The Soviet Union’s first major experience with submarines was at the beginning of this century. Tsarist Russia built its first submarine in 1901 at the Baltic shipyard in St. Petersburg. Named the Delfin, she displaced 115 tons submerged, carried two torpedoes, and had a maximum surface speed of six knots. The Russians were fully appreciative of the significance of submarine warfare, and consequently, sought foreign developments while continuing with their own experiments. During 1904 and 1905, they purchased six Simon Lake Protector class submarines from the United States.[1] In 1907, they purchased three more submarines from Germany (built by Krupp’s Germania yard at Kiel).
The first significant use of submarines in combat was during World War I (it one excludes the experimentations with Bushnell’s Turtle and the Confederate Hunley of earlier eras). Russian submarines, however, played an insignificant role in that conflict. Some minelaying and an occasional anti-coastal shipping sortie in the Baltic and Black Seas comprised the total effort.
With the end of World War I, and of a new political regime in Russia, the Soviets showed a continuing interest in submarines as an integral part of their military forces. Between 1929 and their entry into World War II, the Soviets, emphasizing quantity, built approximately 260 submarines, creating at that time the largest submarine force in the world.
World War II submarine activity by the Soviets was on a par with their World War I performance—unimpressive. In addition to suffering heavy losses without substantially contributing to the war effort, the Soviets suffered particularly heavy damage to their submarine construction facilities at the Nikolaev Shipyard. It is significant that in spite of these heavy losses, the Soviets entered the postwar period with about 200 submarines in their order of battle and 64 others in various stages of construction.
At this point in history, U. S. knowledge of Soviet submarine research and development programs, construction schedules, and order of battle becomes less precise. Since the Soviet Union is essentially a closed society, there is nearly complete administrative control of development programs and information about them. It is extremely difficult to develop data on their research and development programs prior to their completion, and little is known about new construction programs until the ships become operational. Much information can be gleaned from open source information, however, in spite of careful Soviet control of information.
It is apparent that, while most of the nations of the world elected to reduce the magnitude of their armed forces following World War II, the Soviet Union commenced a major expansion program. Reparations from vanquished and occupied countries provided the Soviets with heavy equipment, material, and manpower essential to the rebuilding of the shipyards at home. As each shipyard was returned to productive status, efforts were directed toward the construction of naval vessels, especially submarines, with emphasis on force quantity rather than force quality. Between 1946 and 1958, the Soviets constructed some 400 submarines. During the same period, less than one-tenth that number were built by the United States.
The U. S. submarine force, however, did include its first five nuclear-powered units. This significant new trend in the basic characteristic of the U. S. submarine force obviously had its effect on Soviet designers and planners, because by 1958 they had abandoned their previous emphasis on quantity and entered a qualitative phase, with the construction of their first nuclear-powered submarines and a more sophisticated class of diesel-powered submarines.
In 1964, the Soviets embarked on a major expansion and modernization program affecting all Soviet shipbuilding yards, with emphasis on those facilities associated with the construction and fitting out of submarines. The result has been that the Soviet Union now has the largest and most modern submarine construction facilities in the world.
Although the number of submarines launched per year appears to have dropped, a one-shift capability to build up to 20 nuclear-powered submarines per year exists. Soviet shipbuilders continue to turn out submarines at a rate roughly three times that of U. S. shipbuilders. The result is that the Soviet Union holds the lead (numerically) in submarines on the world order of battle. Although they will probably continue to do so in the foreseeable future, total Soviet submarine order of battle can be expected to decline somewhat, through the retirement of older craft, such as the Whiskey class, constructed in great quantities and becoming obsolete.
Numbers are certainly a part of the total threat picture, but they do not tell the entire story, nor can they be considered a threat by themselves. What constitutes the real threat are the characteristics and capabilities of the submarines in the Soviet inventory. Eighty of the 350 submarines in the current Soviet order of battle are nuclear-powered, and this number is increasing. By contrast, as of 1 July 1970, 85 of the 144 authorized U. S. submarines were nuclear-powered, including 41 ballistic missile submarines (SSBN). This American lead, however, is temporary. Low construction rates force the U. S. Navy to accept long life spans for submarines. While the United States appears to confuse cost consciousness with cost effectiveness, the Soviet Union does not. If the present trend continues, it will soon result in a Soviet numerical, nuclear, and force superiority. Currently, none of the Russian submarines are over 15 years old, while 40% of the U. S. submarines are over that age.
The Soviet submarine force, backbone of the Soviet Navy, poses a three-pronged threat to Western powers, complementing torpedoes and ballistic missiles with the guided cruise missile, now unique to the Soviet Navy.
Their force of ballistic missile submarines, comprising over 14% of their total strength, has experienced an evolution from diesel-powered conversions (Zulu class) and diesel-powered new construction (Golf class), through nuclear-powered new construction (Hotel class), to the current Yankee class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine which is believed to be very similar to our Ethan Allen-class SSBN. It can be expected that, over the next decade, the Soviets will replace their diesel units entirely, leaving them with a nuclear powered strategic attack force very much like that of the United States.
