A New Partnership: the Helicopter and the Destroyer
By Lieutenant (j.g.) Walter W. Price, II, U. S. Navy, USS Tatnall (DDG-19)
Somewhere in the Mediterranean a destroyer, her bridge structure well-emblazoned with battle ribbons, struggles to maintain station on an attack carrier. Pushed to its limit, her steam plant falls short of speeds that once would have been logged with ease. Water over the bow washes down a gun turret that during World War II pounded enemy beaches.
Now, 25 years later, and with her life expectancy extended by the Fleet Rehabilitation and Modernization (FRAM) program she is joined with the Navy’s antisubmarine forces, but her impotent ASW attack is a drone helicopter, which is often guided by an undisciplined mind of its own.
Off her beam is a newly-commissioned destroyer, with twin ship-to-ship missile launchers nestled against her bridge, and with a crew confident that no ship in the world can adequately defend herself against these missiles, which are directed by a resplendent array of electronics. Suddenly, her whining turbines are throttled up, and this Russian destroyer quickly leaves the laboring American behind.
This is by no means an unusual situation. The Russian destroyer is typical of their new breed, but the American ship represents the mainstay of the Navy’s destroyer force. The strength of American seapower is founded on a policy of flexible response to every situation which threatens national security. No instrument of modern naval warfare is neglected. Recent preoccupation, however, with nuclear submarines, carrier strike forces, and unconventional warfare has brought the Navy dangerously close to losing its balance of arms, and consequently, the loss of our flexibility. The time for face lifting has gone, and the time for replacement is now.
Now, a major milestone has been made, and the DD-963 Spruance-class destroyers and the DLGN-38 class of nuclear-powered frigates will become realities within the next three or four years.
The responsibility of designing these ships is great. Not just a class, but a fleet of destroyers is to be replaced. An oversight or faulty design will be a common family trait of weakness in all of tomorrow’s destroyers. Because of its multi mission characteristics, destroyer design is particularly complex. Not just one, but several capabilities must be optimized. Yet, they cannot conflict or detract from each other.
Mission flexibility is primarily a function of weapons system flexibility. The destroyers of tomorrow often will be required to operate independently.
Today, our destroyers need an improved cruise missile defense. Another important Soviet weapon, the mine, can easily restrict destroyer operations, and very few destroyers can adequately defend themselves in antiaircraft warfare (AAW). The degree of success of a single destroyer pitted against a nuclear submarine is less than satisfactory. There is no single, all-purpose cure for the destroyer’s infirmities, but there is a promising weapons system. The future of the destroyer navy is tied inextricably with its successful marriage with the helicopter.
Shipboard helicopters are no innovation. The helicopter has been in the Fleet for 20 years, and today, there are nearly 400 shipboard helicopter platforms. Over half of these platforms are on drone antisubmarine helicopter (DASH) destroyers. DASH itself was a disappointment, and is being phased out because of its complete dependency on the mother ship, and its inability to detect or classify submarine targets. When the versatile manned helicopter and the multipurpose destroyer are combined, however, the Navy will acquire a team without peer. A breakdown of destroyer missions reveals that the helicopter not only enhances each mission, but also provides the destroyer new capabilities.
The pendulum of advantage has swung back and forth between the hunter and the hunted, but today, there can be no doubt that nuclear-powered, deep-diving submarines have the upper hand. In spite of new duties and capabilities of tomorrow’s destroyers, antisubmarine warfare requirements remain paramount. Any helicopter design will have to first satisfy ASW requirements.
Any similarity between the DASH and the light airborne multipurpose system (LAMPS) is remote. This proposed helicopter will not only be manned, but also will have search, detection, classification, attack, and re-attack capabilities. When configured for ASW operations, the LAMPS will have an ASW module consisting of torpedoes or nuclear depth charges, sonobuoys, dipping sonar, magnetic anomaly detection (MAD) gear, and electronic monitoring equipment. A common problem with all aircraft designs is the compromise between fuel weight, module weight, and aircraft size. Basically, the LAMPS requirements is being met by a medium-sized helicopter with three to four hours’ endurance.
The deployment of the LAMPS should be a significant tactical evolution, but unforeseen problems will occur, and will not be solved until the actual sea trials. Questions must be answered such as, when should the helicopter be used in lieu of another weapon such as the antisubmarine rocket (AsRoc)? What new screens or search and attack patterns would make the most effective use of the helicopter?
