Colombia’s Riverine Welfare [sic]
By Vice Admiral Jamie Parra Ramirez, Colombian Navy, Commander of the Navy
Colombia is a land of sharp geographic and demographic contrasts. Three branches of the Andean ranges—with peaks averaging 10,500 feet in the western half of the country—cross the national territory in a south-north direction. Within the Andean ranges are the Magdalena, Cauca, Atrato, and San Juan Rivers, which form the fertile valleys that bear their names. The Andean region, one of the country’s five major geographic areas, has all kinds of climates and a great variety of products. Its economy centers around agriculture, livestock, industry, and trade. The major population centers and cities of Colombia are located in this region.
Conversely, the Pacific Lowlands is a flat and marshy area with hot and humid climate, copious rainfall, and many rivers. Sparsely populated, the region’s inhabitants, in most cases, are concentrated in shacks on the riverbanks because the rivers are the sole means of communication across the dense rain forests. The economy is based on forest products, limited rice, and banana crops, with some gold and platinum mining.
The Caribbean Plains, are characterized by their low vegetation, hot and dry climate, and a six-month rainy season. Its economy is centered around agriculture and livestock.
The Eastern Plains or the Colombian Orinoco region has herb-like vegetation and dry, hot climate. The economy is based mainly on livestock.
The Amazon Region is made up of lowlands with a humid, hot climate and constant rainfall and is entirely covered by rain forests. This area of the country has, as yet, absolutely no industry.
Colombia’s many rivers often constitute the only available means of communication, especially in the Amazon jungle and throughout the lowlands. The main rivers of the Atlantic watershed are the Magdalena, Atrato, and Sinu.
Colombia’s most important river, the Magdalena, is over 1,500 kilometers long and about 1,300 are navigable for ships of less than four feet draft. Its largest tributary is the Cauca River—1,350 kilometers long, of which 670 are navigable.
The Atrato River, 700 kilometers long, with 500 kilometers of navigable water, is one of the largest navigable rivers in the world for its length because of the copious annual rainfall that characterizes its region.
The Sinu River, 360 kilometers long, has many swamps. Its basin is very fertile and supports a very large agricultural and cattle-raising industry.
The largest rivers of the Amazon Region, the Caqueta and the Putumayo, are in the southern watershed.
The Caqueta River—2,200 kilometers long, of which only 1,200 are in Colombian territory and the remainder in Brazilian territory—has 1,700 kilometers of navigable waters.
The Putumayo River—2,000 kilometers long, of which 1,300 are navigable—crosses Colombia, Peru, Brazil, and Ecuador.
Approximately 95% of the population in Colombia is concentrated in the mountainous Andean Region and the Caribbean Plains; the remaining 5% is located on the Pacific Plains, the Eastern Plains, and in the Amazon Jungle.
Of the more than 17,000 dwellers who live along the banks and adjacent areas of the Putumayo River in Colombia as well as Peru, 67% are of Indian stock, belonging to ten different tribes.
In the watershed of the Atrato River and its tributaries some 27,000 people—95% are of Negro stock—live in the valley. The population in the lower Magdalena River is approximately 7,500, of which 70% is of Negro stock.
Because of the population distribution—less than one per square kilometer in the Eastern Plains and the Amazon compared to up to 100 per square kilometer in the Andean mountains—it has been nearly impossible to extend the basic services to the less densely populated areas.
Logically, but not humanely, the limited educational and health resources available to the Colombian nation are concentrated in the areas where a greater percentage of the population lives, nearly neglecting a minority of the population that struggles to dominate the wild and inhospitable geography, which, paradoxically, has a tremendous economic potential. On the other hand, the vast expanses separating small population centers and the large number of isolated dwellers on the banks of the rivers make public health a serious and formidable task, not only in view of the tremendous costs involved in the establishment and maintenance of hospitals and health posts under these circumstances, but also in view of the scarcity of doctors that chronically afflicts our country (one doctor for each 2,800 inhabitants).
In the Amazon region, for example, there is one hospital in Leguizamo, Putumayo, and another in Leticia, on the Amazon—2,000 kilometers apart. In the area between these two centers, are over 17,000 inhabitants who had received no medical attention for generations.
In the Atrato River Region, one hospital on Quibdo serves an area of 700 kilometers of rivers and adjacent areas with a population of approximately 27,000 living under conditions similar to those found near the Amazon.
