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Civil Engineer Corps, U. S. Navy
In 1937, Cyril Northcote Pa rkinson—Englishman, scholar, author, humorist, and civil servant— developed explanations for bureaucratic tendencies. While studying the British Admiralty, Professor Parkinson found that the Admiralty staff (dockyard workers, clerks, and officials) had grown 5.73% annually, irrespective of the size of the British Fleet or the number of officers and men in the Royal Navy. Subsequent studies of other British agencies confirmed his findings and led to the conclusion that in any organization the number of subordinates multiplies at a predetermined annual rate, regardless of the amount of work the staff does, even when the final output decreases. From these observations, he derived several principles which have come to be known as Parkinson’s Laws.1
One must quote these laws with tongue planted firmly in cheek, for they were written in that manner. But their deeper message is not amusing, not when it describes so well what has happened in our own Navy. Here are Parkinson’s Laws:
► First Law: Work expands so as to fill the time available for its completion.
► Second Law: Expenditure rises to meet income.
► Third Law: Expansion means complexity and complexity, decay—The more complex, the sooner dead.
► Growth Principle: In any public organization growth will average 5.75% a year, regardless of the amount of work to be done.
PHOTO OF PROFESSOR PARKINSON COURTESY OF HOUGHTON MIFFLIN CO. PHOTO AT LEFT: U. S. NAVY
;(«««**
is partly explained by the 1966 establishment of Office of Civilian Manpower Management (OCMM)an the initiation in 1967 of the Civilian Substitution Pr0 gram. Establishment of OCMM enhanced the prestige and influence of Navy civil servants. It provided cefl tralized civilian personnel policies and procedures 311 increased the civilian voice in top Navy managernc1'' The purpose of civilian substitution was to coriv^1 as many military billets as possible to civilian positi°nS so that more military men could be sent to contb3t areas. In 1967, 1968, and 1973—the three years in which the program was implemented—36,125 civil[1]*11 positions were substituted for 41,000 military biUctS The ascendency of federal government unions h*5 increased the power of Navy civilian employees. Menl
bership in Navy unions increased from 33,955 m to 179,505 in December 1973, a 423% increase.
the result of inflation, local wage surveys, co
bargaining, or threat of personnel loss to the p sector. Since 1969, federal salaries have, on the av(
X he mission of the U. S. Navy is to control the seas. A truism perhaps, but it has been overlooked lately. The welter of Navy tasks and programs often obscures the reason for its existence. Many Navymen ashore, burdened with minutiae while pursuing their narrow specialties, often regard fleet problems as an unwelcome intrusion into their routine. Unfortunately, however, wars are not won by sheer force of correspondence. The fundamental Navy unit of measure is, as it always has been, the ship, and sea power is still a function of the size of the fleet.
The shore establishment comprises land, facilities, and employees—both military and civilian. Because land and facilities were acquired over many years at different costs, are maintained at different standards, and are operated at different efficiencies, plant value was not selected as the unit of measure of the size of the shore establishment.
The number of officers and men ashore is likewise not a valid indicator of shore establishment size. The percentage of Navymen ashore is nearly constant with respect to total shore establishment manning. Also, the number of officers and men in the Navy is highly sensitive to the size of the fleet.
Navy civilian employees are another matter. It is fundamentally they who operate and maintain the shore establishment. Navy policy requires it. And, although sailors are ashore, there are virtually no civilians at sea. That’s why, for the purposes of our analysis, the permanent, full-time civilian work force has been chosen as the basic shore establishment size indicator.
What has happened to the fleet—the consumer of the shore establishment product—over the last 30 years? While there was an increase of 860% in the number of ships during World War II, and an 85% increase during the Korean War, there was only a 6.4% increase during the Vietnam War. As one might expect, there has been a close correlation between the number of ships and the number of officers and men.