The advantages of the helicopter are readily apparent. It has the speed and maneuverability to maintain the chase with any nuclear submarine of the present or foreseeable future. In pursuit of a submarine, two helicopters would almost be the equivalent to two additional destroyers. The two additional airborne variable depth sonars will enable the team to search three thermal layers simultaneously. Survivability would be high, as helicopters are not vulnerable to current submarine weapons. The element of surprise is also inherent in an airborne strike. This is by no means a complete list of advantages of an ASW-configured LAMPS.
Once the Navy finds a helicopter that meets ASW standards, it must investigate other mission capabilities. Each additional operational assignment should have a module or package that could be integrated into the basic helicopter. Ideally, a new module could be installed, crews rotated, and the aircraft refueled in a short time. The package weights will vary, and some missions with light requirements could carry extra fuel. The cargo or module space should be designed to emphasize reconfiguration efficiency. The major task would probably consist of connecting the package circuits to the outlets on the aircraft.
Twin engines are another important design criterion. Two engines are required to lift the heavy loads on several missions, and over-water operations are safer if the aircraft has two engines to bring the LAMPS back to the ship if the one fails.
Some additional missions for the helicopter/multipurpose destroyer team could be: anti-air warfare, vertical replenishment, minesweeping and minelaying, naval gunfire spotting, electronic countermeasures, sea-air rescue, air search, damage control and towing, underwater demolition activity, environmental data collection, in-flight refueling, medivac, personnel transport, mail carrying, and space shot recovery.
Only the actual deployment of LAMPS will reveal the full extent of its capabilities. Naturally, there are problems that must be overcome. One is the difficulty of landing a LAMPS on a pitching deck. A 1965 Royal Canadian Navy project, however, devised a “bear trap” system that is now well-tested. The helicopter is reeled on board by a constant tension winch, whose cable passes through the middle of a steel jaw recessed in the center of the landing deck. This cable is also attached to a steel shaft protruding from the bottom of the helicopter’s fuselage. The shaft follows the cable through the steel jaw which immediately clamps the aircraft onto the deck.
Another difficulty is accommodating two heavy-duty helicopters on a ship as small as a destroyer. New breakthroughs in rigid rotor design will allow lighter, smaller LAMPS to do the same missions as today’s heavyweight helicopters.
Storage room for numerous modules presents still another area of concern. It is expected that the ship will carry only those modules which she would expect to use. When operating with an attack carrier, the ASW, ECM, environmental data collection, and refueling modules would not be taken on board the ship. If past trends hold true, the new ships will have a life expectancy of 25 years. Today, the Navy is designing the “sea superiority” destroyer not only for 1975, but also for the remainder of the century. Weapons systems on the new destroyers will undoubtedly be subjected to many modifications, in an effort to keep abreast of changing technology. The helicopter offered sufficient proof of its adaptability to new weapons systems in Vietnam. The LAMPS package is also cost effective as most of its equipment needs are presently inventory items. Virtually every performance criterion is within the state of the art.
Unmistakably, the advantages of the destroyer and helicopter team outweigh the disadvantages, and in the words of the late Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, U. S. Navy:
Of all the tools the Navy will employ to control the seas in any future war, the destroyer will be sure to be there.
Gas Turbine Propulsion in Warships
By Captain Donald I. Thomas, U. S. Navy (Retired)
With the construction of at least 30 destroyers of the Spruance (DD-963) class, the U. S. Navy will make a transition from steam to gas turbine propulsion in its destroyer fleet.
A revolutionary change? Hardly, because when these Spruance-class destroyers reach the Fleet several years hence, they will join a worldwide fleet of well over 100 gas turbine-powered destroyer and escort types belonging to 13 foreign navies—Canada, Denmark, France, Finland, West Germany, India, Iran, Italy, Libya, Malaysia, The Netherlands, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. The U. S. Coast Guard, will have 12 high-endurance cutters of the Hamilton class and five medium-endurance cutters of the Reliance class, all having gas turbine propulsion. In size, foreign warships with gas turbines will range from the Royal Navy’s 6,200-ton guided missile destroyers (DDG) of the “County” class and the Soviet Union’s 6,000-ton guided missile frigates (DLG) of “Kresta” and “Kynda” classes to Finland’s 660-ton corvettes of the Turunmaa class.
