One night soon, at about 40° North latitude, within a few miles of our Pacific coast, a commanding officer will be awakened by his watch and informed that radar contact has been made with an object ahead dead in the water. After a few minutes the object will be sighted visually and identified as a ship with an odd array of bright lights amidships. The vessel will be a Japanese fishing vessel, thousands of miles from home, developing a new saury fishery off our Pacific coast. Our fishermen, no more than a few hours steaming time from the lucrative fishing grounds, will nowhere be seen.
The explosive development of foreign fishing activity in recent years, especially the rapid expansion of foreign fishing off our shores, not only is an indication of the sorry state of U. S. fisheries, but also is presenting us with international problems of unusual complexity. Legislative action by the U. S. Congress in 1966 to ensure control of fishing out to 12 miles from our coasts has been one attempt to protect resources for use of our fishermen against the onslaught of foreign fishing fleets. Only the future will reveal if this measure was beneficial to U. S. interests. In principle, one might argue that this is little different from acts of nations that have claimed a 200-mile fishery jurisdiction, a measure which we have repeatedly condemned. But, even so, there are many voices in our country suggesting that we, too, should claim a 200-mile zone for fishery control or at least limit the catch of certain species by foreign fleets in our coastal waters.
By examining historical records of world fish catches and projected plans of major fishing nations, one may surmise that expansion of foreign fishing will continue and that international problems related thereto will not merely fade away as we so dearly wish, but will increase. What this will ultimately mean to the United States and to its citizens who look to the sea for their living is not yet clear. It may mean a deprivation of a way of life to many of our present-day commercial fishermen. Furthermore, it could mean a direct threat to the security of our country if we do not share in the development and use of ocean resources.
Despite the increasing value of oil and minerals recovered from the oceans, fisheries are the largest economic harvest from the seas. Moreover, if properly managed, they are renewable. The annual value of the world catch of fish and shellfish to the fisherman now stands at about $10 billion, which is substantially greater than the annual value of all other resources taken from the ocean.
The growth in world fisheries over the last two decades has been phenomenal. In 1948, the world catch was 19.9 million metric tons, whereas, the 1968 figures released by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations indicate that 64 million metric tons were taken from the oceans and inland waters (Figure 1).
Although a large number of nations are turning increasingly to the sea to solve in part their food problem and to gain foreign exchange through export of fishery products, three nations—Japan, Peru, and the Soviet Union—have been predominant over the last 15 years (Figure 2).
The story of the tremendous growth in Japanese fisheries, especially its high seas tuna operations, is well known. Prior to World War II, the Japanese fleet operated mainly in waters around the home islands but at the same time carried out extensive exploratory ventures in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. From the surrender in August 1945 until the peace treaty came into force in April 1952, Japan’s fishing activity was severely limited by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Following relaxation of restrictions in 1952, Japanese fishermen took advantage of knowledge gained many years earlier and rapidly expanded operations in the Indian, Pacific, and Atlantic Oceans in quest of tuna. Today, the high seas tuna longliner—longline fishing involves the setting of an extraordinarily long main fishing line from which branch lines with baited hooks are suspended at intervals—shifts from ocean to ocean, to whatever grounds are most productive, under a highly organized cooperative venture among fishermen and industry with the assistance of government. However, as Japan’s standard of living and individual wages increase, it is experiencing difficulty in maintaining some of its high seas fisheries as it has in the past. In fact, the present Japanese Atlantic tuna fleet of about 40 vessels is far below the maximum of some 145 vessels several years ago and is now surpassed by the longline tuna fleets of South Korea and Taiwan, countries where wages to commercial fishermen are relatively low. Nevertheless, published plans of future fishery development show clearly that Japan will long remain a major fishing nation of the world.
Growth in Peruvian fisheries has been due mainly to harvesting of anchovy by a fleet of some 1,300 vessels fishing within 50 miles of the Peruvian coast. This sardine-like fish is reduced to fish meal and sold primarily as a supplement to chicken and animal foods. Scientific studies of the anchovy resource indicate that it is now producing at its maximum sustainable yield of about 9 million tons a year, worth hundreds of millions of dollars to the Peruvian economy.