Now let us examine civilian employment. PostWorld War II demobilization caused a fast 35% cut in the number of civilians, understandably much less than the 82% fleet reduction. The Korean War caused increases of 65% in civilians and 85% in ships. After Korea, both ships and civilians declined uniformly at about the same rate and remained closely correlated until I960. Both increased again during the Cuban Missile Crisis, and at roughly the same rate.
Between 1964 and 1968, the fleet grew slowly and regularly, by 6.4%. During the same period, however, civilian employment grew 30%. This odd phenomenon 1962 #t!>
their paid staffs in Washington and increased batg3"1 ing leverage in the field, the unions effectively reSlS reductions in force.
Two other disturbing phenomena which inCje lack of control of civilian personnel have been gr3 escalation or "grade creep” and the increased percent3^ of graded (white collar) workers. The average gr3^ of Navy white collar employees in i960 was 7.261973, it was 7.88, an 8.5% increase. This grade >ncre^t alone cost the Navy approximately $112 million 0 the period, or about $8.6 million per year. Alth°u^ some increase may have been warranted—as pr° sional, technical, and administrative requirement^ creased—much of it was caused by managements ^ of awareness of, or lack of will to resist, grade incr pressures. The price paid is unacceptable. e
In 1969, 39% of the Navy civilian work force vV graded. In 1975, 52% are graded. This trend means ^ the number of managers, administrators, clerks, s taries, and other overhead personnel increased in 1 tion to the number of welders, painters, equip11^,. operators, electricians, warehousemen, and 0 "wrench-pullers.” c
In the aggregate, these examples strongly in that Navy management has tended to pay its clVl^jf employees more than necessary to obtain and hold 1 services, causing an increase in payroll costs that lS
ivatc
ei#
been higher than those of comparable positfo115^ business and industry. For example, since 1964, rough comparability existed, average federal civil1311 has increased 99% while private industry pay has g up only 74%. 0c-
There was another interesting, related condK1 . ( curring at the same time. From 1954 to 19^'
lack of
*hich
second
aati.
on
number of admirals increased 13% while the number s ips declined 41%. No judgment is made here about need for this many admirals. However, it is noteworthy that, since 1954, when there was one admiral k°r each 3.96 ships in the fleet, there will, in 1976, ^ one admiral for every 1.76 ships. This should give areSen°us Pause- Bur two points about this situation I e relevant. First, it may be an indicator of the Navy’s
personnel management discipline, an example carries over into the shore establishment, and
its impact upon the size of the shore establishment .
t ‘ me growth in the number of admirals has led ereation of a bureaucracy to serve them. Thus, we find p^r^ves at the first of Parkinson’s Laws, "Work ex- •j., s so as to fill the time available for its completion.” e has two axioms:
^ OffiC-a^S Str*ve to multiply subordinates, eials make work for each other.2
s;2^° ^°ubt these have been major factors in the large e °f the shore establishment.
has H°m *968 Vietnam peak to the present, the fleet thg r°PPecl 49%. But from the 1969 civilian peak to ^ present, civilian employment has dropped only 26%. itfain’ 0c*^' Whereas the fleet has declined 45% from Pre-Vietnam size, the shore establishment has been p Cc<* less than 4%. Very odd indeed.
Na ^Ufe * Is a comparison of ships in commission and fjSC3j Clvdian employees (the shore establishment) by eSsen lear> beginning in 1938. This relationship is the Hie Ce°* cbls analysis—the number of shore establish- ClVilians Per sblp- World War II was an aberra- ' Its magnitude, nature, and full national mobili- •mposed unusual constraints. It also allowed
huge economies of scale. Central allocation of scarce manpower among the military services and defense industries limited the size of the shore establishment. But World War II data are useful nonetheless. As a revealing indicator of what was achieved, the average number of Navy civilian employees-per-ship supported was 130.
Note the similarity for World War II, the Korean War, and the Cuban Missile Crisis. The number of civilians-per-ship declined during each conflict. There are a number of ready explanations:
► Rapid fleet buildup
► Deferral of maintenance
► Economies of scale caused by application of unused plant capacity, and increase in labor (variable) as a percentage of overhead (fixed) production costs
► Increased efficiency resulting from wartime motivation (patriotism, overtime pay, etc.)