For the U. S. Navy, however, the transition from high-pressure, superheated boilers and steam turbines to gas turbines in the Spruance-class destroyers will be a first in its major warship construction programs; perhaps proving the adage that the only people who are more conservative than the men who go down to the sea in ships are the men who design them. It would be unfair, however, to say that gas turbine marine propulsion has been altogether neglected by the U. S. Navy. Research and development programs have been going on for over 25 years, and a number of prototype and experimental ships and small craft propelled by gas turbines, such as the experimental hydrofoil ships USS Plainview (AGEH-1), and USS High Point (PCH-1), the hydrofoil gunboats USS Flagstaff (PGH-1) and USS Tucumcari, (PGH-2) and the 17 240-ton high speed gunboats (PG) of the Asheville class are either in commission or under construction. The Ashevilles are powered by a marinized version of General Electric’s J-79 aircraft engine, used in the McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom fighter. Gas turbine propulsion has also been successful in the U. S. Military Sealift Command’s cargo ship Admiral William M. Callaghan.
Why should gas turbines be used in warships in place of steam? The advantages are many:
Compactness: Gas turbine main propulsion plants occupy less than half the space and weight of a steam plant. Boiler rooms and boilers are eliminated, except perhaps for a small auxiliary boiler to provide steam for ship’s service uses. This boiler could be eliminated if provision were made for using waste heat from diesel or gas turbine-powered turbo generators which carry the electrical load of the ship.
Immediate Response: A gas turbine plant can go from “cold iron” to full power in a matter of minutes, with no warm-up required. When underway, additional turbines can be put on the line immediately, without warm-up, to meet maximum speed requirements. Acceleration in speed is much more rapid than could safely be achieved with a conventional boiler plant, even when full boiler power was available.
Economy of Manpower: A gas turbine plant requires about 25 per cent fewer operating personnel, primarily from elimination of the boiler plant. In port, watch standing and maintenance requirements would be substantially reduced.
Repair and Maintenance: An entire engine or its major components can be changed quickly. In larger warships, spare engine or major components can be carried on board and then changed without shipyard assistance. Downtime for boiler cleaning is eliminated with undeniable improvement in morale of engineering personnel.
Automation: A gas turbine plant is well suited to automation. Main engines can easily be controlled from the bridge.
Improved Acoustic and Magnetic Signatures: A gas turbine plant should be quieter than a steam plant, and particularly, a reciprocating engine plant. For ships where a low magnetic signature is important, gas turbines offer important advantages by eliminating many tons of magnetic material in its machinery plant.
There are disadvantages, however, with higher fuel consumption being the principal one.
Fuel Economy: Although overall fuel consumption of gas turbines at full power and for some intermediate power plant combinations approaches that of a steam turbine plant, open-cycle gas turbines (such as the aircraft type turbines adapted to marine propulsion) have inherently poor fuel rates when operating at low or intermediate power settings. This can be overcome by use of recuperated-cycle turbines, where exhaust heat is used to preheat air entering the turbine, or by resorting to combined plants, where gas turbines are used as an adjunct to diesels or steam turbines used for cruising purposes.
Because of space considerations and the introduction of undesirable complexities, recuperated-cycle gas turbines have not found much acceptance in marine propulsion. However, combined plants of various configurations are generally used. These include: combined diesel and gas turbine (CODAG), either or both may be used; combined diesel or gas turbine (CODOG), one or the other, but not both, may be used; combined steam and/or gas turbine (CODAG/CODOG); combined gas turbine and gas turbine (COGAG) multiple units of same size, or smaller gas turbines for cruising; combined nuclear and gas turbines (CONAG), nuclear for cruising, gas turbine for burst speed, a potentially attractive arrangement not yet found in existing warships.