On the Pacific coast, there is a hospital in Buenaventura and another in Tumaco, but the people living in the population centers between these areas rarely have a chance to see a doctor.
On the Sinu, Cauca, and the lower Magdalena Rivers, the situation is very similar. Here, as throughout Colombia’s remote areas, the population is affected by innumerable diseases such as the yellow fever, parasitosis, bubonic fever, and tuberculosis. The malnutrition rate is high and infant mortality, which is almost 50%, is a consequence of the lack of elementary knowledge on hygiene and health care.
Because the Colombian Navy maintains riverine units of various types and bases or anchorages on the Meta, Putumayo, Caqueta, and the Amazon rivers, the government entrusted the Navy, in conjunction with the Ministry of Health, to find a way to take to the dwellers of these isolated regions some of the health care that the rest of the nation had been enjoying.
Once the problem had been clearly identified, the Navy proceeded to select from the various types of naval units those that could be most easily converted into dispensary ships without losing their naval capabilities.
An agreement was signed with the Ministry of Health that the Navy would supply naval units and operate them, while the Ministry of Health would pay for the conversion, procurement, and installation of equipment and supply medicines and the required scientific personnel.
For operation in the Amazon Region, some gunboats had been built in Colombian shipyards, with the following features:
Displacement: | 275 tons |
Maximum Length: | 159 feet |
Maximum breadth: | 27 feet |
Draft: | 3 feet 5 inches |
Speed: | 14 knots |
Range at economic speed: | 1,890 miles |
Crew: | 3 officers and 36 men |
The crew of one ship was cut down and some of the crew compartments were converted into medical offices, operating rooms, doctor offices, pharmacies, and dispensaries with six hospital beds. This vessel usually has a doctor, a dentist, and two nurses.
For operations on the Magdalena, Sinu, and Atrato Rivers, the Navy selected three river troop transport vessels, also built in Colombian shipyards, with the following features:
Displacement: | 70 tons |
Maximum Length: | 97 feet |
Maximum breadth: | 18 feet |
Draft: | 3 feet |
Speed: | 11 knots |
Range at economic speed: | 650 miles |
Crew: | One officer, 11 men, and transportation for 48 soldiers. |
Those ships, converted at a cost of $45,000, were provided with facilities similar to the converted gunboat. They have the same medical team.
The Colombian Pacific coast is isolated by the Andes, from the large urban centers, and, because of the topography and heavy jungle vegetation of the region, communication among the various population centers on the coast has to be effected almost exclusively by the sea routes.
Because the hospital situation of this area is critical, the Almirante Brion, a destroyer of the APD class was assigned.
Displacement: | 2,137 tons |
Maximum Length: | 306 feet |
Maximum breadth: | 36 feet |
Draft: | 13 feet 6 inches |
Maximum Speed: | 22.5 knots |
Range: | 5,100 miles |
Space: | 25 officers, 102 NCOs, 232 sailors and soldiers |
For her conversion into a dispensary ship—at a cost of $100,000—the after space originally designed for troop and cargo transportation was used. On the main deck, medical offices, emergency areas, pharmacy, waiting room, administration office, dental office, and a laboratory were installed; on the lower deck, were installed a sterilization room, surgery room, x-ray room, dark room, storage space, sick bays, and a 23-bed hospital. An intensive care unit and another unit for quarantine patients were located in this area. One of the fuel tanks was converted into a fresh water tank and an emergency electrical generator with sufficient capacity for the hospital operation and air-conditioning was installed in all of the rooms. This vessel usually carries four doctors, one dentist, and eight nurses.
The ARC Serpa started operating in the Magdalena and Cauca Rivers in the month of July 1967, and, by December 1970, had logged the following missions:
Distance covered (kilometers): | 14,648 |
Medical calls: | 4,734 |
Tooth extractions: | 2,912 |
Tooth fillings: | 2,133 |
Laboratory tests: | 1,035 |
Immunization shots: | 1,932 |
Surgeries: | 21 |
Figure 1 shows some of the activities of the other dispensary ships.
Figure 1
Vessel | River | Period | Kilometers Covered | Medical Calls | House Calls | Dental Calls |
Leticia | Amazon | 1968 to 1970 | 18,414 | 6,867 | 183 | 5,445 |
Socorro | Sinu | 1968 to present | 9,112 | 3,870 | 408 | 2,235 |
Gutierrez | Atrato | 1971 | 2,628 | 2,714 | 28 | 470 |
Brion | Pacific Coast | 1971 | 2,300 | 4,798 | 17 | 3,926 |
Last, but undoubtedly the most important, is the pending agreement with Peru, whereby the navies of both countries will undertake to provide medical services by naval units to all inhabitants, regardless of nationality, of the banks of the Putumayo and Amazon Rivers.