The increase in number of civilians-per-ship after each crisis is understandable: ship scrapping/mothball- ing, need to restore readiness after degradation caused by wartime operating tempo, drop in variable workload resulting in high overhead and excess yard capacity. The graph was at least rational until 1965.
During the Vietnam War—unlike World War II, the Korean War, and the Cuban Missile Crisis—the number of civilians in the shore establishment per-ship increased sharply, consistently, and nearly uniformly. The increase from 356 to 6l4 civilians-per-ship between 1965 and 1975 suggests a serious imbalance, a discontinuity, and a loss of control. It cries out for explanation, particularly since the fiscal year 1976 budget indicates there will be as many as 635-per-ship.
A continually increasing civilians-per-ship ratio might be expected. Ships are becoming more complex. We now have nuclear power plants, missiles, computerized weapons systems, and more "black boxes” in general. But if the fleet is now a more capital intensive operation, is not the shore establishment also? Obviously not. And there does not appear to have been a productivity increase, which would tend to lower the civilians-per-ship ratio. Apologists might well say that the mix of ship types has changed and, with it, the fundamental character of the fleet. Not so, as Figure 2 indicates.
Figure 2 lists the number of ships by type and percentages at five-year intervals from 1945 to 1975. Since 1950, the percentages have been remarkably constant. Notable exceptions are the elimination of battleships, introduction of frigates, and the increase in the number of submarines. Nor has the average manning of ships changed much; the correlation between Navy ships and men is close.
Figure 2 Fleet Mix (By Fiscal Year)
Ship Types | 1945 (%) | 1950 {%) | 1955 {%) | 1960 (%) | 1965 (%) | 1970 (%) |
Carriers | 138(2.5) | 15(2.4) | 24(2.4) | 23(2.9) | 25(2.7) | 19(2.5) |
Battleships | 23(0.4) | l(-) | 3(-) | O(-) | 0(-) | o(-) |
Cruisers | 72(1.3) | 13(2) | 17(1.7) | 13(1.6) | 14(1.4) | 10(1.3) |
Frigates | o(-) | O(-) | 5(-) | 7(0.8) | 27(2.8) | 25(3.2) |
Destroyer, Destroyer | 365(6.7) | 147(2.4) | 308(30) | 260(32) | 246(27) | 198(26) |
Escorts |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Amphibious Ships | 1,256(23) | 91(15) | 175(17) | 113(14) | 135(14) | 97(12) |
Minesweepers | 611(11.2) | 56(9) | 112(11) | 81(10) | 85(9) | 64(8.3) |
Submarines | 237(4.4) | 72(11) | 109(10) | 113(14) | 134(14) | 146(19) |
Auxiliaries | 1,256(23) | 190(31) | 262(26) | 197(24) | 262(28) | 194(26) |
Patrol Ships | 1,469(27) | 33(5.3) | 15(1.5) | Mr) | 6(0.6) | 16(2.1) |
Totals | 5,427 | 618 | 1,030 | 811 | 934 | 769 |
What, then, | was different about the Vietnam War? | determined to move forward with this | ||||
Many things, but it was not really that different from | establishment] realinement. I could ck | |||||
World War II and Korea. There was shore bombard- | waste of dollars and I would not be a | |||||
ment. There were carrier air strikes, tactical air | support, | continuation | of this waste.” | >4 |
and coastal patrolling. Riverine warfare and the "brown-water Navy” seem to be the only significant Navy variations. The fact that the North Vietnamese had almost no Navy, and no Air Force operating at sea or over South Vietnam, vastly simplified our fleet air, surface, and antisubmarine defense effort.
Still, as Figure 1 shows, the number of civilians-per- ship increased 44%, and this cannot be justified by the peculiarities of the Vietnam War.