Figure 1
GAS TURBINE-POWERED WARSHIPS
(500 Tons and Above)
Navy | Type and Class | No. | Displace-ment | L.O.A. | Type | Gas Turbines/No. | Cruising Engines/No. | Speed |
CANADA | DE | 4 | 4,050 | 426 | COGAG | 2 P&W FT-4A | 2 P&W FT-12 | 27 |
| Iroquois class |
|
|
|
| 44,000 h.p. | 6,200 h.p. |
|
DENMARK | DE | 2 | 2,030 | 395 | CODAG | 2 P&W FT-4A | 2 G.M. diesels | 28 |
| Peder Skram class |
|
|
|
| 44,000 h.p. | 4,800 h.p. |
|
FRANCE | DE | 2 | 1,950 | 338 | CODAG | 1 or 2 Gas turbines | Free piston engines | 25 |
| Commandant class |
|
|
|
| 1,400 h.p. | 5,000 h.p.(E) |
|
FINLAND | Corvette | 2 | 660 | 243 | CODOG | 1 R.R. Olympus | 3 diesels | 35 |
| Turunmaa class |
|
|
|
| 22,000 h.p. | 3,000 h.p. |
|
W. GERMANY | DE | 6 | 2,550 | 360 | CODAG | 2 Brown-Boveri | 4 M.A.N. diesels | 30 |
| Koln class |
|
|
|
| 26,000 h.p. | 12,000 h.p. |
|
| DE-70 class | 4 | 3,500 | 426 | CODAG | (Undetermined) | (Undetermined) | 30 |
| (Proposed) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
INDIA | DE Russian | 6 | 1,200 | 262 | CODAG | 2 Gas turbines | 2 diesels | 30 |
| “Petya” class |
|
|
|
| 10,000 h.p. | 4,000 h.p. |
|
IRAN | DE | 4 | 1,200 | 310 | CODAG | 2 R.R. Olympus | 2 Paxman diesels | 30+ |
| Saam class |
|
|
|
| 44,000 h.p. |
|
|
ITALY | DE | 2 | 2,700 | 352 | CODAG | 2 Metrovick | 4 Tosi diesels | 28 |
| Alpino class |
|
|
|
| 15,000 h.p. | 16,800 h.p. |
|
LIBYA | DE | 1 | 1,500 | 330 | CODOG | 2 R.R. Olympus | 2 Paxman diesels | 37 |
|
|
|
|
|
| 44,000 h.p. |
|
|
MALAYSIA | DE | 1 | 1,600 | 308 | CODAG | 1 R.R. Olympus | 1 Crossley-Pielstick | 27 |
| Hang Jebat |
|
|
|
| 22,000 h.p. | diesel 3,850 h.p. |
|
NETHERLANDS | DDG | 2 | 5,400 | 453 | CODOG | 2 Gas turbines | 2 diesels | 27(E) |
|
|
|
|
|
| 40,000 h.p. | 4,000 h.p. |
|
UNITED | DDG | 8 | 6,200 | 520 | COSAG | 4 Metrovick | 2 Steam turbines | 32 |
KINGDOM | County class |
|
|
|
| 30,000 h.p. | 30,000 h.p. |
|
| DDG-proposed |
| 3,500 |
| COGAG | 2 R.R. Olympus | 2 R.R. Tyne | 30 |
| Type 42 |
|
|
|
| 44,000 h.p. |
|
|
| DDG-proposed | 1 | 6,750 | 507 | COSAG | 2 R.R. Olympus | 2 Steam turbines | 32 |
| Type 82 |
|
|
|
| 44,600 h.p. | 30,000 h.p. |
|
| DE | 1 | 2,500 |
| COGAG | 2 R.R. Olympus | 2 R.R. Tyne gas | 30+ |
| Type 21-proposed |
|
|
|
| 44,000 h.p. | turbines |
|
| DE | 26(E) | 3,000(E) |
| COGAG | 2 R.R. Olympus | 2 R.R. Tyne gas | 30+ |
| Type 22-proposed |
|
|
|
| 44,000 h.p. | turbines |
|
| DE | 8 | 2,700 | 360 | COSAG | 1 Metrovick | 1 Steam turbine | 28 |
| Tribal class |
|
|
|
| 7,500 h.p. | 12,500 h.p. |
|
| DE | 1 | 1,450 | 310 | COGOG | 1 R.R. Olympus | 2 B.S. Proteus | 27 |
| Exmouth |
|
|
|
| 22,500 h.p. | Gas turbines 6,500 h.p. |
|
U. S. NAVY | DD-963 | 30(E) | 6,000(E) | 500(E) | COGAG | 4 G.E. LM-2,500 | (same) | 30+ |
| (Spruance class) |
|
|
|
| 100,000 h.p. |
|
|
U. S. COAST | High end. cutters | 12 | 3,050 | 378 | CODAG | 2 P&W FT-4 | 2 F.M. diesels | 29 |
GUARD | Hamilton class |
|
|
|
| 44,000 h.p. |
|
|
| Medium end. cutters | 5 | 1,000 | 210 | CODAG | 2 Solar Saturn | 2 C.B. diesels |
|
| Reliance class* |
|
|
|
| 2,000 h.p. | 5,000 h.p. |
|
U.S.S.R. | DLG | 2 | 6,000(E) | 508 | CODOG | 4 Gas turbines | Diesels | 34 |
| “Kresta” class |
|
|
|
| 100,000 h.p. |
|
|
| DLG | 4 | 6,000 | 492 | COSAG | Gas turbines | Steam turbines | 35 |
| “Kynda” class |
|
|
|
| (85,000 h.p. Total) |
|
|
| DDG | 10 | 5,200 | 475 | COGAG | 4 Gas Turbines |
| 35 |
| “Kashin” class |
|
|
|
| 100,000 h.p. |
|
|
| DE | 15 | 900 | 262 | COGOG | Gas turbines |
| 28 |
| “Mirka” class |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| DE | 35 | 1,200 | 262 | CODAG | 2 Gas turbines | 2 diesels | 30 |
| “Petya” class |
|
|
|
| 10,000 h.p. | 4,000 h.p. |
|
* Later ships of Reliance class are powered entirely by diesels.