Though growth of Japanese and Peruvian fisheries has been dramatic, that of the Soviet Union has been even more so. In less than 20 years, a nation which once took most of its fish from fresh waters has created a mighty fishing organization which some day will surely make it the number one fishing nation of the world. Fishing operations are carried out under highly centralized direction from regional fishery administrations located in Murmansk, Riga, Vladivostok, Sevastopol, and Astrakhan.
Although it has been the practice of some in the United States to infer that Soviet activity is due to reasons other than fishing, there is evidence that the Soviets fish because they can produce protein more cheaply from the seas than from the land. Some economists estimate that in recent years more than half the food-producing investments in the Soviet Union have gone into fishery development. One would be naive, however, if he did not consider the possibility that the Soviets view economic control of the oceans, of which a global fishing operation is one element, as conceivably the most important avenue in spreading Soviet influence worldwide. Overseas operating bases, such as the one recently established by agreement with Spain in the port of Santa Cruz de Tenerife, Canary Islands, are obvious springboards from which this influence could be exerted.
Modernization of the Soviet fleet started in earnest in 1954 when 20 modern trawlers were ordered from a shipyard in Great Britain. Soon thereafter, 24 additional trawlers were ordered from West Germany. These were based on the design of the British trawler Fairtry and served as the prototype for the stern trawler, Pushkin. This class was followed by production of the Mayakovskii, Leskov, Tropik, Atlantik and Skryplev-class stern trawlers, workhorses of the Soviet fleet. These are capable of fishing for extended periods thousands of miles from their home port with the capability of processing their catches as they are made.
Fantastic is the only word applicable to the new factory-mothership, Vostok. The Vostok has a displacement of approximately 44,000 tons and is over 700 feet in length. She will carry 14 catcher vessels on deck, a helicopter to assist in finding fish, and a crew of 600 for fishing and processing operations.
Of great interest to the United States is the rapid growth of the Cuban fishing fleet. Whereas world landings roughly doubled between 1955 and 1966, those of Cuba increased 3.3 times from 12,800 metric tons to over 43,000 metric tons. By the end of 1971 the catch may be well over 100,000 metric tons.
Rapid advances in Cuban fisheries have been due in large part to technical assistance given them by the Soviet Union in an agreement reached in 1962. In turn, the Soviet Union is being handsomely repaid through the use of the port of Havana as an overseas operating base for much of her South Atlantic fishery operations.
[Figure 1 (bar graph): World catch of fish, crustaceans, mollusks, and other aquatic animals, 1938-1968.]
Last year the National Institute of Fishing, Havana, reported that it was directing and controlling fishing of four fleets: Coastal, Cuban Fishing, Caribbean Shrimp, and Gulf of Mexico. These fleets now contain high seas vessels purchased mainly from Spain and France, but some also from the Soviet Union, West Germany, Japan, and Poland. Spain has now just about completed delivery of 90 shrimp boats which will be used in widespread operations in the Gulf and in the Caribbean. Trawlers, built in Poland for Cuba, have been found north to the Grand Banks and south to the Patagonian Shelf off Argentina. The most recent acquisitions of the Cuban fleet include the 450-foot carrier-motherships Oceano Pacifico and Oceano lndico, from a shipyard in La Spezia, Italy. These vessels will provide a much needed capability in transporting fish from distant grounds to Cuba.
Whereas some countries are finding a bonanza in fishing, others are achieving great economic gain by building fishing vessels. One out of three merchant vessels of over 100 tons launched in 1968 was a fishing vessel. The Soviets have taken full advantage of foreign shipbuilding opportunities by using Poland and East Germany extensively for construction of vessels as well as a number of other nations. The shipyards of Gdansk, Gdynia, Szczecin, and Wisla, Poland, are the most advanced in the world in fishing vessel construction. According to the magazine World Fishing, Polish shipyards since 1952 have exported 294 fishing vessels totalling 453,000 tons. Poland, however, has not become so enamored with shipbuilding for foreign countries that she has neglected expansion of her own fisheries. Polish fishing vessels can be found from the shores of New England to the coasts of South Africa.
[Figure 2 (line graph): World fish catch by leading countries.]