This agreement, designed to co-ordinate the efforts undertaken separately in these distant areas of both countries, responds to the demands that common problems should go beyond the strict limits of nationalities, extending beyond national borders, and fostering a sense of cooperation and brotherhood.
Massawa Navy Days—1972: A Rare Occasion
By Lieutenant Lawrence Phillips, Royal Naval Reserve, Fleet Public Relations Officer, The Commander-in-Chief, Western Fleet, Royal Navy
Warships and admirals from the world’s major fleets assembled at the remote Red Sea port of Massawa in February to take part in a unique annual naval occasion, Ethiopia’s Navy Days.
Certainly, for those of some navies, with the gracious former times of magnificent Spithead Fleet Reviews and Kiel Weeks long since vanished over the horizon, the occasion was one to evoke memories now dimly recalled. Today, warships usually sail the seas alone, occasionally in pairs or very small formations. Only the 16-year old Ethiopian Navy now manages to stage an international gathering, and while that host navy is rather small in comparison to its guests’ fleets, its Navy Days are gaining worldwide significance.
This year, the Royal Navy was represented by the 2,300-ton anti-aircraft frigate, HMS Jaguar, and for three days the ship operated with and competed against guided missile destroyers from the Russian Navy, represented by the Kashin-class Strogyi, the U. S. Navy, which sent the USS Waddell (DDG-24), a French frigate and minesweeper, and Ethiopian and Sudanese naval squadrons in a high-pressure program of diplomatic, sporting, ceremonial, and fleet activities.
The ostensible object of Ethiopian Navy Days, which have been held for several years, is to provide an appropriately impressive formal setting in which naval cadets from the Naval Academy at Massawa may receive their commissions from Emperor Haile Selassie, in a naval environment measureably enhanced by the presence of the warships of the Great Powers represented.
For the foreign guests, it is an intriguing, improbable, and rather bizarre commitment, for Massawa—a growing industrial port with bone meal factories, glue works, and salt works—is a port of call rarely encountered by most naval visitors.
Before the federation of Ethiopia and Eritrea in 1952, Ethiopia was an inland country, cut off from the Red Sea. Since federation, the 600-mile coast of Eritrea, with the ports of Massawa and Assab, has been incorporated into the Ethiopian Empire. The Ethiopian Navy had its beginnings three years later, with the assistance, in the early stages, of personnel from the Royal Norwegian Navy. The fleet today comprises the flagship, Ethiopia, formerly the USS Orca (AVP-49), four coastal patrol boats, four launches, and four landing craft. The Emperor is Commander-in-Chief, and his 36-year-old grandson, Commodore His Imperial Highness Prince Alexander Desta, has operational command.
The Naval Academy at Massawa is the principal training institution of the Ethiopian Navy. Commanded by a former captain of the Royal Navy, and with several ex-R.N. personnel on the staff, it provides a taut and efficient initial training for cadet officers. Their graduation parade forms the highlight of Massawa Navy Days and, as critical observers noted, the standards of their parade training are remarkably high and difficult for foreign contingents to match. The British, this writer is compelled to add, may be forgiven if they attribute some of this excellence to the fact that the commanding officer is a one-time captain of Whale Island, the Royal Navy’s Gunnery School at Portsmouth, England.
The nighttime graduation parade for the seven Ethiopian midshipmen this year was indeed a spectacular occasion. The fine, metalled parade ground of the Academy was marched and counter-marched by naval contingents and military bands from all over the world. Watched by hosts of invited Ethiopian VIPs and foreign officers and diplomats, the marching feet and rousing Western marches drowned the chirping of crickets and jungle noises in the tropical background beyond the reach of the floodlights. The scene was dominated by the small but majestic figure of His Imperial Majesty, Haile Selassie I, Emperor of Ethiopia, who was seated on a throne which was mounted upon a saluting base constructed in the shape of a clipper’s bow.
The presentation ceremony was preceded by military displays and a spectacular exhibition of swinging, flaming torches carried by thousands of men from the Imperial armed forces. But the most improbable spectacle, of armed Russian sailors marching through the tropical night alongside British and American Servicemen, to the rousing imperialistic strains of “Anchors Aweigh,” and led by a bandmaster of the British Army’s XIV/XV Foot, was as extraordinary a military pageant as can readily be conceived.