This developing condition was known to top Defense Department and Navy decision-makers. In 1973, Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., Chief of Naval Opera-
It appears then that the problem has been app:
man!
hart11'
rou$tl
an
men as civilians being cut. Hence, it was Navy cut, not just a shore establishment reduction^ liquidation of these facilities has reduced the
tions, testified:
". . . when I began to report to my superior, the Secretary of the Navy, (1) that we were headed for serious reductions in ships and aircraft, and (2) that we had for nearly a decade not taken any reduction in shore establishments, and (3) that the shore establishment was so large in comparison to the dwindling Navy that I felt it was immoral not to make some dramatic reductions in the shore establishment.”3
Secretary of the Navy John W. Warner addressed the problem in a 22 June 1973 statement:
". . . When Secretary [John] Chafee and I joined the Department of the Navy, February 1969, we had not been there more than a few weeks until Admiral Moorer, the then Chief of Naval Operations, impressed upon us the imbalance between the shore
establishment and the operating fleets.................... When
I took over as Secretary in May of 1972 I was
1915 ft
15(3-0)
O(')
27(5-4), 3(0.0
ll6(23)
126(25)
14(28)
502 to
for years. Why was action to restore the balance 11 jp taken sooner? The following explanation was given Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird on 6 Dece,T1 1972:
". . . it is not the military that is fighting f°r 1 particular base structure or the particular supP facilities that are associated in our defense bu $ There are others in government and in our Cong ^ that really felt a halt had to be called to these m^5 reductions affecting so many people.”5
This justification is unsatisfactory. There are actions which can be taken over time by wise m: ment to reduce the size of the shore establish*11^, actions which are well below the threshold Si
gressional concern and which do not have a local community impact. Vast changes can be w by good management, through careful planning’ * tience, and attrition. The latter averages about year in the Navy civil service. $
The Navy shore establishment realignment5 ^ nounced by Secretary of Defense Elliot Richards®11^ April 1973 have done little to reduce the size 0 shore establishment. The reductions have, over a . year period, reduced civilian employment by 1 ’ ^ about 4.5%. At the same time, the shore estabh5 ^ realignment has eliminated 1,228 officer and 5,/ ^ listed billets, which total almost half as many 111 A
ovo
Th,
who
career.
opposition is assumed to exist to all reduc-
fion i
p ltuent complaints. But congressional inquiries
^ Only if rnmmanrlinrr officers rtimcp fr» rnnsi
are
thena so
j3nt about 5%. The maintenance backlog has also alined by only 5% ($21 million). These reductions 0 ittle to solve the basic problem.
hy did the shore establishment get so out-of-hand? 0se best able to answer are the commanding officers 10 ate the direct employers and managers of the vast )°nty of civilian employees and, therefore, have the So^atest influence on the shore establishment. The rea. not in any particular order of significance, include nical pressure, super-loyalty to command, appro- ist' 3te° ^Unc^ Philanthropy, status quo management, in- ^it^tlonal disincentives, liberal funding, preoccupation n public affairs, the over-readiness syndrome, abdicafix • 1 aecislons t0 the civilian hierarchy, investment rr)^tlc)n> over-concern with morale, mesmerization by agement systems, and poor management itself, th CS,e command management frailties are not the au- tj • s creations. He has repeatedly seen archetype prac- l>ners °f each throughout his Political i ln.t^e civilian work force, regardless of size. This Cer$ "^Joc deterrent to reduction by commanding offi- poi‘. n ^act> however, small reductions seldom attract areattention, and, when they do, good reasons c°nst'ten accePtahle- Congressmen have to respond to
nly if commanding officers choose to consider >o.