This is not to say that all countries are finding fishery development an easily obtainable goal. The State Fishing Corporation of Ghana is a case in point. In 1960, the catch by Ghanaian vessels was less than 35,000 tons. Ghana planned to increase this to over 200,000 tons by 1969. To reach this goal approximately 40 ships were ordered from shipyards in Britain, Norway, Japan, Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia, most were delivered; however, because of inexperience, bureaucratic administration, and political interference, much of the fleet has been idle over extended periods. In direct contrast to operations of the State Fishing Corporation, private industry is operating efficiently and is bringing Ghana to a point where it now has a promising future in fishery development off the West Coast of Africa.
The list of nations planning major expansion into harvesting resources of the ocean could go on and on—Spain, Portugal, Taiwan, South Korea, to name a few. A sobering aspect of this development is whether man will be able to provide the vast amount of scientific data and political acumen necessary to manage ocean resources properly. If he is unable to do so, the fishery wealth of the oceans may be, at least, not fully realized, or, at worst, lost forever.
What can the ocean produce on a sustained basis? A number of estimates, essentially of two types, has been made in recent years. One type extrapolates present trends and successes in areas now heavily exploited to like regions of the oceans yet unexploited. The other is based on food-chain dynamics, that is, on the amount of phytoplankton produced naturally in the ocean, and the flow of energy through the food web to fish. The former approach appears to give estimates much below those of the latter.
Further study is needed on the processes governing ocean productivity to refine estimates now being made. At present, however, the consensus seems to be that production from the sea can be increased significantly, perhaps by a factor of 3-to-5 times that now being produced, especially if new and economical harvesting techniques are developed and fisheries are properly managed.
The greatest increases in catch are expected to come largely from the plankton-eating fishes. This expectation is already borne out by production figures of the last two decades which show the greatest growth in fisheries from harvest of species which are planktonic feeders (Table 1). Peru’s catch record of the anchovy provides an outstanding example of how the harvest of lower trophic level forms can catapult a nation into prominence in world fish production. When one considers forms other than fishes, this expectation is further enhanced. The Soviets are now undertaking a harvest of krill in the Antarctic which could conceivably amount to 50 million metric tons a year, equal to the world marine fishery production now. The 50 million metric tons is estimated on the basis that this is the amount of krill formerly consumed annually by Antarctic whales.
Who owns the fishery resources of the world oceans and what is being done to manage them properly? On the high seas, i.e., outside the territorial waters of any state, fishing is unrestricted to any and all, except as modified by treaties among nations and by regulations of the fish vessel’s home country. The echoes of World War II had not yet subsided, however, before nations began to take various actions to extend their respective claims to ownership of resources off their shores. Harry Truman’s Presidential Proclamation No. 2667 of September 1945 was the first of these: “. . . the Government of the United States regards the natural resources of the subsoil and seabed of the Continental Shelf beneath the high seas but continguous [sic] to the coasts of the United States as appertaining to the United States, subject to its jurisdictions and control.” Proclamation 2668 of the same date states the position of the United States on conservation and management of fishery resources off U. S. shores.
These proclamations were soon followed by a spate of declarations from other countries, expressing unilateral claim to resources some of which extended far beyond the continental shelf. One of the most well-known is the Declaration of Santiago of 1952, in which Chile, Ecuador, and Peru claimed control of fishery resources out to 200 miles. Finally, in 1958, under the aegis of the United Nations, the first Law of the Sea Conference was held; it was followed by another in 1960. The Convention of the Continental Shelf, a result of the 1958 Geneva Conference which came into force in 1964, states that resources of the Continental Shelf adjacent to a nation are exclusive property of that nation. Resources “consist of the mineral and other non-living resources of the seabed and subsoil together with living organisms belonging to sedentary species, that is to say, organisms which, at the harvestable stage, either are immobile on or under the seabed or are unable to move except in constant physical contact with the seabed or the subsoil.” The United States recently published in the Federal Register a list of those fishery resources considered to be U. S. continental shelf resources and, thus, under U. S. ownership. This does not give ownership to those resources capable of moving freely off the bottom, but refers only to those which are in constant contact with the bottom.