SOURCE—Jane's Fighting Ships 1969-70 edition.
ABBREVIATIONS: P&W = Pratt & Whitney R.R. = Rolls-Royce
G.E. = General Electric B.S. = Bristol Siddeley
G.M. = General Motors Metrovick = Metropolitan-Vickers
C.B. = Cooper-Bessemers F.M.= Fairbanks-Morse
[(E) = estimate]
In Figure 1, details are shown of combined plants used in warships of the world’s navies. The CODAG/CODOG plants are the generally accepted arrangement, diesels being used for cruising and gas turbines alone or in combination with diesels for maximum speed. The Royal Navy uses combined steam and gas turbines (COSAG) in its “County”-class DDGs and “Tribal”-class general purpose frigates, as do the Russians in their “Kynda”-class DLGs. Most recent warship designs tend toward all-gas turbine COGAG plants, notably the Russian “Kresta”-class DDGs, the Canadian helicopter-equipped destroyers (DDH) of the Iroquois class, the Royal Navy’s Type 42 DDGs, and the fast Types 21 and 22 frigates. The U. S. Navy’s Spruance-class destroyers will use a COGAG plant consisting of four General Electric LM-2500 gas turbines, a marinized version of their TF-39/CF-6 aircraft engine, each rated in the 20,000-h.p. class.
Another possible arrangement for improving fuel economy in a gas turbine plant is electric drive. In this arrangement, each gas turbine drives a constant speed alternator which in turn delivers power to electric motors on the two propeller shafts. This permits use of a single gas turbine for low-speed cruising and combinations of two, three, or four turbines for higher speed operation. This arrangement also provides rapid engine response in backing down, without use of reversing gears or controllable pitch propellers. Disadvantages are the increased weight and volume of machinery and higher total cost of the engineering plant.
Complexity of Gears and Propellers: Geared gas turbines are non-reversible and, therefore, require either reversing gears or controllable pitch (CP) propellers for backing down. Because of the added weight, cost, and complexity of reversing gears, nearly all gas turbine-propelled warships use CP propellers which, despite their higher cost, susceptibility to damage, and high cost of repairs after damage, do provide precise and rapid response while maneuvering. Another drawback of any plant in which gas turbines are combined with other prime movers is the need for complex and costly combining gears and clutch assemblies for connecting or disconnecting engines from the main reduction gears.
Fuel Quality: Steam boiler plants can use a wide range of residual oil fuels and are reasonably tolerant of contaminated fuels. Gas turbines, in their present state of development, at least, require high grade distillate, diesel, or aviation (JP type) fuels. Gas turbine fuels must be clean and uncontaminated with water if serious damage to the turbine is to be avoided. To ensure this quality, the fuel system must have adequate provision for eliminating impurities by settling tanks, filtration, and/or centrifuging. Moreover, gas turbines require low sulfur and low vanadium fuels to minimize engine damage, particularly when they are operated in a salty marine environment.
Air Quality: Unlike aircraft type turbines, which customarily operate at high altitudes in clear air, marine gas turbines operate at sea level in a moist, salt-laden environment. Because gas turbines pass tremendous volumes of air through their multi-stage compressors, salt particles can rapidly cake compressor blades and reduce their efficiency. To minimize this, a carefully-designed air intake system to minimize ingestion of salt spray by baffling and de-misting must be incorporated in the ship’s design. Provision must also be included for periodic water-washing of compressors with fresh water to remove salt deposits and restore full compressor efficiency.
