WSAM career development program, described earlier, are enjoying well deserved recognition. For example, during the past three selection years in the restricted line category (and these are career management types), of 13 officers selected for flag rank, seven were either project managers at the time of selection or during the preceding tour. Four unrestricted line officers who were or had been project managers in the NMC were also selected. From this year’s rear admiral selection board of the three engineering duty officers selected, one is a project manager and one other had been. The one AEDO selected had been a project manager, and one unrestricted line officer had been in procurement. At the next lower grade, WSAM-designated officers in the chain leading to project management careers were also well rewarded in comparison with their contemporaries as evidenced by last year’s higher selection opportunity for captain.
The Navy has taken the lead among the services in implementing a WSAM program for our civil servants in project management, with a view to development of their abilities with the same aggressive approach being used on the uniformed side. This includes education, a careful performance grading system, and a scheme to rotate these people through the various acquisition activities as we do with officers and as is done throughout industry. A structured career development plan for our civilian partners is long overdue and will be of great benefit in the future.
No matter what policies are developed, no matter what programs are pursued, no policy or program can be any more effective than the people who implement it. All of us, particularly those with direct responsibility for material procurement and support, must offer an active example of professional productivity. In this way we can secure that strong personal commitment on the part of our workers, civilian and military alike, beyond their own self-interest. The problems associated with naval material procurement and support will be eased by additional dedicated, qualified managers. Most of all, the fleet will benefit.
Admiral Kidd graduated from the U. S. Naval Academy shortly after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. His World War II service included duty in the destroyers Cowie (DD-632) and Putnam (DD-757). Following the war, he served on the staff of Commander Destroyers, Atlantic Fleet, in the Bureau of Personnel, and in the USS Salem (CA-139). His first command was the destroyer Ellyson (DD-454). Subsequently, Admiral Kidd commanded Destroyer Squadron 32, Destroyer Squadron 18 (the U. S. Navy’s first all-missile squadron), Cruiser-Destroyer Flotilla 12, and the First and Sixth Fleets. Duty ashore has included being aide to the Superintendent of the Naval Academy, Joint Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, student at the National War College, and executive assistant and senior aide to the Chief of Naval Operations. Admiral Kidd was Chief of Naval Material from December 1971 until April 1975 and has recently taken over as Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet, Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic, and Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic.