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K
st rated
* century began badly for a Russian Navy °Se powerful Far Eastern Squadron barely tu entraPment (only temporarily, as it Tned out) at Port A rthur by four antiquated, in e ac^en Japanese merchantmen, foreground, £ opening days of the Russo-Japanese War.
P*rh^e moc^ern S°wet Navy, below, led by Japs its ablest admiral since Makarov, is n°t lih 1 i ■
- Kely to be either as outmaneuvered or ever again
The revolution in military affairs, which has been expanding over the recent decades, has governed the increasingly rapid replacement of some weapon systems by others possessing improved operational and combat qualities. This circumstance has accelerated the rate of development of the supporting base for warfare and of methods of force employment. In this connection, the study of the prospects for the development of military affairs, including also the theory of the art of naval warfare, is becoming particularly significant.
Let us briefly analyze the individual component parts of the art of naval warfare, i.e., its categories. These categories are those elements of the art which are the most immediately and readily affected and sensitive to changes in naval hardware. Therefore, their transformation can be regarded as the primary, concrete, and objective consequence of the change in this hardware.
Certain component parts of the art of naval warfare are evident in all of its levels. Thus, one may speak of the mutual support and control of forces on the strategic, operational, or tactical plane.1 This pertains to the same degree to such concepts as, for example, strike and concentration. Other categories—e.g., battle and attack—are limited to the area of tactics.
The Scope of the Conflict. The constantly growing capabilities of navies to carry out strategic missions are elevating the naval role in warfare. The significance of the blue-water theaters of military operations is also being elevated accordingly. As a result, an even further increase in the scope of naval warfare as one of the most important parts of warfare as a whole is foreordained.
Such characteristics of a modern navy as its versatility, mobility, and capability to concentrate its striking power, which can be utilized not only in combat with a naval adversary, but also within the zone of operations of other branches of the armed forces, will
Reprinted by permission from Morskoy Sbomik, No. 12, 1974,
copyright 1974 Morskoy Sbomik
For footnotes, please turn to page 63.
the
L "stnke plishM
will signify one of the basic methods of accompli combat missions. In this connection, a strike wi not only a combination of certain operations unite ^ a single goal or mission, as it is now, but it win become an independent operation and, in a nu ^ of instances, a single operation by one weapon P form or grouping or another. ^
For instance, a strike against a surface force can.|eS delivered by a group of ships armed with cruise m* ^ which will fully accomplish the mission of kn°c_
m1
it out. This also pertains in equal measure to pendent naval air operations. ^
On the tactical level, in contrast with the pas*
regarded as a combination of attacks united by tactical mission, the strike will assume a status equ
lent to the battle itself. Thus, a combat mission
niaj°f
.ble
of
i
;i*
foS'
affect the character and results of armed combat to an ever greater degree in the future.
In examining the scale of a conflict on the strategic plane, it is essential to note the ever-growing capability of the navies of the great sea powers to achieve increasingly more critical goals. This particularly pertains to operations of strategic offensive forces with regard to destroying major groupings of the enemy, and above all in crushing his military-economic potential, which can have a direct effect on the course and even the outcome of a nuclear war. It is natural to surmise that the further development of navies will allow them to wage war on an even greater scale.
The scope of individual operations conducted by navies is also sharply increasing. In particular, the increase in the capabilities of strategic missile-armed submarines to prosecute missions entailing the destruction of land targets makes it possible to expand the front and increase their depth of penetration in operations against the enemy. For instance, the range of the American Polaris-Poseidon strategic submarine nuclear system in the last ten years has more than doubled. The transition to the new Trident submarine nuclear-missile system, about which the Western press writes so much, will double this range again. And the front of operations will be expanded accordingly.
Thus, the sharp expansion of the spatial scope of operations against land objectives is not merely a general pattern, but is also the general future prospect for the development of the art of naval warfare by nuclear navies. Hence, the corresponding growth in the spatial dimensions of operations against naval strategic nuclear weapon systems is also quite clear. As a result, naval combat activity may embrace almost the entire expanse of the World Ocean and assume a global character.
The sharp increase in naval offensive and defensive capabilities is being achieved not only and not so much by an increase in the number of ships and other weapon platforms as by expanding the range of missions which each platform is able to prosecute through its more advanced weaponry. In other words, clearly it is not the quantity but the quality of the weapons platforms, i.e., the total power of the potential combat capabilities concentrated on them, which is becoming the ultimate criterion of the scope of operations.
For example, after the end of World War II, the U. S. Navy had 263 submarines. At the end of 1974, while possessing incomparably greater capabilities and while constituting a most important part of the country’s strategic assets (which could not be said of the 263 submarines in 1945), U. S. submarine forces numbered only 114 submarines, of which 102 are nuclear- powered (41 missile-armed and 61 multi-purpose submarines) and 12 are diesels.
The increase in the scope of warfare in the ocean'c theaters entails the participation in it of groupings0 other branches of armed forces on an ever greater scale- And this foreordains the emergence of a strategy 0 warfare in the oceanic theaters within the framew° of a single military strategy.
Strike. At a certain stage in its development, growth in the power of naval weaponry imparted ^ totally new meaning to that category of the art of n^ warfare known as the strike. Previously accompany, by such amplifiers as "artillery,” "torpedo,” "bo1® ’ (and in ancient times, even "ramming,”) such stn were limited to the tactical realm. In certain instan1^ the expression "strike from the sea,” underscoring operational correlation was justified. Today, howevet’ this concept has also been extended to the stra realm. In the future, clearly the strike will become main method of using naval forces. In this connect*0' it will be the solitary method in the strategic field)s* only the delivery of strikes from vast ranges and m ent directions will make it possible to achieve sue strategic goal as crushing the military-economic P°tel1 tial of the enemy. j
The strike concept apparently will be retained 3 strengthened in the operational realm. The term
de-
A ^
it was only one of the elements of a battle an
■ sing
jvJ'
may be accomplished by delivering a strike against target. For instance, a single submarine is capal destroying a major surface ship with a salvo missiles. The development of this trend is being tered by the increase in the range and power or onry which permits, in certain cases, the iCC ^ plishment of tactical missions not through a du > ^ by a unilateral, and sometimes single operation ag the enemy.
Thus, a strike makes it possible to achieve stf * l operational, and tactical goals. Moreover, sonneti ^ strike (e.g., delivered against land targets by a 111
ariJied . , . .
statldsut)rnarine), delivered "according to tactical
achi S an<^ rules” wiH permit strategic goals to be tnayby a single combat unit. In the future this g ec°me a characteristic feature of the strike. mane' This form of operations, combining fire and metho(1er’ has always been and will remain the main accomplishing tactical missions. For a long Htent Qj-Was thc solitary form of the combat employ- ti°nnaval forces. Yet, it too, is undergoing evolu- ne of its more characteristic features is the
‘Hci
conse-
^uCr, |SC ln the ranges of engagements (and the r ^ a^so rhe spatial scope), due to the increase in ^Urati ^ nava' weaponry, in maneuverability, en- platf ’ ancl *n the cruising (flight) range of weapons little rrtfS’ 3nh also due to the participation in the ttient other types of naval forces and the employ- VheriVari°us means of influencing the outcome. battlenav*es were young, no one spoke of range in bility ’07Ce che outcome was determined by the possi- aF*Peara k°arc^n8 or ramming an enemy. With the Only p, Ce projectile weaponry, range in battle not T’he ^Ccarne a reality, but it has continued to increase, destfo ■ sh1Ps of the opposing sides became capable of lyu . S che enemy at ever greater ranges.
V'sibleln^ War II, this distance equaled the
range to the target, using not only visual, but
also the technical means of detection existing at that time. Yet even that was not the limit: in that very war several battles took place without such contact. The first naval engagement marking the beginning of "contactless” ship combat operations is considered to be the battle of Midway Island in the Pacific Ocean on 4 June 1942 between the American and Japanese forces.
In today’s context, these distances have already increased up to several hundred kilometers. In the future, the effective range of naval weaponry will increase even more. Therefore, it will be commonplace for a naval battle to range over vast areas, and the coverage of the situation in the region of the battle will become possible only with the aid of specialized (primarily airborne) means.
The three-dimensional character of naval battle is another special feature of its evolution. Initially, battle
the
tbe
tioP-
execution is becoming simpler. On the contrary,
"When navies were young, no one spoke of range . . . With the appearance of projectile weaponry, range not only became a reality, but it has continued to increase. The warships of opposing sides became capable of destroying the enemy at ever greater ranges.”
was waged only by surface forces, and, consequently, only on the sea surface, on the interface between the water and air media. Later, forces operating in the water (submarines) and air (aircraft) began to participate.
Another feature is the ever-growing importance of destroying (or diverting from a given trajectory) the enemy’s means of destruction (torpedoes, missiles) before they reach their target. This is giving rise to a specific special feature of the modern naval battle and is engendering a totally new quality in it which will distinguish the battle of the future from that of the past, when every effort of the opposing sides was directed toward the destruction of the weapon platforms, and not the means of destruction which they employ.
The vast destructive effect of weaponry and the timely deployment of its platforms will reduce the time needed by forces to accomplish combat missions. Therefore, one of the important factors bringing about significant changes in the nature of a battle is the acceleration of the rate of development of events and the ever greater transient nature and dynamism of them.
A naval battle is almost always waged to destroy the enemy. In the future, this special feature will become indispensable in connection with the equipping of navies with powerful forms of weaponry.
Maneuver. For a long time, the main essence of naval tactics was practically covered by "fire and maneuver.” Through maneuver, the weapon platform was able to put itself into such a position relative to the enemy, where its technical potential capabilities could be employed in a strike to the fullest degree. Moreover, in certain cases, maneuver assured the necessary concentration of forces.
Maneuver in battle, as executed on the tactical deployment level, is decreasing in direct relationship to the increase in the effective range of weapons. Thus, with the appearance of smoothbore guns, the need to close on enemy ships was removed, and maneuver became shorter. It was curtailed even further by the entry into service of long-range rifled guns. And with the creation of missiles having a great horizontal flight range and high accuracy in hitting targets, it has acquired an essentially new quality which has made it possible for maneuver by weapon trajectories to replace maneuver by the platform to a considerable degree.
of1
weapon increases by one order of magnitude, the ^ within whose limits a target can be hit increases 1 two orders of magnitude. Therefore, strategic weap°r systems have the capability of hitting targets vast areas. The naval Trident ballistic missile t,ein® developed in the United States, it is believed, will U a range of more than 10,000 kilometers and in prinC‘F^ possesses ample capabilities for trajectory maneuver hit targets within vast areas.
However, it by no means follows from this that role of maneuver in battle is diminishing and that
maneuvering of forces situated outside the deter' range of the enemy (who, in turn, is also taking 111 ^ ures to get into an advantageous position which 15 ^ located beyond detection range) raises special dem"1^ for supporting the maneuver with information ^ tained from reconnaissance and target data. The ^ neuver must be carried out on the basis of data tained through various electronic means and l0^£ context of the most intensive electronic warfare, correct organization of which can theoretically c ^ pletely paralyze the system for monitoring the situ3 ^ and the gathering of essential information. ThlS^ quires the skill of not only carrying out a mane11 J but also of employing various technical meanS ^ monitoring the situation and for target indicatio11^ this connection, a critical need arises for efficient j tual support between the attack groups and nor f the reconnaissance forces but also external meanS target indication. jt.
Inherent to the maneuver of ship forces is r^e ,c tribute of swiftness, which is acquiring new sign1 ^ owing to the widespread introduction in the \ navies of surface effect ships which have a speed s^s times greater than conventional displacement ^ ^ The American press has been openly writing 0 f possible development of a fundamentally new c ^ aircraft carriers which will be equipped with P° ^ engines and will be in the form of air-cushion sU^f), ships developing speeds up to 180 knots (333 ^ i.e., some five times greater than present carrief^.^jJ
In examining maneuver’s effect on the opera ^ plan, it should be noted that its significance as ^ of operations aimed at supporting the operatl0fl
Th,
and
mpl°yment of strike forces.
Wh,
Pedoe
battle, the massing of forces has always taken part' °riT1 a larSe number of weapon platforms
prC(j1C1Pat*ng in an attack, with their make-up being rnoretCrrn’nec^ to allow for considerable losses. The the P°Werhul the weapons the enemy had, the greater as$i mass*ng of platforms needed to accomplish the eithe ^ COmbat mission. The criteria for massing were the 1 ^'C damaging effects of one type of weapon or With °ncentrati°n of these capabilities in conjunction
Mal!n°US °ther combat means. canCc.aSS/n^’ as such, doubtless will retain its signifi- Under Ut C^ear^f W*U assume another form. Already s°'Call a°day’s c°nditions even in the employment of effectsc°nventional weaponry, whose destructive formsare continually growing, the number of plat-
nceded to carry out missions similar to those
P °yrnent of forces and the concentration of them in CCr^in areas of the oceanic theaters is rapidly increasing, of e Massing of Forces. Since ancient times, massing °rces ^as been due to two basic and mutually ^pendent circumstances. First, the relatively modest 10CtlVe ranSe and destructive power of weaponry, the w hit probability, and also spatial limitations for . acing weaponry on board ship. Second, the constantly ^proving armor plating and survivability of warships. ^ eterr>al struggle between the means of destruction protection has also evoked a need for the massive
Cn C^e ch*eh weapons of navies were guns, tor- pri CS- an<^ bombs, massing in battle was practiced W|^arily wkh the employment of high-speed forces and n° armor’ sucb as torpedo boats, minesweepers, nu^aircrab- Only the participation of a significant CnCr cbese combat units resolutely closing on the at high speed under his heavy fire to a range lent ^or the effective employment of their own l0s r°ns could (and frequently at the cost of high p0 ■ . make it possible for them to take up a launch in ar*d carry out the assigned mission. Therefore,
Of ^
logiCa?r ^ar II has decreased sharply. Hence it is reptes t-lat t*ae mass*ng °f forces, while previously firepo^ tln§ the optimal concentration of weapons sariiy jjCr nee<^e^ to destroy an enemy, no longer neces- patj0nas to be carried out in the form of the partici- Ca^ 0 a large number of ships or aircraft. Today hat unite^°y a considerably smaller number of comIn *tS having a power equivalent to earlier weapons. see 0ne1S change in the concept of massing, we clearly hfve]Qe °y the manifestations of the dialectics of the t'aval «nent °y m*htary affairs and, in particular, of °f theairs; thus, the very same content (the defeat fhe CoCnemy) can have various forms, beginning with as in t^Ccntration of a large number of platforms, earlier context, and ending with the concentration of an equal (or even greater) striking power on a fewer number of platforms under today’s conditions.
However, the main content of massing continues to remain the same: the concentration of the firepower of one’s own forces necessary to carry out a combat mission reliably and to disperse the enemy’s defensive efforts over many sectors and targets.
Thus, massing in naval battle, by retaining its former meaning under existing conditions, still basically takes the form of a concentration on board a relatively modest number of platforms of highly effective weapons necessary to prosecute a combat mission advantageously through a single action against the enemy. In this instance, the platforms, as a rule, will be dispersed over considerable areas.
The massing of forces, as implemented on the tactical level, undoubtedly is also displayed on the operational level when the main efforts must be concentrated in the critical sectors of combat with the enemy fleet. Thus, the mass employment of aircraft in an operation appears not merely in a single powerful strike, which must be regarded as the basic form of operations, but also in the successive delivery of strikes to soften up and later also to fully annihilate groupings of enemy forces. As the maneuvering capabilities of aviation increase, this form of massing will be employed on an ever greater scale.
Mutual Support. One of the most important categories of warfare, including naval warfare, is mutual support by mixed forces. The optimal combination of the offensive and defensive capabilities of mixed groupings makes it possible to carry out missions considerably exceeding in scale those missions which forces of one type, by simply adding up their capabilities, could accomplish. However, these mixed forces must provide mutual support for one another in order to achieve this.
The organization of mutual support (especially tactical support) is becoming more and more complex and its importance is growing as the effective range, power, and diversity of the employed weaponry increases and also as the speed of the weapon platforms is improved. We may assume that in the future all of the above factors will influence mutual support in the fullest measure. Therefore, the increase in the role of tactical and operational mutual support of forces in accomplishing all missions levied on navies should be considered to be a basic pattern. In this connection, the tactical mutual support of mixed forces in the battle against strategic nuclear weapon platforms will be organized so as to take into consideration the urgent need to prosecute this mission in the shortest possible time.
fcv
On one hand, the further mutual penetration into the zone of combat operations of other branches of armed forces complicates the organization of mutual support between the Navy and these other branches on the operational and tactical levels, yet, on the other hand, it makes mutual support an essential condition for achieving victory in operations in the continental and oceanic theaters of military operations. This is explained by the fact that the capabilities of the other branches of the armed forces to operate in concert with the Navy within the Navy’s mission sphere, as well as the Navy’s capabilities to carry out missions on land and in the air, are continually increasing.
Thus, the complication of the organization of mutual support, the growth in the degree of its importance, as well as the increase in the diversity of the forms and methods of implementing it are the basic features characterizing the development of this category of the art of naval warfare.
Surprise. In the theory of naval warfare, surprise formerly meant taking advantage of the enemy’s lack of preparedness to conduct combat operations in order to accomplish your own missions. Today, surprise presupposes active, strictly goal-oriented actions to create conditions hindering the enemy’s capability to react operationally to the actions of the other side. This thesis stems from the development of military equipment and the pattern of military operations in nuclear warfare when surprise can put not only the advantage in the hands of whoever holds the initiative, as was previously true, but even victory in a battle or operation.
Therefore, the struggle to achieve surprise is becoming particularly critical. It comprises an important part of staff efforts to ensure the possibility of taking advantage of such an important factor to the fullest measure.
Intelligence, which to an ever greater degree is based on the employment of electronic means, has always been the enemy’s opportunity to utilize the surprise factor. That is why electronic warfare is a most important trend in the achievement of surprise in a battle or operation. Also security in all of its forms, as before, is of great significance in achieving surprise.
From what we have said it follows that surprise is a multifaceted category having many direct and inverse relationships with other categories of the art of naval warfare. In examining it from the point of view of the ability to achieve the unexpected, one could conclude that it is especially important at all levels of the naval warfare, whereas if we approach it from the standpoint of ensuring the achievement of the final goals of military operations, then we see that surprise is immediately and more fully displayed primarily on the operational-tactical plane. Here the achievement of
surprise, in a context where reconnaissance means an automated systems for analyzing and predicting sin13' tions are being continually upgraded, to a great degfee
is the province of the skill of the flag officer, sin^ only surprise, when both sides have practically e1u3
id-
material capabilities, can yield a definite operation tactical advantage for one side over the other.
Swiftness.3 A characteristic feature of all forms311 varieties of combat operations at sea is the rapid') unfolding nature of events, the rapidity of the chan?
in the situation. This trait is a consequence
of d>£
‘
development of hardware due to which previ°u|
methods of waging naval battle, including contin11.
maneuver of forces and repeated and prolonged oped tions against the enemy, have lost their significance an
have been replaced by dynamic, decisive, and fruitful combat engagements transpiring over e'er shorter time intervals. And this is understandable, s*nCC scientific-technical progress is leading to the cread°” of more mobile platforms and high-speed, long-r3t1^ weaponry. Therefore, swiftness is becoming a motean
more important and indispensable feature of a
strike
the
an operation, and a battle. Its manifestation on operational plane is expressed in the further redudi°n
in the duration of pressure on the enemy by incr<
the
the power of this pressure. Hence, the increase id ,•
effectiveness of combat operations. The swiftnesS
operations of various forces aimed at the main en'
.eit>y
and M
targets is becoming a most important, main, - ciding factor in methods of attaining goals, sin^ ensures a fuller use of all combat capabilities weapons platforms and makes their strikes unstopp3£ Swiftness permits an all-round reduction in the expended on achieving the assigned goals. ^
quickly-developing operations combined with sutp make it possible to beat the enemy to the punch
d
quickly achieve the advantage in maneuver, an
new
deliver a strike against the entire depth of the en^ forces’ combat alignment. Swiftness has been and ^ be one of the most important methods of achie
surprise. #
Thus, surprise and swiftness are closely related gories of the art of naval warfare.
The increase in scope of naval warfare and the ^ ther enrichment of it with combat operations accen
swiftness at every level is imparting a special dynad1
of 1
and effectiveness to this warfare. The totality
:d W
entire combat activity of the Navy is represent6^
the complex combination of instantaneous and sU^, sive quickly developing strikes and operations ac <
Dais, *
,d
plished through the achievement of critical g°a-- ^ having, in certain instances, a direct effect on the c°u
and outcome of the war as a whole.
Thus, swiftness is an indispensable factor 10
n^1
defi:
a]jmP° as a category of the art of naval warfare, since b mi'*tar}' events at sea develop not only in space, tj^a^so time, i.e., at a certain tempo. In this connec
the i
du.
j ^ short period of time. Even in World War II, the li • ~j“uu °f a certain enemy grouping was not always
C,nt that today the possibility exists in certain cases
achi,
(as ~ eving strategic goals through tactical operations Tl/ rnent'oncc^ above).
rniSs- C Constantly growing requirements for reducing exf,r0 execution times in naval warfare are finding 10n in the need to maintain forces at a high
,aij.are> whose role is constantly growing, and the ^ Uty to utilize it in one’s own interests is one of far 171 °rC ™Portant elements of the art of naval war-
Tempo. From the well known Marxian dialectical nitlon of time, we clearly see the importance of tempo always has been and will remain one of lr>dispensable conditions for the planning and con- Xt °f all types and forms of naval combat operations. s nayal hardware developed and the speed of plat- art1X1,3 an<^ range and power of weaponry increased, the 0ut° naval warfare was faced with the need to carry ar> ever-growing volume of missions in an increas-
dest-l, pcr ij ^uction of 2
^ttuted to a definite time frame. In those days, for c‘nern C> * m'ss*on was ass>gne<d °f annihilating the car' j durin8 a sea transit. Yet it could have been <ja °Ut anytime during his entire transit, lasting 0r even weeks. And, in principle, it was not °f thrtant W^et^er it was at the beginning or the end the 1S i)er'0ci- What was important was to accomplish lssion while the enemy was at sea. ton SUC^ an aPProach is impermissible. In today’s stroXt> a hostile group of naval forces must be defied e m a strictly defined and very short time frame— U *S a^e t0 empi°y its own weaponry in full ^Us’ r^e rime factor, i-e-> the tempo of ti0nsS’ ls an element of the success of combat opera-
"Ph
of e characteristic feature of the category of the art the • Waffare which we are now examining is that is beC neecied by a fleet to carry out strategic missions cUti of the same order as that expended on prose-
evijpf tactical missions. Thus, it is becoming more of
The Development of the Art of Naval Warfare 61
"The capabilities of the other branches of the armed forces to operate in concert with the Navy within the Naiy’s mission sphere, as well as the Navy’s capabilities to carry out missions on land and in the air, are continually increasing. ” readiness posture to immediately deliver attacks on the enemy and also in the widespread introduction into navies of various automated systems.
The categories of the art of naval warfare examined above are very closely related to the ability to employ one’s own forces in the rigidly limited frames allocated for the accomplishment of a mission.
Control. A great deal of significance is attached to the art of control in today’s context. The materials of the 24th Communist Party Congress stress that effectiveness of control can be achieved only through the ability to see the prospects, to correctly define priorities, to take advantage of the latest achievements of science and technology, and the latest experience, and to react quickly and efficiently to changing conditions. These theses must be the basis for solving the problems of the development of such categories of the art of naval warfare as control of forces.