Unilateral action was taken by the United States in 1966 to gain further ownership of resources off our shores. Considerable pressure was brought to bear on the Federal government in the early 1960s to stop the ravaging of “our fishery resources” by foreign fleets off U. S. shores. These were not our resources, of course, but, nevertheless, the Congress did move. Public Law 89-658 enacted by Congress on 14 October 1966, established a zone of exclusive fisheries jurisdiction beyond our territorial sea out to a distance of 12 miles from the baseline from which the territorial sea is measured; that is, it established a 9-mile contiguous fishery zone adjacent to the U. S. 3-mile territorial sea. This is intended to give domestic fishermen protection from foreign fishing pressure, yet allowing some foreign fishing based on historical performance within the fishing boundary.
Table 1 World marine fish catch by major groups of species, millions of metric tons.
| 1958 | 1961 | 1962 | 1963 | 1964 | 1965 | 1966 | 1967 | 1968 |
Herrings, sardines, anchovies, etc. | 7.25 | 12.41 | 14.53 | 14.79 | 18.42 | 16.87 | 18.63 | 19.60 | 20.46 |
Cods, hakes, haddocks, etc. | 4.49 | 5.05 | 5.53 | 5.91 | 6.05 | 6.72 | 7.23 | 8.21 | 9.48 |
Unsorted and unidentified fishes | 5.21 | 6.44 | 6.95 | 7.17 | 7.41 | 7.61 | 7.80 | 8.19 | 8.54 |
Redfishes, basses, congers, etc. | 2.24 | 2.41 | 2.60 | 2.71 | 2.96 | 3.18 | 3.21 | 3.15 | 3.19 |
Mackerels, billfishes, cutlassfishes, etc. | 0.99 | 0.99 | 1.09 | 1.22 | 1.35 | 1.67 | 2.00 | 2.67 | 3.06 |
Jacks, mullets, etc. | 1.76 | 1.98 | 2.08 | 1.92 | 2.01 | 2.15 | 2.12 | 2.06 | 1.96 |
Tunas, bonitos, skipjacks, etc. | 0.99 | 1.21 | 1.23 | 1.25 | 1.22 | 1.22 | 1.35 | 1.36 | 1.40 |
Flounder, halibut, soles, etc. | 0.79 | 1.33 | 1.24 | 0.95 | 0.99 | 0.96 | 1.09 | 1.20 | 1.15 |
Sharks, rays, chimaeras, etc. | 0.34 | 0.37 | 0.38 | 0.40 | 0.40 | 0.40 | 0.43 | 0.43 | 0.46 |
One basic objective of fishery management is to ensure that fishing does not exceed the maximum sustainable yield of a fishable stock. Fishing in excess of this yield can result in a devastating blow to the productivity of the resource, by rendering it uneconomical to harvest. The Pacific sardine fishery at one time produced about 500,000 tons of fish annually and provided a livelihood for fishermen on 300 vessels off our West Coast as well as for many others in processing and marketing endeavors. Evidence uncovered over the past years suggests that overfishing for several years, coupled with changes in environmental conditions—which caused abnormally low survival of young—so decimated the sardine population that it never recovered. A trip through Cannery Row, Monterey, California, reveals silent but persuasive evidence of the need for man to manage ocean resources with wisdom.
The concept of fishing at no more than the maximum sustainable yield, though it has shortcomings, provides a universally understood point of reference upon which administrators and scientists of different nations can attempt to reach agreement on division or management of resources. Another concept, one gaining considerable attention, is to exploit resources at the maximum economic yield, which in most fisheries will be somewhat less than harvesting at the maximum sustainable yield. Moreover, some proponents of this course of action suggest that management under this condition might be accomplished by the United Nations or other international body. Though this concept might appear to have merit, it is not at all clear how it would work. To arrive at an agreement, one satisfactory to all nations fishing on a resource as to what the maximum economic yield is just, does not seem an attainable goal. Certainly, the maximum economic yield to the United States is different from that in Japan and in the Soviet Union. Furthermore, many nations are fishing to gain foreign exchange and do not base their fisheries solely on the economics of fishing.