Gas turbine propulsion in warships, however, offers important military advantages which more than offset the drawbacks. What old-time destroyer captain (i.e., pre-DD-963 era) cannot but envy his successor in command of a Spruance-class destroyer? In port, if the need arises for getting underway quickly, the latter’s main engines can be “ready to answer bells” in the same time it takes to station his sea and anchor details. When operating at sea with an attack carrier task force, he will have no concerns about meeting sudden and unpredictable speed requirements of his carrier during flight operations, nor the many and varied high-speed operations frequently given the destroyers accompanying them. As additional gas turbines are cut in and he adjusts his bridge throttle, our modern-day skipper probably wonders how those destroyermen of earlier days ever contended with limitations imposed on them by boiler power availability and acceleration rates inherent in old-fashioned boilers and superheaters. And when his ship reaches port, he can take comfort in the fact that his engineering force will not have to spend their in-port time cleaning and repairing boilers while others more fortunate are enjoying liberty ashore.
Discrimination?
A Minority Review
By Lieutenant Commander Abe Greenberg, U. S. Navy, and Lieutenant (j.g.) Charles H. McKeown, U. S. Navy, both of the USS Providence (CLG-6)
A message to all Navy activities (AlNav 51), and another (Z-GRAM-66) by the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., U. S. Navy, brought to the Navy’s attention the fact that, contrary to popular belief, minority problems still exist. And by now, almost every command has taken another look at its minority groups and reassessed its programs. On board the USS Providence (CLG-6) there had been some dissatisfaction among the non-rated black sailors, especially in the deck force, even though the commanding officer had insisted that each man be treated fairly and equally.
In October 1970, a black sailor approached the commanding officer stating that he believed he was being discriminated against and cited several grievances. So, in an effort to pin down this dissatisfaction, along with the grievances brought forth by the sailor, whom we shall call Seaman Apprentice John Doe, it was decided to take his case under close examination.
The beginning of the study was to reduce the grievances to writing so that the problems were clearly understood. For this purpose, SA Doe selected a white enlisted college graduate to help him write his grievances. With the problems down on paper, the commanding officer offered Seaman Doe a panel of 12 shipmates, ranging from seaman to lieutenant commander, having about one-third black membership, from which he was to select three to examine his grievances. After discussing the panel with the other blacks on ship, he selected, interestingly, three officers, all white. He picked an ensign, a lieutenant (j.g.), and a lieutenant commander. The captain then issued an appointing letter to the three, assigning them to examine and report on SA Doe’s grievances.
The Grievance Committee, as it came to be called, convened on 3 November 1970 to study the problems. As the committee looked at each problem over a six weeks’ period, the report grew in scope well beyond the original grievances.
The first grievance forwarded by SA Doe was a lack of encouragement in advancing from seaman apprentice to seaman. After looking over the man’s service record, it was noted by the committee that he had taken and failed the seaman examination three times in the past year. Only one test result from the past examinations for Doe still exists. There are 150 questions on the test, of which 93 (2.5) must be answered correctly in order to be advanced. Doe scored 86 correct answers on his last test, which clearly failed him. In addition to the examination, the seaman apprentice must receive a recommendation from his division officer. Doe received a recommendation each month. Nothing in the seaman examination itself seemed to be unfair or biased. The general opinion concluded by the Grievance Committee was that SA Doe did not make an energetic or concentrated effort to master the knowledge required for the exam. The fault here, it was concluded, lay with the individual; with personal initiative, he could have been advanced.
Secondly, Doe felt that the petty officers (PO), chief petty officers (CPO), and officers of the ship were disinterested and unsympathetic to him. To find the answer to this question, the committee interviewed ten members, seamen and POs of Doe’s division, including both white and blacks. The committee found that, in general, Doe did not create a favorable impression of interest and, as a result, did not encourage any special interest. All of the whites interviewed considered Doe to be lazy and a troublemaker, yet the blacks viewed him as their leader, thusly discriminated against. One black sailor stated, “Sure he is lazy and uninterested in the Navy, you would be, too, if you were treated like the blacks are here.” What seemed to be lacking, the committee found, was suitable communication and understanding between whites and blacks. The only answer to this problem is education and a better understanding of each other’s outlooks.
Doe complained about the lack of opportunity of sailors, especially black sailors, to transfer to other departments. The blacks on the ship felt that once put in the deck force there was no avenue of escape. This was found to be true in Doe’s case, but no evidence was found that Doe, had in fact, met any of the obligations required for such a transfer. A general finding, however, was that the procedure for an inter-department transfer was not clearly understood by Doe or other enlisted men. Out of a dozen people questioned, both senior and junior, as to the prerequisites for such a transfer, a dozen different answers were given. The success of an inter-department transfer is just as often dependent on the policy of various individuals as on the desires of the person seeking a transfer. To the more junior personnel on board, the inter-department transfer requirements were at best vague or non-existent, and always confusing. As a result, the committee recommended that inter-department transfer requirements be standardized and publicized to all hands on board.