The Emperor’s eye was sharp as well as benevolent as he viewed the scene with approval. Born in 1892, this 225th ruler of the Solomonid Line has wide powers and prerogatives. Under him, Ethiopia has taken an increasingly active part in the work of the United Nations, including military cooperation in Korea in 1951 and the dispatch, in 1960, of an Ethiopian contingent to the Congo. In 1960, during his absence on a tour in Brazil, a military coup was attempted, but the Navy remained loyal and now occupies a position of special trust and favor with the Emperor.
Understandably, Ethiopia continues to exert great effort to improve its economic and technical status. This remote land of King Solomon’s mines, 65% Coptic Christian and 30% Muslim, depends largely on its coffee exports, most of which goes to the United States. American military aid totals over $160 million since 1953, when a U. S. communications base was established at Kagnew in the hills behind Massawa. In common with the rest of the Western world, Haile Selassie I University, in Addis Ababa, encountered a form of student disruption recently, when demonstrations occurred as a result of a dispute over the wearing of mini-skirts. In many other aspects, however, the country, away from the principal roads, remains sternly, even primitively basic.
The visiting warships were berthed alongside the commercial jetty at Massawa, a long line of bunting-covered masts and yardarms, Union Flags, Stars and Stripes, the hammer-and-sickle, and other less-familiar banners. The days were punctuated with the shriek of bosun’s whistles, as admirals and captains paid courtesy calls on adjoining vessels, and by the almost-hourly gun salutes which created considerable additional confusion in the livestock market in the nearby Arab quarter.
Much of the three-day program of events was complicated by the necessary amenities of Imperial and naval protocol, by competitive hospitality on board and ashore, by anxiety to avoid ruffling national feelings, and by the requirements generated by the presence of so many visiting foreign admirals and dignitaries. The Ethiopian Navy triumphed in the international sports meeting, owing in part, perhaps, to the excellent facilities for shore training and to the factor of playing in their “home ground.”
The day of fleet maneuvers, designated by the Ethiopians as “Sea Dog Day,” was attended by His Imperial Majesty and VIPs embarked in his flagship. In line ahead, the foreign warships steamed past the Ethiopia, manning the rails and firing gun salutes. This was followed by a demonstration of sea and air firepower as the Ethiopia shelled a remote island off the coast and Ethiopian Air Force jets carried out air strikes against the same target. The Sea Days are indeed remarkable as this is the only occasion in the year when Russian and Western warships officially exercise together. The clicking of cameras was almost as loud as the guns.
Despite some understandable shortcomings in the capability of Massawa to accommodate fully to the large numbers of visiting sailors, the French, British, and American matelots developed a warm, working comradeship as the days and nights went on. Items of uniform were freely “swapped,” and one rating arrived back on board clad entirely in the uniform of an allied navy! The Russians looked on in envious suspicion, and the many attempts to draw them into the fun were unsuccessful. The Soviets wanted nothing to do with anything other than strictly official proceedings. A group of men from the Jaguar earned the admiration of all by their prompt and gallant rescue of two badly-injured people from the harbor after a powerboat collision.
The annual attendance of foreign naval powers at Massawa is almost certainly symptomatic of continued interest shown by both Western and Communist countries in this area of political change, for West Ethiopia, with its 600-mile coastline, is a country friendly to the West. In an area of not-so-friendly countries, a friend who is located on the Red Sea is a friend indeed.
Massawa Navy Days 1972 concluded much like the reviews of yesteryear, with the guns of many navies thundering out in salute to that remarkable, 82-year-old Emperor and his 23 million subjects, and the Jaguar and her visitor-companions will long remember their visit with the Lion of Judah.
Soviet ASW
By Master Chief Sonar Technician James C. Bussert, U. S. Navy, Material Section, Staff, Commander Cruiser-Destroyer Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet
Antisubmarine warfare has been a Western naval problem because of the dependence of our allies and ourselves on sea import and export. For a period following World War II, Russia’s 350 submarines were a potent threat, not balanced by our 150 submarines. This was changed on 9 June 1959, when the SSBN-598 was launched, to be followed by 40 more Polaris submarines. Suddenly, the land bear was threatened from the sea, and Russia had to try to catch up to the West in this area where the Free World had had two death struggles with enemy submarines in 30 years time. The 1963 revision to Marshal Sokolovskiy’s Military Strategy increased the ASW emphasis over the 1962 original. Combatting Polaris submarines became, “. . . the most important task of the Soviet Navy.”