Soviet cruise missile submarines, comprising roughly 19% of their total force, have seen an evolution similar to that of their ballistic missile submarines. The original ships were diesel-powered conversions of the Whiskey class, followed by new construction diesel-powered Juliette class and then nuclear-powered Echo and Charlie class submarines. Unlike the United States, however, cruise missile submarines are still an active part of the total Soviet inventory. U. S. cruise missile submarines were decommissioned soon after the initial deployment of Polaris submarines to the Pacific, where Regulus submarines had, for several years, provided the submarine element of our strategic deterrence. Cruise missile submarines play an important role in the Soviet concept of submarine operations. The Soviet cruise missile submarine constitutes the greatest tactical threat to the U. S. Navy today, when targeted against Fleet units and, if targeted against land targets, they could constitute a significant strategic threat as well.
The capability of cruise missiles to counter surface forces was amply demonstrated during the Arab-Israeli Six-Day War, when the United Arab Republic attacked and sank the Israeli destroyer Elath, using a Soviet-designed, short-range cruise missile. Although this missile was surface-ship-launched, certainly submarine-launched, longer-range missiles, equipped with conventional or nuclear warheads, must be considered an even greater threat to U. S. naval forces.
The Soviet concept of a balanced fleet is obviously different from that of the United States. They have little sea-based aviation and, therefore, realize a particular advantage from their large cruise missile force. Only when their perception of the Western naval threat changes can the Soviets be expected to phase out cruise missile submarines.
The remaining 67% of the Soviet submarine force is apparently tasked with the more traditional primary missions of conducting torpedo attacks against enemy surface and submarine forces and interdicting enemy commerce on the high seas. Their secondary missions undoubtedly include minelaying and coastal defense of the homeland. To fulfill these missions, the Soviets have constructed several classes of submarines since 1946.
Between 1946 and the early 1950s, the Soviets completed World War II construction programs (SHCH-IV, M-V, and S classes). These submarines were of short range, reflecting Soviet preoccupation with coastal defense and defense of the homeland, and they are no longer operational. The changing Soviet perception of the Western naval threat and attitudes toward their role in world politics is reflected in the characteristics of their postwar design submarines. The first submarines were medium-range Whiskey class, of which over 200 were built in an eight-year construction program, beginning in 1950. The first long-range Zulu class submarines, and some short-range Quebec class craft were also constructed in the early and middle 1950s. Although submarines of these classes are still active, the Whiskey and Zulu conversions, plus the normal retirement of submarines because of age, have probably reduced the original number by one half. This is particularly true in the Whiskey and Quebec classes.
Between 1958 and 1962, a variety of Soviet submarines began coming off the building ways. Eight different classes were started: Romeo, a medium-range diesel-powered submarine; Golf, the first ballistic missile, diesel-powered submarine; November, the first nuclear-powered attack submarine; Hotel, the first nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine; Echo-I, the first nuclear-powered cruise missile submarine; Juliette [sic], a diesel-powered missile craft; and the Echo II, an improved nuclear-powered cruise missile submarine.
We can be reasonably sure that over 150 submarines of these eight classes were constructed through 1968. Why they conducted series production of so many different classes and, in particular, why they coupled diesel production of similar designs is difficult to explain. There are many possible explanations, however, including economic or construction difficulties (diesel construction being cheaper, faster, and easier than nuclear construction); lack of adequate numbers of nuclear trained personnel (diesel submariners being in abundant supply); and operational difficulties (diesel engineering plants being easier to operate than nuclear plants).
After five years, in which new submarine classes kept appearing, came a four or five year hiatus, with nothing new, though a continuing construction of most of these classes. The Soviets during this time tested and evaluated ideas and techniques incorporated in these new submarines, and had the opportunity to re-evaluate their submarine force requirements and objectives for the future.
What then is the threat today, and what can be expected? There is little reason to expect any marked change from their past approaches. Soviet submarines appear to have been targeted against the continental United States, U. S. naval surface forces, (primarily carrier strike forces), and the U. S. submarine force, (with probable emphasis on Polaris), and it is expected that they will continue to do so. To aid them in achieving this objective, they have, in the last year or so, once again simultaneously introduced several new submarine classes, including the Victor class nuclear powered attack; the Charlie class nuclear powered cruise missile; the Bravo class diesel powered attack; and the Yankee class nuclear powered ballistic missile submarine. Soviet literature tells us of continuing research and development work being conducted in scientific fields, particularly suited for enhancement of their submarine force capabilities. It can be expected that these submarines, and those following, will reap the benefits of this research and development work. In the future, Soviet submarines will be faster, quieter, and deeper-diving than they are now.
Clearly, the present and future Soviet submarine threat is significant, credible, and growing. The only logical recourse is to ensure that U. S. efforts are directed toward the future threat rather than the present, or U. S. forces will soon find themselves in the unfamiliar and undesirable position of lagging in technology and capability—a position the United States can ill afford.
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Lieutenant Holme received a Bachelor of Arts degree in political science in 1963, while studying under the NROTC program at Yale University. He attended Submarine School in 1964 and then served on board the USS Sablefish (SS-303) and USS Wahoo (SS-565). Following graduation from the Defense Intelligence School in June 1969, he was assigned to his present job in the Office of Naval Intelligence.
[1] See F. G. Babbitt, “A Submarine for the Tsar,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, April 1970, pp. 46-51.