“Combat Readiness Training"
(See J. B. Kusewitt and W. A. Speer, pp. 45-49, March; pp. 96-97, July; and pp. 83-84, November 1970; and pp. 83-84, January 1971 PROCEEDINGS)
Lieutenant Colonel John B. Kusewitt, U.S. Army (Retired) and Commander William A. Speer, U. S. Navy (Retired)—These articles dealing with current programs, particularly those which are career-related, tend to strike an emotional chord. Such was apparently the case with our article, judging from the responses. Certain factual errors, however, appeared in some of these comments. The allegation that the study considered an aviator returning to sea duty only to a “. . . high-performance, evidently single-piloted aircraft . . ." is incorrect. The study included multi-engine and helicopter pilots, as well as jet pilots in direct proportion to their actual numbers in the Fleet (28% jet, 42 propeller, and 30 helicopter). Another statement, to the effect that the study was limited to officers in the grades of ensign through lieutenant commander, is also incorrect. The study population consisted of all U. S. Navy and U. S. Marine Corps pilots, and naval flight officers in the grades of ensign/second lieutenant through captain/colonel.
The study necessarily had some constraints on the scope of alternative combat readiness training (CRT) programs to be considered. Primary among these was that the basic career patterns (rotation, service periods, and the like) would remain unchanged. There are, of course, many other feasible alternatives which would involve change to the traditional professional career pattern. Lieutenant Commander Scott touched upon two of the myriad possibilities: a bonus and five years of continuous operational flying. These, and a number of other career alternatives were previously addressed by the Navy in the Bureau of Naval Personnel and Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air) Pilot Retention Study of 1966, rather than the subject CRT study.
The largest program value, that of retention in service, had to be obtained from a personal attitude survey. Regardless of the care which was taken in this survey, the possibility remains that the respondent may not actually react to a set of circumstances as he had indicated beforehand. It is interesting to note, however, that 5% of the respondents indicated a service retention value of CRT flying. Further, this group is significantly better able to compete in an alternate career, as evidenced by higher education and intelligence levels, than the population as a whole. It is not surprising that Commander White’s “personal verbal survey” of only 30 pilots did not yield a value, considering his survey’s small scope, lack of population balance, and the small percentage of respondents who would be expected to indicate positive service retention values from the Combat Readiness Training program.
The purpose of the Combat Readiness Training study was to accomplish an objective examination of the proficiency flying program and to make recommendations for improvement or abolishment of that program. The study was conducted in accordance with recognized investigative methods. To this end, the study gathered, analyzed, and reduced large quantities of actual Navy Department source data. The various samples, for example, consisted in the aggregate of over 26,000 subjects. The conclusions and recommendations emanated directly from the results of quantitative analyses of these data.
It is believed that the objective of the study, to substitute fact in an area where opinion had previously held sway, was accomplished.
Lieutenant Commander A. L. Tarver, Royal Navy—The authors and also the writers commenting on the article seem to have overlooked an aviator’s real motivation in their analysis.
Why does CRT exist? Officially, so as to enable an aviator in a non-flying post to remain reasonably current. In practice, it would seem that aircraft available for CRT are rarely representative of current operational types. This means a relatively lengthy re-indoctrination on an operational aircraft is required before a deskbound aviator can regain his rightful place in a squadron. What really motivates a desk-bound aviator towards his CRT? First, it is obviously, his love of flying. Secondly, it is the minimum hours requirement to qualify for flight pay. Surely it would be far cheaper to give flight pay to all qualified aircrew, regardless of the hours flown, than force them to maintain a somewhat dubious standard of proficiency, even though the process in itself may be rewarding.
“Gargantuan Tankers: Privileged or Burdened?”
(See E. F. Oliver, pp. 39-45, September 1970 PROCEEDINGS)
Chief Signalman Lawrence M. Moran, U. S. Navy (Retired)—General Prudential Rule, ". . . including the limitations of the craft involved.” Kick that around.
J. P. Lunde, Vice President, Engineering Services, Arabian American Oil Company, Saudia [sic] Arabia—Captain Oliver’s article was of interest to me because, although our company does not operate any tankers, we do operate a port here in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, which is well-known to most tanker operators.