In 1954, there were seven classes of Soviet ships with depth charge throwers (DCT) or mortars. The modern Skorys and Kotlins had DCTs, with some of the Kotlins with six mortars on a new rotating platform, instead of being welded to the deck. Five obsolete ship types also had DCTs, the Leningrad, Shtorm, Gordi, Artillerist, and Ognevoi, the last just adding four DCTs in 1954. These throwers were comparable to the obsolescent hand-loaded British Squid or American K-guns, which were given to Russia on Lend-Lease ships, such as 45 minesweepers and many patrol craft. All Russian depth charges appear to have the old ash-can shape with its erratic and slow sinking rate. These DCT ships all have mine tracks by the launchers to facilitate the use of reloading trolleys.
This was the extent of surface ASW capability, except for some stern racks, mines, or 21-inch torpedo tubes, which could possibly serve as ASW weapons. References do not mention ten new depth charge-appearing cylinders on each side of the Kashin bridge. In earlier photographs, large rectangular balsa rafts were in that area, leading to the conclusion that they are new life raft cannisters [sic] rather than depth charges. The Kresta and Krivak classes also have these “cans.”
The first Russian antisubmarine rocket launchers appeared in 1955 on the new Tallinn-class destroyer. There were two 16-barrel mounts on the fantail. They were trainable and hand-loaded, with two horizontal rows of eight 10-inch diameter tubes, and a 2,000-yard range circular pattern. Owing to the lack of an unclassified designation system for the Soviet ASW launchers, we shall refer to each by the number of barrels. Two Type 16s were to be installed on the Kildin, Krupny, Kotlin, and Riga classes, and some Petya-class frigates have four type 16s (See Table 1).
Table 1 Ship Antisubmarine Weapons
Class | ASW Rockets | Torpedoes | Other | Built |
| DESTROYERS AND CRUISERS |
|
|
|
MOSKVA | (2) Type 12, (1) Twin | (4) 21” ASW | (30) ASW Helos | 1966 |
KRIVAK/KYNDA | (2) Type 12 | (2) Quad 21” |
| 1971/1961 |
KRESTA | (2) Type 12, (2) Type 6 | (2) Quint ASW |
| 1966 |
KILDIN/ KRUPNY | (2) Type 16 | (2) Triple ASW |
| 1957/1959 |
KASHIN | (2) Type 12, (2) Type 6 | (1) Quint 21” ASW |
| 1962 |
KANIN | (3) Type 12 | (2) Quint ASW |
| 1967 |
KOTLIN |
| (2) Quint 21” | (6) DCT/mines | 1954 |
KOTLIN MOD/SAM | (2) Type 16, (2) Type 12 | (1) Quint 21” |
| 1961/1966 |
TALLINN | (2) Type 16 | (2) Quint 21” | Mines | 1955 |
SKORY |
| (2) Quint 21” | (4) DCT/mines | 1952 |
SKORY MOD | (2) Type 16 | (1) Quint 21” | Mines | 1958 |
|
| FRIGATES |
|
|
KOLA/RIGA |
| (3) 21” | (4) DCT/mines | 1953/1955 |
RIGA MOD | (2) Type 5 or 16 | (3) 21” | Mines |
|
PETYA | (4) Type 12 or 16 | (5) 21” ASW | Mines | 1961 |
PETYA II | (2) Type 12 | (2) Quint |
|
|
MIRKA | (4) Type 12 | (5) 16” ASW |
| 1964 |
MIRKA II | (2) Type 12 | (2) Quint 16” ASW |
|
|
|
| SUBCHASERS |
|
|
KRONSTADT | (2) Type 5 Added 1968 |
| (2) DCT added 1959 | 1948 |
SO-1 | (4) Type 5 | (2) ASW added | (2) DC Racks/mines | 1956 |
POTI | (2) Type 12 | (2) or (4) ASW |
| 1961 |
STENKA |
| (4) ASW | (2) Stern racks | 1967 |
In 1956, the Type 5 made its appearance with four being mounted on the bow of the SO-1 subchaser. These can be elevated, but appear fixed forward. Although the tube diameter is apparently the same, the range of the Type 5 is probably much less, because of the necessity to mount on small vessels for shallow-water, close-in attacks. These launchers are also installed on modernized Kronstadt subchasers and some modernized Riga frigates. The Type 16 and Type 5 are noticeably similar to Soviet Army rockets. The Army BM-14 rocket launcher has 16 rockets identically arranged, although only 140-mm. The BM-24 looks like a Type 5 launcher, and is 240-mm. or ten inches, indicating the Type 16 and Type 5 are both of BM-24 vintage.