A management tool now being investigated is the division of a particular fishery resource among nations fishing it, i.e., the establishment of country quotas. After a quota has been allocated to a nation, the possibility then exists for a country to apply management that takes into account economic factors. This might include limiting the number of vessels that can harvest the country quota, and by closing the fishery when the maximum economic return has been achieved.
Over the years, in moves to assist in management of fishery resources internationally and to maintain access to resources for the benefit of U. S. interests, the United States has joined nine international fishery commissions (Table 2, Figure 3).
In addition to Commissions in which we have membership, another approach in solving management and ownership problems is special agreements, sometimes called “Executive Agreements,” that we negotiate with foreign countries. We now are party to nine of these. Four are with the Soviet Union concerning fishery problems off our Pacific and Atlantic coasts, one is with Poland off our Atlantic coast, two are with Japan off the Pacific coast, one with Mexico concerning Gulf of Mexico and Pacific coast fisheries, and one with Canada concerning reciprocal fishing off Atlantic and Pacific coasts.
Table 2 International Fishery Commissions to which the United States is a Party.[1]
Great Lakes Fishery Commission
with Canada
Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission
with Costa Rica, Panama, Mexico
International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries
with Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, United Kingdom, Norway, Portugal, Spain, U.S.S.R., Poland, West Germany
International North Pacific Fisheries Commission
with Canada
International Pacific Halibut Commission
with Canada
International Pacific Salmon Fisheries Commission
with Canada
International Whaling Commission
with Argentina, Brazil, Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Newfoundland, Norway, U.S.S.R., United Kingdom, South Africa, Iceland, Japan, Mexico
North Pacific Fur Seal Commission
with Canada, Japan, U.S.S.R.
International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas
with Brazil, Ghana, Spain, France, Canada, Japan, Morocco, Portugal, South Africa
[Figure 3 (map) International fisheries commissions (See Table 2).]
The different arrangements concerning international management of fishery resources are complex. In fact, some suggest that the failure in part of the 1958 and 1960 Law of the Sea Conferences at Geneva can be laid in large measure to failure of representatives of a number of countries to understand the political, economic, and biological aspects of fishery problems. A third Law of the Sea Conference is now being planned. If, however, the nations of the world have not become more enlightened on the importance of fishery problems in international affairs, one can predict with certainty that the results of such a conference will fall far short of expectations.
Earlier we discussed the fishery potential of the world oceans and indicated that this might be as much as 200 million metric tons. But what about the potential in our coastal areas? Some fishery scientists estimate that the fish and shellfish potential on or overlying the shelf and slope waters off the United States could yield catches of nearly 20 million tons annually. If these resources were developed, the value to U. S. fishermen would be over $3 billion per year. The value of resources taken now is about $500 million. Currently, U. S. fishermen harvest about one-tenth of this potential, whereas fishermen from foreign nations are taking a slightly higher amount. One might wonder therefore if the demand for fishery products in the United States is great enough for us to concern ourselves with these abundant resources. Certainly the growth in use of fishery products in the United States for both industrial and human consumption suggests that fishery products are becoming increasingly important. Unfortunately, for our domestic fleets, the demand is met mostly from imports (Figure 4).
Why is it, then, that U. S. fishermen are unable to compete on the high seas with foreign fleets that travel thousands of miles? The answers are far from clear, but until some of the following problems are resolved, the domestic fisherman will continue to be at a disadvantage on the high seas.
Archaic fishery regulations. The regulation of fishing in the United States, aside from that done under treaty with other countries, is carried out under state and local laws. A growing conviction among students of U. S. fishery problems is that a major factor preventing the rational development of ocean fisheries is the maze of regulations existing at the state and local level. The origin of many of these regulations are obscured by the passage of time, but they are still on the books. For example, in Alaska none may catch salmon with a purse seine vessel with a vessel more than 50 feet long. In Washington, none may use electronic fish finders with which to locate salmon. In Alaska and Washington, fish traps and other fixed gear have been eliminated; they are too efficient. In the North Pacific, an American may not fish for halibut by trawl, or harvest salmon on the high seas by gill net. It is time for a repeal of those laws which have created inefficiencies in our fisheries and thus have hampered the growth of our domestic fleet.