In this connection, and although it does not in any way diminish Captain Oliver’s message, we should like to point out an omission in the paragraph on page 40 which said, “There are only 20 ports in the world . . . that can accommodate the gargantuan tankers’ extreme draft.” The author mentioned Mena al-Ahmadi and Kharg Island, both in the Persian Gulf. He did not, however, mention the port of Ras Tanura, also in the Gulf. It has a channel depth of 69 feet, and is visited routinely by some of the giant tankers mentioned in the Captain’s discussion.
“Battle: No Longer the Pay-off?”
(See S. T. Possony, pp. 32-37, August 1970; and p. 88, January 1971 PROCEEDINGS)
Lieutenant Eugene P. Sullivan, Supply Corps, U. S. Naval Reserve-R—It is difficult to read Doctor Possony’s comments on the nature of modern war without feeling profoundly pessimistic about the prospects for U. S. foreign policy in the decades ahead. For the type of war he describes, the guerrilla war, in which battle is no longer the decisive pay-off, seems to be precisely the type of war this country is least prepared to fight successfully. Unfortunately, the essence of this unpreparedness lies not so much in a lack of knowledge or technique on the part of the military, but rather in the fact that the American people, by and large, lack the patience and understanding which are essential for the successful prosecution of such a war.
Most Americans remain convinced that peace is the normal and natural condition of the world. Whenever war does disrupt that condition, however, they feel the war should be brought to a speedy and victorious conclusion, by bringing the maximum firepower to bear against the enemy in a pitched battle at the earliest possible time. Once complete victory has thus been achieved things can “return to normal.”
Thus, when Doctor Possony speaks of conducting war with “. . . a minimum of tactical contact and a maximum of military detachment . . . he cuts across the grain of the American national character and will be opposed by those contemptuous of so-called “half measures.” At the same time, of course, his words will have no appeal to those who are opposed to the waging of such wars by the United States under virtually any circumstances. Consequently, those waging this kind of war will find themselves caught in a crossfire between doves opposed to the fighting of the war at all, and hawks impatiently urging that we “either win or get out.” The result is likely to be disastrous for this country in the long run. The Communists, aware of this weakness in our body politic, will employ the weapon of guerrilla warfare more frequently throughout the world, confident that public opinion in this country will weaken the capacity of our government to respond effectively.
The only solution to this problem would seem to be the education of the American people in the realities of the modern world through such articles as that of Doctor Possony. Without such an education, we may eventually find ourselves in the melancholy position of having won more battles than any other defeated country in history.
Cover Painting—“Refueling at Sea”
(See cover, December 1970 PROCEEDINGS)
Captain D. E. Cummins, U. S. Navy—Let me be among the first to suggest that Mr. Brightwell must have painted from a print made from a reversed negative. As you must know, for many reasons, we do not refuel from the port bow of aircraft carriers in the U. S. Navy.
Commander W. V Hanson, U. S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—How long have the “small boys” been refueling from the port side of carriers?
EDITOR’S NOTE: For these and other readers who questioned the correctness of the scene depicted by Navy combat artist Walter Brightwell, of a destroyer refueling from the port side of a carrier; would you believe: the USS Lexington (CVA-16) refueling the USS Ingersoll (DD-562) and the USS Twining (DD-540), and the USS Kitty Hawk (CVA-64) refueling the USS McKean (DDR-748) and the USS Harry E. Hubbard (DD-748)—among others?
“The Minesweeping/Fishing Vessel”
(See H. A. Chatterton, pp. 121-125, June; and pp. 82-83, November 1970 PROCEEDINGS)
John Stebbins—Howard Chatterton provides a refreshingly candid and economical proposal to strengthen our mine forces that, traditionally, are the stepchildren of the Fleet, last in funding and planning priority. As former first lieutenant of the USS Ozark (MCS-2), I experienced the frustrations involved in converting a ship for mine warfare. Considerable time and expense was involved in her conversion from a vehicle landing ship. Although hailed as a needed instrument in our amphibious assault forces, she now is the victim of economy measures—mothballed four years after commissioning.
It was most impressive to see the ease with which present day mines are laid, compared with the immense effort involved in “sweeping” them. The need for ships capable and ready for sweeping has not diminished, whereas the money available for them is becoming even more limited.