From September to 15 November 1961, the Russians tested a new ASW missile in Barents Sea war exercise. This new weapon would be the Type 12, which appeared with two semi-circular mounted launchers on the forecastle of the Kynda in 1961. The Type 12 appears similar to the 4-tube Swedish Bofors ASW rocket of 1954 design. The reload time for the Type 12 with a hoist, however, is apparently slower. On considering a photograph of a Poti-class subchaser in the 1970 issue of Jane’s, it appears obvious that the Type 12 reloads in the vertical position. In photographs, the Type 12 rockets appear still to be ten inches, but, with propellant improvements since 1955, the Type 12 range should be double, or well over 4,000 yards. The Type 12 is the most universally-used ASW rocket launcher on all ships from frigate to cruiser. Eleven of 24 classes on Table 1 have this rocket. The pictures of the Type 12 show elevation and depression as well as a large train arc of fire.
The Soviet approach to ASW rockets seems to be very simplistic and functional, in contrast to the expensive and exotic American “contract” approach. This gives Russia more maintainable systems, possibly “off the shelf” from Army hardware, but the accuracy and flexibility would be much less, with needs such as launcher stabilization not apparent.
The Kashin class in 1962 was the first the West saw of the Type 6 rocket, with two launchers by the after fire control structure. It reportedly has the longest range of the Soviet ASW rockets and appears fully trainable. In April 1969, the Bennett Sea Power Subcommittee said Russia had a “. . . new DDG with ASW torpedoes, a new-design AS rocket launcher probably capable of automatic loading, and SAM.” This would be the Kresta with the Type 6 launchers aft. So far, it has appeared only on the Kashin and Kresta. It is surprising that it is not on the newer Krivak class.
The latest ASW rocket is the Type 2, a twin-arm launcher similar in appearance to a Goa surface-to-air launcher, with automatic load from ready service magazines below. The rectangular access hatches are noticeable below each arm. The Type 2 appeared in 1966 on the Moskva-class ASW carrier, or “cruiser” as Russia terms her. Owing to the Marxist tirades against “obsolete” American carriers, they could not admit to having a “carrier” of their own. The Type 2 has similarities to the antisubmarine rocket (AsRoc) or Malafon systems. The Type 2 would have distinct advantages in reload time and weapon protection over the AsRoc match-box on the forecastle. In June 1966, when the Type 2 premiered, Engineer-Captain Second Rank V. Demyanov stated that “. . . conventional depth charges have given way to rocket-type depth charges. Charge launchers now have a high rate of fire and long range.”
The first Soviet ship with special purpose ASW torpedo tube mounts mentioned, were on the Kildin in 1957, with two triple 21-inch mounts. Many of the earlier ships with 21-inch tubes can now fire either ASW or conventional antishipping surface torpedoes. About 1964, the Russians showed a 16-inch diameter torpedo on the Mirka, with 16.5-foot long tubes that are configured from single tubes up to quintuple mounts. Table 1 shows the various class ships with ASW or standard torpedo tubes. References vary on the Kresta class. Jane’s says two twin mounts, and Siegfried Breyer’s Guide to the Soviet Navy states triple tubes. There are two quintuple 21-inch mounts; however, pictures show eight torpedo tube-appearing cylinders by the stack, two on the 0-1 deck forward and three on each side on the main deck. Could the liferaft canisters be confused as torpedo tubes? The ASW torpedo tubes replaced guns, such as the 25-mm. AA on the SO-1, and ASW rockets, like Type 12 launchers on the Mirka, in modernization programs on some Soviet vessels. This indicates a high confidence level in the torpedo effectiveness.