h
erri e federal government buys votes by distributing erntn ^naent' ^nd the Navy is part of the federal gov- ulei^ent-'a fact of life. But the Navy must still recom- ke closures when it believes they are necessary. To s0risnaval installations open purely for political rea- of f ’ °r t0 maintain inflated payrolls, robs the Navy b3(j ds nceded to keep in fighting trim, encourages havnaanagement and in general creates—well, what we
n1'odly-
last H ^rowth and success of the Soviet Navy in the of , . e have been fantastic. The Russian method S0vjet. leving this ought to tell us something. The the^tS build their defense installations and manage ef}jc: ln 0rder to achieve their objectives in the most ^valnumanner' 's doubtful that they operate their jobs S °re establishment for social benefit, to create 0Ur’ °r t0 spread the ruble evenly around the U.S.S.R. y "aval planning system places us at a serious disad- ^ 8e with respect to the Soviets. the serious commanding officer fault is placing
terestsare °f the command ahead of the Navy’s in- at ^ts principal result is maintenance of the payroll di^i .°at any cost, fighting every change that could ^and.'w,the budget, prestige, or influence of the com- lJntbr1C costly corollary to superloyalty is that phi- Py and humanitarianism with tax dollars costs
the Navy dearly. Many commanding officers fear hurting their employees. The old "of course everyone knows Joe is incompetent, but he can retire in only eight more years so let’s keep him until then” trick has no place in a good manager’s bag. Still it is a commonplace in the Civil Service.
Another problem is the conventional officer wisdom which holds that one cannot fire a civilian. Civilian personnel managers perpetuate this myth. In fact, it can be done—by properly documented unsatisfactory performance, by patience, and by determination. The Navy discharges officers and enlisted men for unsatisfactory performance, but of late we have not shown equal determination to do it to our civil servants. The humanitarian commanding officer must be made to realize that Civil Service regulations provide each employee with ample protective rights, but absolute security is not one of them. A good CO must call them as he sees them—then let the system take over.
Status quo management is the norm in the shore establishment. The whole Navy system encourages and contributes to it. Our incremental budgeting system requires justification primarily for changes from the previous budget. Savings resulting from command innovation may result in embarrassment to headquarters by reducing obligation rates. They often result in lowering future budget bases. Personnel cuts taken unilat-
. . we had for nearly a decade not taken any reduction in shore establishments, and. . . the shore establishment was so large in comparison to the dwindling Navy that I felt it was immoral not to make some dramatic reductions in the shore establishments. ”
Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr.
:
erally by an aggressive commanding officer may be followed by across-the-board cuts dictated by Washington. If there is no fat left, flesh or bone must go. The fat command next door can take the cuts easily.
The economy-minded commanding officer attracts headquarters attention to himself—often unfavorably. He may be viewed as "negative” or a troublemaker. The most career-enhancing style is that of growth management. The most successful commanding officers are usually those who create new programs and manage to have their budgets increased. Expansionary management is laudatory, whether or not mission requires it. Hence the prudent CO avoids reductions. He keeps a low profile and doesn’t rock the boat.
The local Civil Service hierarchy exerts great pressure on the commanding officer to constantly increase, or at least to maintain, the payroll. Recommendations to reduce the force rarely reach the commanding officer through the civilian chain. Reductions not only eliminate jobs, they result in (or should result in, although it does not often happen) reduced grade levels for many who remain on the payroll. So when personnel reductions are mentioned, the protective civilian screen goes up. Few commanding officers have a good enough military staff and management information system to find out where cuts are possible. Fewer yet are tough- minded enough to start reduction actions when the need becomes clear.
Many commanding officers have had little experience working with Navy civilian personnel. They do not know civilian personnel regulations and procedures and thus feel inadequate in this area of their responsibility. They therefore tend to accept too readily recommendations of their civilian advisors. They do not question civilian solutions to problems in the same way they do those presented by their military staffs. Commanding officers should recognize the strong vested interest of their civilian managers and their tendency to solve most problems by simply "putting more men on the job,” with all the benefits, such as promotion, which flow to the civilian hierarchy by doing so. This tendency does not necessarily imply evil motives to our civilian administrators. It is as natural as ambition. But commanding officers must recognize it and make allowances for it.
Civilian positions which become vacant should never be filled routinely, as is commonly done. Each should be regarded as a new position being filled for the first time. Questions should be asked: Is the work done by this position necessary? What other position can do it? What will happen if the position is not filled? The one fundamental criterion should be the contribution the position makes to the command mission. If the relationship is too indirect or obscure, the position
should not be filled. With sufficient time, commands can be reduced and reorganized in this manner.