The need for sweeping in home waters may escape some naval experts, but during both world wars, U. S. Atlantic ports were closed by submarine-laid mines. The Navy was forced to launch extensive minesweeping operations with small, unsuitable craft. In World War II, Germany laid 338 mines along U. S. shores. Ten ships were sunk or damaged. At one time, 125 minesweepers were employed along the coast. Shipping was diverted or curtailed—New York’s port was closed for two days; Chesapeake Bay, Jacksonville, and Savannah were closed for three days each; Wilmington, eight days; and Charleston 11 days. There is no reason to believe that mining of our coastal waters could not happen again, nor that our response would be any more effective given the present inadequacy of our mine forces.
At this time, there is a trend toward increasing the use and productivity of the seas. The prospect of employing additional, more-efficient fishing vessels, while providing a ready reserve of minesweepers, is most attractive. As Admiral William Fechteler, U. S. Navy, said: “When you need the ships, it’s too late to build them.”
“Naval Air Training: A Change Is Needed”
(See D. R. Wright, pp. 115-117, February, and p. 84, November 1970; p. 83, January; and p. 89, February 1971 PROCEEDINGS)
Lieutenant Commander Gregory S. Wren, U. S. Navy—The situation described by Lieutenant Wright may be irreverently called by some “the breaks of naval air.” Duty assignments for an aviator (the type of aircraft he flies) become primary retention incentives during his early career. Presently, at the completion of primary training, the student pilot lacks the experience for a considered decision on the “pipeline” of his choice (and he may not get it, as the author describes).
The postponing of the “fork” in the “pipeline” to the completion of basic training would provide some additional basis for student preference—having just completed carrier qualifications, probably 95% would want tailhook squadrons—and would provide the enlarged “data base” to enhance the accuracy of the assignment process. This is not to suggest that all the lower students be assigned to a particular type of duty.
“Sea Lords”
(See R. L. Schreadley, pp. 22-31, August 1970; p. 83 January; and p. 89 February 1971 PROCEEDINGS)
Lieutenant S. A. Mohsberg, III, U. S. Navy, Former Chief Staff Officer, River Assault Division 131—Commander Schreadley’s article unfortunately gives the impression that in the absence of ground troops, river assault craft cannot be gainfully employed. Such is not the case. On 25 August 1969, the Second Brigade of the U. S. Army’s Ninth Infantry Division redeployed from Vietnam and the Joint Army-Navy Mobile Riverine Force dissolved. The naval component, the River Assault Force (TF-117) (with approximately half of its one-time afloat assets remaining) was renamed the Riverine Strike Group and assumed the Sea Lords designator TG-194.7. With some exceptions, riverine assault operations on the scale and in the manner formerly executed by the Mobile Riverine Force ceased.
With the Sea Lords emphasis on interdiction, the question naturally arose as to the adaptability of river assault craft to the waterborne guardpost concept so successfully employed by the PBRs. The high speed of a PBR enables her to expend her ordnance and quickly extricate herself from situations in which the enemy has momentarily achieved local superiority. The relatively lumbering pace of river assault craft forbids this tactic. Their survival would necessarily depend upon their ability to absorb enemy punishment and to reply in greater measure.
The experience of River Assault Squadron 15 in nightly employment on operations Barrier Reef and Giant Slingshot, quickly proved that the heavier armament and armor of the river assault craft more than compensated for the reduced speed. In April 1970, soon after an armored troop carrier of River Assault Division 51 had established a waterborne guardpost on the Grand Canal, one of these craft received nine direct, almost simultaneous hits from enemy rockets. Although every member of the American-Vietnamese crew was wounded, the craft’s structural damage was slight. She immediately got underway and replied to the source of the enemy fire. Such concentrated firepower would likely have obliterated a less firmly constructed craft.
In Vietnam, where the change of seasons is marked by drastic variations in water level, the additional height of eye provided by the larger river assault craft, often means the difference between having the field of vision obscured by the river bank and being able to use one’s night observation device to its full potential.
When augmented by ground troops, the employment possibilities of river assault craft naturally multiply, but even without this asset, the four types of river assault craft—armored troop carriers, assault support patrol boats, monitors, and command and communications boats—still provide a versatile, hard-hitting, riverine weapon whose use is limited only by one’s imagination.