At the end of World War II, Russia captured German pattern-running, homing torpedoes, such as the 24-knot, 6,000-yard T5, and the gyro off-set zig-zag LUT, which likely contributed to later development. Some Soviet ASW ships, such as the Krupny and Mirka II, have towed noisemakers on the stern to attract our homing torpedoes. Russian literature describes closed-cycle hydrogen and oxygen torpedoes for low noise and no wake. The 1963 Military Strategy states: “Effective weapons against missile-carrying nuclear submarines are hunter-killer submarines with homing missiles and torpedoes and also surface ships.” Six lines later, it speaks of the SSBNs “. . . great vulnerability to underwater nuclear bursts.” Other direct references to torpedoes with nuclear warheads indicate the high probability of nuclear ASW torpedoes. This could give the Type 2 a nuclear capability if torpedoes are the propelled payload.
Sonar is hardware not visible except for topside submarine domes and bow arrays, and a relationship is tangible between submarine and surface ship sonars. Much equipment is equivalent or parallel between these two forces. The Whiskey and Zulu-class submarines, of 1952 and 1954 respectively, had clipper bows with no topside sonar; however, there was a large keel dome about 40 feet aft of the bow. The 1958 Foxtrot class had a bulbous bow array, with a cone-shaped sonar dome on deck, as did the Golf and Romeo class. The Foxtrot has four acoustic windows on the forward part of the sail, unique to this class. Many Whiskey and Zulu-class ships had a topside bow transducer installed later. The small size indicates high frequency, either a close object locator or underwater communications gear. The 1963 Echo-class SSG had a large bow array in a squarish vertical bow shape, with no dome above. From the 1961 November SSN attack class up to the 1968 Yankee-class SSBN, the bow arrays are rounded into the streamlined bow. Apparently, the late 1950s were intensive sonar development years. In the 1963 ASW exercises, Russian literature said a Soviet submarine commander “. . . was very much disturbed by the unprecedented range of a (Russian) ASW ship . . .” operating against him. In November 1970, Rear Admiral Levering Smith, U. S. Navy, Director, Strategic Systems Projects Office, Naval Material Command, said: “I think we have—at the least—offset Soviet improvements in noise reduction and in sonar.” The Russians have a new sonar “. . . that has some attractive features.” There is “. . . no indication that they have actually gotten the increased performance . . out of it that might have been expected. Admiral Smith could be referring to the new variable depth towed sonar in the stern of the Moskva.
Russia’s first Seven Year Plan in oceanography started in January 1959. The priority of underwater acoustic data in this massive state-backed program is indicated by the fact that two of the earliest large (4,600-ton) research ships, Vavilov and Lebedev, were equipped in 1959 by the Acoustic Institute of Moscow. The use, by these vessels, of British MS-26 echo sounders, and the Lomonosov’s use of German LODAR depth recorder and STD (salinity-temperature-depth) recorder is witness to the lack of Soviet quality instrumentation in these technical areas. Russia now series-produces her own automatic STD system and NEL and GEL type echo sounders. Later Soviet oceanographic ships carry Loran receivers to use our facilities for navigation fixes. Their Paltus sonar can depress 90 degrees to serve as Fathometer or fish-finder. The Acoustics Institute in Moscow has a Black Sea station at Sukhumi which carries on experiments in sound transmission, especially convergence zone mode. The 3,500-ton research ships Fedor Litke and Alexi Chirikov, which pulled into Ensenada in 1966, were both of the Nikolai Zubov class, which are outfitted for acoustic studies. The 11 ships of the Zubov class were all constructed since 1963.
The subject of offshore sonar surveillance stations is highly classified; however, there are occasional public awarenesses of our installations in the Atlantic and Pacific. In March 1959, the Soviet trawler Novorossisk cut five cables on the North Atlantic Ocean floor and was promptly boarded by the USS Hale. The Soviet Union had their Tamir stations off their coast in World War II, installations which will have been expanded and improved since then.
In mid-1963, Admiral Gorshkov stated the need for “. . . warships and aircraft for ASW.” Soviet literature has many grandiose boasts of aircraft and space satellites pinpointing Polaris, but this is to be regarded more for home consumption than as a military reality. More realistically, they developed an ABM net to intercept Polaris and constructed helicopter carriers to see if effective ASW tactics can be developed against the nuclear submarine in the “open sea” zone. Russian Navy responsibilities include three defense zones, which is a defensive tactic of Army origin. The “precoastal” zone extends out to 150 miles, with all forces to bear; “remote offshore” is 150-to-300 miles, with ships and aircraft, and “open sea” is the area beyond 300 miles, normally covered by submarines only. Here, to consider as “open sea” a 300-mile area which is close to other countries’ territorial fishing waters, evidences a lack of true oceanic scope. The Moskva and the Leningrad each carry 30 antisubmarine KA-25 Hormone helicopters. Although photographs do not reveal it, the helos would logically carry dipping sonars, as well as torpedoes and depth charges, as does the KA-20 Harp. The MIA-4 Bison and IL-18 May bombers, BE-12 Mail amphibious plane, and MI-4 Hound all are configured for MAD ASW search, and TU-16 Badger and TU-95 Bear are long-range naval reconnaissance aircraft. During the giant 1970 operation “Okean,” ASW operations were conducted by IL-18 and BE-12 planes. Soviet aircraft sonobuoys should be effective. In 1963, a Soviet submarine, being tracked in the Pacific, surfaced and retrieved one of our latest sonobuoys. At that time, it was reported that we had picked up over 200 Russian sonobuoys in the last ten years.