Discrimination in assignment of tasks was Doe’s fourth grievance. He felt that the blacks in his division were given less favorable tasks such as sweeping, working parties, mess cooking, and the like, in inequitable schedules. In researching this grievance, it appeared to be a general practice throughout the deck divisions to assign the slow and least productive workers to the more mundane tasks, while retaining the more proficient and productive workers on assignments within their division. Doe was considered to be a slow and unproductive worker by all the POs interviewed, but the statements of the black seamen interviewed differed. They felt that it was a matter of personalities, that no matter how equal and unbiased the policy makers are, there are still lower levels of management that openly discriminate. In the eyes of the blacks, this was justification for their grievance. The problem lies not in the ship’s policies, but in the individual personalities involved. Some are fair, others are not.
Lastly, and most important. Doe felt that he was discriminated against when being assigned to the deck force. The committee found that about 6% of the ship’s force, at the time of the investigation, was black. Out of this 6%, about 42% were assigned to the deck force (first, second, and third divisions). This, from the committee’s point of view appeared to be an exceedingly large number, and from the black outlook constituted verification of prejudiced assignment.
[Figure 1: graph of black percentage of ship’s departments]
A graphic and numerical distribution of the black/white ratio for September and December 1970, and February 1971 is shown in Figures 1 and 2. In general, assignments to department and divisions were made on the basis of general classification test/arithmetic test (GCT/ARI) scores, a battery of tests given during a sailor’s first week in the Navy. A review of the black GCT/ARIs shows them generally to be numerically lower than that of the corresponding whites. This may largely reflect a man’s educational background and opportunity rather than the true individual potential. The fact becomes more evident in the substantial number of senior black petty officers who have succeeded in their specialties in spite of their low GCT/ARI scores. In reaction to this finding, the committee recommended that the GCT/ARIs not be the sole decision factor when assigning men to divisions. Attention should be paid to background experience and schooling, both military and civilian, and, in particular, to the desires of the individual. In some cases, the ship will just have to “take a chance” and assign motivated personnel to the more technical divisions. While this may produce instances in which the individuals fail, in general it is believed that this policy will be more fair, reduce tension among the black sailors on board, give them greater pride in their job and themselves, increase their value to society when discharged, and increase overall their present retention rate. Not only will this policy break down what has come to be viewed as a traditional assignment to the deck force; it will also simultaneously remove the large “cliqueish” group of black sailors from the deck divisions, where most of the racial tensions and dissatisfactions were encountered.
Figure 2
Department | Black/White | Percent of Black | Percent of | Percent of | White | |
WEAPONS | Sep | 21/219 | 44.6 | 8.7 | 25.2 | 91.3 |
| Dec | 19/207 | 45.3 | 8.4 | 24.2 | 91.6 |
| Feb | 15/195 | 32.0 | 7.1 | 23.1 | 92.9 |
ENGINEERING | Sep | 10/234 | 21.2 | 4.1 | 28.3 | 95.9 |
| Dec | 8/228 | 19.5 | 3.5 | 27.3 | 96.5 |
| Feb | 11/242 | 23.6 | 4.3 | 28.6 | 95.7 |
SUPPLY | Sep | 10/113 | 19.0 | 8.1 | 13.6 | 91.9 |
| Dec | 10/106 | 23.3 | 8.6 | 11.5 | 91.4 |
| Feb | 12/113 | 25.5 | 9.6 | 13.4 | 90.4 |
COMMUNICATIONS | Sep | 3/53 | 6.0 | 5.4 | 6.4 | 94.6 |
| Dec | 2/74 | 4.7 | 2.6 | 8.8 | 97.4 |
| Feb | 2/86 | 4.3 | 2.3 | 10.2 | 97.7 |
EXECUTIVE | Sep | 2/54 | 4.0 | 4.6 | 6.8 | 95.4 |
| Dec | 2/48 | 4.7 | 4.0 | 6.0 | 96.0 |
| Feb | 1/48 | 2.1 | 2.0 | 5.7 | 98.0 |
OPERATIONS | Sep | 2/132 | 4.0 | 1.5 | 16.6 | 99.0 |
| Dec | 2/137 | 4.7 | 1.4 | 16.7 | 98.6 |
| Feb | 4/136 | 8.5 | 2.9 | 16.0 | 97.1 |
NAVIGATION | Sep | 0/21 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.5 | 100.0 |
| Dec | 0/29 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.6 | 100.0 |
| Feb | 1/25 | 2.1 | 4.0 | 3.0 | 96.0 |
Ship’s Black/White Ratio | Sep | 50/827 or 6.4% |
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| Dec | 43/834 or 4.8% |
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| Feb | 47/845 or 5.7% |
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It appeared that as a result of initial division assignment, there was a definite lack of black sailors being assigned to schools of any type. This tends to cement the black sailor’s idea that he stands little chance to improve his lot.
