“Sea power in the broad sense, includes not only the military strength afloat that rules the sea or any part of it by force of arms, but also the peaceful commerce and shipping from which alone a military fleet naturally and healthfully springs, and on which it securely rests.’’
Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, U. S. Navy
Seapower once involved, fundamentally, only the surface of the seas. In the past few decades, however, aircraft operating over the seas and submarines operating just below the surface of the seas have increased the dimensions for the applications of seapower. Today, not only are we experiencing the revolutionary effects of radical changes in the sea transportation industry, but we are apparently also on the threshold of an even more profound change in the nature of seapower.
Ahead of us lies a decade of development of the underseas—a breaching of a new frontier of the earth. The movement into the depths of the oceans to exploit the wealth of deep-seabed resources and to use the potentials of the vast bodies of water covering the earth, is accelerating. The years ahead, the 1970s, should demonstrate clearly the value of seapower in the traditional sense, but, in the immediate future, we should see also the creation of a new and additional extension of seapower—underseas power.
Freedom of the seas (even for electronic intelligence ships or nuclear ballistic missile submarines) has created a somewhat different ocean environment than that which Mahan observed; one where merchant marine power is vastly different from naval power and cannot be exercised in the same way.
Admiral John McCain, Jr., the most persuasive advocate of seapower today, is acutely aware of its changing nature. He notes in The Expanding Scope of Sea Power, NavPers 15223, that four major developments since World War II required a re-evaluation of the scope and importance of seapower.
The first major development is political in nature, involving the rapid increase in number of new nations since World War II. Africa offers a striking example. On V-J day, ten nations held control of that vast land area. Today there are 39 independent nations on this awakening continent. For the most part, these new nations are underdeveloped economically, socially, and politically and are good targets for aggressive nations—either through subversion or by direct intervention—and the seas are the main avenue of approach to these countries.
The second major development is also political in nature. The United States now has more commitments, in more places, with more nations, involving more people than any nation in history has ever had to meet. The United States is committed to the defense of some 60 nations, either by treaty or by other agreement. And the great majority of these nations border on the oceans of the world. The United States has moved irreversibly away from isolationism. Today and in the future, events halfway around the globe will profoundly affect our own national life. Most significant in this trend away from isolationism is the tremendous amount of U. S. big business involvement overseas and the rapid growth of U. S. sea-trade to over 400 million tons annually.
The third major development, technical in nature, represents one of the most profound changes in military strategy in the history of warfare. Seapower is no longer confined to the vast, trackless wastes of the oceans, but now represents an additional element of military power which can strike inland at land targets anywhere on the earth’s surface. This fact means that all previous strategies dealing with seapower must be revised drastically to include this new inland-reach of naval striking power, in any consideration of land hostilities. This new naval strike-power is three-fold in nature consisting of long-range ballistic missiles, jet-powered aircraft, and helo-lifted marine forces.
The fourth major development is nuclear power. The destructive power of the nuclear warhead has added a new dimension to the power which can be exerted at and from the area of the sea. And with this added destructive power from sea-based naval units, the big wars are increasingly deterred by seapower. On the positive side, nuclear power also means a new dimension of' endurance for naval ships, freeing them from the limitations of logistics. Politically, nuclear power changes the need for well-spaced refueling facilities worldwide, giving seapower a total oceanwide effectiveness. Additionally, the nuclear-powered submarine has demonstrated that strategists of naval warfare must now add the Arctic to their thinking and planning.
A fifth development, though in its infancy, should be added. This development, as illuminated by Albert Wohlstetter, in his January 1967 Foreign Affairs article, “Illusions of Distance,” stems from the use of satellites for extremely long-range communications, the use of large, fast aircraft for the rapid movement of people, and the use of increasingly larger ships for the transporting of liquids and bulk materials, thus decreasing communication and transport costs significantly. With the use of satellites, distance becomes relatively unimportant in the sending of messages to far-off and isolated locations. Jet aircraft now move people across the oceans in a matter of hours. And the introduction of tremendous ships to ocean trade, (Japanese construction of 500,000-ton tankers is planned for the 1970s) provides such a drastic reduction in the long-haul costs of bulky, primary commodities as to cause new economic groupings of nations to emerge. A new type of “regionalism” or economic grouping of countries because of low-cost sea transportation is thus developing, and seapower is the dominant factor creating this regionalism.