The traditional Russian expertise in the mine warfare area is well known and is a formidable ASW weapon. In 1950, Russian mines, laid by junks, took control of the sea away from the U. S. Navy in Wonsan Harbor, effectively turning a critical amphibious landing into a tardy sham. The mine-conscious Russians had mine-laying capability built into all destroyers, cruisers, and submarines constructed up to 1958. The 1957, Kildin class was the first Russian destroyer not equipped for mine laying.
One of the most effective ASW weapons is another submarine. Russia has the November-class nuclear attack boat in large series production, with the second generation Victor class following, and over 30 attack SSNs at sea now. Russia will soon have more ASW submarines than we have SSBNs, and the Soviet submarines are getting faster and quieter. A 1969 international panel reported that, “. . . even the long-standing invulnerability of our Polaris submarines may in time be effectively challenged.”
There have been many contradictory opinions and much discussion as to the question of a Soviet ASW lag in comparison to the West. Some, in our Defense Department, evidently felt that the U. S. lead was so great that Russian, Polish, and Bulgarian military attachés were among a group of 43 foreign guests for an ASW briefing and tour of a U. S. Navy nuclear submarine in Hawaii. When Senator Clinton P. Anderson, (Dem., New Mex.), made an objection, only the SSN tour was deleted from the agenda. A 1969 study concluded that, “. . . among all the branches of naval science, the Soviet Navy lags the United States most in antisubmarine warfare against nuclear submarines.” In the same year. Rear Admiral Levering Smith stated, “I am quite positive that the new generation of Russian submarines that are getting close to operational status, that are now being tested, will not be able to follow our Polaris subs.” He continued, “. . . the Russians have no specific new ASW methods we know of which would make the Polaris fleet vulnerable to attack, despite many reports of a superior Russian sonar system or satellite detection capability.” By contrast, the Navy’s top research scientist, Robert A. Frosch, told the Senate, “We are no longer almost a decade ahead in sonar developments. In some areas, they are ahead of us.” In May 1969, the late Representative L. Mendel Rivers, (Dem., So. Car.) told a Navy League audience that, “Soviet advances in nuclear submarine technology, in missile-launching submarines, and in antisubmarine warfare have been especially significant and pose a greatly increased threat to U. S. Navy power.” In October 1969, Representative Samuel S. Stratton (Dem., N.Y.), discounted unidentified Navy officials who state that the United States has a comfortable ten-year lead over Russia in submarine and antisubmarine warfare capability. Stratton said the U. S. lead “. . . is only in one single aspect of antisubmarine warfare . . . the Soviet’s rate of progress in ASW is actually far ahead of our own.” Possibly the July 1969 ASW exercises in our Gulf of Mexico by a Soviet flotilla made this topic so controversial.In summation, any remaining U. S. lead in ASW is being reduced with each new Soviet ASW ship, such as the impressive new Krivak class, and the new attack SSNs, which are being built at a rate of 15 per year. Russian oceanographic research is being pursued vigorously all over the world, and Soviet electronics and weapons systems are increasing in power, complexity, and range over the crude beginnings of only 16 years ago. While this Professional Note, of necessity, is not a complete picture—owing to our own security restrictions combined with Russia’s fanatical secretiveness and grandiose claims, and as sketchy as open references allow—there is still evident the Soviet appreciation of their ASW problem.
Russia is spending $3 billion more annually on military research and development (R&D), or twice the amount allocated to our own effort. Congress has recently cut $400 million in R&D, which will likely mean the loss of some 10,000 scientists this year. With many Yankee-class SSBNs lurking off our coasts, it is time for the U. S. to take positive measures to keep from falling behind in this field, as we have in others, through neglect and under-funding.