Requirements for the control of forces have continuously grown with the development of naval forces and with changes in the conditions under which they operate. For example, control even in complex and multi- phased combat operations, as a rule, formerly was implemented on the basis of direct visual observation of the situation. In this instance, decisions were made by the flag officer, to a considerable degree, on the basis of his own experience and intuition. Later, as a result of the sharp increase in the scale and rapid pace of combat operations due to improving performance characteristics of weaponry and combat equipment, control was transformed into a complex process requiring the employment of long-range and very-long-range technical equipment. Under today’s conditions when opposing groupings of forces have nuclear weapons at their disposal which are essentially sufficient to completely destroy one another many times over, control of forces is related to the employment of various automated equipment to ensure surprise and swiftness of operations and to gain time over the enemy. In this case, control of forces is a guarantee of success. It has become especially critical in the realm of the employment of nuclear forces and of the forces whose mission it is to knock them out.
As was noted earlier, one trend in the development
|
| jfc \v \ W49K. \ ■ |
LT -« Tjjri |
|
|
of naval warfare to the subsurface medium has enge^ dered a principally new quality of the art of na'^ leadership, based on the employment of modern cofl^ systems and complexes. Together, they must pr°vl. the flag officer with accurate information on the i[i' surface, and subsurface situations and aid in maki*1# the optimal decision on the employment of a number of forces. j
It must be noted that the problem of the cor>tr°
of forces is related not only to the comprehen
to &
introduction of automated equipment, but also <•- ^ inclusion of groups of highly qualified officers admirals in the contiol system. j
Automated control systems, which are being 11 ^ more and more widely, today call for highly intelle^. human effort as an indispensable element, i.e., a com
oft*
degre£!
of naval warfare is the increase in its scope. Yet this increase in itself entails a further increase in and concentration of information traffic and in the intensity of its circulation through various circuits and spheres of control. In order to receive and process all incoming information and, on the basis of it, to prepare and make the optimal decision in a short time, there is a need for an increasingly broader introduction of scientific methods of control based on the use of the latest technical means (of communications, automation, and computerized equipment).
The postwar development of submarine forces having great strike and defensive capabilities in all of the navies of the sea powers has complicated the control of submarine forces located in distant regions of the World Ocean. Moreover, the transfer of the main efforts
nation of the objective and subjective principles control process in which man, to an ever greater u-p j is supported by "machines” with the data to be uSC by him in optimal decision-making.
Organization. The employment of diverse izational forms fully corresponding to actual capaD ties and conditions for the employment of naval ‘°^c
and means, has always comprised and comprises
rfarc
of the important branches of the art of naval svai Naval forces, which have had quite definite °P^ tional and combat capabilities and properties in historical stage of their development, can be regar as the object to which a concrete organizational 0 must always correspond. Therefore, over the efl history of naval development, organizational strU have continually been replaced, and as naval bar has been upgraded, they have assumed one syste1^ another of permanent force formations or battle a
ments. For example, at a certain stage squadrons their appearance as a permanent organization. ^ same time, we observed a tactical reserve of high'sP j, well-armed frigates in the combat organization °
F. F. Ushakov’s forces, and in Admiral D. I. ^nyavin’s forces, we saw tactical groups together with e traditional line alignment of forces with the dispatching of an independent formation of two ships to att^ck the enemy flagship.
more recent times the organization of forces in
vare. This affirms the well-known thesis of Marxist
Phil,
[ - . ucuianuo wn wigaiiiz-auwn,
of ajj>na^ variant of it will permit the fullest realization an i. tbe capabilities in the control of forces which
In
. e> and later also in an operation called for a c°nsiderable number of different groups and detach- s- The totality of these groups in battle assumed ^ organizational structure which has come down in art of naval warfare as the concept of "battle align-
and in an operation as an "operational alignment °t forces.”