“The Low Cost of Freedom”
(See V. H. Krulak, pp. 68-72, July; and p. 82, December 1970; and p. 88, January 1971 PROCEEDINGS)
Captain L. N. Smith, U. S. Navy (Retired)—The General asked the searching question that he answered himself. “What is wrong with the United States of America?” His answer: “It has to do with that region of our body down around the midsection—we are suffering a shortage of that four letter commodity called [‘]guts.[’] There is a passive unwillingness on the part of the vast bulk of our people to stand up and be counted; to fight what is wrong.”
This shotgun blast at the American people, it seems to me, could well be aimed at a much smaller target, a small part of our people—our military leaders. Why do not our top military leaders stand up publicly to be counted concerning dictates of our civilian leaders that are unsound and in some cases are plain foolish? I believe, as we all should, that our military should be subject to our civilian leadership, but this does not mean that the military follows the orders of our civilian leaders without question. Was not that what the Nuremberg trials were all about?
If our military leaders throw off the “politician’s muzzle” and publicly tell the story from a military viewpoint, we may never again see the American public trying to swallow a “war of attrition” concept, where we trade one American life for a certain number of enemy lives and pass it off as victory. We may see the end of “decisions by referral,” where military commanders at every turn say to their superiors, “With your permission I intend to do so and so,” Then they sit on their hands until this referral goes up the line, step, by step, to the White House and then back the same route. We may see the revival of a military leader who carries out his orders as best he can and lets the results speak for themselves. And, we may get rid of the type of military leadership that spawned a Pueblo incident.
For our military leaders to stand up and be counted will take a certain amount of guts—Billy Mitchell type. I wonder who will be first, if anyone?
“A Wetter, Better NROTC”
(See J. W. Corey, Jr., pp. 64-67, June 1970; and pp. 82-83, February 1971 PROCEEDINGS)
Lieutenant David G. Parent, U. S. Naval Reserve-R—The following proposals are offered:
Length of cruises: The cruise period must be lengthened to 12 weeks, if the program is going to be attractive financially to potential midshipmen. There are fewer summer work opportunities for college students. Even in periods of full employment, there are not likely to be many summer jobs in which a student would be allowed to leave for a six-week period. A 12-week cruise would solve the summer employment program. While recognizing that midshipman pay is not as high as civilian pay, the addition of free room, board, and uniforms would make the cruise financially attractive. Thus, the longer cruise would solve many of a midshipman’s financial problems.
Longer cruises would be more costly, however. On the other hand, the longer cruises would give the midshipman more opportunity to improve his seamanship skills. As a newly-commissioned officer, he would be able to qualify as an officer of the deck.
Cruise ports: It cannot be denied that the prospect of a cruise to selected northern European ports would have great appeal to a prospective midshipman. Unfortunately, as Lieutenant Commander Corey noted, such a cruise would have a lesser appeal to ship’s crew, who already have spent too much time away from their homeport. However, a training squadron, composed of East Coast ships, could participate in a cruise originating in Chicago, passing through the St. Lawrence Seaway, then down the East Coast with stops at major seaports, around the Florida peninsula, across the Gulf of Mexico, up the Mississippi, and end at New Orleans. Similar cruises could be organized for West Coast ships. The result would be that both ship’s crew and midshipmen would be near home at least part of the time. Moreover, ships on this type of cruise could embark Naval Reservists for active duty for training periods. This would allow very liberal leave and liberty policies, while maintaining a full complement. Finally, while discussing ports of call, any port that one has not yet visited is a foreign port. If a midshipman were given the opportunity to alternate East and West Coast cruises, he would be able to see much of his country. He would see enough of the Mediterranean, northern Europe, and the Far East during his commissioned service.
As correctly mentioned in the article, there will be a need for qualified instructors to teach during the cruise. A possible source of instructors could be junior Naval Reserve officers recently released from active duty. Many of these officers are either graduate students, high school or college teachers. Certainly some of these would welcome an opportunity to go back to sea, increase their own proficiency, augment their incomes, and make a meaningful Reserve contribution to the Navy. Curriculum planning and development could be carried out during the academic year under the direction of the NROTC college staff, or possibly under a special component of the Naval Reserve Officer School system.
Lieutenant Commander Corey, recognizing that he might not have all the answers to the NROTC problem, has modestly proposed a pilot program in which his ideas could be tested. I hope that such a unit can be established, perhaps under his direction, in which new ideas can be given a fair trial. I believe that he has already pointed the way to a “wetter, better, NROTC.”