Today, seapower represents: new dimensions of destructive power; increasingly cheaper long-haul transportation of bulk commodities; unfettered world trade across the seas; significant extensions of naval power from the seas into the land masses of continents; extensive worldwide commitments and alliances with maritime nations, as well as a control of the seas in specific areas where dominant force can actually be brought to bear at any given moment. This latter attribute of seapower stems from the great degree of power which the air forces and submarines of many of the nations of the world could apply to a limited locale of the oceans to gain temporary control of that sea area. (Even with the Seventh Fleet deployed in the Far East, Red Chinese air power, through concentration of forces, might hold temporary control of the Taiwan Straits.)
Despite the changing dimensions of seapower, its importance in the Mahan sense should not be lost sight of. Today, 40 of the 50 largest cities in the United States have thriving port activities located either close to or with easy water-access to the sea. These port cities have developed on waterways that were sufficiently deep to allow great tonnages of commodities to be delivered to the doorsteps of thriving industries. For the first half of this century, these 40 locales could have been called deep-water ports. But for the last part of this century, only a few can provide sufficient depths off their piers (even with extensive dredging) to handle the super bulk-carriers of raw materials—so necessary to the cost- competitive production of basic industries. The importance of this new need for very deep-water ports can be illustrated by the Japanese success in producing steel at lower cost than U. S. steel industries. With Japanese steel mills newly located adjacent to pier areas for the off-loading of ore ships (drawing up to 57 feet), the savings in transportation costs are sufficient to provide a major cost difference in offsetting the efficient U. S. steel-production operations. (The cost of loading ore into freight cars and the additional freight costs in trans-shipping by rail, although less than one cent per ton-mile, creates a significantly greater cost.)
In bringing the definition of seapower up to date, former Secretary of the Navy, Paul Ignatius, has said:
To many, the term Sea Power defines the act of controlling the world’s sea lanes through the employment of combatant ships. In reality, Sea Power has a broader definition. It encompasses the Merchant Marine, oceanography, ocean engineering, marine research and technology as well as naval power.
The Soviets appear to have recognized the new dimension of seapower inherent to an understanding and use of the underseas areas of the world. In “Report on the Soviets and the Seas,” a report of a Congressional Delegation to Poland and the Soviet Union, 4 August 1966, the Congressmen who participated said:
Since World War II the Russians have realized that knowledge of the oceans’ secrets would be mandatory if the Red goal of world naval, economic and maritime superiority was to be achieved . . . Highly directed Soviet planning in oceanography is one of the reasons for their present progress. It was our impression that these are their major goals:
Rapid and efficient conversion of the results of basic oceanographic research into economic development.
World respect for Soviet scientific achievements.
Gaining leverage with the international scientific community and making use of the accomplishments of foreign oceanography.
International political leverage as a result of assisting nations to establish their own oceanographic programs.
The Congressmen noted that the Soviets have over 200 oceanographic and hydrographic vessels at work and about 9,000 oceanographers and technicians as compared to our 3,000. Their edge in fisheries is just as significant, a catch of 5.6 million tons of fish in 1965, to 2.3 million for U. S. fishermen. And the Soviets planned a 50 per cent expansion of their catch by 1970. But more than the differential in catch is the oceanographic use of much of this fleet. Additionally, the Soviets are building a merchant marine with a target of 20 million deadweight tons by 1980, which is double the present declining U. S. tonnage.
To this listing of areas of Soviet emphasis to gain primacy as a seapower should be added their recognition of the growing value of underseas naval power. Their more than 350 operational submarines and a nuclear submarine building program which is considerably in excess of that of the United States indicates a belief that the “military strength” which is required of a great seapower is best exerted by underseas systems.
Whether the definition of seapower by a former Secretary of the Navy or by the Soviets (as interpreted by our Congressmen) suffices for a use of the term, applicable to the 1970s, should be examined in light of both the expected values of seapower in the world environment of the Seventies as well as the expected oceanographic and technological developments in the province of the oceans and particularly the underseas.
The values of seapower in the 1970s will, for the most part, be the same as those of today. Thus, in its all-inclusive aspects, seapower should:
- Provide a general reputation for power which would give a nation considerable leverage in international affairs.
- Seapower in the Seventies
- Comprise extensive worldwide sea trade, of great importance to the national economy.