There are a number of administrative barriers to cuts- Whereas increases require only money and civilhn ceiling points (neither of which were problems during the war in Vietnam), cuts of magnitude (over 50 poS1' tions or 10%) require headquarters approval and c°n' gressional notification. Reductions cause inefficienCf and turmoil. For each employee terminated, an average of four employees is affected. Civil service "bumping often knocks the best people out of positions. Poorly qualified employees fill positions for which they h3'e low aptitude or require long training. This causes pr0 duction slowdown and general low morale. These arC powerful disincentives, to be sure.
The availability of funds is unfortunately the b3SlC
reduction consideration. If the budget supports
the
payroll, the payroll won’t change. If the budget w°n'
support it, the commanding officer has a ready excuse' He can tell his employees that he couldn’t help it-
only
should blame headquarters. He is making cuts because Washington made him do it. His comm311 loyalty survives, but at the expense of his manage11^11
competence. ^
Among those things most galling to a m3n3S ought to be being told by headquarters to do sofl^
thing which he knows he should have done on
own initiative. But, alas, as long as the budget supP1
the organization in most naval shore installations,
his
ore*
the
organization remains unchanged. Note conform311
with Parkinson’s Second Law: "Expenditure rise5 meet income.”
"Over-readiness” is the cause of much waste.
the
country cannot afford in times of relative pe3<-e^. maintain in the shore establishment in large qua6 ^ all the skills and capabilities required during war- ^ production capacity and a civilian work force stan or work at half speed. Many skills in the civilian e omy can be quickly mobilized. And contracts C3I\
aten3'
awarded quickly for the manufacture of war m3 ^ The maintenance of a huge shore establishment c neither of the extreme war scenarios. In the even^. a fast nuclear exchange, with the decisive action pleted in a few hours or days, a large shore esta ^ ment counts for nothing. In the more likely evcnt > a protracted Vietnam-like limited war, there is 3 time to recruit, train, and produce. f[J
Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, CNO during
War II, attributed much of the Navy’s success r°
th3'
to
war to the fact that his wartime organization **-
hsbi'5
be recruited from scratch. In his autobiography h . "There were no civilian employees with fixed ^
to consider. 'Empire builders’ were conspicuous by
absence.”6 Our naval and national leadership mig
fit
&
| s/J |
Rjj |
|
Create^ Underempi°yed work force. Make-work jobs are thejr ' Ptnployees find non-productive ways to use trripj tlrne- At many overstaffed commands, civilian appr0 ,CS simpiy hide—with the knowledge and tacit to gre^a °P top management. Also, management goes forCeC Pains to continually justify its inflated work ’ °Verstating its needs or fabricating new ones. But
1 .
bUil, Vlsccl to reflect on this lesson. If we have to y°Un faPidly P°r m°t>ilization, we will have a u0t ^er exilian force able and willing to learn and p°jn^ncurnbered by traditional methods. There is a at which experience becomes a liability. theSelnson’s First Law comes into full play under pan(j rea'iiness overmanning conditions: "Work ex- •y, So as to fill the time available for its completion.” sidered °aVa^ s^ore establishment should not be conges^ a simple means of distributing the federal larin Suitably among congressional districts. The price itig ~e and inefficiency is too great. Many command- tiVes oj.Cers cannot reconcile the two conflicting objec- rou Managing effectively and maintaining the pay’ll •
larCre also a morale problem caused by keeping
So many new ships were added to the fleet during World War II, above, that the proportion of Navy civilian employees- to-ships plummeted. The ratio also dropped from peacetime norms during the Korean conflict and the Cuban Missile Crisis. During the Vietnam buildup, however, the ratio actually increased and has done so since. Dr. Parkinson’s puckish laws seem less humorous in light of such reality.
here is the real danger: After years of sloppy management and inefficient work methods, it may not be possible for an organization to suddenly become alert and efficient when an emergency occurs. Good management ability atrophies when not used regularly.