• ^*Uring the Great Patriotic War major organiza-
• a changes in the Navy were evoked by the emerg- 0y ^Rational-strategic situation in the ground theaters
military operations, and in particular in the littoral 0rs, and also by the need to carry out the missions flew ^ t0 4 was expressed in the creation of ’ and restructuring of previously existing flotillas, si/1 bases> maritime defense regions, and forces of 0|r ' [1][2] [3] [4] [5]’ aircraft, and rear logistic organs, etc. The taking organizational measures in a timely and efficient
>n t?er cornPr*seci a definite part of managing the Navy that era.
alw^UeSta°ns of the organization of naval forces have of T been dec’ded in response to the requirements the C art nava^ warfare in a certain period and, to co CXtent it was rational, they were a unique form the eSP°ncbng t0 the content entailed in the form of [larjCertain potential combat capabilities of the naval ,;s°Phy of the correspondence of form to content, the °Ubtedly it will also be displayed in the future as missmiss>0ns of the Navy develop further, and as its tj0n10ns> the military-political situation, and the condi- ^ f°r waging naval warfare change. fifcat C rev°^uti°n in military affairs is having an ever preCr ehhct on organization. This is particularly ex- aUtQe by the fact that computerized equipment and tteat^t^ sPstems (which serve as the basis for the ijjt- *?n new organizational structures) are being thereUCC<^ into various areas of control. Therefore, a r., ■ are mcreased demands on organization, since only rattonal v
a11 the
aUt°mated system offers.
As
Warf We bave seen, the development of the art of naval t’Onal^ ^ rcdated t0 tbe affirmation of all of its tradi- chaCategories using new quality criteria which are i ctertzed by continually growing requirements, a re(j ness °f standards, a strengthening of efforts, a l0n in decision-making time, and increased responsibility for the flag officer. Despite the appearance of powerful weaponry, highly efficient control systems, etc., the role of man in the development of all branches of the art of naval warfare is constantly increasing.
One should consider the following to be the important trends in the development of the art of naval warfare: a steady extension of the concept of optimization to wider areas, and an increase in the role of the engineering and technical fields and in the emphasis on physical and mathematical sciences as the basis needed to resolve theoretical and practical questions.
This article touches on only a part of the questions comprising, in the aggregate, such a broad problem as the employment of a modern navy, whose solution is considered to be one of the tasks of the theory of the art of naval warfare. Clearly, review of all the questions constituting the art of naval warfare should be made on the basis of a strict consideration of the changing operational and combat capabilities of naval hardware which are the basis for the formation of all of its categories.
Sergei G. Gorshkov was born 26 February 1910 in the Ukraine. He graduated from the four-year Frunze Higher Naval School in 1931, and his first career assignment was the destroyer Frunze. He served in the Black Sea Fleet and later the Pacific Fleet. By 1938 he commanded a brigade of destroyers, and when war with Germany broke out in June 1941, Gorshkov commanded a cruiser brigade under the Commander-in-Chief of the Black Sea Fleet. In October 1941, having commanded a successful amphibious landing at Odessa the month before, Gorshkov was promoted to rear admiral at the age of 31. After the war, he commanded a squadron of ships in the Black Sea Fleet, became fleet chief of staff in 1948 and fleet commander in 1951. After a brief period as First Deputy Chief of the Soviet Navy, Admiral Gorshkov became its Commander-in-Chief in June 1956 and has held the post ever since. During that time he has been instrumental in transforming the Soviet Fleet from a coast defense force to a true blue-water power.
'Though the U. S. Navy generally distinguishes between only strategy and tactics, many European navies—parallel to land warfare—insert the concept of "operation” between the two. Moreover, the terms are used with slightly different connotations. Rear Admiral Edward Wegener, Federal German Navy (Retired), explained this point on page 198 of his essay in the 1972 Naval Review: "Strategy is the 'grand design’ for the totality of military activities. It is brought into reality by operations. To clarify how these terms are applied, we might take the example of the Bismarck's cruise in May 1941: The decision to use major fighting ships in raider warfare was a strategic decision; the decision to employ specifically the Bismarck at that time of the year and under the circumstances of that spring was an operational decision; and the decision of the admiral on board the Bismarck to engage in combat with the British capital ships, Hood and Prince of Wales, was a tactical decision.
[2] The New York Times, 21 October 1970.
translator’s Note: The term "swiftness” here does not do justice to the original Russian word stremitel'nost’, which also includes the meaning of "dash,” "impetuosity,” and "rapidity,” yet "swiftness” seems the most appropriate translation in the context of this category.
[4]The term "Great Patriotic War” refers to the part of World War II in
which the U.S.S.R. participated.