- Provide a continuing bond between maritime nations which both ensures mutual protection of their sea trade and through military alliances guarantees a continuing free use of the oceans.
- Guarantee adequate logistics in time of war for support of the economy and military forces.
- Deter general nuclear war by assuring massive destruction from the oceans. (This value accrues to nuclear powers who use the sea for the deployment of deterrent weapons systems.)
- Provide a capability to muster sufficient sustained power in an area of the oceans remote from own land-based air power to pose effective control of that area.
- Represent technological leadership in the development of the potentials of the oceans, with its many benefits, commercially, politically and militarily.
- Comprise a technological base which permits buildup and reinforcement of sea forces, if necessary.
- Provide a capability to act independently at sea for political and economic national interest. (The capability for unilateral action not only increases military options but also increases the ease and credibility of political maneuvering.)
- Create prestige in the international scientific community by being authoritative on ocean matters.
In relating these values of seapower to U. S. self-interest and national well-being, it should be noted that an expanded, efficient U. S. flag merchant marine will be necessary to provide for support of military operations in order to retain the flexibility of unilateral action. (The success of the naval quarantine of Cuba as a unilateral application of military pressure must be recognized in contrast to the uncertain, slow, and tenuous processes in the past which have been involved in obtaining consensus for military action from our maritime allies.) Without a strong flag merchant marine a number of unilateral military options are lost. Additionally, being pre-eminent in technological knowledge for exploiting of the oceans should produce new areas for the worldwide expansion of U. S. business. This leadership in ocean exploration may prove of foremost value in the future development of U. S. seapower as related to our national economy. Similarly, pre-eminence in oceanographic matters will cause the United States to retain its image as a leader in the scientific world, as well as to reap the practical benefits from fall-outs which are only too often unpredictable ahead of time. The international image is important, not only to the foreign buyers of U. S. products, but to U. S. international relations, where alignments may to some degree depend upon a belief in the future strength of the United States.
Since the Soviets, with their emphasis on undersea power, offer the major challenge to U. S. seapower primacy in the 1970s, the possible uses of seapower to further their own interests should be recognized. In a speech, Admiral McCain identified a specific Russian interest in the oceans for providing a new means of solving the food problems of a growing and hungry world population. His words put focus on this one aspect of seapower:
Russia is quick to realize what the Western world is equally quick to forget, namely, the increasing importance of the oceans to the entire human race.
L. W. Martin, in The Sea in Modern Strategy, focuses on the probable use of Soviet military strength at sea. His estimate of the Soviet’s sea strategy differs from that being used by either U. S. or other NATO military planners, and appears more reasonable—particularly in view of Soviet development of a considerable overseas tender-based capability for their submarine forces. Martin sees a use of Soviet naval forces “for limited assaults on communications that might attempt to single out particular powers within a loosening framework of alliances.” Such limited assault would be in the context of hostilities restricted to limited parts of the oceans, with naval forces enjoying sanctuary outside a defined combat area. Hence, the factor of present base limitation would weigh less. In this context, “provision for distant replenishment would be desirable and in many cases essential.”
But the usefulness of Russian seapower, Martin feels, need not be limited to conflict:
The value extracted from nonbelligerent deployments of naval and amphibious power by Western nations, gives rise to speculation as to whether Russian ventures of this kind may be anticipated . . . . Russian help in a new state’s need for intervention could be attractive . . . .
In such affairs to be first is a great advantage . . . . Some form of peacekeeping action, so called, may well prove to be the way in which Soviet maritime power at last moves on to the political offensive. Well calculated, such a move would present the Western alliance with difficult and divisive problems.
What Martin describes, a strategy where the Soviets could separate the United States from its allies, is a somewhat different type of threat to U. S. seapower than is generally discussed.
It is not difficult to visualize the Soviets using their naval power to intervene in the revolution of an African state while the United States was attempting “to keep the peace.” Military pressures against U. S. shipping only could be applied on a low key in areas of the oceans remote from U. S. bases. Such pressures would probably skyrocket insurance costs for U. S. shipping, as well as the cost of carrying U. S. goods in foreign ships. This type of military action would have, primarily, economic and political overtones and would be more in consonance with the Soviet’s accelerated expansion of its own merchant fleets.
The military implications of this rival seapower of the 1970s are certainly different than in the past few decades.