With a shore establishment having a current value of $40 billion, there is an understandable reluctance to retire any of this plant. But this attitude reveals an inability to recognize that these costs are "sunk” and cannot be recovered. What are important are maintenance and operations costs—future, controllable costs— which compete dollar for dollar with other needs. The
;tiU
and
employees at the expense of ungraded workers, tunately, many of the systems have never proven selves to save money or improve effectiveness.^ ^
they have done is become institutionalized and devi a clientele. ..
The most serious fault of all is simply poor ma j ment. Management is the ability to equate work [2]
backlog of real property maintenance was estimated $398 million in June 1973 and it is increasing at th6 rate of $50 million per year. An acceptable backlog lS $35 million. Hence, the annual backlog increase lS greater than what the total backlog should be. An the Navy is worsening the situation by adding ne" construction at several times the rate at which faciHtl6S are disposed of. For example, in fiscal year 1974, °n^v $33 million (5.4%) of the $609 million Military C°n struction Program was for replacement of facility This increased ro 26% in fiscal year 1975, but it issf much too low. The cost of plant maintenance operation alone should be a great motivator for Navy to reduce the size of the shore establishment. 0ut choice is to continue to operate a large, ineffie*eI’|’ materially degraded plant or a smaller, efficient, maintained one. ,
Commanding officers can be over-concerned 'V1 morale. It leads many of them to bad decisions, worse, the avoidance of decisions. Morale is mercurial and highly perishable. Several major (and costly) deC1 sions favorable to employees can result in a happ)’ motivated workforce. Then a single incident can caLf£ morale to plummet. Optimism beats strong 111 j human breast. Low morale tends to rise. But sustain6' high morale is unachievable, and attempts to acW it can be unacceptably costly. <
A few commanding officers have a fundameC inability to regard appropriated funds as money- 1 think of command as something entrusted to theft1 a reward for long and faithful service, rather than a great responsibility, a charge to manage (and c°n^ serve) public resources. Our tendency to manage ev ^ thing as a system has resulted, in many cases, in °r§ izational constipation: inability either to digeSt eliminate the mass of data produced. This ten accounts in large measure for the increase in gra..^
thehi'
resources, of which the most expensive resoUf^0rlc manpower. When work changes, so must the force. As we have shown, the work (the fleet) ^ diminished dramatically with very little change lfl ^ work force (shore establishment). By definition1’ ^ is poor management. To be sure, every comman j not have ideal, well-defined work units, measure effectiveness criteria, and a management inrorrrr system to reveal quickly variances from its whether caused by workload or work force. A pr°
fati° has
t a
>■75%
may intangible. Only our industrial (productive) C°mmands have good, quantifiable standards. But if a ^mmanding officer doesn’t at least have some seat-of-
and^aiUS tec*in‘clues t0 taP him °^> is not a manager and [3][4] 3 [5] [6] [7]^°u^ kept at sea> where his resources (ship I crew) are fixed, and his product (training) places astic demands upon time.
erhaps the Navy has lost sight of its fundamental Jectives. It has created so many programs of second- j-j anc^ indirect relation to its mission that it has ea its efforts and squandered its energies and re, ces- It has become bogged down in trivia. It has th a*16. t0° C0mpilcateci- B has in many cases made jj etJsion to spend money for a vast officialdom and * ureaucracy, instead of for weapons and fighting ectiveness.