Policy on new vessel construction. In order to protect an infant shipbuilding industry, the United States passed a law, in 1792, preventing the landing of fish in a U. S. port from a foreign-built hull. This law remains on the books and, as other nations bargain on the world market for construction of fishing vessels, the U. S. fisherman builds in a U. S. shipyard even though it may cost him 50% more than if purchased in a foreign yard.
U. S. trade policy. Following World War II, deliberate steps were taken by the United States to rebuild the economic capabilities of our allies. We then threw open to our allies many lucrative markets, including the fisheries market, on a reciprocal trade basis. At that time, and for several years thereafter, this may have been a good policy. Although some changes have been made over the years, the advantage gained by foreign countries in some fisheries because of trade policy and for other reasons has been too much for our domestic fishermen to overcome.
[Figure 4 (line graph) U. S. supply of U. S. fishery products, 1960-1969.]
In 1936, the average U. S. ad valorem duty for all imports was 16.5% and for fisheries imports 15.6%. By 1969, the average ad valorem duty on all imports into the United States had dropped to 7.1%, but fisheries had dropped to 3.0%. Although it is dangerous to draw conclusions from these figures, they certainly suggest forthright policy on the part of the United States to create competitive hazards for its domestic fisheries in comparison with other U. S. industries.
As we watch other nations develop fisheries to gain foreign exchange through exports, and as we lose about $800 million annually for purchase of fishery products abroad and gain only about $100 million from sale to foreign countries, is it not time to effect a major change concerning our trade policy in fisheries?
Inadequate extension services. One reason for rapid advances in many sectors of U. S. industry has been the ability of U. S. managers to effect transfer of technology from one industry to another. This has not been the case in U. S. fisheries. The best research and technology is of no use if it is not applied. The fragmented nature of the fishing industry—consisting of scores of individual or loosely organized units—makes technology transfer a difficult problem indeed.
The Marine Science, Engineering and Resources Commission, reporting to the President in January 1969, recognized this problem and recommended “that fisheries extension services, analogous to the Agricultural Extension Service, be established in order to facilitate transfer of technically useful information to fishermen at the local level.”
In 1966, Congress passed the National Sea Grant College and Programs Act (PL 89-688), which authorizes marine extension services to be carried out by selected universities and colleges. Extension services now underway at Oregon State University and the University of Rhode Island and others indicate that we now may have the avenue to provide the technical information so desperately needed by our fishermen.
One might list competition of foreign fishing fleets off our shores as a problem for our domestic fishermen to ovecome [sic]. The huge fleets off our shores, however, are only a result of our neglect to develop an aggressive U. S. fishery policy. Foreign competition per se does not intimidate our domestic fisherman. Nor is he asking for a subsidized program to compete on the high seas. In fisheries where institutional barriers do not fetter his operations, he competes handsomely with the best foreign fleets have to offer. American tuna and shrimp fleets operating off South America and Africa are ample testimony to this.
Understanding the nature of foreign fleet operations, however, is an essential input in the development of a rational domestic fisheries policy. Though fishing is carried out by a number of nations, elements of the Soviet fleet are the ones most commonly sighted off our shores. Soviet trawlers now fishing in the North-west Atlantic are either from Murmansk in the Barents Sea, or from Leningrad, Tallinn, Riga, Klaipeda, or Kaliningrad in the Baltic Sea (Figure 5). Fishing activity by the Soviets in the Northwest Atlantic commenced in 1956 with a small fleet of trawlers fishing in the vicinity of Flemish Cap about 250 miles east of St. Johns, Newfoundland. By March 1961, Soviet medium-sized trawlers had commenced fishing on the western edge of Georges Bank about 150 miles east of Boston, Massachusetts. The exploratory fishing surveys apparently were quite successful. By August 1961, Pushkin-class factory stern trawlers and a number of medium trawlers began to show on Georges Bank. It is believed that the fleet in 1961 numbered about 100 vessels, including logistic vessels. By February 1962, vessels began to appear about 75 miles east of Cape Cod and, by May, 448 different vessels had been observed at one time or another on the fishing grounds. In some areas domestic fishing vessels were literally denied access to the resources. Along the northern edge of Georges Bank rather than chance becoming entangled in gill netting, domestic vessels stayed clear of their favorite fishing grounds.