Interviews of personnel acquainted with SA Doe showed also that black and white sailors view the same problem quite differently. While all of the whites interviewed were unanimous in their opinion that Doe was slow, lazy, uncooperative, and in general useless, only one black agreed to this description; he thought that Doe was justified acting in the manner he did, because of the way he was being treated. Another case presenting divergent views was that of a black petty officer placing two white sailors on report. The case was dismissed because of very poor judgment on the petty officer’s part. While the whites considered this decision to have been just and fair, all of the blacks interviewed thought that this dismissal merely emphasized their point that not even a black petty officer had any authority or equality.
Though the commanding officer’s open-door policy was extremely favorable and just, individuals were leery of availing themselves of this path for fear of later repression and having the stigma of a troublemaker attached in bucking the chain of command. A minority or minorities representative might eliminate this problem, but it is recognized that the commanding officer is in the best position to deal with such grievances and the individual will have to accept this as his avenue for a just hearing.
A large number of black sailors interviewed, when complaining of a lack of opportunity, seemed to be completely unaware that the Navy does have several black senior officers, and they knew little of the Navy’s effort in recruiting people for all aspects of its life and operations. It was believed that lectures or discussions by senior and knowledgeable ship personnel would go a long way in explaining both the opportunities available in the Navy to blacks and in citing the black individuals who have been successful in the Navy. This, coupled with an active program to redistribute the black population on board, should eliminate some of the racial tension.
A suggestion encountered during the investigation was that more should be done to acquaint all hands with minority—especially black—customs and traditions. Very few people know why blacks refer to themselves as “brothers.” What is a “dashiki” or “afro?” Ethnic talent-shows on board ship or even ethnic dinners such as Italian, Chinese, Japanese, and even “Soul Food” menus were suggested as aids to bridge this education gap. Though none of the men expressed a desire to eat “Soul Food” regularly, they were more interested that people on board be aware of its existence as an ethnic food.
As a result of this study, the following policy changes and additions were instigated on board the Providence:
(1) A general redistribution of the blacks on board to the more technical ratings at a ratio similar to that of the whites. This program calls for ratio change at a rate exceeding the present so as to balance distribution.
(2) Each new non-designated seaman apprentice or seaman is assigned to the deck force for a minimum of three months. At the end of this time, he will be transferred to the department/division of his choice, if he has completed the basic qualifications for that rate. After serving one year in any division, the man will be automatically considered for transfer to the division of his choice (if possible) on a two-month trial basis without regard to prior qualification.
(3) A minority board was established. Its sole purpose is to hear, investigate, and report valid minority problems to the commanding officer. At the present time, this committee contains a white lieutenant commander, black ensign, a black CPO, a black PO1, and a black PO3 (first enlistment).
(4) Minority views will now be stressed in leadership training.
(5) Inter-department transfer requirements have been standardized and made known to all hands via the Plan of the Day and bulletin boards.
On 12 January 1971, this study was presented to the Secretary of the Navy, John Chafee, when he visited the Commander of the First Fleet, on board the Providence. During this seminar, four major all-Navy suggestions were made to the Secretary:
(1) Simplify GCT/ARI retesting.
(2) Standardize the requirements for inter-department transfers and promulgate these requirements to all in the Navy.
(3) Include minority problems and views in leadership training.
(4) Assign all new non-designated seamen apprentice and seamen to the deck force for a minimum of three months. At the end of this time, transfer the man to the department/division of his choice, if he has completed the basic qualifications for that rate. After serving one year in any division, consider transferring a man to the division of his choice (if possible) for a two-month trial basis without regard to prior qualification.
While no particular dramatic or startling points stand out in the study, it is a rather comprehensive way in which one ship analyzed its problem areas and took remedial action.