re ^eca^ Parkinson’s Third Law. It may be the most ^ ea lng, alarming, and damaging of all: "Expansion ns complexity and complexity, decay—The more jsex> the sooner dead.” Put another way, if youth by ■ racter‘zed by vigor and imagination and maturity e ^rha, rigidity and stagnation, the naval shore 0rlshment must surely have reached senility. A static 12at'on is indeed a dying organization, hoty f US a&a'n examine Figure 1 to remind ourselves theaSt C^e rat‘° civilians to ships has grown over . years. In the 35 years between 1940 and 1975, the
grown from 199 to 620, a 210% increase, or year, remarkably close to, but surpassing, the kinso“ estimated for the Royal Navy by Professor Parra] ^ en be became Chief of Naval Operations, Admi- the <, Umwalt said that it might be necessary to give Vlet Union naval superiority for five to ten years m0cje bl- S. Fleet is modernized. He paid for this '^QuTd'1211'*00 mostly by reducing the size of the fleet. the11 not have been wiser to reduce the size of sP°nd °re estabbshment—at least an amount corre- in ^ ln§ to the present smaller fleet size? A 16% cut sb°re establishment, 50,000 civilian employees, stin rt^Uce the support ratio to 530 civilians per ship, yearsmjUCh ^'^bet than the 450 average for the last 25 c°m - w°uld allow for a sizeable increase due to ship civil; Xlty’ *ncreased administrative requirements, and year j.ni2ation, and would release about $1.5 billion a '»ish.0ra,s.h„ip”'v construction and modernization. It Perha a^S° create a hke number of jobs elsewhere, bUt PJ ln a different region or sector of the economy, hot j Cre they could be of better use to the Navy, p. the bloated shore establishment.
^itjj , Navy is now second best.[8] If we are content the We need not worry. But if we want to meet v,ct maritime challenge, ever larger appropriations are not the only solution. There is another way. We can awaken, stir ourselves, and shake free from the bureaucratic impediments, complacency and excesses we have acquired in 30 years of being first. We must renounce our business-as-usual shore establishment non-management. We must return to our founding principles and regain our former clear eye and steady hand. We must firmly engage ourselves in the cause, for to achieve greatly, one must feel strongly and strive mightily.
The place to start is the shore establishment, and the time to begin is long past.
Commander Morton, a Naval Academy (Class of 1954) and Naval War College graduate, served in destroyers before transferring to the Civil Engineer Corps. In the latter he has had staff, planning, engineering, construction, public works, and Seabee duty. His most recent assignments have been as executive officer of Navy Mobile Construction Battalion Five, Management Course Director and Development Programs Officer at the Naval War College, and executive officer of the Construction Battalion Center at Davisville, Rhode Island. He is now in Washington on the staff of the Navy Comptroller.
[1]For footnotes, please turn to page 53.
[2]E. R. Zumwalt, "Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Military Construction of the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate,” 93rd Congress, 1st Session, Part 3, 28 June 1973, p. 136.
1q N. Parkinson, Parkinson’s Law and Other Studies in Administration (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1957), pp. 2, 12; The Law and the Profits (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1960), p. 4; In-Laws and Outlaws (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1962), p. 233.
[4]C. N. Parkinson, Parkinson’s Law, p. 4.
[5]J. W. Warner, "Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Military Construction of the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate,” 93rd Congress, 1st Session, Part 2, 22 June 1973, pp. 239-240.
[6]M. R. Laird, news conference during meeting with NATO Defense Ministers, Brussels, Belgium, 6 December 1972.
[7]E. J. King and Walter Muir Whitehill, Fleet Admiral King: A Naval Record (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1952), p. 359.
[8]Norman Polmar, U. S. Editor of Jane’s Fighting Ships, had this to say in "Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate,” 93rd Congress, 1st Session, Part 8, 3 August 1973, pp. 6032-6034, 6039.
"Today the Soviet Navy is the world’s largest by almost any criteria. . . . Today I would rate the Soviet Navy ahead of the United States in . . . Antiship missiles; submarines; small combat craft; tactical coordination; afloat intelligence; new technology application; shipbuilding initiatives; military/ naval education; and integration of maritime resources. ... In cruisers and frigates, they are ahead of us. . . . Under the water, they have left us far behind in new designs in all classification of submarines. . . . But more and more the Soviet Union is emerging as the most innovative and extensive user of the sea. Today the Soviet Union has surpassed us in many aspects of what we call 'seapower.’”