[Figure 5 (map) Home ports of Soviet fishing vessels operating in the northwest Atlantic.]
Over the next several years, constant fishing pressure was applied on different species in the Northwest Atlantic by these fleets of Soviet vessels, moving from fishing ground to fishing ground under the highly centralized control of a fishing fleet captain (Figure 6).
[Figure 6 (map) Soviet fishing areas off Alaska.]
While Soviet expansion in the Northwest Atlantic has been dramatic, with nearly 500 different fishing vessels sighted in some years, other nations, too, have been entering fisheries in this area. In August 1969, 325 foreign vessels from ten nations were sighted off New England: 212 were from the Soviet Union, 40 from East Germany, 37 from Poland, 24 from the Federal Republic of Germany, six from Iceland, two from Norway, and one each from Romania, Bulgaria, Israel, and Spain.
Foreign fishing off the North American coast in the northwest Pacific began in 1930 when Japan sent a king crab expedition into the eastern Bering Sea. By the outset of World War II, an active king crab and groundfish fishery was being prosecuted. In 1952, Japanese fishing off Alaska resumed with the beginning of salmon fishing in the western Aleutians. In the following years, they resumed their prewar fisheries in the eastern Bering Sea. Japanese fishing areas now encompass practically all the coastal areas off Alaska and are found in increasing numbers off Washington, Oregon, and California.
The Japanese fleets off Alaska were joined in 1959 by fleets of the Soviet Union which began taking flounder and king crab in the eastern Bering Sea and whales along the Aleutian Islands. The Soviets accelerated activity in the 1960s, as did Japan, and now both fleets range throughout the 550,000 square miles of the continental shelf of Alaska (Figure 7). Over 100 Soviet vessels were fishing off Oregon and Washington in some months in 1966 and 1967; but, in 1968 and 1969, the largest count of different vessels during one month was just over 50. These were higher capacity vessels, however, so the amounts harvested probably did not drop correspondingly. By the mid-1960s, Soviet commercial ventures were carried out off the Santa Barbara channel in California. To date, however, no extremely large concentrations of Soviet vessels have fished off central and Southern California even though it is known that very large unused resources are in this area.
As yet, no heavy concentrations of foreign fishing vessels have been sighted in our coastal waters in the Gulf of Mexico. Much Soviet traffic, however, has been seen passing through the Florida Straits after Havana became a base for Soviet activity in the South Atlantic. Since Cuba is rapidly expanding her efforts in the shrimp fishery, among others, it seems highly probable that her vessels may soon be sighted near our shores in significant numbers in the Gulf of Mexico.
Although the extent of cooperation between foreign military and fishing fleets is not generally known, in some instances it is probably substantial. In comparison, the apparent lack of sustained interest by the U. S. Navy in the U. S. fishing fleet is puzzling.
During World War II, the Navy made good use of elements of the U. S. fishing fleet in a number of instances. Perhaps the most well-known was the employment of tuna vessels in the South Pacific, mostly as logistic vessels. Following the return of the tuna vessels to the fleet at the end of World War II, for some inexplicable reason, the Navy turned its back on U. S. fisheries, and only in recent months has some interest been revived. The offices of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research and Development, the Oceanographer of the Navy, and the Fleet Numerical Weather Central of the Naval Weather Service Command have shown the most vision in attempting to aid the development of U. S. fisheries. Through their interest, fishermen are receiving oceanographic and meteorological information in selected areas from Fleet Numerical Weather Central, through a cooperative program with the National Marine Fisheries Service; and the Navy in turn is receiving much needed environmental information to analyze in developing operational forecasts for naval fleet operating units. This cooperation, however, is limited, and may or may not survive the laissez faire attitude of the Navy toward the fishing fleet. Understandably, there is some reluctance on the part of fishermen to join their “fair weather” friend in any cooperative program after so many years of neglect. Any cooperative programs that are developed should be of a continuing nature, since, unquestionably, it does more harm than good to turn interest on and off at the whim of whoever may be at the helm today. Certainly, a strong merchant marine and an aggressive high seas fishing fleet could be increasingly important as the austere military budget forces the further reduction of operating naval units on the high seas.