The technological and oceanographic developments in the arena of the ocean which affect the nature of seapower in the 1970s appear to be predictable from the present trends in surface transportation technology, deep-ocean technology, and the ongoing research which is designed to increase knowledge of the oceans themselves.
The development of massive bulk-carrying ships, as noted earlier, will have a profound effect on the nature of seapower in the next decade. To the previous comments might be added: sea trade becomes more worldwide; business becomes increasingly international in scope; sea trade becomes more vulnerable to interdiction in time of war; and geographical bottlenecks in sea trade decrease in importance. Suez, for example, even before the closure of the canal, noted a decrease in the use of the canal by tankers owing to the increasing use of the supertankers in the movement of oil around the Cape of Good Hope.
The projection of man’s capability to work as a free swimmer, down to depths of 1,500 to 2,000 feet, within the next decade will open up industries aimed at exploiting the seabed to at least these depths. With the technological developments which will be sparked by the promise of profitable industrial operations at such depths will come a host of capabilities for utilizing the sea-bed and water column to this limit. Dr. William A. Nierenberg of Scripps Institution of Oceanography notes that, with the proliferation of underseas installations, military posts on the bottom will follow, to be used as a source for intelligence on the movement of hostile submarines. He also notes that control of the depths of the oceans—a three-dimensional form of control—will have to be seriously considered as an extension of the limited aspect of control of the surface of the seas, as in the past. “The possibility of exploiting the ocean basins for material purposes have added possession of the oceans as an objective, even if in a limited sense of the word. The drive toward possession, and its accompanying technology, will return naval warfare to its earliest origin, which was that of economic domination by the country that had most succeeded.”
Man’s increasing capability to move about freely under water will have a great impact on amphibious operations—an important extension of naval power. A lock-out technology from submerged vehicles will be translated into an extensive capability for launching large numbers of assault troops from bottomed submarines. The Grayback, a fairly modern conventional submarine, still retaining the two bow tanks which housed Regulus missiles, can lock-out simultaneously several dozen troops, mounted on underwater sleds and equipped with infantry weapons. This is only the start of a new concept for powerful attack forces launched from underseas against defending forces in virtually any coastal area.
The movement of vehicles close to the bottom, or on the bottom itself, will translate into a capability for military vehicles to operate close to the bottom and thus enhance their security by minimizing the dangers of detection and destruction. (Aircraft in daily operations over Vietnam have minimized their detectability while approaching land targets by flying low and thus using the irregularities of the terrain to shield their movement from radar detecting devices). What this new capability to hug the bottom might mean, in view of the trend toward the use of new hull materials, such as glass or ceramics and the consequent rapid extension of submerged operations of vehicles to about 20,000-foot depths, is difficult to predict. And the new types of antisubmarine vehicles which must necessarily be developed are even more difficult to visualize. But the chief trend in military submarine technology should be toward operation at very great depths, and the hunter-killer submarine may have to be prepared to go to any depths to meet her objective.
Floating platforms, which can provide offshore ports as well as airfields outside of territorial waters, are in the offing. With their appearance, in a world political environment which continues to recognize a freedom of the high seas, the nature of seapower becomes more autonomous—less dependent upon a worldwide network of land bases. The political influence of seapower is thereby strengthened and the flexibility in the use of seapower is heightened. This development alone may provide the most significant increase in the influence of seapower, to be seen in the 1970s.
New types of sea-based nuclear deterrent systems should emerge, as the requirement for security, second- strike capability, assured destruction of enemy targets and survivability of such systems are increasingly hazarded by technological developments.
In fact, what is most easily predictable is that a whole new family of military weapons systems will grow out of man’s mastery of the deep oceans, and their natures are extremely difficult to even guess at. Looking back to the 1930s, only a handful of visionaries foresaw the aircraft systems used in World War II (only a decade later)—and even fewer could sense the revolutionary role to be played by the jet engine.
Just as sea trade on the surface of the oceans has for the past thousands of years been a prime factor in a nation’s peacetime and wartime viability, the next decade should begin to demonstrate the importance accruing to the exploitation of the underseas and sea bottoms. The vehicles and industries developed, and the skills acquired in the process will create a new dimension of seapower in the Mahan sense.
Maritime powers have dominated the past. Those who will master and use the ocean environment through its entirety may similarly control their destiny.