The commanding officer of the future, whether of a nuclear carrier or a fleet tug, will be forced to cope with vastly increased amounts of information. He will be held instantaneously answerable to the very highest levels of government for his actions or inactions, his decisions or indecisions. As we approach a technology that will permit an instantaneous exchange between our national leadership and all afloat commands, will the CO of the future discover that his previously sacrosanct authority has been eroded to the point that he exists as a mere automaton to execute the orders of others in the fighting of his ship?
On the surface this appears highly unlikely. It is only when we delve deeper into the subject that some rather disturbing trends become obvious. Thus, we are bombarded with such diverse and esoteric acronyms as SITS, VIDICOR, OCRE, CAMEA, SNARS, MPDS, LDMX, SNARS, IXES ad infinitum. The capabilities of these various systems and many more, offer the promise of a much- needed improvement in communications reliability and speed. Certainly in a world where real-time communications are a political and military necessity and the inability to respond within a very few minutes in a crisis can be catastrophic, it behooves us to develop the best communications systems that money can buy. Yet, there may be some subtle, undesirable side-effects, largely ignored or not even comprehended, that will result from the development of a real-time, secure, video/data communications capability.
Our nation’s leaders have always faced the problem of communicating with and therefore exercising control of its representatives, whether military commander or diplomatic emissary. George Washington once remarked, "We haven’t heard from Ben Franklin this year. Perhaps we should write him a letter.”
The advent of wireless telegraphy made more effective control possible. Greater centralization of command and decision-making naturally followed.
The adoption of wireless telegraphy by the U. S. Navy was of considerable concern to many officers. Gleason Archer in his book History of Radio to 1926 writes: "There were captains and even admirals who were so reactionary in their views and so jealous of their perogatives [sic] while on the high seas that they resented the idea of receiving orders by wireless. They opposed with might and main the new agency of communications.” Such fears were without much foundation since communication capabilities were more imagined than real. In those days, it was still common to use vessels of a force as relay ships whose main task was to repeat signals hoisted by the flagship.
Considerable progress had been made by the outbreak of World War II. While certainly not a real-time network, communications had improved so that Admiral Chester Nimitz could exercise a reasonable amount of control over his far-flung forces in the Pacific. Still, communications were not always rapid or reliable. When Admiral Halsey chose to pursue the decoy Japanese Carrier Force and vacate the San Bernardino Strait during the Battle for Leyte Gulf, Nimitz learned of it in time to send what Halsey took to be an insulting message: "Where is Task Force 34. The world wonders.”*
For the first time, however, a commander located far from the battle front could receive front-line intelligence in sufficient time to act or react as necessary. Obviously a great deal of latitude and initiative remained with subordinate commanders. Political considerations were pretty much secondary; national survival was at stake.
Korea was the first of the political wars wherein national survival was not an overriding factor. Complex treaties, pacts, and alliances had made military intervention a political necessity. Ultimate "victory” was no longer sought. This led eventually to the downfall of General Douglas McArthur. The old soldier could not conceive of a war without victory, or of the fundamental change in national goals and policies. His open criticism of the administration on basic Far East policy led to his removal. The issues were complex; but, it is perhaps not too much to say that, had McArthur’s offensive military actions taken place in any prior historical setting, they would have been considered entirely consistent with America’s national goals and policy.
Vietnam offered classic examples of centralized decision-making. Decisions which formerly had been the prerogative of on-scene commanders were made at the very highest levels of government. Targeting, weaponry, and strike profiles were often spelled out in the most minute detail, leaving little in the way of flexibility or imagination for those tasked to carry out the assignments. Never in the history of warfare have on-scene commanders been so handcuffed in their capacity to wage war. What appeared to be perfectly feasible or "cost-effective” to the Secretary of Defense in the Pentagon often clashed violently with the reality of the Vietnamese terrain, weather, and/or any of a dozen other factors.
The lessons are still being learned from the Vietnam war and hopefully will be for the foreseeable future. Still, although the Vietnam war is over, it would be wrong to assume that limited wars are a thing of the past. In the future, a limited war will certainly be just that for the on-the-scene commander—his decisions will be made half a world away.
The trend is obvious: over the last 30 years, erosion of command authority has been a military fact of life. There is no reason to assume that this process will be reversed. On the contrary, current developments in communications technology and plans for the future give every indication of an even more rapid rate of erosion of a commander’s initiative.
It might be useful at this point to examine briefly a few of the more near-term projects.
The Secure Imagery Transmission System (SITS) has been successfully operated in the three major fleet areas. SITS was advertised as providing a capability for transmitting combined visual and voice information in a real-time secure mode. It demonstrated feasibility and practicability of this type of communications, but has been removed from the ships due to non-availability of the TACSAT-1 satellite. Video communications have not died, however. Future versions will be called "Electronic Visual Communications” which will be linked between ships and Fleet Command Support Centers (FCSCs). While these systems appear to be primarily for the exchange of graphs, photographs, charts, etc., the next logical step should be similar to the Picture- phone now being marketed by the Bell system. The promotional literature of Picturephone conjures up some amusing insights into a possible tactical conversation of the future: although it is useful for displaying objects or written matter, its chief value is the face-to-face mode of communication it makes possible. Once the novelty wears off and one can use Picture- phone without being self-conscious, (one) senses in his conversation an enhanced feeling of proximity and intimacy with the other party. The unconscious response that a party makes to a remark by breaking into a smile, or by dropping his jaw, or by not responding at all adds a definite . . . 'extra’ to the communications process.” In other words one frown is worth a thousand words.
The Local Digital Message Exchange (LDMX), Naval Communications Processing and Routing System (NAVCOMPARS), Message Processing and Distribution System (MPDS) and the Information Exchange Systems (IXES) together with the FLTSATCOM system are the Navy’s major "near-term” programs. All are aimed in one way or another at eliminating the major bottleneck in naval communications, that of message preparation, reproduction, relay and routing. Certainly vast improvements are needed in these areas. All of these systems have been successfully demonstrated in the fleet. These and many other developments represent a positive step toward achieving a real-time communications system. Let’s take a look at the projected capabilities.
Common User Digital Information Exchange System (CUDIXS), when used with MPDS, makes possible an automatic on-line interface with Autodin, in other words, writer-to-reader communications without the necessity for torn-tape handling at the communications center. A variation of this, RIIXS (Remote Interrogation Information Exchange System) will provide command authority, either ashore pr afloat, with the ability to access, on demand, remote tactical nets or data bases within the area of interest restricted only by the satellite coverage areas. MPDS eliminates the need to duplicate and route messages by hand. The system provides all necessary copies of the messages and routes them to appropriate printer outlets throughout the ship. Ashore, the LDMX will recognize predetermined message categories by precedence, flagwords, addees and route messages to the command center. Internal distribution will be assigned automatically. Also LDMX will support the electrical communication needs of several collocated commands.
Programmed to become operational in 1975-1976, FLTSATCOM will provide world-wide coverage so that all naval vessels having the appropriate equipment will be able to access a satellite. Data rates of up to 9,600 bits per second will permit transfer of large amounts of data in a short time. This, combined with ADP equipment at both ends of the communications link, will eliminate the dependency of the system upon the speed of the operators.
These systems, to name only a few, when combined into one viable communications system will have truly awesome capabilities. One wonders where man will fit into the scheme of things. Except for the task of drafting the message in the first place, it would appear that eventually he will be a not-too-important appendage, whose primary function is to monitor the computers and computer-like machinery. While automation is necessary for the more routine functions, it is not unrealistic to carry these capabilities another step. It is possible today for the signals from a touch-tone telephone to control distant computers or other machinery. This same ability translated into military terms portends a significant and frightening change in the ultimate control of a ship and her weapons and electronic systems.
Let’s suppose that a Navy man-of-war, thousands of miles from CONUS, becomes involved in a crisis. Realtime communications are established with the Pentagon. Computers in the war rooms are linked with shipboard computers. Assuming the decision is made to fight, the ship’s CO proceeds to maneuver and fight his ship. All the while, his actions are being monitored in the Pentagon. NTDS data is transmitted; visual and audio information is exchanged. The Pentagon decides the CO is not fighting his ship properly and instructs him to assume different tactics. The harried CO, now battling two foes, refuses, and is preempted by the war room staff and its computers.
An impossible scene? Perhaps, but the scenario is technologically feasible today.
Such control at the national level was implicit in the entire conduct of the Vietnam war—only the hardware was missing. Obviously one man cannot control a whole war, even one on as small a scale as Vietnam. But one man can control a crisis. This same man, backed by a staff of experts and computers, will be able to control a number of crises.
One of Webster’s definitions of crisis is "an unstable or crucial time or state of affairs.” By that definition the world is in a constant state of crisis. It seems reasonable to assume that any event that can upset delicate political balances or the continuing detente will assuredly be considered a crisis. In all likelihood, Navy operations in the future will consist of two extremes: one approaching moribundity (normal ops), the other involving a crisis. In the former, nobody will care; in the latter, everyone will. The only other alternative would be full-scale war where, as mentioned previously, national survival would replace political expediency, thereby freeing local commanders from big-brother review.
Obviously, there is room for considerable controversy, and undoubtedly, few will agree with these conclusions. The assertion that national leadership will actively participate in remote actions appears especially vulnerable. Yet this tendency has been obvious for at least the last decade. It seems to be a characteristic of human behavior to believe that, "I can do it better.” It certainly is a characteristic of the military mind, although not at times without some justification. Still, the spectacle of an XO, having just returned to sea after three or four years of shore duty, attempting to evaluate an ASW action or "coordinate” a Naval Gunfire Support mission, is a familiar scene to most destroyer officers. If senior officers, by virtue of their seniority only, are more capable, more competent, more professional it would necessarily follow that CINCPAC, or CNO, or SECDEF himself would know better how to fight a ship than its own Commanding Officer. This of course is an absurd non sequitur. Yet once the capability to do so exists, as it soon will, are we not likely to see our most senior officers taking advantage of it?