Paradoxically, as the sea divides, so it also is now providing the United States with an unparalelled opportunity to draw nations together. We have the capability to provide the technology and leadership to assist in feeding the world’s hungry with protein from the seas. We can hardly ignore the moral responsibility to do so.
Though the last three or four years have seen phenomenal gains in total food production, the worldwide protein demand is severe and will continue so in the foreseeable future. In 1600, the world population was about 350 million; by 1800, this figure had doubled, and by 1900, it had again doubled and stood at about 1.5 billion. In only slightly over 60 years since then doubling has again occurred, and within the next 30 years, if this rate of increase continues, the world’s population will stand at over six billion. Stated another way, though it has taken all the vast time since the genesis of man to arrive at a population of around three billion today, it may take no more than 30 years to add the next three billion. Little possibility exists that either the birth or death rate in the next few decades will change the trend in population growth. One does not have to be omniscient to understand that an overwhelming problem confronts the world if it is to rise to the challenge of feeding its hungry.
Protein requirements are likewise going to more than double in the next 30 years. The present day shortage of animal protein is well seen, for example, in the dreaded disease, kwashiorkor, which is known throughout the world wherever a shortage of animal protein exists, although it is most prevalent in the tropics. Not only is the disease a fearful killer of the young, in adults, it also results in general lassitude, lowered resistance to infectious disease, and suboptimum mental attitudes. One can hardly expect some of the developing nations to form a viable democratic government if large numbers of its population are suffering from protein malnutrition.
Properly used, the sea can provide a substantial input to world protein requirements for some time to come. Unfortunately, we continuously see the dolorous situation where people suffer severely from lack of protein while they are in easy reach of unused protein off their shores.
Two efforts now underway in the United States should be expanded in attacking the world food problem through use of fishery resources. First, we must use our abundant scientific talent to expand our efforts in the management of world fishery resources. The specter of declining yields from the ocean could someday become a reality through mismanagement with a valuable source of world food thus being lost. To enhance our position as the leader in world fishery resource management is one reason why expansion of U. S. fisheries internationally is desirable. We will then be in a better position to exert our influence. Second, we should accelerate our efforts to develop fishery products acceptable to the world’s hungry and explore new approaches in the distribution of these products.
The largest unused protein potential is that represented at the bottom of the food chain, the herring-like fishes. These are used to a limited extent for direct human consumption, but costs of processing, storage and distribution place them out of reach to the low income consumer that needs them the most. These small fish are ideal, however, for production of fish protein concentrate now under production in several countries. There still remains the Herculean task of obtaining acceptance of this essentially odorless, tasteless fishmeal into a mix of the staple diet of those billions that need it, and also in its distribution. It remains to be seen if the blocks—social, economic, and religious—against the full use of food resources, restrictions prevalent in so many needy countries, can be overcome to allow the people therein to eat this new bread of life.
The winds of change are blowing strongly as fisheries of nations wax and wane. The consequences of rapid expansion of far-ranging foreign fleets throughout the world will be felt for years to come as nations react boldly, but sometimes blindly, seeking to protect their national interests. Clearly, many problems must be solved or the chaos that will inevitably ensue will be frightful. These solutions must be found soon, for just as time is no ally of our domestic fishermen, neither has it ever allayed the pangs of the hungry of the world.
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After graduating from the U. S. Naval Academy in 1947, Commander Johnson served in cruisers, destroyers, and amphibious forces, and taught at the Naval Academy Preparatory School. On returning to civilian life in 1954, he attended graduate school at the University of Michigan. Since 1956, he has served as an oceanographer with the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries (recently organized as the National Marine Fisheries Service, U. S. Department of Commerce). Duties have included research with the Bureau’s Great Lakes Fishery Investigations, head of the Tuna Forecasting Program at the Fishery Oceanography Center, La Jolla, California, and administrative duties in Washington, D.C., where he served on a number of interagency committees concerning fisheries, oceanography, and meteorology. He now heads an Environmental Forecasting Unit at Monterey, California in cooperation with the Navy’s Fleet Numerical Weather Central.
[1] A shrimp convention was signed by Cuba and the United States in 1958 but an active commission as a result of this convention is not in effect.