Who, then, will be Senior Officer Present? Will the CO have any but the most vestigial authority? If all this resembles some nightmarish chimera, it would be worthwhile to spend a few moments in quiet solitude and reflect on the actual initiative and decision-making allowed on-the-scene commanders since, say, the Cuban missile crisis. There has been precious little latitude in the recent past and it is most unlikely to increase in the foreseeable future.
One effect of this consolidation of decision-making is a reduction in the number of subordinate commanders in the operational chain-of-command. Within the last two or three years, destroyer division commanders have been eliminated. Destroyer squadrons have been realigned to consist of, for the most part, six ships. Destroyer flotilla commanders now ride DLGs instead of cruisers, primarily because there are no cruisers. COMASWFORPAC and COMFIRSTFLT have been combined. The same consolidation has occurred on the East Coast. Obviously, the need to economize, with its concomitant cry for a smaller Navy, has motivated these and similar actions—but the trend is nevertheless an unmistakable one.
There is no longer a valid reason for so many subordinate commanders whose functions duplicated those of other commanders and thus cluttered up the chain of command. In any action requiring emergency action messages these same commanders are not included as addees; they may be addees on a lateral routing system from the original addees and they may be info addees on "follow-up” or amplifying messages, but their true worth is obvious to anyone knowledgeable in emergency communications or actions.
Where might these reductions and consolidations logically end? Probably at an "oceanic” commander level. In a crisis why should CINCPACFLT (or his equivalent) wait upon COMTHIRDFLT, COMSEVENTHFLT, CTF 77 or CTG 77.4 for information, decisions, or opinions? If the Commanding Officer of a ship can be talked to directly, what operational functions do intermediate commanders perform? Very little, although the appearance of having a great deal to do is easily conveyed. This doesn’t imply that subordinate commanders will simply disappear. They will continue to exist for administrative paper-pushing. Heaven forbid that the Navy should reduce paperwork to the point that several layers of administrative commanders are not needed to oversee it. But in an operational environment, in other words a crisis, it is easy to imagine a direct linking between the oceanic commander, the Pentagon if necessary, and individual fleet units with no intermediate operational echelons of command at all.
This assertion that command prerogative is disappearing is hardly a new or original observation. In his book, A Matter of Accountability, Trevor Armbrister succinctly states the problem. "If the Secretary of Defense . . . insists on bypassing the chain of command and issues orders to a destroyer skipper—as happened during the Cuban missile crisis, what initiatives are left to the field commanders?” He then continues by illustrating the ambivalence of civilian, centralized control of the operating forces: "Aren’t they (field commanders) simply errand boys? Yet it is also true that in (the) Cold War period, civilian officials must exercise stringent control. The consequences of possible military miscalculations are so far-reaching that to do otherwise would be foolish indeed.”
One consequence of the erosion of command prerogative will be a serious diminishing of the attractiveness of command at sea. With few exceptions, men who aspire to command are the type who will resent and resist this erosion. The exceptions are those who feel command is necessary for the proper career pattern, a questionable assumption in this day of specialization, sub-specialization and OTMS. Heretofore, there have always been far more aspiring to command, for whatever reason, than commanding officer billets available. With our smaller Navy, and the inherent delay in perfecting our communications system, it will be several years before the reverse will be true: there will simply not be enough good men to fill existing billets.
Command at sea is already looking less attractive to junior officers. Statistics are hard to come by, but conversations with groups of junior officers are enlightening in this respect and more than a little sobering. At least one junior officer has voiced his concern in these same Proceedings. Writing in Comment and Discussion of the February 1972 issue, Lieutenant Larry Roberts said ". . . pervasive, management-from-the-top concept has reached into every aspect of (Navy) life . . . (The CO) cannot afford to make a mistake for, with the onset of instant communications, he has an admiral looking over his shoulder 24 hours a day. Junior officers look at this . . . and wonder why they should strive to attain his status.”
Given present military procurement cycles and the apparently inevitable delays in testing and evaluation of new equipment and systems, it is doubtful that the naval commander will soon experience the "dizzying disorientation brought on by the premature arrival of the future” that Alvin Toffler describes. By 1985, however, well within the careers of today’s junior officers, command and control of the fleet will in no way resemble that of the structure in existence today.
Obviously, totally secure, completely reliable, and instantaneous communications has not existed in the past, nor does it exist today; it will not exist tomorrow. But only the most pessimistic (or is it optimistic) of individuals can doubt that such a system will be with us eventually. The equipment is being developed; the technology is here; the precedent has been set. Along with the advantages, of which there are many, severe disadvantages will soon become apparent. It is hoped that they can be overcome.
* Later it was discovered that "the world wonders” was padding inserted by Nimitz’ cryptographers.